Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
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G.R. No. 158385 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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BRION, |
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ABAD, and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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JULIET AWISAN, represented by |
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her Attorney-in-Fact GREGORIO |
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Promulgated: |
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AWISAN, |
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Respondent. |
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February 12, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
A
person occupying a parcel of land, by himself and through his
predecessors-in-interest, enjoys the presumption of ownership. Anyone who desires to remove him from the
property must overcome such presumption by relying solely on the strength of his
claims rather than on the weakness of the defense.
This
Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assails the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court dated
1.
Awarding the
subject land in favor of the [respondent] with the exclusion of the area where
the residential house of the [petitioner] is erected.
2.
Ordering the
[petitioner] to vacate the rootcrop land and surrender its possession in favor
of the [respondent], and enjoining the [petitioner] to refrain from doing any
act disturbing the [respondent’s] peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
same.
3.
Cancelling
Tax Declaration No. 31297 of the [petitioner] insofar as the rootcrop land of
.0648 hectares is concerned, with the exclusion of his residential land. All other reliefs and remedies prayed for are
DENIED, there being no sufficient evidence to warrant granting them.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Factual
Antecedents
Respondent Juliet Awisan
claimed to be the owner[5] of a parcel of land in Sitio Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko,
Respondent’s
(Plaintiff’s) Allegations
According to respondent,
the 6.6698 hectare land was originally owned by her father, Cresencio
Cadwising. The latter testified that he
and his wife were able to consolidate ownership over the land by declaring them
from public land as well as by purchasing from adjoining landowners. He admitted including in his tax declaration
a communal sacred lot (patpatayan)
even if he did not acquire free patent title over the same. As for the properties he bought, these were
generally purchased without any documentation, save for two.[10]
Cadwising also claimed
having introduced improvements on the subject property as early as the 1960s.[11] The 6.6698 hectare land was mortgaged to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which acquired it in the foreclosure
sale. DBP then sold the land to one Tico
Tibong, who eventually donated the same to respondent.
Petitioner’s
(Defendant’s) Allegations
In his defense,
petitioner denied the encroachment and asserted ownership over the subject property. He maintained that he and his ancestors or
predecessors-in-interest have openly and continuously possessed the subject
land since time immemorial. He and his
siblings were born on that land and, at that time, the area around the house
was already planted with bananas, alnos,
and coffee.[12] When his mother died, he buried her in the
lot beside the house in 1975; while his father was buried near the same plot in
1993.[13] His own home had been standing on the property
for the past 20 years. Petitioner
insisted that during this entire time, no one disturbed his ownership and
possession thereof.[14]
Sometime in 1974,
petitioner declared the said land in his name for taxation purposes.[15]
The said Tax Declaration indicates that
the property consists of 200 square meters of residential lot and 648 square
meters of rootcrop land (or a total of 848 square meters).
Proceedings
before the Regional Trial Court
It is worth mentioning that both the complaint[16] and the pre-trial brief[17] of respondent alleged encroachment only on the northern portion of her 6.6698-hectare land. During trial, however,
respondent’s attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Awisan,[18] and respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, Cresencio Cadwising,[19] both alleged that there was an
encroachment in the southern portion
also. This was done without amending the
allegations of the complaint.
Confronted with this new allegation of encroachment on the southern portion, petitioner tried to
introduce his tax declaration over the same (in the name of his deceased
father), but was objected to by respondent on the ground of immateriality.[20] After such objection, however,
respondent surprisingly and inconsistently insisted that the ownership of the
southern portion was included in the complaint and was an issue in the case. The ensuing confusion over the subject of the
case is revealed in the following exchange between the parties’ lawyers:[21]
Atty. Awisan: Where
is the land in question located?
Palali: In
Tapapan, Bauko, sir.
Atty. Awisan: Where
is that situated in relation to your house?
Palali: It is near my house which
is enclosed with fence.
Atty. Awisan: How
about the land in question situated in
the southern portion, do you know that?
Palali: That
is the land our parents gave to us as inheritance. There are terraces there.
Atty. Awisan: So,
the land in question [is] located below your house and on the southern portion?
Atty. Bayogan: As
far as the southern portion is concerned, it is not included in the complaint.
Atty. Awisan: It
is included.
