BIBIANA
FARMS AND MILLS, INC.,
Petitioner, - versus - ARTURO LADO, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 157861
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: February 2, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1]
filed by the Bibiana Farms and Mills, Inc. (petitioner),
assailing the Decision[2]
dated August 21, 2002 and the Resolution[3]
dated January 27, 2003 of the Former Thirteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66005 entitled “Arturo Lado v. National Labor Relations Commission (Fifth Division)
and Bibiana Farms and Mills, Inc.”
The Antecedents
The
facts of the case are briefly summarized below.
The
petitioner is an agricultural corporation located in Katangawan,
On
P3.50 per sack. Manalo
then gave Manzo a note containing the number and words “3,000/mix-mix” and told
her to proceed to the warehouse. Manzo did
and showed the note to Lado. The latter
in turn showed her the bundles of empty sacks (50 pieces per bundle) available
for sale. At Manzo’s request, Lado
loaded 68 bundles (or 3,400 pieces of empty sacks) in the dump truck for
unloading at the gate after payment. Upon
payment, however, Manalo only accepted the cash payment for 60 bundles (3,000
pieces) and refused to accept Manzo’s personal check for the excess; thus,
Manzo only paid for the original 60 bundles purchased. Instead of personally overseeing the
segregation and unloading of the excess 8 bundles on being informed (through
the delivery receipt and the gate pass) that only 60 bundles were paid for,
Lado allegedly delegated the task. The excess 8 bundles, however, were not
removed from the truck and the whole lot was unloaded at the gate. When Manalo passed by the gate on her way
home, she saw the sacks “dumped outside the guardhouse.” She asked for a count of the sacks as they
appeared to be more than the 60 bundles that Manzo purchased.[4] She confirmed that there were 68 bundles
outside the guardhouse.
On
September 8, 1998, the petitioner’s General Operations Manager/Production
Supervisor, Peter L. Lim (Lim),
issued two (2) inter-office memoranda[5]
directing Lado to submit his written explanation on: (1) the release of 3,400 pieces of empty
sacks when only 3,000 pieces were duly paid for and covered by receipt, and (2)
the release of one-use sack when Manalo’s note expressly authorized the release
of mix-use sacks.
On
On
Later
on the same day, Lim issued a notice informing Lado that management would
conduct further investigation/inquiry on the incident at
On
As
scheduled, the petitioner conducted its investigation of the incident on
On
On
September 15, 1998, Lim issued Lado a Notice of Termination,[12] dismissing
him from the service effective upon receipt, for “serious misconduct,
dishonesty, willful breach of trust, fraud, loss of confidence and other
grounds,” based on the results of the investigation and after considering his
written explanations dated September 9, 1998 and September 10, 1998. Lado received the Notice of Termination on
Lado
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner and Lim. The cases for illegal suspension and illegal
dismissal were consolidated.
In
defense, the petitioner alleged that Lado was validly dismissed for loss of
trust and confidence due to dishonesty and fraud in the release of the excess
400 empty sacks, as well as for other infractions, such as extortion from laborers
under his supervision in exchange for overtime work, habitual tardiness and
absenteeism. It also claimed that Lado was afforded due process when he was
required to submit his written explanations on the empty-sacks incident; when
he was preventively suspended and duly informed of the investigation to be
conducted on September 11, 1998 (which he did not attend); and when he received
the Notice of Termination on September 18, 1998.
THE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
DECISIONS
Labor
Arbiter (Arbiter) Arturo P. Aponesto
dismissed the complaints for lack of merit.[14] The Arbiter gave weight to the affidavits of
the petitioner’s witnesses regarding Lado’s involvement and noted that they were not motivated by ill-will
and did not testify falsely against Lado. He found that Lado committed fraud or
willful breach of his employer’s trust in releasing 3,400 pieces of empty sacks
despite Manalo’s note stating that only 3,000 pieces were to be purchased by
Manzo. The Arbiter also found that Lado
was afforded due process, rejecting Lado’s contention that he was not notified
of the investigation that led to his dismissal.
The
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the Arbiter’s decision on appeal,[15] ruling
that Lado had been illegally dismissed.
