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SPOUSES MORRIS CARPO and
SOCORRO CARPO, Petitioners, - versus
- AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 166577
Present: PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO
MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: February 3, 2010
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LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
In the instant petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners seek to set aside and annul the Decision[1] dated December 22, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61784, which reversed
and set aside the Summary Judgment[2]
dated December 22, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City,
Branch 255. Also subject of the present
petition is the CA Resolution[3]
dated December 16, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
earlier decision.
A summary of the facts,
as culled from the records of the case, follows:
On February 16, 1995,
petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for
Quieting of Title[4]
with the RTC of Makati City against Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures
Corporation (APVC), and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas, docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-292.
In their Complaint, the
Carpos claimed to be the owners of a 171,209-square meter parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued in their
names.[5] They further alleged that Ayala Corporation
was claiming to have titles (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and
T-4368) over the property covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and that Ayala
Corporation had made such property its equity contribution in APVC to be
developed into a residential subdivision.
Attached as annexes to the complaint were photocopies of:
(a) TCT No. 296463
issued on August 13, 1970 in the name of the Carpos, covering a parcel of land
(Lot 3, plan Psu-56007) located in the Barrio of Almanza, Las Piñas with an
area of 171,309 square meters;
(b) TCT No. 125945
issued on April 6, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of
land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-80886) located in Bo. Tindig na Manga, Las Piñas with an
area of 171,309 square meters;
(c) TCT No. T-4367
issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of
land (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza,
Las Piñas with an area of 218,523 square meters; and
(d) TCT No. T-4368 issued
on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land
(Lot 3, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las
Piñas with an area of 155,345 square meters.
No copy of TCT No.
T-4366 was attached to the complaint.
According to the
complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 and their derivatives
“appear to have been issued in the name of Ayala and purport to cover and
embrace the Carpo’s property or portion thereof duly covered registered under the
already indefeasible and incontrovertible TCT [No.] 296463 are inherently
invalid and enforceable (sic) for not being the duly issued derivatives of the
Carpos’ title.”[6]
The Carpos additionally applied for a restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin Ayala Corporation and APVC from doing construction and
development works on the properties in purported violation of the Carpos’
rights.
The complaint prayed
that the trial court render judgment:
(1) canceling and
declaring void TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367, T-4368 and all alleged
derivatives thereof, issued in the name of Ayala Corporation and/or APVC over
the properties or portion thereof embraced in the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and
issuing a writ of possession in favor of the Carpos and/or ordering Ayala
Corporation and APVC to surrender to the Carpos the properties or portion
thereof being occupied by the said corporations under inherently invalid or
void titles; (2) declaring TCT No. 296463 issued in their names as valid and the
Carpos as the owners of the property described therein “including the parcels
of land being claimed and occupied by Ayala [Corporation] and APVC withou[t]
valid and enforceable titles”; and (3) ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to
pay jointly and severally the amount of P100,000 as attorney’s fees plus
costs of suit and litigation expenses.[7]
On March 10, 1995,
before defendants could file an answer, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint,
impleading respondent Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI) in lieu of Ayala
Corporation after purportedly verifying with the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas
that the title to the subject property was registered in the name of ALI and
not Ayala Corporation.[8]
On October 12, 1995 and
January 12, 1996, ALI filed its Answer
with Counterclaims and Opposition to Application for Restraining Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction[9] and Pre-trial
Brief with Motion to Admit Amended
Answer,[10] respectively.
In its Amended Answer,
ALI alleged that APVC no longer exists having been merged with ALI in
1991. ALI pointed out that the areas
covered by TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do not overlap with the Carpos’
claimed property and the dispute pertained only to the land covered by the
Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Piñas Ventures,
Inc. (LPVI) which was derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala
Corporation. It appeared that Ayala Corporation contributed the property to
LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also merged with ALI. Further, ALI alleged that it
is the true owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it traces back
its title to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950 while
the Carpos’ title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued only in 1970. ALI also
claimed the Carpos’ complaint was barred by res
judicata in view of the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v. San Pedro[11]
which upheld the ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico over the subject property
as Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over the claim of a certain Florentino Baltazar who was
asserting ownership of the same under his plan, Psu-56007.
