Republic of the
Supreme Court
THE PEOPLE
OF THE
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G.R. No. 177747
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION, ABAD, and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: February 16, 2010 |
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D E C I S
I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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We
resolve in this Decision the appeal from the
THE CASE
The
prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape under
an amended Information[3]
that reads:
That on or about the 27th day of November 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant [AAA],[4] a minor 13 years of age, while the latter was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, in the following manner, to wit: having been made to drink milk with sleeping substance, as a result of which the undersigned was reduced into a state of unconsciousness and deprived of her willpower, accused Ignacio Poras y Benedicto had sexual intercourse with the undersigned, against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [underscoring in the original]
The
appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the amended charge.[5]
The prosecution presented the following witnesses in the trial on the merits
that followed: AAA; Dr. Rosaline Cosidon (Dr.
Cosidon); and BBB. The appellant solely testified in his own defense.
AAA
first took the witness stand for the prosecution on
AAA
testified that she lives in Barangay Pingkian,
Pasong Tamo, Quezon City with the appellant and CCC, her godmother’s daughter.
She was 13 years old at the time of the incident complained of.[6] AAA recalled that on the night of
AAA further testified that she slept
at the sala of the house with CCC, while the appellant slept alone in his room.
She recalled that CCC was no longer beside her when she woke up, but was lying
outside of the mat where they slept. According to her, it was not the
appellant’s usual practice to prepare coffee for her.[9]
She did not reveal the incident to her brother DDD when the latter came home
because she was afraid that he (DDD) would side with the appellant. She instead
disclosed the incident to her school friend, “Jennifer.” Jennifer
accompanied AAA to her (AAA’s) aunt, BBB, who, in turn, reported the matter to
the Sangandaan Police Station.[10]
The police took her testimony and referred her to
AAA further narrated that she had
known the appellant since she was six (6) years old and resented him because he
was a “manyakis.”[12] According to AAA, the appellant often pressed
his penis against her buttocks when she was younger.[13]
On cross examination, AAA declared
that she had been living with the appellant and her siblings ever since her
mother died on
AAA reiterated that CCC was no longer
on the mattress where they slept when she (AAA) woke up. She further stated
that their residence – a rented house - measures 4 ˝ x 6 meters. The house has
a sala that is approximately 3 ˝ square meters wide,[18]
and a room that measures 2 ˝ x 1 square meters. This room has no door, but has
a wooden bed inside. The sala and the room are separated by a wooden partition.[19]
Dr.
Cosidon, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Medico-Legal Report No. M-1736-94
x x x x
GENITAL:
There is a moderate growth of pubic
hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the light brown labia
minora presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed an elastic,
fleshy-type hymen with deep-healed lacerations at 3 and
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically. There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococcic and for spermatozoa.[21]
Dr.
Cosidon stated that the lacerations could have been caused by a hard object
such as a finger or a fully erect penis.[22]
BBB, testified
that the appellant was the live-in partner of her sister. BBB recalled that on
The
defense presented a different version of events.
The
appellant testified that he knew AAA because the latter’s mother, FFF, was his
common-law wife. Prior to FFF’s death in
February 1994, the appellant lived with FFF and her five (5) children in a
rented house in a squatter’s area in Barangay
Pingkian. This house has a small room made of plywood, with a wooden bed
inside.[25]
The
appellant further stated that he looked for a job after the death of FFF and
stayed at a friend’s house on
The
appellant recalled that he was in
On
cross examination, the appellant stated that Larry’s house was about an hour
away from his (appellant’s) former house in Pingkian. FFF’s children visited
him at work in May 1994, but he did not give them any money as they were
already of age. According to him, he did not marry FFF because the latter’s
former marriage was still subsisting.[30]
The
RTC also ordered the re-taking of the appellant’s testimony because the court
stenographer who attended the proceedings went AWOL and failed to submit the
transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings. The appellant essentially
reiterated his previous court testimonies.
The
RTC convicted the appellant of rape in its decision of
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
finding the accused Ignacio Poras GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and ordered to
pay private complainant AAA a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.
Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, let the period of his detention be credited in the service of his sentence.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[31]
The
records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal.
Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[32]
we endorsed the case and its records to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.
The
CA, in its decision dated
The
CA further observed that minor inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony strengthened
her credibility because they eliminated the chance of a rehearsed testimony. The appellate court also noted that the
victim’s delay in reporting the rape was not an indication of a fabricated
charge; victims of harrowing experiences would rather bear their ignominy and
pain in private rather than reveal their shame to the world.
