Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
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ATTY. MANGONTAWAR M. GUBAT, |
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G.R. No. 167415 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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BRION, |
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ABAD, and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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February 26, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
Truly,
there is no doubt that the rights of others cannot be prejudiced by private
agreements. However, before this Court
can act and decide to protect the one apparently prejudiced, we should remember
what Aesop taught in one of his fables: Every truth has two sides; it is well
to look at both, before we commit ourselves to either.
A
lawyer asserts his right to his contingent fees after his clients, allegedly
behind his back, had entered into an out-of-court settlement with the National
Power Corporation (NPC). The trial court
granted his claim by way of summary judgment.
However, this was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA) because the
counsel was allegedly enforcing a decision that was already vacated. In this petition, petitioner Atty.
Mangontawar M. Gubat (Atty. Gubat) attempts to persuade us that the
compensation due him is independent of the vacated decision, his entitlement
thereto being based on another reason: the bad faith of his clients and of the respondent
NPC.
Factual
Antecedents
In August 1990, plaintiffs Ala Mambuay, Norma Maba, and Acur
Macarampat separately filed civil suits for damages against the NPC before the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur in Marawi City (RTC), respectively
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 294-90, 295-90, and 296-90. In the said complaint, plaintiffs were
represented by Atty. Linang Mandangan (Atty. Mandangan) and petitioner herein, whose
services were engaged at an agreed attorney’s fees of P30,000.00 for
each case and P600.00 for every
appearance. Petitioner was the one who signed
the complaints on behalf of himself and Atty. Mandangan.[1]
During the course of the proceedings, the three complaints were
consolidated because the plaintiffs’ causes of action are similar. They all arose from NPC’s refusal to pay the
amounts demanded by the plaintiffs for the cost of the improvements on their
respective lands which were destroyed when the NPC constructed the Marawi-Malabang
Transmission Line.
On
the day of the initial hearing on the merits, NPC and its counsel failed to
appear. Consequently, respondent was
declared in default. Despite the plea of
NPC for the lifting of the default order, the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 8, rendered
its Decision[2]
on
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the herein plaintiffs and against the defendant National Power Corporation
as represented by its President Ernesto Aboitiz, P.M. Durias and Rodrigo P.
Falcon, ordering the latter jointly and severally:
(1)
In Civil Case No. 204-90 to pay
plaintiff Ala Mambuay the sum of P103,000.00 representing the value of
the improvements and the occupied portion of the land, P32,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, P20,000.00 as moral and/or exemplary damages, P50,000.00
as actual damages and the costs;
(2)
In Civil Case No. 295-90 to pay
plaintiff Norma Maba represented by Capt. Ali B. Hadji Ali the sum of P146,700.00
representing the value of the improvements and the occupied portion of the
land, P32,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P20,000.00
as moral and/or exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as actual damages and the
costs;
(3)
In Civil Case No. 296-90 to pay
plaintiff Acur Macarampat the sum of P94,100.00 representing the value
of the improvements and the occupied portion of the land, P32,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, P20,000.00 as moral and/or exemplary damages, P50,000.00
as actual damages and the costs.[3]
NPC appealed to the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33000. During the pendency of the appeal, Atty.
Gubat filed an Entry and Notice of Charging Lien[4] to
impose his attorney’s lien of P30,000.00 and appearance fees of P2,000.00
on each of the three civil cases he handled, totalling P96,000.00.