Atty. Bayogan: The
southern portion refer[s] to Lot 3 and it is not included in the
complaint. In fact when I started asking question regarding this land, the counsel
objected.
Atty. Awisan: This
land indicated as
The trial court,
apparently relying on the allegations of the complaint, ruled on the northern portion as the subject property
of the case.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After due trial,
the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc,
In contrast, the trial court duly
verified during the ocular inspection the existence of the improvements
introduced by petitioner and his predecessors on the subject property.[26] Moreover, the trial court observed that the
witnesses for the petitioner all lived continuously since their births within
or near Sitio Camambaey in
Tapapan and that they knew the land very well.
They knew petitioner and his predecessors, as well as the improvements
introduced by them to the land. Thus, the
trial court found that the petitioner presented overwhelming proof of actual,
open, continuous and physical possession of the property since time
immemorial. Petitioner’s possession,
coupled with his tax declarations, is strong evidence of ownership which
convinced the court of his better right to the property.[27]
For purposes of clarity, we cite the
dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision thus:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendant Modesto Palali and against the plaintiff
Juliet C. Awisan, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Gregorio B. Awisan, as
follows:
a)
Ordering the dismissal of the complaint and
costs against the plaintiff;
b)
Adjudging the
defendant Modesto Palali as the owner and lawful possessor of the subject property; and
c)
The court
cannot however grant the counterclaim of defendant for lack of evidence to
prove the same.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent
appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA, which reversed the same. The CA found that petitioner failed to prove
actual possession of the entire 6.6698
hectare land, which the CA believed to be the subject of the case. According to the appellate court, petitioner
was only able to prove actual occupation of the portion where his house was
located and the area below where he had planted fruit-bearing plants.[29]
The CA also
ruled that based on the
ocular inspection report of the trial
court,
petitioner’s possession did not extend to the entire 6.6698 hectares. In its own words:
Likewise,
the report on the ocular inspection of the land in question divulges that the
alleged possession of the land by [petitioner] Modesto Palali does not extend
to the entire 6.6698 hectares of the subject land. Not even in the sketch plan of the land does
it illustrate that the possession of the [petitioner] refers to the entire
subject land. Instead, the possession of
[petitioner] merely points to certain portions of the subject land as drawn and
prepared by the tax mappers.
From the
foregoing testimony, no sufficient indicia could be inferred that the
possession of the [petitioner] refers to the entire portion of the land.[30]
The appellate
court also refused to give credence to petitioner’s tax declaration. The CA held that petitioner’s Tax Declaration
No. 31793, which covers only an 848-square meter property, is incongruous with
his purported claim of ownership
over the entire 6.6698-hectare land.
Proceeding from
this premise, the CA gave greater weight to the documentary and testimonial
evidence of respondent. The presumption
of regularity was given to the public documents from which respondent traced
her title to the subject property.
Thus, the CA awarded
the entire 6.6698-hectare property to respondent and ordered the cancellation
of petitioner’s tax declaration (except for the 200-square meter residential
lot thereof which was not being claimed by respondent).[31]
Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the unfavorable Decision, but his motion was denied for lack
of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Preliminary Matter
The CA Decision is based on a mistaken understanding of the subject
property
It
is apparent that the CA Decision proceeded from an erroneous understanding of
what the subject property actually is and what the trial court actually ruled
upon. The CA was under the mistaken
impression that the subject property was the entire 6.6698 hectares of land allegedly owned by respondent under
her Tax Declaration No. 147. Because of
this, the CA ruled against petitioner on the ground that he failed to prove
possession of the entire 6.6698
hectares. The CA also disregarded
petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 31793 (despite being coupled with actual
possession) because the said tax declaration covered only an 848-square meter
property and did not cover the entire
6.6698 hectare property. This is clear
from the following text lifted from the CA Decision:
The trial court’s finding that the
defendant-appellee had acquired the subject land by virtue of acquisitive
prescription cannot be countenanced. At
the outset, the subject land being
claimed by the plaintiff-appellant as described in the complaint is the 6.6698
hectares land [boundaries omitted]. The said description is with the exclusion of
the portion of land where the residential house of the defendant-appellee is
erected. However, the adverse and exclusive possession offered by the defendant-appellee,
which includes his tax receipt, does not refer to the entire land consisting of 6.6698 hectares being claimed by the
plaintiff-appellant. x x x The witnesses for the defendant-appellee
testified that indeed Modesto Palali’s predecessors-in-interest have once built
a house in Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mt. Province, but whether or not the defendant-appellee or his predecessor-in-interest
have actually, exclusively, notoriously, and adversely possessed the entire 6.6698 hectares of land could
not be deduced from their testimonies.