It found that Lado had no intention to defraud the petitioner and that the
petitioner’s accusation of fraud for releasing 68 bundles of empty sacks was a
“product of unrestrained imagination.” The
NLRC ordered Lado’s reinstatement with full backwages from
The
petitioner moved for reconsideration.[16] In its Resolution[17] of
Lado
moved[18] but
failed[19] to
secure a reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution of
The CA Decision
In
its Decision[21] of
The
appellate court also found that the petitioner failed to accord Lado due
process because he did not receive the notice for the investigation conducted
on
Accordingly,
the CA ordered Lado’s reinstatement with full backwages from
The
petitioner came to us through the present petition after it failed to secure a reconsideration
of the CA Decision.[22]
The Petition
The
petitioner submits that Lado was validly dismissed since his separation from
the service was based on the release to the buyer under fraudulent
circumstances of more than the empty sacks paid for and authorized. It insists that since Lado’s position involved
trust and confidence in the care and custody of the petitioner’s properties,
his actions in Manzo’s purchase of the empty sacks led to the conclusion that
he intended to defraud the company. The
petitioner stresses that Lado’s dismissal satisfied the requirements of due
process since he was given the opportunity to explain his side through the two
(2) show-cause letters, the formal notice of preventive suspension, and the notice
of employment termination.
The
Case for the REspondent
Lado,
on the other hand, contends that the petitioner raised no new matters to merit the
Court’s favorable consideration, and that the arguments and evidence presented
by both parties were duly considered and evaluated by the CA. He submits that the petitioner failed to
prove his supposed fraudulent intent and likewise failed to afford him due
process when he was not informed by the two (2) inter-office memoranda that his
infractions would cost him his job of more than 16 years.
The issues
The
core issue focuses on loss of trust and confidence. In the context of the Rule 65 petition before
the CA, the issue is whether the CA correctly found that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Lado was legally dismissed for loss of
trust and confidence.
The Court's Ruling
We find the
petition meritorious.
At
the outset, we clarify that we are generally precluded in a Rule 45 petition
from reviewing factual findings of the CA; we are not triers of facts. However,
the conflicting factual findings of the Arbiter and the NLRC,
on one hand, and the CA, on the other, compel us to depart from this general
rule, and to wade into the consideration of the presented evidence.[23]
Under
the Labor Code, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee are
two-fold, consisting of substantive and procedural aspects. Not only must the dismissal be for a just or
authorized cause; the basic requirements of procedural due process – notice and
hearing – must likewise be observed before an employee may be dismissed.
Without the concurrence of the two, the termination is illegal in the eyes of
the law, for employment is a property right that the holder cannot be deprived
of without due process.[24] The
burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the employee’s dismissal has
met these due process requirements. The case of the employer must stand or fall
on its own merits and not on the weakness of the employee’s defense.[25]
Lado’s
notice of termination of employment, contained in the petitioner’s memorandum of
On the supposed fraudulent intent which became the
basis for lack of trust and confidence, fraud as a just cause for terminating
an employee’s services, particularly for lack of trust and loss of confidence,
being defined as any act, omission or concealment which involves a breach of
legal duty, trust or confidence justly reposed and is injurious to another,
implies willfulness or wrongful intent.
In fact, under Article 283 (c) of the Labor Code, the
breach of trust must be willful and a breach is willful, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly and inadvertently (Atlas Consolidated Mining Development Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 290 SCRA 479).
In this case at bar, the release of the excess 400
empty sacks by herein petitioner could not and cannot be considered with
fraudulent intent considering that it was not willful although done
intentionally and knowingly but with justifiable reason x x x.
We
do not agree that the evidence presented did not support the conclusion that a valid
cause for dismissal existed.
Lado was no ordinary rank-and-file employee. As warehouseman, his duties involved the
handling of incoming and outgoing feed ingredients, classifying feed
ingredients, classifying and controlling feeds empty sacks, and supervising
feed mill laborers. He had, as the
Arbiter noted, access to company property.
As early as November 17, 1982 or fifteen (15) days into his employment
by the company, the petitioner’s then operations manager, Froilan G. Tecson,
issued Lado a memorandum[27]
directing him to devise means to immediately check the full sacks sent to the stations
and the empties being returned, and to take extra care of their accounting and
inventory, down to the last sack. In
short, the petitioner tasked Lado with the close monitoring and handling of
company property, especially the outflow of full sacks of feeds destined for
the stations and the return of empty sacks, to avoid or minimize losses.
Nowhere in the record of the case does it appear that
Lado denied the issuance of the memo. He
was therefore aware of his duties and understood or should have understood why the
memo had been issued – to make him, as warehouseman, extra careful in the
handling, monitoring and safekeeping of the company property under his
charge. In other words, Lado held a
position of trust and confidence. It was
this trust that he had to uphold in the afternoon of
Manzo, the purchaser, transacted with Manalo, the
petitioner’s cashier, who quoted the price of empty sacks at P3.50 per
piece. Manzo only ordered 3,000 empty
sacks; to verify their availability, she proceeded to Lado’s warehouse bearing Manalo’s
note on which was written “3,000/mix-mix.”
