G.R. No. 192935  (Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010) and G.R. No. 193036 (Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, Rep. Rodolfo B. Albano, Jr., Rep. Simeon A. Datumanong and Rep. Orlando B. Fua, Sr., v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. and Department and Management Secretary Florencio B. Abad).

 

                                                                   Promulgated:

 

                                                                             December 7, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  x

 

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

 

 

PERALTA, J.:

 

On July 30, 2010, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III issued Executive Order (E.O.)  No. 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission), which is “primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption x x x involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.”

 

Petitioners filed their respective petitions questioning the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1.  In G.R. No. 193036, petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, have legal standing to impugn the validity of E.O. No. 1, since they claim that E.O. No. 1 infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.[1]  In G.R. No. 192935, petitioner, who filed his petition as a taxpayer, may also be accorded standing to sue, considering that the issues raised are of transcendental importance to the public.[2]  The people await the outcome of the President’s effort to implement his pledge to find out the truth and provide closure to the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration.  The constitutional issues raised by petitioners seek the determination of whether or not the creation of the Truth Commission is a valid exercise by the President of his executive power.  

 

Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 1 is unconstitutional, because only Congress may create a public office, pursuant to Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution.[3]

 

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counter that the issuance of E.O. No. 1 is mainly supported by Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,[4]  Section 31, Title III, Book III of E.O. No. 292, and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.

 

Quoted in E.O. No. 1 as the legal basis for its creation is Section 31, Title III, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

 

SEC. 31.  Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.  For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:

 

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

 

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and

 

(3)        Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments and agencies.

 

 

In Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration,[5] the Court held that the first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.  Section 31(1) of Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the President’s power to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another.[6]   Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of the President Proper allowing the President to transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other department or agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency and vice-versa.[7]

 

Thus, the reorganization in Section 31 involves abolishing, consolidating or merging units in the Office of the President Proper or transferring functions from one unit to another in the Office of the President Proper, and the transfer of any function or any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency and vice-versa.  Nowhere is it stated that the President can create an office like the Truth Commission, which does not result from any reorganization under Section 31.  Hence, the said section cannot be used to justify the creation of the Truth Commission.

 

Moreover, in its Comment, the OSG stated that one of the bases for the creation of E.O. No. 1 is P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, which amendment was enacted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 15, 1981.

 

P.D. No. 1416, as amended, is inapplicable as basis in the creation of the Truth Commission, since it was intended by President Ferdinand E. Marcos to promote efficiency and flexibility in the organization of the national government to strengthen the government bureaucracy when the government was in the transition from presidential to the parliamentary form of government.  This is evident in the preamble of P.D. No. 1416,[8] which states:

 

WHEREAS, the transition toward the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government; x x x[9]   

 

 

The OSG admitted during the oral argument[10] that the 1987 Constitution ended the power of the President to reorganize the national government. It is noted that President Ferdinand E. Marcos exercised legislative power concurrently with the interim Batasang Pambansa  (1976) and, subsequently, with the regular Batasang Pambansa (1984).[11] After the February 1986 revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino assumed revolutionary legislative power, and issued Proclamation  No. 3,  the Provisional Freedom Constitution.  Section 3, Article I of   Proclamation  No. 3 abolished the Batasang Pambansa, while Section 1, Article II of the said Proclamation vested legislative power in the President until  a legislature would be elected  and convened under a new Constitution.  Thus, Section 6, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution provides that “[t]he incumbent President (President Corazon Aquino) shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.”[12]

 

In view of the foregoing, the decision in Larin v. Executive Secretary[13] insofar as P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, is cited as a law granting the President the power to reorganize, needs to be re-examined.

 

Assuming that P.D. No. 1416, as amended, is still a valid law, it cannot be the basis of the creation of the Truth Commission, because all the cases, from Larin v. Executive Secretary;[14] Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora;[15] Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications  v. Mabalot;[16] Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration;[17] Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.  DENR Region 12 Employees;[18] Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals;[19] Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) v.  Romulo[20] to Banda v. Ermita,[21] which cited P.D. No. 1416, as amended, as a basis to reorganize, involved reorganization or streamlining of an agency of the Executive Department. However, the Truth Commission was not created for streamlining purposes.