During the pendency of
the case, ALI secured a title in its own name, TCT No. T-41262, over the
property previously covered by TCT No.
T-5333.[12]
In the Order[13]
dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC ruled that the present case was an action in rem and directed the transfer of the
case to the RTC of Las Piñas where the disputed property is located. The case was thereafter assigned to Branch
255 of the Las Piñas RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0082.
On December 17, 1996,
ALI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
the ground that there was allegedly no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the only issue for the court to resolve was a purely legal one ―
which of the two (2) titles should be accorded priority. According to ALI, the parties were relying on
their respective TCTs, and since ALI admittedly traces its title to OCT No. 242
which was issued more than twenty (20) years earlier than the Carpos’
predecessor’s title (OCT No. 8575), its title is, thus, superior. Expectedly,
the Carpos filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, arguing that
there were “genuine issues and controversies to be litigated.”
In an Order dated April
7, 1997, the RTC denied ALI’s motion for summary judgment. This denial was challenged in a petition for certiorari
with the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243.
In a decision[14]
dated September 25, 1997, the CA granted ALI’s petition and ordered the RTC to
render a summary judgment. Both parties
moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision. ALI filed a motion for partial
reconsideration, entreating the CA itself to render the summary judgment in the
interest of judicial economy and on a claim that the sole issue was legal. The Carpos, in their motion, insisted that
there were genuine issues in this case that must be threshed out in a trial.
Both motions were denied in the CA Resolution dated January 12, 1998.[15]
Both parties elevated
the matter to this Court in separate petitions for review on certiorari. In G.R. No. 132259, ALI assailed the CA’s
refusal to render a summary judgment, while in G.R. No. 132440, the Carpos
assailed the CA’s ruling that trial was unnecessary.
In separate minute
Resolutions,[16]
the Court denied both petitions. Both
parties’ motions for reconsideration were likewise denied.
Accordingly, the RTC
rendered a Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998, finding the Carpos’ title
superior to that of ALI and ruling, thus:
Upon the
other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala’s claim of the
validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission
to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant’s answer reveals
that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on
file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical of the validity of the
issuance of OCT No. 242. In original
land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be
accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the
Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin
and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant
ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed
under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the
Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore
void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198
SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme
Court held: “That unless a survey plan
is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is
not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably,
therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to
credit and should be rejected.”
The
submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and
unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director
of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA
210). In another case, it was ruled that
the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey
plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA
177).
Evidently,
the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been
originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau
of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land
Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is void.
It will
also be noted that aside from the admissions made by defendant ALI in its
answer, it clearly appears in its title TCT No. T-5333 that the date of survey
was on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs’
property covered by TCT No. 296463 was surveyed on January 4-6, 1927. This means that plaintiffs’
predecessor-in-interest had claimed ownership of the property ahead of that of
defendant ALI’s predecessor-in-interest.
The principle of prior registration cannot be applied in this case
because the land previously surveyed cannot anymore be the subject of another
survey, and there is already a record of a prior survey in the Bureau of
Lands. This is precisely the reason why
the survey plan has to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. This must be the reason why the later survey
in favor of Ayala’s predecessor-in-interest did not anymore bear the approval
of the Director of Lands because had it been submitted for approval, the
records of the Bureau of Lands will show that an earlier survey of the same
land had already been made and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Evidently,
Ayala’s claim of superiority of its title over that of the plaintiffs’ cannot
therefore be sustained. Be that as it
may, the fact that cannot be disputed on the basis of Ayala’s answer is its
admission that SWO survey without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of
Lands was submitted in the alleged registration proceedings, rendering the
decree and the title issued thereunder to be tainted with irregularity and
therefore void.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a)
Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the plaintiffs Spouses
Morris G. Carpo and Socorro R. Carpo as valid and legal, and superior to that
of defendant Ayala’s TCT No. T-5333;
(b)
Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, TCT No. T-6055, TCT No.