It could be gleaned from the testimony of Consigno Saligen, that what
the defendant-appellee actually possessed and claim as their own is merely that
portion where the house is erected and that portion of land below the house
where Modesto Palali planted fruit-bearing plants. x x x
Likewise,
the report on ocular inspection of the land in question divulges that the alleged possession of the land by
defendant-appellee
From
the foregoing testimony, no sufficient indicia could be inferred that the
possession of the defendant-appellee refers to the entire portion of the land.[32]
This was perhaps
not entirely the appellate court’s fault, because a reading of the issues
presented by respondent to the CA gives the wrong impression that the subject
property is the entire 6.6698
hectares:
x x x [T]he
plaintiff-appellant elevated the matter on appeal assigning the following
errors committed by the trial court:
I
The trial court erred in
failing to consider the overwhelming superior documentary and oral evidence of
the plaintiff Juliet C. Awisan showing her ownership on (sic) the land in question consisting of 6.6698 hectares described in her complaint
II
The trial court erred in adjudicating the land in question to the defendant
Modesto Palali who is a squatter on the land whose tax declaration merely
overlapped or duplicated that of the plaintiff and which covered only a small portion of 200 square meters of residential
portion [sic] and 648 square meter of rootcrop land.
x x x x[33]
The foregoing
formulation of the issues presented by respondent before the CA erroneously
described “the land in question” as “consisting of 6.6698 hectares” and
erroneously stated that the trial court “adjudicated the land in question to
[petitioner]”. Said formulation is very
misleading because the case before the trial court did not involve the
ownership of the entire 6.6698 hectares, but merely the northern portion thereof – the property actually occupied by petitioner
and much smaller than 6.6698 hectares. Even
if we go back to the respondent’s complaint, we would find there that
respondent is claiming encroachment merely of the “northern portion” of her
6.6698-hectare property, and not of the entire 6.6698 property.[34]
Neither did the
trial court adjudicate to petitioner the entire 6.6698-hectare land; it simply
upheld petitioner’s right to the property he is actually occupying. It only declared petitioner as the lawful
owner and possessor of the “subject property”, which is the property to the
north of the 6.6698-hectare land and occupied by petitioner. This is evident from the trial court’s
summary of the facts established by the respondent and her witnesses, to wit:
During
the hearing of the case, plaintiff and her witnesses established and disclosed:
x x x that only a portion of the entire
6.6 hectares in its northern portion located below and above the residential
house of the defendant Modesto Palali is now the land in question as
properly shown in the sketch of the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 147 in
the name of Juliet Awisan x x x.[35]
Proceeding from a wrong premise as to what is the subject property, the
CA utterly failed to appreciate the evidence as they relate to the parties’
claims. Thus, while the general rule is
that this
Court is not a trier of facts, and that in a petition for review under Rule 45,
only questions of law may be raised, the Court is behooved to admit the instant
case as an exception.[36]
Issue
The issue in this case is who between the parties has the better right
to the subject property.
Our Ruling
Having gone over
the parties’ evidence before the trial court, we find adequate support for the
trial court’s ruling in favor of petitioner.
The CA erred in reversing the trial court’s findings, particularly
because, as discussed above, such reversal was premised on the CA’s erroneous
understanding of the subject property.
As found by the
trial court, petitioner was able to prove his and his predecessors’ actual,
open, continuous and physical possession of the subject property dating at
least to the pre-war era (aside from petitioner’s tax declaration over the
subject property). Petitioner’s
witnesses were long time residents of Sitio
Camambaey. They lived on the
land, knew their neighbors and were familiar with the terrain. They were witnesses to the introduction of
improvements made by petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest.
