G.R.
No. 192935 (Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010) and G.R. No. 193036 (Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, Rep.
Rodolfo B. Albano, Jr., Rep. Simeon A. Datumanong and Rep. Orlando B. Fua, Sr.,
v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. and Department and Management
Secretary Florencio B. Abad).
Promulgated:
December 7, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PERALTA, J.:
On
July 30, 2010, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III issued Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 1 creating the Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission), which is “primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and
corruption x x x involving third level public officers and higher, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration and thereafter submit its findings and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.”
Petitioners
filed their respective petitions questioning the constitutionality of E.O. No.
1. In G.R. No. 193036, petitioners, as
members of the House of Representatives, have legal standing to impugn the
validity of E.O. No. 1, since they claim that E.O. No. 1 infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.[1] In G.R. No. 192935, petitioner, who filed his
petition as a taxpayer, may also be accorded standing to sue, considering that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance to the public.[2] The people await the outcome of the
President’s effort to implement his pledge to find out the truth and provide
closure to the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration. The constitutional
issues raised by petitioners seek the determination of whether or not the
creation of the Truth Commission is a valid exercise by the President of his
executive power.
Petitioners
contend that E.O. No. 1 is unconstitutional, because only Congress may create a
public office, pursuant to Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution.[3]
Respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counter that the issuance of
E.O. No. 1 is mainly supported by Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,[4] Section 31, Title III, Book III of E.O. No. 292,
and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.
Quoted in E.O.
No. 1 as the legal basis for its creation is Section 31, Title III, Book III of E.O. No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which
provides:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the
President to Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure
of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of
the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to
the Office of the President from other departments and agencies.
In Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration,[5] the Court held that the first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President. Section 31(1) of Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers
to the President’s power to restructure the internal organization of the Office
of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another.[6] Section
31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of the
President Proper allowing the President to transfer
any function under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under the Office
of the President to any other department or agency and vice-versa.[7]
Thus, the reorganization in Section 31
involves abolishing, consolidating or merging units in the Office of the
President Proper or transferring functions from one unit to another in the
Office of the President Proper, and the transfer of any function or any agency
under the Office of the President to any other department or agency and
vice-versa. Nowhere is it stated that
the President can create an office like the Truth Commission, which does not
result from any reorganization under Section 31. Hence, the said section cannot be used to
justify the creation of the Truth Commission.
Moreover,
in its Comment, the OSG stated that one of the bases for the creation of E.O.
No. 1 is P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, which amendment was
enacted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
P.D. No. 1416, as amended, is
inapplicable as basis in the creation of the Truth Commission, since it was
intended by President Ferdinand E. Marcos to promote efficiency and flexibility
in the organization of the national government
to strengthen the government bureaucracy when
the government was in the transition from presidential to the parliamentary
form of government. This is evident
in the preamble of P.D. No. 1416,[8]
which states:
WHEREAS, the transition toward the parliamentary form of government will necessitate
flexibility in the organization of the national
government; x x x[9]
The
OSG admitted during the oral argument[10]
that the 1987 Constitution ended the power of the President to reorganize the national government. It is noted that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos exercised legislative power concurrently with the
interim Batasang Pambansa (1976) and, subsequently, with the regular Batasang Pambansa (1984).[11]
After the February 1986 revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino assumed
revolutionary legislative power, and issued Proclamation No. 3,
the Provisional Freedom Constitution.
Section 3, Article I of
Proclamation No. 3 abolished the
Batasang Pambansa, while Section 1, Article II of the said Proclamation vested
legislative power in the President until
a legislature would be elected
and convened under a new Constitution.
Thus, Section 6, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution provides that “[t]he incumbent President (President Corazon
Aquino) shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress
is convened.”[12]
In view of the
foregoing, the decision in Larin v. Executive Secretary[13]
insofar as P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, is cited as a law
granting the President the power to reorganize, needs to be re-examined.
Assuming
that P.D. No. 1416, as amended, is still a valid law, it cannot be the basis of
the creation of the Truth Commission, because all the cases, from Larin
v. Executive Secretary;[14]
Buklod
ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora;[15] Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications v. Mabalot;[16]
Bagaoisan
v. National Tobacco Administration;[17]
Department
of Environment and Natural Resources v.