4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368 and their derivatives as null and void;
(c)
Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to pay the sum of P100,000.00
as attorney’s fees; and
(d)
To pay the costs.[17]
On January 5, 1999, ALI
filed a notice of appeal but the same was dismissed by the CA in a Resolution[18]
dated May 14, 1999 for failure to pay the full amount of docket fees. In its motion for reconsideration, ALI
pointed out that it paid the full amount assessed by the cash clerk on duty at
the RTC Las Piñas. The motion was also denied, prompting ALI to file with this
Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 140162. Finding ALI’s petition meritorious, the
Court, in a Decision[19]
dated November 22, 2000, reversed the CA’s dismissal of ALI’s appeal and
remanded the same to the CA for further proceedings.
On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision
in favor of ALI, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING
DISQUISITIONS, the instant appeal is GRANTED,
the assailed Summary Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas, Branch
255, dated December 22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new one is
rendered as follows:
(1)
TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T-5333, in the name of
defendant-appellant Ayala Land, Incorporated is hereby declared to be the VALID title to the subject property;
(2)
TCT No. 296463 issued in the name of plaintiffs-appellees is
declared to be NULL and VOID;
(3)
The concerned Register of Deeds is hereby ORDERED to cancel plaintiffs-appellees’ TCT No. 296463, and any and
all titles issued covering the subject property, for being spurious and void,
and of no force and effect.[20]
The
Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA
in its Resolution dated December 16, 2004. Hence, the instant petition for
review filed by Socorro Carpo and the heirs of Morris Carpo.[21] The Petition contained the following
assignment of errors:
A THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT IS VALID EVEN WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SURVEY PLAN
APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE RTC “RELIED HEAVILY” ON AN ALLEGED “ADMISSION” BY RESPONDENT OF THE
VALIDITY OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS OVER THE DISPUTED PARCEL OF LAND.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THERE IS RES JUDICATA AGAINST
PETITIONERS BASED ON THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN PEDRO, ET AL., 72 PHIL 415,
WITHOUT PROPER DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID CASE ARE DIRECTLY
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE PRESENT.[22]
After a thorough review of the
records, we deny the petition and concur with the CA that the Summary Judgment
rendered by the trial court should be reversed and set aside.
Preliminary discussion
regarding subject matter of the controversy
At
the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in its Summary Judgment
declared null and void (a) TCT No. T-5333 (and its antecedent, TCT No. [125945]
T-6055A) covering a parcel of land with an area of 171,309 square meters; (b)
TCT No. T-4366 with a land area of 254,085 square meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367
with a land area of 218,523 square meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 with a land
area of 155,345 square meters, despite the lack of evidence of identity of the
properties described in TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 with the property
covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 or any portion of said property claimed
by petitioners. This was grievous and palpable error on the part of the trial
court considering that the property being claimed by the Carpos under their TCT
No. 296463 had an area of only 171,309 square meters and the total area of the
properties in the titles invalidated by the trial court was 799,262 square
meters.
It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R.
SP No. 44243, involving the same parties, the CA ruled that:
On
the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive pleading did not deny the
existence of a title in the name of the plaintiffs/private respondents.
Instead, it alleged:
“14. The parcel of land described in TCT
No. 296463, issued in the name of the plaintiffs, completely overlaps the
property covered by ALI’s TCT No. T-5333.
But TCT No. T-296463 traces itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued on
August 12, 1970, long after OCT No. 242 (the title from which ALI’s TCT No.
T-5333 was derived) was issued on May 9, 1950 (on the basis of Decree of
Registration No. 2917, Record No. 43516). Hence, ALI’s TCT No. T-5333 is
superior to TCT No. 296463. xxx.”
