EN BANC
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, g.r. No. 126297
INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO,
C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO,
JR.,
NACHURA,
- v e r s u s
- LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA,
JR.,
PEREZ and
MENDOZA, JJ.**
THE COURT OF
APPEALS and NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
NATIVIDAD [substituted by
her G.R. No. 126467
children Marcelino Agana
III,
Enrique Agana, Jr.,
Emma Agana-Andaya,
Jesus Agana and Raymund
Petitioners,
-
v e r s u
s -
THE
COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN FUENTES,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
MIGUEL AMPIL, G.R. No. 127590
Petitioner,
- v e r s u s
-
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE
Respondents.
Promulgated:
February
2, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
R E
S O L U T I O N
With prior leave of court,[1] petitioner
Professional Services, Inc. (PSI) filed a second motion for
reconsideration[2] urging referral thereof to the Court en banc and seeking modification of the
decision dated January 31, 2007 and resolution dated February 11, 2008 which
affirmed its vicarious and direct liability for damages to respondents Enrique
Agana and the heirs of Natividad Agana (Aganas).
Manila Medical Services, Inc. (MMSI),[3] Asian Hospital, Inc. (AHI),[4]
and Private Hospital Association of the Philippines (PHAP)[5] all
sought to intervene in these cases
invoking the common ground that, unless modified, the assailed decision
and resolution will jeopardize the financial viability of private hospitals and
jack up the cost of health care.
The
Special First Division of the Court granted the motions for intervention of
MMSI, AHI and PHAP (hereafter intervenors),[6]
and referred en consulta to the Court en banc the motion
for prior leave of court and the second motion for reconsideration of PSI.[7]
Due to paramount public interest, the
Court en banc accepted the referral[8]
and heard the parties on oral arguments on one particular issue:
whether a hospital may be held liable for the negligence of physicians-consultants
allowed to practice in its premises.[9]
To recall
the salient facts, PSI, together with Dr. Miguel Ampil (Dr. Ampil) and Dr. Juan
Fuentes (Dr. Fuentes), was impleaded by
Enrique Agana and Natividad Agana
(later substituted by her heirs), in a complaint[10]
for damages filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
96, for
the injuries suffered by Natividad
when Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
neglected to remove from her body two gauzes[11]
which were used in the surgery they performed on her on April 11, 1984 at the
Medical City General Hospital. PSI was impleaded as owner, operator and manager
of the hospital.
In a decision[12]
dated
On petition for review, this Court, in
its
The Court
premised the direct liability of PSI to the Aganas on the following facts and
law:
First, there existed between PSI and
Dr. Ampil an employer-employee relationship as contemplated in the
Second, by accrediting Dr. Ampil and advertising his
qualifications, PSI created the public impression that he was its agent.[22]
Enrique testified that it was on account of Dr. Ampil's accreditation with PSI
that he conferred with said doctor about his wife's (Natividad's) condition.[23]
After his meeting with Dr. Ampil, Enrique asked Natividad to personally consult
Dr. Ampil.[24] In
effect, when Enrigue and Natividad engaged the services of Dr. Ampil, at the
back of their minds was that the latter was a staff member of a prestigious
hospital. Thus, under the doctrine of apparent authority applied in
Finally, as owner and operator of
PSI is now
asking this Court to reconsider the foregoing rulings for these reasons:
I
The declaration in the 31 January 2007 Decision vis-a-vis
the 11 February 2009 Resolution that the ruling in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 134354, December 29, 1999) that “an employer-employee relations
exists between hospital and their consultants” stays should be set aside for
being inconsistent with or contrary to the import of the resolution granting
the hospital's motion for reconsideration in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals (G.R.
No. 134354, April 11, 2002), which is applicable to PSI since the Aganas failed
to prove an employer-employee relationship between PSI and Dr. Ampil and PSI
proved that it has no control over Dr. Ampil. In fact, the trial court has
found that there is no employer-employee relationship in this case and that the
doctor's are independent contractors.
II
Respondents Aganas engaged Dr. Miguel Ampil as their
doctor and did not primarily and specifically look to the Medical City Hospital
(PSI) for medical care and support; otherwise stated, respondents Aganas did
not select Medical City Hospital (PSI) to provide medical care because of any
apparent authority of Dr. Miguel Ampil as its agent since the latter was chosen
primarily and specifically based on his qualifications and being friend and
neighbor.