Manzo showed the note to Lado. Versions
of what exactly happened after Lado saw the note vary because the testimonies
of Lado and Manalo on the sequence of events, although not necessarily
contradictory, differed in emphasis.[28]
In his affidavit dated January 19, 1999 which he
submitted in the compulsory arbitration proceedings and which was quoted by the
CA,[29]
Lado stated that Manzo showed him the note from Manalo, at which point he
showed her the empty sacks available for sale; after inspecting the empty
sacks, Manzo went back to the business office and on her return, she requested
the counting and loading of 68 bundles of empty sacks at 50 pieces per bundle
which she intended to buy; after loading, the sacks were transported first to
the business office, for Manzo to get a gate pass after paying the sacks she
purchased, and then to the gate where the bundled sacks would be unloaded;
Manzo came back and told him that she only bought 60 bundles; he told her to leave the excess 8
sacks behind, and went to the gate to advise the guard to segregate and place
the extra bundles inside the compound.
On the other hand, Manalo, in her affidavit dated
February 23, 1999[30]
(also cited by the CA), deposed that Lado, without waiting for the delivery
receipt and gate pass, in contravention of the usual office procedure,
immediately loaded the empty sacks into the dump truck; Manzo returned to the
office and paid Manalo P10,500.00 in cash for the 60 bundles for which
she gave Manzo the delivery receipt and the gate pass for the 60 bundles; after
office hours at around 5:05 p.m., while she was leaving the company compound in
a service vehicle, she noticed the empty sacks dumped just outside the guardhouse; the
bundles appeared to be more than the 60 bundles or 3,000 pieces purchased by
Manzo who was the only purchaser of empty sacks that day; apprehensive, she
ordered the guards on duty to count the bundles and discovered, after the
count, that there was an excess of 8 bundles or 400 pieces; the dump truck driver
(Andy Saclot) who unloaded the empty sacks outside the company guardhouse told
her that 68 bundles were loaded on the dump truck pursuant to Lado’s
instructions.
On the basis principally of Lado’s role in the empty sacks transaction,
the labor tribunals adjudged Lado’s dismissal to be for a just cause. The Arbiter found Lado to have committed
fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in him by his employer. The Arbiter also found that Lado’s employment
with the petitioner is far from exemplary because of tardiness and absences
from work without leave of absence in the past, as well as exaction of money
from laborers in exchange for overtime work.
After considering the parties’ submission, we are
convinced that Lado’s acts that almost led to the loss of 400 empty sacks,
constituted not only a violation of company rules and regulations, but also a
serious infraction resulting in his employer’s loss of trust and confidence in
him. His act of loading 68 bundles of
empty sacks, despite the authority to deliver only 60 bundles, was not just in
anticipation of the possible purchase by Manzo of the entire lot of empty sacks
as the CA opined; it was part of a scheme to transport the entire lot, a part of
which was unpaid, out of company premises.
This is the only conclusion that we can draw when Lado had all the 68
bundles loaded into the truck after Manzo presented to him Manalo’s note
clearly stating “3,000 mix-mix.” This
note clearly indicated that Manzo and Manalo agreed that Manzo was only buying 3,000
pieces of empty sacks. Yet, Lado disregarded
this note on the justification that Manzo expressed the desire to purchase the
entire lot shown to her. Lado, in fact,
was subsequently presented with the receipt and gate pass for only 3,000 empty
sacks, yet again failed to act on this clear evidence of the purchase and the
overloading that he had made.
On the assumption that Manzo indeed expressed the
desire to purchase all of the 68 bundles, Lado should have asked Manzo to go
back to Manalo to have the purchase transaction adjusted and to secure a
receipt and gate pass from Manalo expressly indicating that she paid for the 68
bundles of empty sacks. Despite the
absence of any clearance or instructions from Manalo, Lado had the 68 bundles
loaded. Subsequently, despite the
receipt and gate pass for only 60 bundles, Lado failed to ensure that the
excess were unloaded. At the very least,
this is negligence and mishandling of the grossest kind of property under his
care.
Lado’s excuses that he had asked Manzo to leave the
extra 400 sacks at the gate when Manzo told him that she only paid for 3,000
pieces and that he went to the gate to tell the guard to segregate the 8
bundles and to place them inside the compound are critical points that can
exculpate Lado from liability.