This is an admission that the
private respondents have a title to the property in question, and that the
property described in private respondents’ TCT No. 296463 completely overlaps
the title of petitioner ALI. This fact is further substantiated by an
affidavit of Jose Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic Engineer who, after attesting to
his qualifications, competence and experience, declared under oath:
“9. In
connection with the subject case, Affiant was requested to find out, based on
the technical descriptions in their respective titles, if the lots described in
the title of plaintiffs, TCT No. 296463, overlaps the lots of ALI covered by
TCT No. 41262 (formerly, TCT No. T-5333 of LPVI, and, more previously, TCT No.
T (125945) 6055-A, in the name of Ayala Corporation), TCT No. 4366, TCT No.
4367 and TCT No. 4368, x x x.
‘9.1.
To accomplish this task, Affiant resorted to the plotting of the technical
descriptions found in the plaintiffs’ and ALI’s respective titles. The standard operating procedure, adopted by
Affiant in this particular instance, in plotting properties is to study the
technical description in the titles and at the same time, to get all the
available survey plans described in the titles for reference.
‘9.2.
To evidence this plotting that Affiant conducted, Affiant prepared a Sketch
Plan reflecting Plaintiffs’ title vis-a-vis
ALI’s title. Attached hereto as Annex
“G” is an original copy of the Sketch Plan prepared by the Affiant.
‘9.3.
The orange-shaded portion on the Sketch Plan indicates the area covered by the
title of the plaintiffs and it is clearly shown in this plan that plaintiffs’ claimed property entirely
overlaps ALI’s property delineated in TCT No. T-41262. Plaintiffs’ claimed property (Lot 3,
PSU-56007) is in fact identical to ALI’s lot (Lot 3, PSU-80886).
‘9.4.
The blue, pink and green lines on the Sketch Plan indicate the boundaries of
ALI’s TCT Nos. 4366, 4367 and 4368, respectively, and it is clearly shown that
these do not overlap with plaintiffs’ claimed property.’”
The Sketch Plan attached thereto clearly
indicates the overlapping and identical boundaries between the private
respondents’ TCT No. 296463 and petitioner’s TCT No. 125945, (formerly TCT No.
T-5333).[23] In addition to the affidavit of the Geodetic
Engineer, the petitioner likewise attached to its Motion for Summary Judgment
copies of the following titles:
x x x x
In contrast, the private
respondents never controverted the petitioner’s allegation that their (private
respondents’) title, TCT No. 296463 traces its origin to OCT No. 8575, issued
on August 12, 1970, while that of the petitioner has its origin in OCT No. 242,
issued on May 9, 1950. Moreover, the private respondents attached no
supporting document to its Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thus, as matters stand, the
requisites for the grant of summary judgment appear to have been satisfied xxx.
x x x x
Since the existence
of two titles over the same property, as well as the fact of overlapping of the
technical descriptions of the two titles are admitted in the pleadings, and
substantiated by the supporting documents attached by the defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to its Motion for Summary
Judgment, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. If at all, the sole issue is a legal one,
to wit: whose title (as to the
conflicting ones) is superior and must be upheld. This
issue may be decided on the basis of the affidavits and supporting documents
submitted by the parties, as well as the applicable law and jurisprudence
on the matter. In other words, there
need not be a protracted trial thereon, since all that the trial court should
do is to apply the law to the issue, taking into consideration the documents
attached by the parties in their respective pleadings and/or submitted together
with the motion or the opposition thereto.
The same is true with the other
defenses raised by the petitioner in its responsive pleading, to wit: res judicata, prescription and laches –
which may likewise be resolved without going to trial.[24]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The foregoing CA decision became final
and executory after the separate petitions for review filed with this Court by
the parties were denied with finality. The parties, and even the trial court, were bound by the CA’s factual finding
therein that the only lots whose technical descriptions overlap are those
covered by the Carpos’ TCT No. 296463 and ALI’s TCT No. T-5333 which later
became TCT No. T-41262. There was simply
no basis for the trial court to invalidate all the ALI titles mentioned in the
complaint.