III
PSI cannot be liable under doctrine of corporate
negligence since the proximate cause of Mrs. Agana's injury was the negligence
of Dr. Ampil, which is an element of the principle of corporate negligence.[29]
In their respective memoranda, intervenors raise parallel arguments that
the Court's ruling on the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between private hospitals and consultants will force a drastic and complex
alteration in the long-established and currently prevailing relationships among
patient, physician and hospital, with burdensome operational and financial
consequences and adverse effects on all three parties.[30]
The Aganas comment that the arguments of PSI need no
longer be entertained for they have all been traversed in the assailed decision
and resolution.[31]
After gathering its thoughts on the
issues, this Court holds that PSI is liable to the Aganas, not under the
principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employment
relationship with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible agency for
the negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the principle of
corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital.
While in
theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine,[32] in
reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct
of its business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment.[33]
Within that reality, three legal relationships crisscross: (1) between the
hospital and the doctor practicing within its premises; (2) between the
hospital and the patient being treated or examined within its premises and (3)
between the patient and the doctor. The exact nature of each relationship
determines the basis and extent of the liability of the hospital for the
negligence of the doctor.
Where an employment relationship exists, the
hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article 2176[34] in
relation to Article 2180[35] of
the Civil Code or the principle of respondeat superior. Even when no
employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to
the patient that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously
liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431[36] and
Article 1869[37] of the
Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority.[38]
Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be
held directly liable to the patient for
its own negligence or failure to follow established standard of conduct to
which it should conform as a corporation.[39]
This Court
still employs the “control test” to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between hospital and doctor. In Calamba
Medical Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.[40] it
held:
Under the "control test", an
employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital if the
hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which the
physician is to accomplish his task.
xx xx xx
As
priorly stated, private respondents maintained specific work-schedules, as
determined by petitioner through its medical director, which consisted of
24-hour shifts totaling forty-eight hours each week and which were strictly to
be observed under pain of administrative sanctions.
That petitioner exercised
control over respondents gains light from the undisputed fact that in the
emergency room, the operating room, or any department or ward for that matter,
respondents' work is monitored through its nursing supervisors, charge nurses
and orderlies. Without the approval or consent of petitioner or its medical
director, no operations can be undertaken in those areas. For control test to
apply, it is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the
performance of duties of the employee, it being enough that it has the right to
wield the power. (emphasis
supplied)
Even in its
In the present case, it appears to have escaped the
Court's attention that both the RTC and the CA found no employment relationship
between PSI and Dr. Ampil, and that the Aganas did not question such
finding. In its
PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes appealed[44]
from the RTC decision but only on the issues of negligence, agency and
corporate liability. In its
The Aganas appealed from the
CA decision, but only to question the exoneration of Dr. Fuentes.[46]
PSI also appealed from the CA decision, and it was then that the issue of
employment, though long settled, was unwittingly resurrected.
In fine, as there was no dispute over the RTC
finding that PSI and Dr. Ampil had no employer-employee relationship, such
finding became final and conclusive even to this Court.[47]
There was no reason for PSI to have raised it as an issue in its petition.
Thus, whatever discussion on the matter that may have ensued was purely
academic.
Nonetheless, to allay the
anxiety of the intervenors, the Court holds that, in this particular instance,
the concurrent finding of the RTC and the CA that PSI was not the employer of
Dr. Ampil is correct. Control as a determinative factor in testing the
employer-employee relationship between doctor and hospital under which the
hospital could be held vicariously liable to a patient in medical negligence
cases is a requisite fact to be established by preponderance of evidence. Here,
there was insufficient evidence that PSI exercised the power of control or
wielded such power over the means and the details of the specific process by
which Dr. Ampil applied his skills in the treatment of Natividad. Consequently, PSI cannot be held vicariously
liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under the principle of respondeat
superior.
