HEIRS OF SARAH MARIE G.R. No. 169711
Petitioners, Present:
Carpio, J., Chairperson,
- versus - Brion,
Del Castillo,
Abad, and
Perez, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS and
JOHNNY CO y YU, Promulgated:
Respondents.
February 8,
2010
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ABAD, J.:
This case is about the legal standing
of the offended parties in a criminal case to seek, in their personal capacities
and without the Solicitor General’s intervention, reversal of the trial court’s
order granting bail to the accused on the ground of absence of strong evidence
of guilt.
The Facts and the Case
On January 7, 1992 a number of
assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos while all were
asleep, killing Sarah and her uncle Erasmo Palma (Erasmo). Another uncle, Victor Palma (Victor), and a
friend, Benigno Oquendo (Oquendo), survived the attack. The theory of the police was that a land transaction
gone sour between Sarah’s live-in partner, David So (David), and respondent
Johnny Co (Co) motivated the assault.
Four months after the incident, the
police arrested Cresencio Aman (Aman) and Romeo Martin (Martin) who executed
confessions, allegedly admitting their part in the attack. They pointed to two others who helped them,
namely, Artemio “Pong” Bergonia and Danilo Say, and to respondent Co who
allegedly masterminded the whole thing.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
After 10 years or on September 5,
2002 respondent Co surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. The prosecution charged him with two counts of
murder for the deaths of Sarah[1]
and Erasmo[2]
and two counts of frustrated murder committed against Oquendo[3]
and Victor.[4] Upon arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to
the charges.
On September 25, 2002 respondent Co
filed a petition for admission to bail.[5] After hearing or on April 14, 2004, the RTC[6]
granted bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not
strong. The RTC summarized the
prosecution’s evidence as follows:
1. Aman and Martin’s extrajudicial
confessions that pointed to Co as the one who hired them to kill David and his
family.
2. David’s testimony as alleged witness to
the killing of Sarah. Aman supposedly
told David later when they met that it was Co who ordered the massacre.
3. Police officer Leopoldo Vasquez, assistant
leader of the police team that investigated the case, said that his team
conducted two operations to take Co into custody. The first was in a restaurant where they waited
for him. But Co got suspicious and when
he saw the police, he immediately left the restaurant, got into his car, and
sped away. The police also tried to
arrest Co at his residence but the police did not find him there. Co also offered to settle the case.
The RTC had a low estimate, however,
of the above evidence. First, the extrajudicial confessions of Aman
and Martin, apart from having been irregularly executed, merely proved their
participation in the killing. Neither,
however, claimed conspiracy with respondent
Second, David’s
narrations were, to the RTC, contradictory, uncorroborated, and self-serving,
thus lacking in evidentiary weight.
Third, police
officer Vasquez’s story was likewise uncorroborated. Besides, while flight is often indicative of
guilt, it requires a clear showing of the identity of the offender and his
evasion of arrest. Here, said the RTC, the
prosecution failed to establish Co’s identity as the assailant and his reason
for fleeing from the police.
Fourth, the
prosecution failed to prove that the offer of settlement came from
Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for
reconsideration[7] but the RTC,
now presided over by another judge,[8] denied
the same in its Order of May 18, 2005.[9] This prompted the victim’s heirs to file a
special civil action of certiorari with
prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction[10] before
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 90028.
The
CA dismissed the petition,[11]
however, for having been filed without involving the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in violation of jurisprudence[12]
and the law, specifically, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code which states that:
Sec. 35. Powers and
Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceedings, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as
such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following specific powers
and functions:
x x
x x
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all
other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for
reconsideration[13] but the
CA denied it for lack of merit in its Resolution of September 16, 2005,[14] hence, the heirs’ recourse to this Court.
The Issue
The case raises one issue: whether or
not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari, which questioned the RTC’s grant of bail to respondent
Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without the OSG’s
intervention.
The Court’s Ruling
Generally, a criminal case has two
aspects, the civil and the criminal. The civil aspect is borne of the principle
that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.[15]
The civil action, in which the
offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant,[16]
is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.[17]
The law allows the merger of the
criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of suits.[18] Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting
the offense, the offended party benefits from such result and is able to collect
the damages awarded to him.
But, when the trial court acquits the
accused[19]
or dismisses the case[20]
on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since
liability under such an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of
evidence. The offended party may peel
off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal
of his claim for civil liability.[21]
The purpose of a criminal action, in
its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having
outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for
it. In this sense, the parties to the
action are the People of the
As a general rule, the mandate or
authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. Thus—
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker
was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the
unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is
the discernible intent which may be gathered from the term “shall” x x x.
x x x x
The Court is firmly convinced that
considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical
interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed,
mandatory upon the OSG to “represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.[26]
For
the above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if
not initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule,[27] summarily
dismissed.[28]
Here, the question of granting bail
to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from
eluding punishment in the event of conviction.
The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of
the accused that depends on conviction by final judgment. Here, respondent Co has already been
arraigned. Trial and judgment, with
award for civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.
In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[29] this
Court allowed the offended party to challenge before it the trial court’s order
granting bail. But in that case, the
trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
granting bail without conducting any hearing at all. Thus, to disallow the appeal on the basis of lack
of intervention of the OSG would “leave the private complainant without any
recourse to rectify the public injustice.”[30] It is not the case here. The trial court took time to hear the parade
of witnesses that the prosecution presented before reaching the conclusion that
the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong.
WHEREFORE, the
Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals Decision
in CA-G.R. SP 90028 dated June 29, 2005 and its Resolution dated September 16,
2005.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Criminal Case 92-107853.
[2] Criminal Case 92-107854.
[3] Criminal Case 92-107855.
[4] Criminal Case 92-107856.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 39-41.
[6] Presided over by Judge Romulo A. Lopez.
[7] CA rollo, pp. 42-52.
[8] Judge
[9] CA rollo, pp. 36-38.
[10]
[11] Rollo, pp. 23-26; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
[12] Cited case: Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., 432 Phil. 290 (2002).
[13] Rollo, pp. 31-33.
[14]
[15] REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 100.
[16]
[17] RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1(a).
[18] Salazar v. People, 458 Phil. 504, 514 (2003); Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, supra note 16, at 511.
[19] People v.
Santiago, G.R. No. 80778, June 20, 1989, 174 SCRA 143, 151; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Veridiano II, 412 Phil. 795 (2001).
[20] Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., 384
Phil. 322 (2000).
[21] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II, supra note 19.
[22] Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, supra note 16, at 514.
[23]
[24] ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Book IV, Title III,
Chapter 12, Section 35 (1); Macasaet v.
People, 492 Phil. 355, 375 (2005); Cariño
v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 688, 696; People v. Puig, G.R. Nos. 173654-765,
August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 564, 575.
[25] Cariño
v. De Castro, supra note 24.
[26] Gonzales v.
Chavez, G.R. No. 97351, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 816, 832; Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., supra note 12, at 307.
[27] Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., supra
note 20, at 334.
[28] Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., supra note 12, at 306.
[29] 385 Phil. 208 (2000).
[30] Id. at 222, citing People v. Calo, G.R. No. 88531, June 18, 1990, 186 SCRA 620, 624.