On P90,060.00, P90,000.00, and P90,050.00
respectively, in full satisfaction of their claims against the NPC. The motion stated that copies were furnished
to Atty. Mandangan and herein petitioner,
although it was only Atty. Mandangan’s
signature which appeared therein.[7]
On
WHEREFORE, the Order of Default dated December 11, 1990;
the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration to Lift Order of Default dated January 25, 1991; and the
Decision dated April 24, 1991, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the
records of Civil Case Nos. 294-90, 295-90 and 296-90 are hereby ordered
remanded to the court of origin for new trial.[9]
After the cases were remanded to the RTC, petitioner filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment[10] on his
attorney’s fees. He claimed that the plaintiffs
and the NPC deliberately did not inform him about the execution of the
compromise agreement, and that said parties connived with each other in
entering into the compromise agreement in order to unjustly deprive him of his
attorney’s fees. Furthermore, he alleged:
x x x x
12. That, in view of such settlement, there are
no more genuine issues between the parties in the above-entitled cases except
as to the attorney’s fees; As such, this Honorable Court may validly render a
partial summary judgment on the claim for attorney’s fees; and
13.
That
the undersigned counsel hereby MOVES for a partial summary judgment on his
lawful attorney’s fees based on the pleadings and documents on file with the
records of this case.[11]
x x x x
Petitioner thus prayed that a partial
summary judgment be rendered on his attorney’s fess and that NPC be ordered to
pay him directly his lawful attorney’s fees of P32,000.00 in each of the
above cases, for a total of P96,000.00.
NPC opposed the motion for partial
summary of judgment. It alleged that a
client may compromise a suit without the intervention of the lawyer and that petitioner’s
claim for attorney’s fees should be made against the plaintiffs. NPC likewise claimed that it settled the case
in good faith and that plaintiffs were paid in full satisfaction of their
claims which included attorney’s fees.
On
x x x x
There is no dispute that the Compromise Agreement was
executed during the pendency of these cases with the Honorable Court of
Appeals. Despite the knowledge of the
defendant that the services of the movant was on a contingent basis, defendant
proceeded with the Compromise Agreement without the knowledge of Atty.
Gubat. The actuation of the defendant is
fraudulently designed to deprive the movant of his lawful attorney’s fees which
was earlier determined and awarded by the Court. Had defendant been in good faith in
terminating these cases, Atty. Gubat could have been easily contacted.
x x x x[14]
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs Ala Mambuay,
Norma Maba and Acur Macarampat as well as defendant National Power Corporation
are hereby ordered to pay jointly and solidarily Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat the
sum of P96,000.00.[15]
NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] but the
motion was denied by the
trial court in its
NPC maintained that it acted in good faith in the execution of the
compromise settlement. It likewise averred
that the lower court’s award of attorney’s fees amounting to P96,000.00
was clearly based on the award of attorney’s fees in the April 24, 1991
Decision of the trial court which had already been reversed and set aside by the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 33000. Moreover,
NPC contended that petitioner cannot enforce his charging lien because it
presupposes that he has secured a favorable money judgment for his
clients. At any rate, since petitioner
is obviously pursuing the compensation for the services he rendered to his
clients, thus, recourse should only be against them, the payment being their
personal obligation and not of respondent.
NPC further alleged that even assuming that the subject attorney’s fees
are those that fall under Article 2208 of the Civil Code[19] which
is in the concept of indemnity for damages to be paid to the winning party in a
litigation, such fees belong to the clients and not to the lawyer, and this form
of damages has already been paid directly to the plaintiffs.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he was not informed of the
compromise agreement or furnished a copy of NPC’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal. He alleged that the same was received only by
Atty. Mandangan who neither signed any of the pleadings nor appeared in any of the
hearings before the RTC. Petitioner
clarified that his motion for a partial summary judgment was neither a request
for the revival of the vacated April 24, 1991 Decision nor an enforcement of
the lien, but a grant of his contingent fees by the trial court as indemnity
for damages resulting from the fraudulent act of NPC and of his clients who conspired
to deprive him of the fees due him. He asserted
that NPC cannot claim good faith because it knew of the existence of his
charging lien when it entered into a compromise with the plaintiffs.
Petitioner also alleged that NPC’s remedy should have been an ordinary appeal
and not a petition for certiorari because the compromise agreement had
settled the civil suits. Thus, when the
trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment on his fees, it was
a final disposition of the entire case. He
also argued that the issue of bad faith is factual which cannot be a subject of
a certiorari petition. He also insisted
that NPC’s petition was defective for lack of a board resolution authorizing Special
Attorney Comie Doromal (Atty. Doromal) of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
to sign on NPC’s behalf.