The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI titles in
the Summary Judgment is even more evident in the case of TCT No. T-4367 (Lot 2,
plan Psu-47035) and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035). Petitioners’ claims with respect to these
properties are already barred by res
judicata. In Realty Sales Enterprise,
Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[25]petitioner Morris Carpo
already asserted his purported ownership of these two properties based on a
transfer certificate of title with the same survey plan number (Psu-56007) as
TCT No. 296463. However, in Realty, his claim was discredited by the
Court when it held that Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty), ALI’s
predecessor in interest,[26] is the one with valid title
to these properties. The relevant portions of the Realty Decision are quoted here:
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in
the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609,
issued on May 21, 1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657,
758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13,
1970 in the name of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT No. 8629,
issued on October 13, 1970 pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No.
N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on
July 27, 1971 in the name of Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation,
derived from OCT No. 8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC
Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777.
On December 29, 1977,
Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera (hereafter
referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree No.
N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise,
Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration. x
x x.
x x x x
In the case at bar, it appears that it was
Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of
Realty, who originally filed on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding
docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over
parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 are
the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, Realty and QCDFC.) Case
No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record
No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721
filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved identical parcels of
land, and identical applicants/oppositors.
x x x x
Carpo bought the disputed property
from the Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of a deed
executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9,
1970. x x x.
x x x x
The Baltazars,
predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an
oppositor in the original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As
stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao
to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 "desestimando oposicion de
Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, they
could not pretend ignorance of the land registration proceedings over the
disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino
Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions rendered therein.
Moreover,
it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from whom
Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years before the
issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled
that "(t)he general rule is that in
the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails x x x. In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect
of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the
holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who
was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof
x x x.”[27]
(Emphasis and underscoring ours; citations omitted.)
We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the petition.
First
Assignment of Error
Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that the title
of respondent is valid even without the requisite survey plan approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Petitioners clearly misunderstood or deliberately misread the CA’s
ruling on this point. It is the CA’s
view that the trial court’s pronouncement that OCT No. 242 was issued without
an approved survey plan was unwarranted in view of the presumption of
regularity that said title enjoys.
We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon perusing the
following portion of the Summary Judgment:
Upon the other hand, this Court is
not inclined to concur with Ayala’s claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333
and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the
plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading
of the defendant’s answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed
under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved
by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be
skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is
mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the
property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau
of Lands. A survey plan without the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of
dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant
ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed
under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of
Lands. Any title issued emanating from a
survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted
with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734.
In the said case, the Supreme Court held: “That unless a survey plan is duly approved
by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as
evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the
reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to credit and should
be rejected.”
The submission of the plan is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its
technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are
not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that the Land
Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans
(Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the
property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242
had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was
apparently prepared and approved by the then Land Registration Commissioner and
under the law, the same is void.[28]
To begin with, a perusal of the defendant’s answer or amended
answer would show that, contrary to the trial court’s allusions thereto, there
is no admission on the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was issued without a survey
plan that was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. There is
likewise no evidence on record to support the trial court’s finding that the survey
plan submitted to support the issuance of OCT No. 242 in the 1950 land
registration proceedings was approved only by the Land Registration
Commissioner and not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion that OCT
No. 242 was issued without a duly approved survey plan simply because the
notation “SWO” appeared in the technical description of the said title which
was attached to the answer and due to ALI’s failure to allege in its pleadings
that the survey plan submitted in support of the issuance of OCT No. 242 was
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.[29]
It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the
survey plan mentioned in OCT No. 242 was unapproved by the appropriate
authority all from the notation “SWO” which appeared beside the survey plan
number on the face of the title or from a failure to allege on the part of ALI
that a duly approved survey plan exists. We quote with approval the discussion
of the CA on this point:
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a quo erred
when, in ruling that the validity of OCT No. 242 is dubious, it gave emphasis
to defendant-appellant’s failure to allege that the survey plan of OCT No. 242
was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. It is admitted that a survey plan is one
of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of registration, but upon the
issuance of such decree, it can most certainly be assumed that said requirement
was complied with by ALI’s original predecessor-in-interest at the time the latter sought original
registration of the subject property.
Moreover, the land registration court must be assumed to have carefully
ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree in favor of ALI’s
predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions by public officers.