Finally,
the CA stated that the appellant’s uncorroborated alibi and denial cannot prevail over the victim’s positive
testimony. It ruled that the appellant failed to show that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
In
his brief,[33] the
appellant argued that the RTC erred in convicting him of the crime charged
despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to the appellant, AAA gave different versions of the incident, but
never testified that there was any penetration of her private parts. AAA only
concluded that she had been raped when she learned of the result of the medical
examination and because she felt weak when she woke up.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find
that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape. We convict him instead of the
lesser of
acts of lasciviousness, included in rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence
of all the elements of this crime.
Circumstantial
Evidence Insufficient
To
Establish Carnal Knowledge
The review of a criminal case opens
up the case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both
the prosecution and the defense is weighed, thus, avoiding general conclusions
based on isolated pieces of evidence.
In a charge of rape, the review begins with the
reality that rape is a very serious accusation that is painful to make. At the same time, it is a charge that is not
hard to lay against another by one with malice in her mind. Because of the
private nature of the crime that justifies the acceptance of the lone testimony
of a credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the accused, although
innocent, to disprove his guilt. These
realities compel us to approach the appeal with great caution, and to
scrutinize the statements of the victim on whose sole testimony conviction or
acquittal depends.[34]
By definition, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use
of force or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented.
Although full penetration is not required to sustain a conviction of rape, there must at least be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
entrance of the male organ within the labia
of the pudendum of the female organ.
In this case, no direct evidence
exists showing the required penetration; AAA could not have seen the appellant
insert his penis into her vagina because she was unconscious. However, direct
evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only basis from which courts
may draw their findings and conclusions. Where the victim could not testify on
the actual penetration that the crime of rape requires because she had been
rendered unconscious at the time of the crime, Rule 133, Section 4, of the
Revised Rules on Evidence allows the courts to rule on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, thus:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
There is more than one circumstance;
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
A related rule is that the totality
or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proved leads to no other logical
conclusion than the guilt of the appellant.[35]
In the present case, the
lower courts convicted the appellant of rape based on the following
circumstances: (a) the appellant made AAA drink coffee which made her fall
asleep; (b) AAA saw the appellant lying beside her, moving on top of her, and
touching her private parts when she woke
up; (c) AAA’s panty had been lowered to her knees, and the strap of her bra
had been removed; (d) the appellant put on his briefs and shorts after AAA
pushed her; (e) AAA felt pain in her private parts, and saw blood stains on her
panty; (f) the appellant threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident
to anyone; and (g) the examining physician found deep-healed lacerations in
AAA’s vagina.
The test to determine whether or not
the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to
convict the accused requires that the duly proven series of circumstances must
be consistent with each other, and that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.[36]
In other words, the circumstantial evidence must do more than
just raise the mere possibility or even the probability of guilt. It must engender moral certainty.
In the present case, we can only
conclude, after due consideration of the evidence adduced, that the circumstantial
evidence failed to clearly establish an unbroken chain
leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the appellant raped AAA.
First, the result of the medical examination did not in any way
support AAA’s claim that the appellant had sex with her. Dr. Cosidon testified
that the deep-healed lacerations on the victim’s hymen could have also been
caused by a finger, and that these
lacerations could have been present even
before
ATTY. IGNACIO BANDAL, JR.:
Q: Dr., will
you please, you said seven (7) days or more on deep healed lacerations you
mentioned. [sic] Could it be possible
that this [sic] lacerations at 3 and
DR. COSIDON:
A: It could be possible.
Q: Now, could
it be possible that this deep laceration that your finding the 3 and
A: Could be possible.
x x x x [emphasis
ours][37]
In addition, we cannot
equate a ruptured hymen with rape. In People
v. Domantay,[38] we had occasion to expound on the
evidentiary value of a finding of hymenal lacerations, as follows:
[A]
medical certificate or the testimony of the physician is presented not to prove
that the victim was raped but to show that the latter had lost her virginity.
Consequently, standing alone, a physician’s finding that the hymen of the
alleged victim was lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other
evidence proving carnal knowledge that rape may be deemed to have been
established.
Thus, while the healed
lacerations are undisputed, they can only prove, in the absence of any other
evidence, that AAA has had prior sexual experience. Specific proof of penile contact, on or about
the time the appellant allegedly raped her, is missing.
Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that the appellant succeeded in inserting
his fingers in AAA’s vagina, this act still would not suffice to convict the
appellant of rape. In 1994, the insertion of one or more fingers into a woman’s
vagina without her consent did not constitute rape. It was only in 1997 that the law on rape was
expanded to include this act.[39]
Second, we find
it highly unlikely that the appellant inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina
while the latter’s panty was lowered to her knees. Common sense and ordinary
human experience show that penile penetration is extremely difficult, if not
almost impossible under this situation, unless the victim’s legs were spread
apart. If the appellant’s intention had been to consummate sexual coitus with
AAA, he would have completely removed her (AAA’s) underwear, given that he had
the opportunity as she was then asleep.
Third, considering that AAA was an unmarried 13-year old, she
would have been in unusually deep sleep in order not to feel the pain and
sensation reasonably expected
from the insertion of a penis into her young, vaginal canal. We are baffled how could she have slept
through a consummated sexual intercourse and awakened only after its completion.
While AAA alleged that she had been drugged, this state – by itself and in the
absence of any other evidence – only gives rise to the possibility of a
consummated act of rape; the conviction in a rape case though must rest on
evidence, not on mere possibility.[40]
Fourth, we
cannot equate AAA’s testimony of pain in her private parts with rape. Carnal knowledge, not pain, is the element of
consummated rape and we believe that it would be a dangerous proposition to
equate a victim’s testimony of pain, in the absence of any other evidence, with
carnal knowledge. The peril lies in the
facility of asserting pain. Pain, too, can come from various reasons other than
carnal knowledge; it is also subjective and is easy to feign.[41]
Fifth, the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses did not
establish with moral certainty that the appellant raped AAA. BBB’s testimony that AAA admitted to her
that she had been raped by the appellant is clearly hearsay and is inadmissible
for the purpose of showing that the appellant raped AAA. The prosecution
likewise failed to explain why BBB only reported the incident to the police on
Likewise strangely missing, in our
view, was any corroborative statement from CCC who, from AAA’s testimony, was
sleeping beside her on the night of the alleged rape. According to AAA, CCC was still beside her,
but was no longer on the mattress they shared, when she (AAA) woke up and found
the appellant lying beside her. The
implication from AAA's testimony is that CCC slept through the whole incident
of rape. We find this unusual if indeed
AAA had been drugged into sleep and if the appellant had taken his time in
ravishing her during her asleep. If
indeed the appellant had ample time for the rape and did it silently so that
CCC never awakened, it would have been unusual – as we already noted – for
AAA's panty to have been simply pulled down to her knees in a position that made
penile insertion extremely difficult. In
sum, AAA's testimony on the details of the alleged rape, and the fact of rape,
does not simply add up into a coherent whole.
Finally, we cannot help but observe that AAA, in her direct testimony,
revealed that she merely came to the conclusion that the appellant had raped
her after being told by the examining
physician that the result of the medical examination was “positive,” and
that something had happened to her. For clarity and precision, we directly
quote from the records:
FISCAL LORNA CHUA CHENG:
Q: Miss
witness, during your direct examination, you testified that you were allegedly
raped by your step-father Ignacio Poras, why
do you say that you were allegedly raped while you were asleep then?
[AAA]:
A: Because when I woke up, I
saw him beside me and because of the
result of the medical examination.
Q: Why, were
you able to talk to the doctor who examined you?
A: Yes, Ma’am.
Q: What did he [sic]
tell you, if any?
A: He [sic] told me it is positive.
Q: What do you
mean by positive?
A: That there was something that happened.
COURT:
Q: Something
happened to whom?
A: To me, sir.
x x x x[42]
[emphasis supplied]
AAA, to our mind, jumped from the
premise that the examination was “positive” into the conclusion that she
had been raped.[43] True,
she was unconscious and could not have seen whether there had been actual
penile contact. To conclude, however,
that the appellant had raped her because she saw him lying beside her when she
woke up, and because the examining physician later told her that something had
happened to her, is not sufficient; it does not prove, to the point of moral
certainty, that the appellant, to the exclusion of other possibilities, had
raped her.