On
The reasoning of Atty. Gubat is a ‘crude palusot’ (a
sneaky fallacious reasoning) for how can one enforce a part of a decision which
has been declared void and vacated. In
legal contemplation, there is no more decision because, precisely, the case was
remanded to the court a quo for further proceeding.
It was bad enough that Atty. Gubat tried to pull a fast [one]
but it was [worse] that respondent Judge fell for it resulting in a plainly
erroneous resolution.
Like his predecessor Judge Adiong, Judge Macarambon
committed basic errors unquestionably rising to the level of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Court
issues the writ of certiorari and strikes down as void the Order dated March
15, 2000 granting Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment as well as the Order dated June 27, 2000 denying petitioner National
Power Corporation’s Motion for Reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied
by the CA in its
Petitioner insists on the propriety of the trial court’s order of
summary judgment on his attorney’s fees.
At the same time, he imputes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the CA for entertaining respondent’s Petition for Certiorari. He maintains that the petition should
have been dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of appeal.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks
merit.
Petitioner’s resort to Rule 65 is not proper.
At the outset, the
petition should have been dismissed outright because petitioner resorted to the
wrong mode of appeal by filing the instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Section 1 of the said Rule
explicitly provides that a petition for certiorari is available only
when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. In this case,
the remedy of appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 is not only available but also the proper mode of appeal. For all intents and purposes, we find that
petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as a
substitute for a lost appeal. We note
that petitioner received a copy of the
At any rate, even if
we treat the instant petition as one filed under Rule 45, the same should still
be denied for failure on the part of the petitioner to show that the CA
committed a reversible error warranting the exercise of our discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.
Petitioner’s resort to summary judgment
is not proper; he is not entitled to an immediate relief as a matter of law,
for the existence of bad faith is a genuine issue of fact to be tried.
A summary judgment is allowed only if, after hearing, the court finds
that except as to the amount of damages, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions
and admissions show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[23] The purpose of a summary judgment is to avoid
drawn out litigations and useless delays because the facts appear undisputed to
the mind of the court. Such judgment is
generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions,
pleadings, or admissions of the parties.[24] For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with,
the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating
clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed is
patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue.[25] “Genuine issue” means an issue of fact which
calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious or contrived.[26]
Petitioner pleaded for a summary judgment on his fees on the claim that
the parties intentionally did not inform him of the settlement. He alleged that he never received a copy of
NPC’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the CA and that instead, it was another
lawyer who was furnished and who acknowledged receipt of the motion. When he confronted his clients, he was
allegedly told that the NPC deceived them into believing that what they
received was only a partial payment exclusive of the attorney’s fees. NPC contested these averments. It claimed good faith in the execution of the
compromise agreement. It stressed that
the attorney’s fees were already deemed included in the monetary consideration
given to the plaintiffs for the compromise.
The above averments clearly pose factual issues which make the rendition
of summary judgment not proper. Bad
faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong. It is synonymous with fraud,
in that it involves a design to mislead or deceive another.[27] The trial court should have exercised
prudence by requiring the presentation of evidence in a formal trial to
determine the veracity of the parties’ respective assertions. Whether NPC and the plaintiffs connived and
acted in bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary. Bad faith has to be established by the
claimant with clear and convincing evidence, and this necessitates an
examination of the evidence of all the parties.
As certain facts pleaded were being contested by the opposing parties,
such would not warrant a rendition of summary judgment.