The court upon which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to
have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have
exercised it effectively. This is as
it should be, because once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens
system, and the time has passed within which that decree may be questioned the title is perfect and cannot later on be
questioned. There would be no end to
litigation if every litigant could, by repeated actions, compel a court to
review a decree previously issued by another court forty-five (45) years
ago. The very purpose of the Torrens
system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a
second action for registration, as what the court a quo did when it faulted
ALI’s failure to allege that its predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey
plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the original land
registration case.
The Court need not emphasize that
it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its
predecessor-in-interest complied with the requirements for the original
registration of the subject property. A
party dealing with a registered land need
not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so
as to guard or protect his or her interest. Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond what
appeared in the transfer certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor. It may rely solely, as it did, on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued for the subject property and the law will in no way oblige it to go
behind the certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. This is the fundamental nature of the Torrens
System of land registration, to give the public the right to rely upon the face
of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further.[30]
(Underscoring ours; citations omitted.)
It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No.
242 was a result of the registration decree of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, pursuant to land registration proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT
No. 242 and its derivatives, including ALI’s TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the
presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that its title was
regularly issued. That is precisely the nature of such a presumption, it
dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3.
Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x x
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether
in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a
case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that
all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were
laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; x x x.
Thus, we held in Herce, Jr.
v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna[31]:
In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC
(CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree
No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911, is presumed to have been regularly issued by the accountable public
officers who enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of
their functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the issuance of Decree No.
4244 in favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao cannot be overturned without any countervailing proof to the contrary.
In the words of Tichangco v. Enriquez:[32]
To overturn this legal
presumption carelessly — more than 90 years since the termination of the case —
will not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying
principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted
legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree
issued in Case No. 976 and OCT No. 242 includes the presumption that all the
requisites for the issuance of a valid title had been complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that a duly
approved survey plan accompanied the issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it
is presumed. It is the party who seeks to overcome the presumption who would
have the burden to present adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary.
This, petitioners did not even attempt to do.
We cannot accept petitioners’ proposition that they did not have
the burden of proof of showing the irregularity of ALI’s title since the burden
of proof purportedly did not shift to them since no full-blown trial was
conducted by the RTC.
This specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule 131, Section 1
of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden
of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law.
With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have
alleged all the bases of their cause of action, particularly their allegation
that ALI’s title is null and void and that such title should be cancelled.
However, a scrutiny of the complaint would show that petitioners never alleged
the purported lack of an approved survey plan as a defect of ALI’s title. All
that the complaint alleged is that ALI’s titles should be declared void for not
being derivatives of the Carpos’ title. Implicit in that allegation is that
petitioners were relying solely on the supposed priority of their own title
over ALI’s. It stands to reason then that ALI did not have to allege in its
Answer that its mother title, OCT No. 242, was supported by a duly approved
survey plan when petitioners did not raise the same as an issue in their
complaint or in any other pleading filed with the trial court.
Indubitably, in view of the CA’s Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243,
this controversy has been reduced to the sole substantive issue of which
between the two titles, purporting to cover the same property, deserves
priority. This is hardly a novel issue. As petitioners themselves are aware, in
Realty, it was held that:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the
case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than
one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person claiming under the
prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is
deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim
is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x."[33]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Degollacion v. Register
of Deeds of Cavite,[34] we held that “[w]here two certificates of title purport
to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to
trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were
derived.”
In all, we find that the CA committed
no reversible error when it applied the principle “Primus
Tempore, Portior Jure”
(First in Time, Stronger in Right) in this case and found that ALI’s title was
the valid title having been derived from the earlier OCT.
Second
Assignment of Error
Petitioners contend that it is error
on the part of the CA to rule that their cause of action has been barred by
prescription and laches. According to them, since the OCT from which ALI
derived its title is void for want of a duly approved survey plan, their cause
of action did not prescribe. However, as discussed above, the conclusion of the
trial court that OCT No. 242 is void was not sufficiently borne out by the
evidence on record. Verily, the premise upon which petitioners build their
theory of imprescriptibility of their action did not exist.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb
the CA’s finding that:
As
previously emphasized, OCT No. 242 of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest was issued
on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45) years before plaintiffs-appellees filed
their complaint on March 10, 1995. As
such, it is the Court’s firmly held view that plaintiffs-appellees’ claim is
barred not only by prescription, but also by laches.