For one, when Dr. Cosidon told AAA
that “it is positive,” and that something “had happened” to her,
the doctor could have simply been confirming what she wrote in her medico-legal
report, that she found the victim to be in a non-virgin state, with deep-healed
hymenal lacerations – a finding that did not necessarily mean that AAA had
been raped on the occasion that gave rise to the medical examination. As previously discussed, Dr. Cosidon did not
discount the possibility that the deep-healed lacerations could have been inflicted
before
We are not unmindful of decided cases where the victim was
unconscious and was not aware of the sexual intercourse that transpired, yet the
accused was found guilty on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
In People v. Sabardan,[45]
the victim felt dizzy and lost consciousness after the accused forced her to
drink beer. On waking up, she found herself completely naked and felt severe
pains in her vagina. The Court upheld
the culpability of the accused for rape.
In People v. Gaufo,[46]
the victim was hit on her head by the accused but she fought back and asked for
help. The accused then punched her abdomen causing her to lose
consciousness. Upon regaining her
bearings, she noticed that her underwear was missing, her vagina was bleeding
and her body was painful. The
combination of these circumstances, among others, led the Court to adjudge the
accused guilty of rape.
In People v. Perez,[47]
this Court ruled that the victim’s positive identification of the accused as
the person who came to her room and covered her nose and mouth with a foul
smelling handkerchief until she lost consciousness, the blood and white
substance found in her aching vagina, her torn shorts and her missing panty,
all led the Court to the conclusion that accused had raped her while she was
unconscious.
In all these cases, the totality of
the circumstances led to no other logical conclusion than the fact of rape and
its commission by the accused. Other
cases, however, are also on record where this Court did not hesitate to set
aside convictions in rape cases involving unconscious victims where the
circumstantial evidence was found insufficient to convict.
In People v. Sumarago,[48]
the victim testified that the accused boxed her, rendering her unconscious.
When she regained consciousness, she had a severe headache. However, she still had her clothes on. She suspected that the appellant had carnal
knowledge of her because her vagina was painful. The examining physician also
found incomplete lacerations on her private parts. In acquitting the accused,[49]
the Court explained:
There is no proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant’s penis entered the labia of the
pudendum of Norelyn. It is possible that
while [the victim] was unconscious, the appellant undressed her, removed her
panties and inserted his private organ into her vagina; and after satisfying
himself, put her clothes back on before she regained consciousness. But such possibility is not synonymous with
evidence. That the appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim cannot be
presumed simply because she felt pain in her vagina when she regained consciousness,
and that for over a period of time, the appellant warned her not to tell
anybody.
In
People v. Arcillas,[50]
the accused hit the victim with a wooden stick on the head rendering her
unconscious. When she woke up, she found herself covered in blood. The
laboratory examination showed that she was positive for sperm cells in her
private parts. In setting aside the accused’s conviction of rape with
frustrated homicide, this Court held that although the prosecution amply proved
that private complainant had been clubbed into unconsciousness by the accused,
the proffered evidence was inadequate to prove that she had been raped. The mere presence of spermatozoa in the vagina, according to the
Court, did not prove that the accused raped the private complainant since these
sperm cells could have been introduced by sexual contact earlier or later than
the alleged rape.
Similarly, in People
v. Daganta,[51]
the accused was acquitted of the charge of raping a minor. According to the prosecution, the accused
invited the supposed victim to his room and once inside, the accused started
kissing her on the cheek and then on her lips. He then sprayed an insect
repellant on her face, rendering her unconscious. When she woke up, she found the accused
sitting outside his room. The lower
portion of her umbilicus was painful; she felt pain in her private parts when
she urinated. The physical examination
of the alleged victim revealed that there was hymenal laceration at
Finally,
in People v. Masalihit,[52]
the victim saw the accused on top of her and wiping his private parts when she
woke up. Nonetheless, the Court
acquitted the accused because there was no evidence showing that the act of “wiping”
was preceded by an intercourse; the prosecution also failed to show that what
was wiped was semen.