There
is, however, ample evidence that the hospital (PSI) held out to the patient
(Natividad)[48] that
the doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. Present are the two factors that
determine apparent authority: first, the hospital's implied manifestation to
the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital's
agent; and second, the patient’s reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and
the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.[49]
Enrique
testified that on April 2, 1984, he consulted
Dr. Ampil regarding the condition of his wife; that after the meeting
and as advised by Dr. Ampil, he “asked [his] wife to go to
Medical City to be examined by [Dr. Ampil]”; and that the next day, April 3, he
told his daughter to take her mother to
Dr. Ampil.[50] This
timeline indicates that it was Enrique who actually made the decision on whom
Natividad should consult and where, and that the latter merely acceded to
it. It explains the testimony of
Natividad that she consulted Dr. Ampil at the instigation of her daughter.[51]
Moreover, when asked what
impelled him to choose Dr. Ampil, Enrique testified:
Atty. Agcaoili
On that particular occasion,
A. First, before that, I have known him to be a specialist on
that part of the body as a surgeon, second, I have known him to be a staff
member of the
Clearly,
the decision made by Enrique for Natividad
to consult Dr. Ampil was significantly influenced by the impression that
Dr. Ampil was a staff member of
PSI's acts tended to confirm
and reinforce, rather than negate, Enrique's view. It is of record that PSI
required a “consent for hospital care”[53]
to be signed preparatory to the surgery of Natividad. The form reads:
Permission is hereby given to
the medical, nursing and laboratory staff of the
By such statement, PSI
virtually reinforced the public impression that Dr. Ampil was a physician
of its hospital, rather than one independently practicing in it; that
the medications and treatments he prescribed were necessary and desirable; and
that the hospital staff was prepared to carry them out.
PSI
pointed out in its memorandum that Dr. Ampil's hospital affiliation was not the
exclusive basis of the Aganas’ decision to have Natividad treated in
The Court cannot speculate on
what could have been behind the Aganas’ decision but would rather adhere
strictly to the fact that, under the circumstances at that time, Enrique decided to consult Dr. Ampil for he believed him to be a staff member of a prominent and known
hospital. After his meeting with Dr. Ampil, Enrique advised his wife Natividad
to go to the
This
Court must therefore maintain the ruling that PSI is vicariously liable for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil as its ostensible agent.
Moving
on to the next issue, the Court notes that PSI made the following admission in
its Motion for Reconsideration:
51. Clearly, not being an agent or employee of petitioner PSI, PSI
[sic] is not liable for Dr. Ampil's acts during the operation. Considering
further that Dr. Ampil was personally engaged as a doctor by Mrs. Agana, it is
incumbent upon Dr. Ampil, as “Captain of the Ship”, and as the
PSI
reiterated its admission when it stated that had Natividad Agana “informed the
hospital of her discomfort and pain, the hospital would have been obliged to
act on it.”[56]
The
significance of the foregoing statements is critical.
First,
they constitute judicial admission by PSI that while it had no power to control
the means or method by which Dr. Ampil conducted the surgery on Natividad
Agana, it had the power to review or cause the review of what may
have irregularly transpired within its walls strictly for the purpose of
determining whether some form of negligence may have attended any procedure
done inside its premises, with the ultimate end of protecting its patients.
Second, it
is a judicial admission that, by virtue of the nature of its business as well
as its prominence[57] in
the hospital industry, it assumed a duty to “tread on” the “captain of the
ship” role of any doctor rendering services within its premises for the purpose
of ensuring the safety of the patients availing themselves of its services and
facilities.
Third, by
such admission, PSI defined the
standards of its corporate conduct under the circumstances of this case, specifically: (a) that it had a corporate
duty to Natividad even after her operation to ensure her safety as a patient;
(b) that its corporate duty was not limited to having its nursing staff note or
record the two missing gauzes and (c) that its corporate duty extended to
determining Dr. Ampil's role in it, bringing the matter to his attention, and correcting his negligence.
And
finally, by such admission, PSI barred itself from arguing in its second motion
for reconsideration that the concept of corporate responsibility was not yet in
existence at the time Natividad underwent treatment;[58] and
that if it had any corporate responsibility, the same was limited to reporting
the missing gauzes and did not include “taking an active step in fixing the
negligence committed.”[59] An admission
made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission
and is conclusive as to him, and all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto
or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether or not objection is
interposed by a party.[60]
Given the standard of conduct that PSI defined for itself, the next relevant
inquiry is whether the hospital measured up to it.
