Republic of
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Supreme
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SECOND DIVISION
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ARMANDO VIDAR @ “Ricky”, |
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G.R. No. 177361 |
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NORBERTO BUTALON,(†) SONNY |
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Present: |
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DOES and PETER DOES, |
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Petitioners, |
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CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, |
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BRION, |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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PEOPLE OF THE |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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February 1, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
A person is
killed, either by reason or on occasion of the robbery. To
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) taking of personal property belonging to another; (2)
with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A
conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the
malefactor’s main purpose and
objective, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the
taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during, or after the
robbery.[1]
In the instant
case, the prosecution satisfactorily proved that the crime committed by the
petitioners was robbery with homicide.
Factual
Antecedents
It was early evening of
Consequently, a criminal charge for
Robbery with Homicide against herein petitioners Armando Vidar @ Ricky (Vidar),
Norberto Butalon (Butalon), Sonny Marbella @ Spike (
The
undersigned accuses ARMANDO VIDAR @ “Ricky” of Sto. Domingo, Pto. Diaz,
Sorsogon, NORBERTO BUTALON, of Maslog,
That
on or about the 30th day of April 2001, at about 7:00 o’clock in the
evening at Sitio Burabod, Barangay Poblacion, Bacon District, Sorsogon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
armed with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and with intent to gain, enter the dwelling of one Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda and
once inside, took therefrom at gunpoint a Cal. 45 pistol, a wallet containing P1,000.00
cash, a crash helmet and a motorcycle all belonging to the said Sgt. Julio D.
Dioneda; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take, steal and carry away the items above mentioned with
ease, herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and taking advantage of
their superior number and strength and with intent to kill, attack, assault and
repeatedly shot the said Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda, inflicting upon him multiple
gunshot wounds that caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice
of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.
Petitioners, assisted by their
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime of Robbery with
Homicide as charged in the Information.
After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits followed.
The antecedent facts of this case as
recounted by the prosecution witnesses Florecita Dioneda (Florecita) and Niña
Dioneda Elemanco (Niña) that led to the conviction of the petitioners are as
follows:
At about
Niña corroborated the material
details of the robbery and the killing and testified further that she could not
forget the faces of the three malefactors as she was very sure that they were
the ones who barged inside the house and later killed her brother.
Petitioners vehemently denied the
accusations against them.
Ruling of the
Regional Trial Court
The Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Branch 52, relying on the credible and positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, rejected the defense interposed by the petitioners and accordingly
rendered a Decision[3] on
WHEREFORE-, premises considered, the Court finds
accused Armando Vidar @ “Ricky”, Norberto Butalon, and Sonny Marbella @ “Spike”
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, and applying
the provision of Art. 63, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Article 294 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court hereby sentences each
one of them to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and
severally, the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and the further sum of P5,500.00 as actual damages, the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages, the amount of P3,336,768.00 as
unearned income and the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit
the records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review,
and to prepare the Mittimus immediately.
The Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP)
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioners raised the
following errors:
I
The Honorable Court a quo erred in finding the
accused-appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide despite the
insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution to support the same.
II
The Honorable Court a quo erred in not finding
that robbery and homicide were committed in furtherance of rebellion as
admitted both by the prosecution and the defense witnesses that the victim was
killed by reason of his being a member of the Philippine Army and in the
performance of his duty and the assailants are members of the New People’s Army
(NPA) of which the accused- appellants are also members even up to the time of
their arrest.
On
Accordingly, the CA affirmed the
findings of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed from Death to reclusion
perpetua. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the P50, 000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P5,500.00 as actual damages and P2,224,512.00 for the
victim’s loss of earning capacity.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
Hence, this petition.
On August 8, 2007, we issued a
Resolution[6]
treating the instant petition as petitioners’ Supplemental Brief and notified
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that it may file a supplemental brief
within 30 days from notice thereof, if it so desires. The OSG filed a Manifestation[7]
(in lieu of Supplemental Brief) that it had already exhaustively argued all the
issues relevant to the case in its Appellee’s Brief[8]
dated
Petitioners’
Arguments
Petitioners contend that the
appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court despite the
absence of proof adduced before the court below establishing beyond reasonable
doubt that they committed the crime of robbery with homicide. They maintain that the delay of almost a year
in filing formal charges against them cast serious doubt on the intention and
motive of the complainant. They aver that
while the incident took place on
Respondent’s
Arguments
In refuting petitioners’ contention,
the OSG representing the respondent, reiterated the ruling of the court a quo
and sought the affirmation of the assailed decision.