 

The purpose of reorganization under P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, is to “promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development, and to improve upon the services of the government in the transaction of the public business.”

 

The creation of the Truth Commission, however, is not to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government. The Truth Commission is primarily tasked to conduct fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which separate investigative body, as stated in the preamble, “will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all.”  It is, in part, the implementation of the pledge of President Benigno Aquino, Jr. during the last election that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds. 

 

In its Memorandum, the OSG justifies the power of the President to create the Truth Commission based on his authority to create ad hoc fact-finding committees or offices within the Office of the President, which authority is described as an adjunct of his plenary executive power under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.[22]  It cited the case of Department of Health v. Camposano,[23] which held:

 

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.  Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.  Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

 

 

To clarify, the power of control is “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter;”[24] hence, it  cannot be the basis of creating the Truth Commission.

 

The ponencia justifies the creation of the Truth Commission based on the President’s duty to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, thus:

 

Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.  He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.[25]

 

 

According to the ponencia, to ascertain if laws are faithfully executed, the President has the  power to create ad hoc investigating committees, which power has been upheld in Department of Health v. Camposano.[26]  In the said case, some concerned employees of the Department of Health (DOH)-National Capital Region (NCR) filed a complaint before the DOH Resident against certain officers of the DOH arising from alleged anomalous purchase of medicines. The Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against the respondents. Subsequently, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of Republic Act No. 3019.  Thereafter, the Executive Secretary issued Administrative Order No. 298, creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees.  The said Administrative Order was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), which found the respondents guilty as charged and recommended their dismissal from the government.  However, the Court  overturned  the dismissal of respondents  by the Secretary of DOH, because respondents were denied due process, but it declared valid the creation of  the ad hoc committee, thus:

 

x x x The investigation was authorized under Administrative Order No. 298 dated October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the administrative charges filed against Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and Enrique L. Perez.

 

The Investigating Committee was composed of all the members of the PCAGC: Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, Commissioner Dario C. Rama and Commissioner Jaime L. Guerrero.  The Committee was directed by AO 298 to “follow the procedure prescribed under Section 38 to 40 of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), as amended.” It was tasked to “forward to the Disciplining Authority the entire records of the case, together with its findings and recommendations, as well as the draft decision for the approval of the President.”

 

 The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.  Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.  Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.[27]

 

 

The ponencia stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.   The ponencia stated that this was also the objective of investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission.  Hence, the ponencia held that the President’s power to create investigative bodies cannot be denied.

 

Albeit the President has the power to create ad hoc committees to investigate or inquire into matters for the guidance of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, I am of the view that the Truth Commission was not created in the nature of the aforementioned ad hoc investigating/fact-finding  bodies.  The Truth Commission was created more in the nature of a public office.

 

Based on the creation of ad hoc investigating bodies in Department of Health v. Camposano and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[28]  the members of an ad hoc investigative body are  heads and representatives of existing government offices, depending on the nature of the subject matter of the investigation. The ad hoc investigating body’s functions are primarily fact-finding/investigative and recommendatory in nature.[29] 

 

In this case, the members of the Truth Commission are not officials from existing government offices. Moreover,  the Truth Commission  has been granted powers of an independent office as follows:

 

1.     Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;[30]

2.     Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence.[31]

3.      The Truth Commission shall have the power to engage the services of experts as consultants or advisers as it may deem necessary to accomplish its mission.[32]

 

In addition, the Truth Commission has coercive powers such as the power to subpoena witnesses.[33] Any government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action.[34]  Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.[35] Apparently, the grant of such powers to the Truth Commission is no longer part of the executive power of the President, as it is part of law-making, which legislative power is vested in Congress.[36]  There are only two instances in the Constitution wherein Congress may delegate its law-making authority to the President:[37]

 

Article VI, Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

 

(2)  In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.  Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

 

Article VI, Sec. 28. (1)  The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.  The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

 

(2)  The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government.[38]

 

 

  Although the President may create investigating bodies to help him in his duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, he cannot be allowed to encroach on or usurp the law-making power of the Legislature in the creation of such investigative bodies.  