PSI excuses itself from fulfilling its
corporate duty on the ground that Dr. Ampil assumed the personal responsibility
of informing Natividad about the two missing gauzes.[61]
Dr. Ricardo Jocson, who was part of the group of doctors that attended to
Natividad, testified that toward the end of the surgery, their group talked
about the missing gauzes but Dr. Ampil assured them that he would personally
notify the patient about it.[62] Furthermore,
PSI claimed that there was no reason for it to act on the report on the two
missing gauzes because Natividad Agana showed no signs of complications. She
did not even inform the hospital about her discomfort.[63]
The excuses proffered by PSI are totally
unacceptable.
To
begin with, PSI could not simply wave off the problem and nonchalantly delegate
to Dr. Ampil the duty to review what transpired during the operation. The
purpose of such review would have been to pinpoint when, how and by whom two
surgical gauzes were mislaid so that necessary remedial measures could be taken
to avert any jeopardy to Natividad’s recovery. Certainly, PSI could not have
expected that purpose to be achieved by merely hoping that the person likely to
have mislaid the gauzes might be able to retrace his own steps. By its own
standard of corporate conduct, PSI's duty to initiate the review was non-delegable.
While Dr. Ampil may have had
the primary responsibility of notifying Natividad about the missing gauzes, PSI
imposed upon itself the separate and independent responsibility of initiating
the inquiry into the missing gauzes. The purpose of the first would have been
to apprise Natividad of what transpired during her surgery, while the purpose
of the second would have been to pinpoint any lapse in procedure that led to
the gauze count discrepancy, so as to prevent a recurrence thereof and to determine
corrective measures that would ensure the safety of Natividad. That Dr. Ampil negligently failed to notify
Natividad did not release PSI from its self-imposed separate responsibility.
Corollary
to its non-delegable undertaking to review potential incidents of negligence
committed within its premises, PSI had the duty to take notice of medical
records prepared by its own staff and submitted to its custody, especially when
these bear earmarks of a surgery gone awry. Thus, the record taken during the operation
of Natividad which reported a gauze count discrepancy should have given PSI
sufficient reason to initiate a review. It should not have waited for Natividad
to complain.
As
it happened, PSI took no heed of the record of operation and consequently did
not initiate a review of what transpired during Natividad’s operation. Rather,
it shirked its responsibility and passed it on to others – to Dr. Ampil whom it
expected to inform Natividad, and to Natividad herself to complain before it
took any meaningful step. By its inaction, therefore, PSI failed its own
standard of hospital care. It committed
corporate negligence.
It
should be borne in mind that the corporate negligence ascribed to PSI is
different from the medical negligence attributed to Dr. Ampil. The duties of
the hospital are distinct from those of the doctor-consultant practicing within
its premises in relation to the patient; hence, the failure of PSI to fulfill
its duties as a hospital corporation gave rise to a direct liability to the Aganas distinct from that of
Dr. Ampil.
All
this notwithstanding, we make it clear that PSI’s hospital liability based on ostensible agency
and corporate negligence applies only to
this case, pro hac vice. It is not
intended to set a precedent and should not serve as a basis to hold hospitals
liable for every form of negligence of their doctors-consultants under any and all
circumstances. The ruling is unique to this case, for the liability of PSI arose
from an implied agency with Dr. Ampil and an admitted corporate duty to Natividad.[64]
Other
circumstances peculiar to this case warrant this ruling,[65]
not the least of which being that the
agony wrought upon the Aganas has gone on for 26 long years, with Natividad coming
to the end of her days racked in pain and agony. Such
wretchedness could have been avoided had PSI simply done what was logical: heed the report of a guaze count discrepancy,
initiate a review of what went wrong and take corrective measures to ensure the
safety of Nativad. Rather, for 26 years,
PSI hemmed and hawed at every turn, disowning any such responsibility to its
patient. Meanwhile, the options left to
the Aganas have all but dwindled, for the status of Dr. Ampil can no longer be
ascertained.[66]
Therefore,
taking all the equities of this case into consideration, this Court believes P15
million would be a fair and reasonable liability of PSI, subject to 12% p.a.
interest from the finality of this resolution to full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the
second motion for reconsideration is DENIED and the motions for
intervention are NOTED.