Moreover, the validity or the correct interpretation of the alleged
compromise agreements is still in issue in view of the diverse interpretations
of the parties thereto. In fact, in the
Decision of the CA dated
Considering the above disquisition, there is still a factual issue on
whether the NPC and the plaintiffs had already validly entered into a
compromise agreement. Clearly, the NPC
and the plaintiffs have diverse interpretations as regards the stipulations of
the compromise agreement which must be resolved. According to the NPC, the amounts it paid to
the plaintiffs were in full satisfaction of their claims. Plaintiffs claim otherwise. They insist that the amounts they received
were exclusive of attorney’s claim. They
also assert that NPC undertook to pay the said attorney’s fees to herein petitioner.
A client may enter into a compromise agreement
without the intervention of the lawyer, but the terms of the agreement should
not deprive the counsel of his compensation for the professional services he
had rendered. If so, the compromise
shall be subjected to said fees. If the
client and the adverse party who assented to the compromise are found to have intentionally
deprived the lawyer of his fees, the terms of the compromise, insofar as they
prejudice the lawyer, will be set aside, making both parties accountable to pay
the lawyer’s fees. But in all cases, it
is the client who is bound to pay his lawyer for his legal representation.
A compromise is a contract whereby the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to
one already commenced.[28] It is a consensual
contract, binding upon the signatories/privies, and it has the effect of res judicata.[29] This
cannot however affect third persons who are not
parties to the agreement.[30]
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, a client
has an undoubted right to settle a suit without the intervention of his lawyer,[31]
for he is generally conceded to have the exclusive control over the
subject-matter of the litigation and may, at any time before judgment, if
acting in good faith, compromise, settle, and adjust his cause of action out of
court without his attorney’s intervention, knowledge, or consent, even though
he has agreed with his attorney not to do so.[32] Hence, a claim for attorney’s fees does not void
the compromise agreement and is no obstacle to a court approval.[33]
However, counsel is not without remedy. As the validity of a compromise agreement
cannot be prejudiced, so should not be the payment of a lawyer’s adequate and
reasonable compensation for his services should the suit end by reason of the
settlement. The terms of the compromise subscribed
to by the client should not be such that will amount to an entire deprivation of
his lawyer’s fees, especially when the contract is on a contingent fee basis. In this sense, the compromise settlement cannot
bind the lawyer as a third party. A
lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or
imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on
the part of his counsel. The duty of the
court is not only to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner,
but also to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees.[34]
Even if the compensation of a
counsel is dependent only upon winning a case he himself secured for his
client, the subsequent withdrawal of the case on the client’s own
volition should never completely deprive counsel of any legitimate compensation
for his professional services.[35] In all cases, a client is bound to pay his
lawyer for his services. The
determination of bad faith only becomes significant and relevant if the adverse
party will likewise be held liable in shouldering the attorney’s fees.[36]
Petitioner’s compensation is a personal obligation of his clients who
have benefited from his legal services prior to their execution of the
compromise agreement. This is strictly a
contract between them. NPC would only be
made liable if it was shown that it has connived with the petitioner’s clients
or acted in bad faith in the execution of the compromise agreement for the
purpose of depriving petitioner of his lawful claims for attorney’s fees. In each case, NPC should be held solidarily
liable for the payment of the counsel’s compensation. However, as we have already discussed,
petitioner’s resort to summary judgment is not proper. Besides, it is interesting to note that
petitioner is the only one claiming for his attorney’s fees notwithstanding
that plaintiffs’ counsels of record were petitioner herein and Atty. Mandangan.
Nevertheless, this is not at issue
here. As we have previously discussed,
this is for the trial court to resolve.
The CA soundly exercised its discretion in
resorting to a liberal application of the rules. There are no vested right to technicalities.
Concededly,
the NPC may have pursued the wrong remedy when it filed a petition for certiorari
instead of an appeal since the ruling on attorney’s fees is already a ruling on
the merits. However, we find that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ordered NPC solidarily liable with the plaintiffs for the
payment of the attorney’s fees. The rule
that a petition for certiorari is dismissible when the mode of appeal is
available admits of exceptions, to wit: (a) when the writs issued are
null; and, (b) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority.[37] Clearly, respondent has shown its entitlement
to the exceptions.