Aside from the fact that OCT No.
242 had become incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from the time a
decree of registration was issued, any action for reconveyance that
plaintiffs-appellees could have availed of is also barred. Although plaintiffs-appellees’ complaint was
for quieting of title, it is in essence an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust, considering that plaintiffs-appellees were
alleging in said complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in
the issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-settled that an action for
reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name, must be filed
within ten years from the issuance of the title, since such issuance operates
as a constructive notice. Since ALI’s
title is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year prescriptive period
expired in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. It does not
involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the
assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances
inequitable or unfair to permit. In the
instant case, plaintiffs-appellees, as well as their predecessor-in-interest,
have not shown that they have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from
which ALI’s title was derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if
successful, would be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on the
validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by
the precise provisions of P.D. 1529, thus:
“SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent
purchaser for value – The decree of registration shall not be reopened or
revised xxx subject, however, to the right of any person xxx to file in the
proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of entry
of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the
land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for
value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include and innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrances for value.”[35]
Third
Assignment of Error
The next assigned error involves the question of whether the trial
court, in rendering the Summary Judgment, indeed relied heavily on the alleged
admission made by ALI on the validity of Carpos’ title, as declared by the CA.
Specifically, the CA stated as follows:
In its assailed decision, the court a
quo relied heavily on the alleged admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the
existence and validity of plaintiffs-appellees’ title. We have read the
pertinent pleading and We find ALI’s statement to be of no moment.
Nowhere in ALI’s statement was there an
admission of the validity of plaintiffs-appellees’ title. x x x.
The Court cannot comprehend where and
how the court a quo could have gotten the impression that ALI was admitting not
only the existence, but also the validity of plaintiffs-appellees’ certificate
of title. x x x.[36]
An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial court would
readily show that indeed the trial court relied on ALI’s supposed admission of
the existence of Carpos’ title in ruling which of the conflicting titles was
valid. Pertinently, the trial court merely declared:
The existence of plaintiffs’ TCT No.
296463 has been admitted by defendant Ayala in its answer to have been
originated from OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970. It is very
significant that defendant ALI admitted it in its answer that OCT No. 8575 and
plaintiffs’ TCT No. 296463 both originated from Decree No. 131141 issued on
October 15, 1969 in the name of Apolonio Sabater as Annex “G” to defendant
ALI’s answer. This
admission made by the defendant in its answer is conclusive upon it. It cannot therefore take position contrary to
or inconsistent with its answer, and the facts are to be taken as true
(Westminister High School vs. Sto. Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 12666 R-July 5,
1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248-255).
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to
concur with Ayala’s claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT
No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their
complaint. x x x.[37]
Although the Summary Judgment did not expressly state that ALI
admitted the validity of Carpos’ title with its admission of the said title’s
existence, that is the unmistakable import of the trial court’s statements that
ALI’s admission of the existence of Carpo’s title “are conclusive upon it” and
bars ALI from taking a “position contrary to or inconsistent
with its answer” followed by the statement that the trial court is “not
inclined to concur with Ayala’s claim of validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and
alleged OCT No. 242, absent of (sic) any admission to that effect by the
plaintiffs.” This is yet another non
sequitur argument on the part of the trial court which the CA correctly
pointed out in its own Decision.
Fourth Assignment of Error
As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the decision in the case of Guico v.
San Pedro[38]
was binding on the Carpos as it proceeded to discuss, thus:
In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved the conflicting
claims over a tract of land situated in barrio Tindig na Manga, Parañaque,
Rizal, which was subdivided into eleven (11) lots. The subject land was sought to be registered
by a certain Eduardo C. Guico on the basis of an accompanying plan Psu-80886,
which interestingly is also the basis of ALI’s TCT No. T-5333, now TCT No.