Professional Services, Inc. is ORDERED
pro hac vice to
pay Natividad (substituted by her children
Marcelino Agana III, Enrique Agana, Jr., Emma Agana-Andaya, Jesus Agana and
Raymund Agana) and Enrique Agana the total amount of P15 million, subject to
12% p.a. interest from the finality of this resolution to full satisfaction.
No further
pleadings by any party shall be entertained in this case.
Let the long-delayed entry of judgment
be made in this case upon receipt by all concerned parties of this resolution.
SO
ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
|
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice
|
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice |
|
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA Associate Justice |
(No Part) LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
|
|
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
(On Official Leave) ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On leave)
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
* No part.
** On leave.
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 126297), p. 468.
[2]
[3] Filed a motion for leave of court to intervene (by way of attached memorandum), id., p. 512.
[4] Filed a motion to intervene and for leave to file memorandum-in-intervention, id., p. 534. AHI did not file any memorandum.
[5] Filed a motion for intervention (by way of attached brief/memorandum), id., p. 602.
[6] Resolution dated
[7] Resolution dated
[8] Resolution dated
[9] As per Advisory dated
[10] Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43322, record, p. 6.
[11] Also referred to in the records as “sponges.”
[12] Penned by then Presiding Judge and now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Lucas Bersamin.
[13] RTC Decision, record, p. 133.
[14] CA decision dated September 6, 1996, penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice and later Supreme Court Associate Justice Cancio Garcia (Ret.); CA rollo, pp. 136-137.
[15] G.R.
Nos. 126297/126467/127590,
[16] Rollo, p. 403.
[17] G.R. Nos. 126297/126467/127590,
[18] G.R. No. 124354,
[19] Supra at 15, p. 499.
[20] G.R. No. 124354,
[21] Supra at 17, p. 179.
[22] Supra at 15, p. 502.
[23] Supra at 17, p. 181,
citing TSN,
[24]
[25] G.R. No. 142625,
[26] Supra at 15, p. 505.
[27] Supra at 17, p. 182.
[28]
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 126297), pp. 489-490.
[30]
[31]
[32] Section 8, Republic Act No. 2382 (RA 2382) or The Medical Act of 1959.
[33] See Acebedo Optical Co. Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 100152,
[34] Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
[35] Art. 2180. The obligation
imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by
the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion
of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when
it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is
provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
[36] Article 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
[37] Art. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority.
[38] Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, et al., supra at 25.
[39] Pedro Solis, Medical Jurisprudence (The Practice of Medicine and the
Law),
[40] G.R. No. 176484,
[41] Supra at 18.
[42] Supra at 20.
[43] Supra at 13, p. 126.
[44] Dr. Fuentes filed with the CA a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 (CA rollo, p. 1) while Dr. Ampil and PSI jointly filed an appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 (CA rollo, pp. 40 and 152).
[45] Supra at 14, p. 135.
[46] Rollo (G.R. No. 126467), p. 8.
[47] Elsie Ang v. Dr. Erniefel
Grageda,
G.R. No. 166239,
[48] Through the patient's husband Enrique.
[49] Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, et al., supra at 25.
.
[50] TSN,
[51] Second Motion for Reconsideration, rollo, pp. 495-496.
[52] Supra at 50, pp. 25-26.
[53] Exh. “D-1,” Exhibit Folder for Plaintiffs, p. 92.
[54] Petitioner's Memorandum with Compliance, pp. 57-58.
[55] Motion for Reconsideration, rollo, pp. 429-430.
[56]
[57] PSI has not denied its prominent place in the hospital industry but has
in fact asserted such role in its 1967 brochure
(Annex “K” to its Manifestation filed on
[58] Rollo, p. 505-506.
[59]
[60] Luciano Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, G. R. No. 168071, 18 December 2006, 511 SCRA 162; Heirs of Pedro Clemena Y Zurbano v. Heirs of Irene B. Bien, G.R. No. 155508, 11 September 2006, 501 SCRA 405.
[61] Second Motion for Reconsideration, rollo, pp. 502-503.
[62]
[63] Supra at 55.
[64] In Partido ng
Manggagawa (PM) and Butil Farmers Party (Butil) v. Comelec (G.R. No. 164702,
[65] See
Sps. Chua v. Hon. Jacinto Ang, et al.,
G.R. No. 156164,
[66] His last pleading was filed on