DENR Region 12 Employees;[18]
The
purpose of reorganization under P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, is
to “promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it
to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and
economic development, and to improve upon the services of the government in the
transaction of the public business.”
The
creation of the Truth Commission, however, is not to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government. The Truth Commission is primarily
tasked to conduct fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and
corruption involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which separate
investigative body, as stated in the preamble, “will recommend the prosecution
of the offenders and secure justice for all.”
It is, in part, the implementation of the pledge of President Benigno
Aquino, Jr. during the last election that if elected, he would end corruption
and the evil it breeds.
In its Memorandum, the OSG justifies the power of the
President to create the Truth Commission based on his authority to create ad hoc fact-finding committees or
offices within the Office of the President, which authority is described as an
adjunct of his plenary executive power under Section 1 and his power of control
under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.[22] It cited the case of Department of Health v. Camposano,[23]
which held:
The Chief Executive’s
power to create the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law.
With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.
Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
To
clarify, the power of control is “the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter;”[24]
hence, it cannot be the basis of
creating the Truth Commission.
The
ponencia justifies the creation of
the Truth Commission based on the President’s duty to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, thus:
Sec.
17. The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.[25]
According to the ponencia, to ascertain if laws are faithfully executed, the
President has the power to create ad hoc investigating committees, which
power has been upheld in Department of Health v. Camposano.[26] In the said case, some
concerned employees of the Department of Health (DOH)-National Capital Region
(NCR) filed a complaint before the DOH Resident against certain officers of the
DOH arising from alleged anomalous purchase of medicines. The Resident
Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct against the respondents. Subsequently, the Secretary of Health
filed a formal charge against the respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty,
and Violation of Republic Act No. 3019. Thereafter, the Executive
Secretary issued Administrative Order No. 298, creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed
against the DOH-NCR employees. The said Administrative Order was indorsed
to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), which
found the respondents guilty as charged and recommended their dismissal from
the government. However, the Court overturned
the dismissal of respondents by
the Secretary of DOH, because respondents were denied due process, but it
declared valid the creation of the ad hoc committee, thus:
x x x The investigation was authorized under
Administrative Order No. 298 dated October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla
G. Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and Enrique L. Perez.
The Investigating Committee was
composed of all the members of the PCAGC: Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo,
Commissioner Dario C. Rama and Commissioner Jaime L. Guerrero. The Committee
was directed by AO 298 to “follow the procedure prescribed under Section 38 to
40 of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), as amended.” It was tasked to “forward to
the Disciplining Authority the entire records of the case, together with its
findings and recommendations, as well as the draft decision for the approval of
the President.”
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law.
With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.
Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.[27]
The
ponencia stressed that the purpose of
allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to
exist is to allow inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know
so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. The ponencia
stated that this was also the objective of investigative bodies created in
the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission.
Hence, the ponencia held that
the President’s power to create investigative bodies cannot be denied.
Albeit the President has the power
to create ad hoc committees to
investigate or inquire into matters for the guidance of the President to ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed, I am of the view that the Truth
Commission was not created in the nature of the aforementioned ad hoc investigating/fact-finding bodies.
The Truth Commission was created more in the nature of a public office.
Based on the creation of ad hoc investigating bodies in Department
of Health v. Camposano and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[28] the members of an ad hoc investigative body are
heads and representatives of existing government offices, depending on
the nature of the subject matter of the investigation. The ad hoc investigating body’s functions are primarily
fact-finding/investigative and recommendatory in nature.[29]
In this case, the members of the
Truth Commission are not officials from existing government offices.
Moreover, the Truth Commission has been granted powers of an independent
office as follows:
1. Engage
or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel
determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;[30]
2. Promulgate
its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to
effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order
and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and
hearings, including the presentation of evidence.[31]
3. The Truth Commission shall have the power to
engage the services of experts as consultants or advisers as it may deem
necessary to accomplish its mission.[32]
In
addition, the Truth Commission has coercive powers such as the power to
subpoena witnesses.[33]
Any government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to
appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the
Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative
disciplinary action.[34] Any private person who does the same may be
dealt with in accordance with law.[35]
Apparently, the grant of such powers to the Truth Commission is no longer part
of the executive power of the President, as it is part of law-making, which
legislative power is vested in Congress.[36] There are only two instances in the
Constitution wherein Congress may delegate its law-making authority to the
President:[37]
Article VI,
Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both houses in joint
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
(2) In
times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Article VI, Sec.