Our Ruling
Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of
merit. The delay did not greatly weaken
the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in
the case at bar, we believe that the delay in reporting to the police
authorities the attendant facts of the crime for which the petitioners have
been charged is consistent with normal human behavior considering that after a
tragic incident, the last thing that the bereaved would want is to provoke
further reprisals from the perpetrators of the felonious act. Although there is a natural tendency to seek
the ends of justice for the treacherous killing of a dearly departed, personal
safety takes priority as dictated by our culture. Moreover, considering private complainant’s
honest belief that petitioners are known to be members of the NPA, the fear of
reprisal from them was ever present which caused her momentary silence. After all, delay in reporting the occurrence
of a crime or other unusual event in rural areas is well known.[9]
Others reveal the perpetrator of the
crime only after the lapse of one year or so to make sure that the possibility
of a threat to his life or to his loved ones is already diminished if not
totally avoided. In People v. Gornes[10]
we held that:
It is true that the charge against the appellant
was initiated only three and a half years after the commission of the crime. However, the fact of delay alone does not work
against the witness.
Thus, the fact
of delay attributed to the prosecution witnesses cannot be taken against them.[11]
What is important is that their
testimonies regarding the incident bear the earmarks of truth and
dependability.
One thing which bolsters the
prosecution witnesses’ credibility is the fact that they had no motive to
prevaricate against the petitioners. They
were not actuated by improper motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very
serious offense against them. Where
there is no evidence, as in this case, to indicate that the prosecution witnesses
were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so
actuated and that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.[12]
For personal motive on the part of a
witness to testify against the accused to be appreciated as showing bias, its
presence should be supported by satisfactory proof.[13]
Aside from their bare allegation,
petitioners miserably failed in this regard. On the contrary, we are not prepared to
disbelieve the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies on their vital points
substantiating the circumstances of time and place of the offense charged
against petitioners.
Petitioners likewise contend that
their identification by the prosecution witnesses was attended with
irregularity considering that they were identified merely from among the four
photographs presented at
We beg to disagree.
In ascertaining whether an
out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court has adopted
the totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into
consideration: 1) the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; 2) the witness’s degree of attention at that time; 3) the accuracy
of any prior description given by the witness; 4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; 5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and 6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.[14]
We have scrutinized with great
caution the witnesses’ manner of identifying petitioners vis-a-vis the
foregoing factors and we discern nothing irregular that would result in an
erroneous identification.
At the outset, it must be stressed
that the prosecution witnesses had an unobstructed view of the petitioners’
appearance who were not donning masks to hide their faces when the latter
barged inside the house. There is no
indication that darkness prevailed inside the house so as to have an obscure
view at the time. They even testified
that one of the petitioners even poked a gun at them while the others were
ransacking the house. Thus even for a
while, there was a frontal confrontation between petitioners and the witnesses,
giving the latter an opportunity to take a good look at petitioners. Nothing in the records allows the presence of
any distraction that would have disrupted the witnesses’ attention during the
occurrence of the incident. Niña even described
to the policemen the physical appearance of petitioners though no cartographic
sketch was presented.[15]
Experience dictates, precisely because of the unusual acts of violence
committed right before witnesses’ eyes, that they remember with a high degree
of reliability the identity of criminals.[16]
Though a considerable length of time had
elapsed, the witnesses never wavered in their identification of petitioners. They cannot forget their faces.
It is worth mentioning also that the
identification of petitioners was effectively admitted when petitioners failed
to dispute the same before the lower courts. The in-court identification of the petitioners
later on dispels any doubt as to the correctness of their identities. As we held in People v. Rivera:[17]
Even
assuming arguendo that the appellant Alfonso Rivera’s out-of-court
identification was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identification in
court cured any flaw that may have attended it.
Without hesitation, the two prosecution witnesses, Renato Losaria and
Juanito Baylon identified the appellant as one of the assailants. In People v. Timon, the accused were
identified through a show-up. The
accused assailed the process of identification because no other suspect was
presented in a police line-up. We ruled
that a police line-up is not essential in identification and upheld the
identification of the accused through a show-up. We also held that even assuming arguendo
that the out-of-court identification was defective, the defect was cured by the
subsequent positive identification in court for the ‘inadmissibility of a
police line-up identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent in-court identification.