Unfortunately, they lack corroboration.
The stark reality is that the entire lot was dumped unsegregated outside
the company guardhouse and was ready for pick up. Had Manalo not chanced upon the bundles of
sacks on her way out of company premises, the entire lot would have been loaded
without hindrance on Manzo’s truck. That
the entire 68 bundles were all dumped outside the guardhouse, cleared for
release and ready for pick up, belied Lado’s claim that he had ordered a
segregation and unloading of the unpaid portion of the lot.
Interestingly, when Manalo confronted Lado on the
excess empty sacks when the delivery receipt was for only 3,000 pieces, Lado could
only try to convince Manalo to allow the excess to be paid by Manzo’s
check. Although Lado denied this company
claim, the weight of the other evidence leads us to disbelieve this
denial. At that point, Lado had been
caught red-handed in a scheme to spirit off unpaid company sacks. There was really no excuse he could offer
Manalo, given the written authorizations for the release of only 3,000 empty
sacks; thus he could only plead that the excess be paid for by check. To be sure, the failure of the guard to heed
his unloading orders and the purported time constraint could have been given as
justifications. That no such excuse was
then given only leads to the inference that, right then and there, the guards
would have denied the alleged unloading instructions; thus, the lame offer to
pay by check was the only way out given.
Based on these considerations, we can only conclude that
Lado has become unfit to remain in employment with the petitioner. When he disregarded Manalo’s note, Lado violated
company procedures, laying the company open to the possibility of loss. This is already serious misconduct for which
he should be held accountable. When he
failed to unload despite the clear obligation to do so, he consummated his end
of the deal that would have led to the loss of company property and thereby
violated his fiduciary duty as custodian of company property.
In. Fungo v.
x x x a) loss
of confidence should not be simulated; b) it should not be used as subterfuge
for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; c) it may not be
arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and
d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken
in bad faith.
We find these guidelines complied with in the
present case. To reiterate, Lado held a
position of trust and confidence and was given access to and authority over
company property with clear tasks and guidelines laid down very early in his
employment.[32]
Like any business entity, the petitioner
has every right to protect itself from actual threats to the viability of its
operations. Lado, given what happened on
On
the issue of due process
The
CA held that the respondent was denied due process when he failed to adduce
evidence in his behalf during the investigation conducted on
We
find this to be a gross error on the part of the CA.
The
records disclose that notice of the investigation was duly sent to the respondent’s
home address on
The
essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard; it is the denial of this
opportunity that constitutes violation of due process of law.[36] The respondent was given the opportunity to be
heard when a proper notice of investigation was sent to him, although the
notice did not reach him for reasons outside the petitioner’s control. He was not also totally unheard on the matter
as he was able to explain his side through the two (2) explanation letters he
submitted. These letters are clear indications that he intimately knew of the
matter for which he was being investigated.
If he was denied due process at all, the denial was with respect to the
charges of extortion, tardiness and absenteeism, which are grounds invoked
separately from loss of trust and confidence and which were not serious
considerations in the dismissal that followed. We need not therefore consider
these grounds as material to the present case.
All told, we
find that the CA gravely abused its
discretion when it grossly misread the evidence before it; the appellate court
should have dismissed Lado for a just cause determined after observance of due
process.
WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated
additional Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Roberto A.
Abad, per Special Order No. 812 dated
[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired), with Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez (deceased) and Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, pp. 20-32.
[3]
[4] Id. at 59-60; complainant’s Position Paper dated January 19, 1999; see also Manalo’s affidavit to respondent’s Position Paper dated February 23, 1999.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Decision dated
[15] Resolution of
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Supra note 2.
[22] Per Resolution dated
[23] Cadiz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153784, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 232, 241; Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 737, 758.
[24] Bughaw, Jr. v. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 173151, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 307, 317-318.
[25] De Jesus v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 151158, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 489, 495; PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 153031, December 14, 2006, 511 SCRA 44, 57.
[26] Supra note 12.
[27] Rollo, p. 62; Position Paper for the Respondents, p. 2, paragraph 1.
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] G.R. No. 152531,
[32] Supra note 28.
[33] Colgate
Palmolive Philippine, Inc. v. Ople, No. L-73681,
[34] Rollo, p. 97.
[35]
[36] Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.154503, February 29, 2008, 547 SCRA 220, 243; Eastern Overseas Employment Center, Inc. v. Bea, G.R. No. 143023, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 384, 392.