28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress
may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
government.[38]
Although the President may create
investigating bodies to help him in his duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed, he cannot be allowed to encroach on or usurp the
law-making power of the Legislature in the creation of such investigative
bodies.
Moreover,
the Truth Commission’s function is questioned on the ground that it duplicates,
if not supersedes, the function of the Office of the Ombudsman. The OSG avers that the Ombudsman’s power to
investigate is not exclusive, but is shared with other similarly authorized
agencies, citing Ombudsman v. Galicia.[39]
Based
on Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, the powers and functions of the Truth Commission do
not supplant the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.[40] Nevertheless, what is the use of the Truth Commission
if its power is merely recommendatory? Any finding of graft and corruption by
the Truth Commission is still subject to evaluation by the Office of the Ombudsman, as it is only the Office of the
Ombudsman that is empowered to conduct preliminary investigation, determine
the existence of probable cause
and prosecute the case. Hence, the creation of the Truth Commission will
merely be a waste of money, since it duplicates the function of the Office of
the Ombudsman to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption.
Further, E.O. No. 1 violates that equal
protection clause enshrined in the Constitution. The guarantee of equal protection of the laws means that no person or
class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.[41]
In this case, investigation by the Truth
Commission covers only third level public officers and higher, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.[42]
The
OSG, however, counters in its Memorandum that the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is not violated, because although E.O. No. 1 names the previous
administration as the initial subject of the investigation of cases of graft
and corruption, it is not confined to the said administration, since E.O. No. 1
clearly speaks of the President’s power to expand its coverage to prior
administrations as follows:
SECTION 17.
Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the
President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in
Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft
and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so
extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.[43]
As
provided above, the mandate of the Truth Commission may be expanded to include
the investigation of cases of graft and corruption during prior
administrations, but it is subject to the “judgment” or discretion of the
President and it may be so extended by way of a supplemental Executive Order. In the
absence of the exercise of judgment by the President that the Truth Commission
shall also conduct investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption
during prior administrations, and in the absence of the issuance of a
supplemental executive order to that effect, E.O. No. 1 covers only third level
public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. This is admitted by the OSG in its
Memorandum[44] as it explains that “to include the past
administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the Commission and
lead it to lose its effectiveness.” The OSG’s position shows more consideration
for the burden that the investigation may cause to the Commission, while losing
sight of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The OSG
further states that even if the Truth Commission would solely concern itself
with graft and corruption, if there be any, of the previous administration,
there is still no violation of the equal protection clause. It submits that the
segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous
administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification
based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the E.O.
seeks to correct. The distinctions cited
are:
1) E.O No. 1 was issued in
view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous administration
which have eroded public confidence in public institutions.
2) The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of
fact-finding investigations is warranted by the reality that the current
administration will most likely bear the immediate consequences of the policies
of the previous administration, unlike those of the administrations long gone.
3) The classification of the previous administration as a separate
class for investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal
activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally
dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption
laws are faithfully executed, are more easily established in the regime that
immediately precedes the current administration.
4) Many
administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to
investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life
or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent
administration.
Indeed, the equal protection clause of the Constitution
allows classification.[45] If the classification
is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people
without violating the equal protection clause.[46] To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) It must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the class.[47]
Peralta v. Commission on
Elections [48] held:
The equal protection
clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What [it] proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a
reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all
those belonging to the same class. The equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class
and those who do not. There is,
of course, no concise or easy answer as to what an arbitrary classification is.
No definite rule has been or can be laid down on the basis of which such
question may be resolved. The determination must be made in accordance with the
facts presented by the particular case. The general rule, which is well-settled
by the authorities, is that a classification, to be valid, must rest upon
material differences between the persons, activities or things included and
those excluded. There must, in other words, be a basis for distinction. Furthermore,
such classification must be germane and pertinent to the purpose of the law.
And, finally, the basis of classification must, in general, be so drawn that
those who stand in substantially the same position with respect to the law are
treated alike.