Moreover, the
burden is on petitioners to prove that their mug shot identification was unduly
suggestive. There is no evidence that
the authorities had supplied or even suggested to the witnesses that
petitioners were the suspected gunmen. We,
therefore, fail to see any flaw that would invalidate the eyewitnesses’
identification. As aptly observed by the
CA:
Both
Florecita Dioneda and Niña Elemanco gave a credible eyewitness’ account of the
victim’s x x x death [by gunshots] in the hands of accused-appellant. Their testimony [sic] giving details of a
startling and shocking incident that cannot easily be fabricated deserves
credence and full probative weight for it indicates sincerity and truthfulness
in the narration of events. Both of
these witnesses had a good look at the victim’s assailants, who did not at any
time during the incident attempt to conceal their faces. Accused-appellant MARBELLA even stood less [than]
a meter from Florecita Dioneda as he pointed a gun at her while another
accused-appellant even [etched] upon her a distinct impression of his baldness
as repeatedly mentioned by her during her testimony. As there is nothing to indicate that these
two principal witnesses were moved by improper motives, their positive declarations
on the witness stand deserve full faith and credit.[18]
The fact that the prosecution
witnesses are related to the victim will not necessarily taint their
testimonies. The weight of testimony of
witnesses is neither impaired nor in any way affected by their relationship to
the victim when there is no showing of improper motive on their part.[19] Relationship per se of a witness with
the victim of the crime does not necessarily mean that the witness is biased.[20]
These prosecution witnesses are the most
aggrieved parties, being the victim’s widow and sister. Thus, their motive of putting the killers
behind bars cannot be considered improper.[21]
It would be unnatural for a relative who
is interested in avenging the crime to implicate persons other than the real
culprit lest the guilty go unpunished.[22]
Deeply entrenched in our
jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses
is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique
opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a
vantage point denied appellate courts – and when his findings have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive
upon this Court.[23]
Significantly, in the pleadings
filed before the trial court and in the appellate court, petitioners were
steadfast in their position that the crime was committed in furtherance of
rebellion, obviously to escape criminal liability for the present charge. This is judicial admission that they indeed
committed the crime. A judicial
admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position
contradictory to or inconsistent with his pleading. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof
and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[24]
Moreover, when a party adopts a certain
theory in the court below, he is not allowed to change his theory on appeal,
for to allow him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but would
also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[25]
Treachery was also duly proven. The
deadly and successive actions of the petitioners did not allow the victim any
opportunity to defend himself. The
victim was innocently taking a bath totally unaware of the planned attack
against him. Or while he may have
realized a possible danger to his person, the attack was executed in such a
manner as to make defense, not to say counter attack, impossible. The suddenness of the assault, without the
slightest provocation from him who was unarmed and with nary an opportunity to
repel the aggression or defend himself, ineluctably qualified the crime with alevosia.[26]
The twin defenses of denial and
alibi raised by petitioners must necessarily fail in view of the positive
identification made by the prosecution witnesses. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses
and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively
ascertained the identity of the accused.[27]
And it is only axiomatic that positive
testimony prevails over negative testimony.[28]
The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses thus established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of robbery with
homicide, namely: 1) the taking of personal property was committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; 2) the property taken belongs to
another; 3) the taking was done with animo lucrandi; and 4) by reason of
the robbery or on the occasion thereof, the crime of homicide which is therein
used in a generic sense, was committed.[29]
As to damages, we find the amounts
awarded by the trial court as modified by the CA with respect to the amount of
the loss of earning capacity to have been duly substantiated and warranted. We see no cogent reason to reverse the same.
Finally, we take note that
petitioner Butalon died before final judgment. According to the written report of the Penal
Superintendent,[30]
Butalon died at the
WHEREFORE, the petition for
review is DENIED. The challenged Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00554 dated
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division C E R T I F I C A T
I O N Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice *
In lieu of Associate Justice Roberto
A. Abad who is on leave per Special Order No. 812 dated [1] People v. Musa, G.R. No. 170472, [2] Records, p. i. [3] Records, pp. 113-119, penned by Judge Honesto A. Villamor. [4] CA rollo, pp. 107-122; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. [5] [6] Rollo, p. 89. [7] [8] CA rollo, pp. 78-102. [9] People v. Belon, G.R. No. 87759, [10] G.R No.
104869, [11] People v. Carizo, G.R. No. 96551, [12] People v. Simon, 473 Phil. 336, 365 (2004). [13] People v. Foncardes, 466 Phil. 992, 1005 (2004). [14] People v. Sinco, 408 Phil. 1, 13 (2001). [15] TSN, [16] People v. Foncardes, supra note 13 at 1006. [17] 458 Phil. 856, 876-877 (2003). [18] Rollo, p. 49. [19] Velasco v. People, G.R. No. 166479, [20] Tadeja v. People, G.R. No. 145336, [21] People v. Navales, 334 Phil. 521, 541 (1997). [22] People
v. Dulanas, G.R. No. 159058, [23] Heirs of Florentino Remetio v. Villareal,
G.R. No. 132357, [24] Heirs of Pedro Clemena y Zurbano v. Heirs of Irene B. Bien, G.R. No. 155508, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 405, 414-415. [25] Naval v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167412, [26] People v.
Pallarco, 351 Phil. 391, 410 (1998). [27] People
v. Torres, G.R No. 176262, [28] People v.
Corpuz, G.R No. 168101, [29] People v.
Lara, G. R No. 171449, [30] CA rollo, p. 126. [31] G.R No.
102007, |