In
rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present
its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the
only logical and inevitable conclusion. The
Constitution requires moral certainty or proof beyond reasonable doubt; a
conviction cannot be made to rest on possibilities.[53]
In the case before us, the pieces of
circumstantial evidence do not indubitably lead to the conclusion that appellant
is guilty of the crime charged. When two
antithetical interpretations may be inferred from the circumstantial evidence
presented, the situation calls for the application of the equipoise rule – i.e., when the
evidence is consistent with a finding of innocence and also compatible with a
finding of guilt, then the evidence is at equipoise and does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty sufficient to support a conviction.[54]
Lewd or Lascivious Design Proven
Notwithstanding the prosecution’s
failure to prove the appellant’s guilt for rape, the Court holds that
sufficient evidence exists to convict him of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. A charge of acts of
lasciviousness is necessarily included in a complaint for rape.[55]
The elements of acts of lasciviousness are:
(1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2)
that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or
intimidation, (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age;
and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.[56]
“Lewd”
is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, or lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality related
to moral impurity, or that which is carried on a wanton manner.[57]
AAA’s testimony during direct
examination showed how the appellant committed lewd conduct against her:
x x x x
Q: Miss
witness, you said when you woke up on
[AAA]:
A: He was touching me.
Q: What part of your body was he touching?
A: My
organ.
Q: What
was he using while touching you?
A: His
fingers.
Q: After that what happened?
A: When I was fully awakened he told me not
to tell anybody.
Q: And while
the accused was still touching your
private part, were you still having your panty on? [sic]
A: No more.[58]
[emphasis ours]
AAA likewise confirmed on cross examination that the
appellant fondled her breasts.
During the re-taking of her direct examination, AAA reiterated that the
appellant touched her private parts.
Undeniably, the evidence confirms
that appellant committed lewd acts against the victim when he touched her
private parts. An examination of AAA’s testimony shows that she did not consent
to the touching of her private parts. In fact, she immediately pushed the
appellant when she saw him lying beside her and touching her private parts when
she woke up. The appellant’s act of touching AAA’s
private parts demonstrated lewdness that
constituted acts of lasciviousness.
The imposable penalty for the crime
of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is prision
correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of arresto mayor which has a range of one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Absent any modifying circumstances
attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken
from the medium period of prision
correccional or two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Accordingly, the appellant is hereby
meted an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
In
addition, we award the amounts of P30,000.00 moral damages, P20,000.00
civil indemnity, and P2,000.00 exemplary damages to the victim in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[59]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the
The conviction for the crime of rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is VACATED,
and –
(1) we find appellant
Ignacio Poras GUILTY of the crime of
acts of lasciviousness penalized under Article 336 of the same Code;
(2) we SENTENCE the appellant to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum; and
(3) we ORDER him to PAY the victim the amounts of P30,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 as civil indemnity; and P2,000.00
as exemplary damages.
Costs against appellant
Ignacio Poras.
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
MARIANO C. Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, and concurred in by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, and Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam; rollo, pp. 3-33.
[2] Penned by Judge Rogelio M. Pizarro; CA rollo, pp. 25-29.
[3]
[4] The Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed.
[5] Records, pp. 48-49.
[6] TSN,
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] A colloquial corruption of the word “maniac,” referring to an oversexed individual.
[13] TSN,
[14] TSN,
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] TSN,
[20] TSN,
[21] Records, p. 155.
[22] TSN,
[23] TSN,
[24]
[25] TSN,
[26]
[27]
[28] TSN,
[29]
[30]
[31] CA rollo, p. 29.
[32] G.R. Nos. 147678-67,
[33] CA rollo, pp. 96-110.
[34] People
v. Fabito, G.R. No. 179933,
[35] See People
v. Moran, Jr., G.R. No. 170849,
[36] People v. Canlas, 423 Phil. 665 (2001).
[37] TSN,
[38] 366 Phil. 459, 479 (1999).
[39] People v. Quijano Sr., 451 Phil. 729 (2003).
[40] People v. Abino, 423 Phil. 263 (2001).
[41] People v. Quarre, 427 Phil. 422 (2002).
[42] TSN,
[43] People v. Masalihit, 360 Phil. 332 (1998).
[44] See People v. Valenzuela, G.R. No.
182057,
[45] G.R. No. 132135,
[46] 469 Phil. 66 (2004).
[47] 366 Phil. 741 (1999).
[48] 466 Phil. 956 (2004).
[49] The Court, however, found the accused guilty for the other four (4) counts of rape.
[50] 401 Phil. 963 (2000).
[51] 370 Phil. 751 (1999).
[52] Supra note 43.
[53]
[54] People
v. Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348,
[55] People
v. Abulon, G.R. No. 174473,
[56] People
v. Mingming, G.R. No. 174195,
[57] People v. Lizada, 444 Phil. 67 (2003).
[58] TSN,
[59] People
v. Abello, G.R. No. 151952,