From their
consistent, unwavering, and candid testimonies, we find that petitioner’s
grandfather Mocnangan occupied the land during the pre-war era. He planted camote on the property because
this was the staple food at that time.
He then gave the subject property to his daughter Tammam, while he gave
a separate one to his son Pacolan Mocnangan.
In the 1960s, Tammam and her husband Palalag cultivated the land, built
a cogon home, and started a family there.
Palalag introduced terraces and, together with his sons, built earth
fences around the property. Palalag’s
family initially planted bananas, coffee, and oranges; they later added
avocadoes, persimmons, and pineapples.
When Tammam and Palalag died, their son, petitioner herein, buried them
in the subject property and continued cultivating the land. He also constructed a new home.
On the other
hand, respondent relied merely on her tax declaration, but failed to prove
actual possession insofar as the subject property is concerned. To be sure, respondent attempted to prove possession of the subject property. Her predecessor-in-interest, Cadwising, had
allegedly introduced improvements like a piggery, poultry, terracing,
plantings, and a barbed wire fence.
However, not one of these alleged improvements was found during the
ocular inspection conducted by the trial court.
The absence of all his alleged improvements on the property is
suspicious in light of his assertion that he has a caretaker living near the
subject property for 20 years. Cadwising did not even bother to explain the
absence of the improvements. The trial
court’s rejection of Cadwising’s assertions regarding the introduction of
improvements is therefore not baseless.
Thus, respondent
having failed to prove possession, her claim rests solely on her tax
declaration. But tax declarations, by
themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership of real property. In
the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of the
land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.[37] Respondent’s tax declaration, therefore,
cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession (by himself
and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war.
Neither can respondent
rely on the public instruments dealing with the 6.6698-hectare property covered
by her tax declaration. Such public
documents merely show the successive transfers of the property covered by said
documents. They do not conclusively prove that the transferor actually owns the
property purportedly being transferred, especially as far as third parties are
concerned. For it may very well be that
the transferor does not actually own the property he has transferred, in which
case he transfers no better right to his transferee. No
one can give what he does not have – nemo dat quod non habet.[38] Thus, since respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest Cadwising appeared not to have any right to the subject property, he transferred no
better right to his transferees, including respondent.
All told, we hold that as between
the petitioner and the respondent, it is the petitioner who has the better
claim or title to the subject property.
While the respondent merely relied on her tax declaration, petitioner
was able to prove actual possession of the subject property coupled with his
tax declaration. We have ruled in
several cases that possession, when coupled with a tax declaration, is a
weighty evidence of ownership.[39] It certainly is more weighty and preponderant
than a tax declaration alone.
The
preponderance of evidence is therefore clearly in favor of petitioner,
particularly considering that, as the actual possessor under claim of
ownership, he enjoys the presumption of ownership.[40] Moreover, settled is the principle that a
party seeking to recover real property must rely on the strength of her case
rather than on the weakness of the defense.[41] The burden of proof rests on the party who
asserts the affirmative of an issue. For
he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that
fact. Having failed to discharge her
burden to prove her affirmative allegations, we find that the trial court
rightfully dismissed respondent’s complaint.
A final note. Like the trial court, we make no ruling
regarding the southern portion of the
property (or
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 27, 2002 Decision as well
as the April 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
52942 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
May 24, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc,
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-17.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] As donee in a Deed of Donation dated
[6] Before the conduct of the pre-trial
conference, respondent sold a portion of her property to a third party (Deed of
Sale of a Portion of Real Estate dated May 24, 1994, id. at 59). Thus, her alleged landholding was reduced to 5.4326
hectares. For some reason unbeknown
to the Court, respondent continued to refer to her property as consisting of
6.6698 hectares (
[7] The plaintiff describes the land donated to her as follows:
ROOTCROP
LAND – situated at sitio Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mt. Province, bounded on
the north by a Creek and the Provincial Road; on the south by a creek and
public land; on the east by the provincial road, and west by public land and
the municipal road, containing an area of 6.6698 hectares, more or less, and
declared for taxation purposes in the name of plaintiff under TD No. 147 of the
Municipal Tax Rolls of Bauko, Mt. Province, id. at 1.
[8]
[9]
[10] Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property, id.
at 75; Deed of Absolute
[11] TSN,
[12] TSN,
[13]
[14] Records,
p. 32.