The
same liberal application should also apply to the question of the alleged lack
of authority of Atty. Doromal to execute the certification of non-forum
shopping for lack of a board resolution from the NPC. True, only individuals vested with authority
by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in
behalf of the corporation, and proof of such authority must be attached to the
petition,[38]
the failure of which will be sufficient cause for dismissal. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Atty.
Doromal does not enjoy the presumption that he is authorized to represent respondent
in filing the Petition for Certiorari before the CA. As Special Attorney, he is one of the
counsels of NPC in the proceedings before the trial court, and the NPC never
questioned his authority to sign the petition for its behalf.
In any case, the substantive issues we have already discussed are
justifiable reasons to relax the rules of procedure. We cannot allow a patently wrong judgment to
be implemented because of technical lapses. This ratiocination is in keeping with the
policy to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or
proceeding.[39] As we have explained in Alonso v. Villamor:[40]
There is nothing sacred about processes or
pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were
created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the
administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the
means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an
end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the
administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in
the performance of their obvious duty.
The error in this case is purely technical. To take
advantage of it for other purposes than to cure it, does not appeal to a fair
sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's case smacks of
skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which
one more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and
position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather, a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and
then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form
and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits.
Law-suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There
should be no vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted
to challenge a record of a court of these
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO
C.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T
I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 132, 135, and 138.
[2] CA
rollo, pp. 48-56; penned by Judge Santos B. Adiong.
[3]
[4] Rollo,
p. 34.
[5]
[6]
This
is to acknowledge receipt from the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC) the sum of (amount)
as full and complete settlement of the cases entitled in (name of case)
in (civil case no.) which is now pending appeal before the Court of Appeals.
With
the execution of this Acknowledgment Receipt, it is understood that I and my
heirs and assigns have no further claim against NPC with respect to the damage
to improvements over my parcel of land which was affected by the 69 KV
Transmission Line.
Sgd.
(name
of claimant)
Representing NPC:
(Sgd.)
CANDIDATO RAMOS
(Sgd.)
ATTY. ARTHUR L. ABUNDIENTE
Counsel for Defendant-NPC
[7]
[8] CA
rollo, pp 62-73; penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred
in by Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Article
19. Every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
[14] CA
rollo, pp. 81-82.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] In the absence of stipulation, attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When
exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When
the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In
criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In
case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where
the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In
actions for legal support;
(7) In
actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
(8) In
actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability
laws;
(9) In a
separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at
least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any
other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all
cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
[20] Rollo,
pp. 26-31; penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino and concurred in by
Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
[21] Id
at 30-31.
[22]
[23] Rules of Court, Rule 35, Section 3.
[24] Nocom
v. Camerino, G.R. No. 182984,
[25] Philippine
Countryside Rural Bank v. Toring, G.R. No. 157862,
[26] Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank v. Guerrero, 445 Phil. 770, 776
(2003).
[27] Solidbank
Corporation v. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, G.R. No. 153535, July 28,
2005, 464 SCRA 409, 426.
[28] Civil Code, Article 2028.
[29] Civil Code, Article 2037.
[30] University
of the East v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. 93310-12,
[31] Rustia
v. Judge of First Instance of Batangas, 44 Phil 62, 65 (1922).
[32] Samonte
v. Samonte, 159-A Phil. 777, 791-792
(1975).
[33] Cabildo
v. Hon. Navarro, 153 Phil. 310, 314 (1973).
[34] Masmud
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 183385,
[35] National
Power Corporation v. National Power Corporation Employees and Workers
Association, 178 Phil. 1, 10-11 (1979).
[36] See Aro
v. Hon. Nañawa, 137 Phil. 745 (1969).
[37] Jan-Dec
Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146818, February 6,
2006, 481 SCRA 556, 564.
[38] Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 143088, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 605, 608.
[39] Rules of Court, Rule 1, Section 6.
[40] 16
Phil 315, 321-322 (1910).