41262. Guico’s application was opposed
by, among others, Florentino Baltazar, on the basis of plan Psu 56007, under
which plaintiffs-appellees’ title was derived.
It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico on the
basis of Psu-80886 (Lot 3 is the subject matter of the instant case), Lot 10 in
favor of Baltazar on the basis of Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees’
title was based, and the rest to the heirs of Narciso Mayuga. While Baltazar claimed Lot 3 on the basis of
his Psu-56007, his claim was rejected and the Lot was adjudicated to Guico on
the basis of his Psu-80886.
It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffs-appellees
have on the subject property on the basis of Lot 3 Psu-56007, through their
predecessor-in-interest, Florentino Baltazar, the same had been clearly and
finally denied by the Supreme Court in Guico vs. San Pedro.
For res judicata to
apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be
final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Plaintiffs-appellees only have objections
with respect to the fourth requisite, offering the lame excuse that it is not
bound by such decision, there being no identity of parties in Guico vs. San
Pedro and the instant case.[39]
We agree with
petitioners that it is not apparent from an examination of Guico and the evidence on record that indeed the
predecessors-in-interest of ALI and the Carpos with respect to the subject
property are Eduardo Guico and Florentino Baltazar, especially since the
parties’ respective OCTs were not issued in these persons’ names but rather a
certain Alberto Yaptinchay and Apolonio Sabater. It cannot be categorically said that there
was identity of parties between the Guico
case and the instant case. Clearly, one of the elements of res judicata, i.e., that there
must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, is lacking. In any event, the CA’s questioned Decision
had sufficient basis in fact and law even without relying on the Guico case.
In conclusion, we find
that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in setting aside the
patently erroneous Summary Judgment of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated December 22, 2003 and the Resolution dated December 16, 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine (ret.), with then Associate Justice (now Retired Associate Justice of this Court) Cancio C. Garcia and Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao (ret.) concurring; rollo, pp. 9-27.
[2] Id.
at 90-94.
[3] Id. at 29-31.
[4] Records, pp. 1-7.
[5] In the Complaint, the area of the subject property was alleged to be 171,209 square meters but in TCT No. 296463, the property was described as having an area of 171,309 square meters.
[6] Paragraph 3.03 of the Complaint; records, p. 3.
[7] Id. at 5.
[8] Plaintiffs’ Manifestation dated March 7, 1995; id. at 91.
[9] Id. at 97-128.
[10] Id. at 133-A to 161.
[11] 72 Phil 415 (1941).
[12] Records, p. 133-A.
[13] Id. at 166.
[14] Id. at 282-292.
[15] Id. at 305-306.
[16] G.R. No. 132259, id. at 472; G.R. No. 132440, id. at 406.
[17] Rollo, pp. 92-94.
[18] CA rollo, p. 9.
[19] Id. at 177-194.
[20] Rollo, p. 27.
[21] Morris Carpo passed away on December 12, 1999 as shown by the death certificate attached to the Petition; id. at 87.
[22] Id. at 40.
[23] This should read “subsequently TCT No. T-5333” instead of “formerly TCT No. T-5333.”
[24] CA rollo, pp. 166-169.
[25] G.R. No. L-67451, September 28, 1987, 154 SCRA 328.
[26] From the annotations on TCT Nos. T-4367 and T-4368, it would appear that Ayala Corporation acquired the properties from Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.
[27] Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 25 at 330-346.
[28] Rollo, pp. 92-93.
[29] The technical description in OCT No. 242 began with the words: “A parcel of land (Lot 2, plan Psu-80886, SWO-20609, Case No. 976, G.L.R.O. Record No. 43516).”
[30] Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[31] G.R. No. 166645, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 797, 808.
[32] G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004, 433 SCRA 324.
[33] Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 25 at 346.
[34] G.R No. 161433, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 108, 115.
[35] Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[36] Rollo, p. 14.
[37] Id. at 92.
[38] Supra note 11.
[39] Rollo, pp. 24-25.