[15] Tax
Declaration No. 31297 was issued in 1974, id. at 111.
[16]
That said acts
of defendant in encroaching, entering the land of herein plaintiff,
particularly the said NORTHERN portion thereof, and thereafter declaring the
same surreptitiously for taxation purposes as abovementioned, and thereby
claiming ownership and possession of said NORTHERN portion, is patently
illegal, fraudulent and unjustified, and which acts of defendant constitute a
cloud and a thorn to the title of ownership of and possession of herein
plaintiff, which she now prays for the removal and consequently cleared and
dissipated in accordance with law x x x .
[17]
x
x x That since its acquisition, plaintiff and family, have been in open,
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the same, tilling and
cultivating it until the present without anyone questioning their said
possession and ownership, including defendant herein. It was only sometime the early months of
1992, and before the aforementioned donation was formalized, plaintiff, who is
residing at Baguio City, sought assistance from her father-in-law (herein
atty-in-fact, Gregorio Awisan) to look into the present status of the said
land, as a result of which, the latter informed that one by the name of Modesto
Palali x x x have encroached and actually entered the property, particularly the northern side thereof, and even
declared a portion thereof with an area of 848 square meters, more or less, as
reflected in the latter’s Tax Declaration bearing No. 31793 of the Municipal
Tax Rolls of Bauko, Mt. Province.
[18] TSN,
Q: Do you know the portions of this land
entered into by the defendants [sic]?
A: Yes.
x x x x
Q: Will you describe the portion of that
property?
A: North is near his [petitioner’s] house
maybe about 2,000 to 3,000 square meters.
In the south is about 1,500 square meters.
[19] TSN,
Q: Beside this
A: This is the land which Palali entered.
Q: Is that the land that is now being
litigated in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: I show you Exh. “C-6” as claimed by
Modesto Palali, what does this exhibit refer to?
A: This is another portion which Palali
entered.
Q: Is this the portion which is the subject of
this case?
A: A part of the case.
[20] TSN,
Q: Do you have tax declaration on the land
in question?
A: There is.
x
x x x
Q: I am showing to you Exhs. 1, 2, 3 which
are tax declaration nos. 31297, 32674, and 31793; are these the tax
declarations on the land in question?
A: Yes, sir.
x
x x x
Q: During ocular inspection also, the
plaintiff’s representative [sic] named Cresencio Cadwising included another portion to the south of the property in question; who
owns that property that was included by Cresencio Cadwising on the south?
A: The southern part is also owned by my
parents, and distributed among us which we in turn gave to our children.
Q: In other words, that property which was
included by Cresencio Cadwising at the southern side during ocular inspection
also belongs to the Palali clan?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: Does your father have tax declaration
over that southern property?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you be able to bring that to court
if necessary?
A: Yes, sir.
Atty:
Awisan (for plaintiff): Immaterial.
Court: Proceed with matters related to the issue.
[21] TSN,
[22] Decision
dated
[23] The ocular inspection was
conducted on
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Rollo, pp. 87-88.
[30]
[31] The
CA described the subject property as follows:
At
the outset, the subject land being claimed by plaintiff-appellant as described
in the complaint is the 6.6698 hectares land bounded by a canal on the
northeast and pine land on the northwest, on the west by a barangay road, by
the pine land on the southwest and riceland on the southeast, and on the east
by a provincial road. The said
description is with the exclusion of the
portion of land where the residential house of the defendant-appellee is
erected.
[32]
[33]
[34] Records, p. 154.
[35]
[36] Tio v. Abayata, G.R. No. 160898, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 175, 184; Sampayan
v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 200, 207-208
(2005).
[37] Daclag v. Macahilig, G.R. No. 159578,
July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 137, 151-152; Cequeña v. Bolante, 386 Phil. 419,
430-431 (2000).
[38] Daclag v. Macahilig, supra at 150-151.
[39] Cequeña v. Bolante, supra; Llanes v.
Republic, G.R. No. 177947,
November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, 271; Heirs
of Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon,
G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391, 410.
[40] Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,
424 Phil. 757, 771 (2002).
[41] New Civil Code, Article 434.
[42] Rules of Court, Rule 10, Section 5.
[43] Supra
note 20.