The
distinctions cited by the OSG are not substantial to separate the previous
administration as a distinct class from prior administrations as subject matter
for investigation for the purpose of ending graft and corruption. As stated by the ponencia, the reports of widespread corruption in the previous
administration cannot be taken as a substantial distinction, since similar
reports have been made in earlier administrations.
Moreover,
a valid classification must rest upon material differences between the persons,
or activities or thing included and excluded.[49] Reasonable grounds must
exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and
those who do not.[50] There
is no substantial distinction cited between public officers who may be involved
in reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration and
public officers who may be involved in reported cases of graft and corruption
during prior administrations in
relation to the purpose of ending graft and corruption. To limit the investigation to public officers
of the previous administration is violative of the equal protection clause.
I
vote, therefore, to GRANT the
petitions as Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional since it violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution and encroaches on the law-making
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
[1]
See David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396,
[2] Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375,
[3]
Sec. 1.
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
[4] Sec. 17. The President shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
[5] G.R. No. 152845,
[6]
[7]
[8] Enacted on
[9] Emphasis supplied.
[10] Conducted on
[11] Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, A Commentary, Vol. II, First edition, pp. 70-73, citing Legaspi v. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418. (1982).
[12] Id.
at 73.
[13] G.R. No. 112745,
[14] Id.
[15] G.R. Nos. 142801-802,
[16] G.R. No.
138200,
[17] Supra
note 5.
[18] G.R. No. 149724,
[19] G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007, 527
SCRA 746.
[20] G.R. No. 160093,
[21] G.R. No. 166620,
[22] OSG Memorandum, p. 43.
[23] 496 Phil. 886, 896-897 (2005).
[24] Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications v. Mabalot, supra
note 16.
[25] Emphasis
supplied.
[26] Supra
note 23.
[27] Department
of Health v. Camposano, supra
note 23.
[28] G.R. No. 145184,
WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the
1987 Constitution provides that “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest”;
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution provides that “The right of the state to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel”;
WHEREAS, there have been allegations
of loans, guarantees, or other forms of financial accommodation granted,
directly or indirectly, by government owned and controlled bank or financial
institutions, at the behest, command or urging by previous government officials
to the disadvantage and detriment of the Philippine government and the Filipino
people;
ACCORDINGLY, an “Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS” is hereby created to be composed of the following:
Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government - Chairman
The Solicitor General -
Vice-Chairman
Representative from the
Office of the Executive Secretary - Member
Representative from the
Department of Finance - Member
Representative from the
Department of Justice - Member
Representative from the
Development Bank of the
Representative from the
Philippine National Bank - Member
Representative from the
Asset Privatization Trust - Member
Government Corporate Counsel - Member
Representative from the
Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation - Member
The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:
1.
Inventory all behest loans; identify
the lenders and borrowers, including the principal officers and stockholders of
the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for granting the loans
or who influenced the grant thereof;
2.
Identify the borrowers who were granted
“friendly waivers”, as well as the government officials who granted these
waivers; determine the validity of these waivers;
3.
Determine the courses of action that
the government should take to recover those loans, and to recommend appropriate
actions to the Office of the President within sixty (60) days from the date
hereof.
The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any department, bureau, office, agency, instrumentality or corporation of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for such assistance as it may need in the discharge of its function.
[29] See
Footnote 28.
[30] E.O. No. 1, Section 2 (i).
[31] E.O. No. 1, Section 2 (j).
[32] E.O. No. 1, Section 5.
[33] E.O. No. 1, Section 2 (e).
[34] E.O. No. 1. Section 9.
[35]
[36] The Constitution, Article VI, Section
1. The legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the
[37] Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, A Commentary, Vol. II, supra
note 11, at 70, 140-141, 161.
[38] Emphasis supplied.
[39] G.R. No. 167711,
[40] Republic
Act No. 6770, Section 15. Powers,
Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases x x x.
[41] City of
[42] E.O. No. 1, Section 2. Powers and functions.-- The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported
cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public
officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
[43] Emphasis supplied.
[44] Memorandum,
p. 89.
[45]
Central
Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No.
148208, December 15, 2004, 446 SCRA 299, citing Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54. (1974).
[46] City
of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308,
348.
[47] Id.
at 348-349.
[48] No. L-47771,
[49] Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.
[50]