 

Moreover, the Truth Commission’s function is questioned on the ground that it duplicates, if not supersedes, the function of the Office of the Ombudsman.   The OSG avers that the Ombudsman’s power to investigate is not exclusive, but is shared with other similarly authorized agencies, citing Ombudsman v. Galicia.[39]

 

Based on Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, the powers and functions of the Truth Commission do not supplant the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.[40]  Nevertheless, what is the use of the Truth Commission if its power is merely recommendatory? Any finding of graft and corruption by the Truth Commission is still subject to evaluation by  the Office of the  Ombudsman, as it is only the Office of the Ombudsman that is empowered to conduct preliminary investigation,  determine  the existence of probable cause  and prosecute the case. Hence, the creation of the Truth Commission will merely be a waste of money, since it duplicates the function of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption.

 

Further, E.O. No. 1 violates that equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution.  The guarantee of equal protection of the laws means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.[41] 

In this case, investigation by the Truth Commission covers only third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.[42]

 

The OSG, however, counters in its Memorandum that the equal protection clause of the Constitution is not violated, because although E.O. No. 1 names the previous administration as the initial subject of the investigation of cases of graft and corruption, it is not confined to the said administration, since E.O. No. 1 clearly speaks of the President’s power to expand its coverage to prior administrations as follows:

 

SECTION 17.  Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.[43]

 

 

As provided above, the mandate of the Truth Commission may be expanded to include the investigation of cases of graft and corruption during prior administrations, but it is subject to the “judgment” or discretion of the President and it may be so extended by way of a supplemental Executive Order.   In the absence of the exercise of judgment by the President that the Truth Commission shall also conduct investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption during prior administrations, and in the absence of the issuance of a supplemental executive order to that effect, E.O. No. 1 covers only third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. This is admitted by the OSG in its Memorandum[44]  as it explains that “to include the past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the Commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.” The OSG’s position shows more consideration for the burden that the investigation may cause to the Commission, while losing sight of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 

 

The OSG further states that even if the Truth Commission would solely concern itself with graft and corruption, if there be any, of the previous administration, there is still no violation of the equal protection clause. It submits that the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the E.O. seeks to correct.  The distinctions cited are:

 

1)     E.O No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions.

2)    The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding investigations is warranted by the reality that the current administration will most likely bear the immediate consequences of the policies of the previous administration, unlike those of the administrations long gone.

3)    The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precedes the current administration.

4)    Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent administration.

 

 

Indeed, the equal protection clause of the Constitution allows classification.[45] If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause.[46] To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:  (1) It must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the class.[47] 

 

 Peralta v. Commission on Elections [48] held:

 

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What [it] proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all those belonging to the same class. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not.  There is, of course, no concise or easy answer as to what an arbitrary classification is. No definite rule has been or can be laid down on the basis of which such question may be resolved. The determination must be made in accordance with the facts presented by the particular case. The general rule, which is well-settled by the authorities, is that a classification, to be valid, must rest upon material differences between the persons, activities or things included and those excluded. There must, in other words, be a basis for distinction. Furthermore, such classification must be germane and pertinent to the purpose of the law. And, finally, the basis of classification must, in general, be so drawn that those who stand in substantially the same position with respect to the law are treated alike.

 

The distinctions cited by the OSG are not substantial to separate the previous administration as a distinct class from prior administrations as subject matter for investigation for the purpose of ending graft and corruption.   As stated by the ponencia, the reports of widespread corruption in the previous administration cannot be taken as a substantial distinction, since similar reports have been made in earlier administrations.

 

Moreover, a valid classification must rest upon material differences between the persons, or activities or thing included and excluded.[49]  Reasonable grounds must exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not.[50]  There is no substantial distinction cited between public officers who may be involved in reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration and public officers who may be involved in reported cases of graft and corruption during prior administrations in relation to the purpose of ending graft and corruption.  To limit the investigation to public officers of the previous administration is violative of the equal protection clause. 

 

I vote, therefore, to GRANT the petitions as Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional since it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and encroaches on the law-making power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution.

 

 

 

                                                DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                         Associate Justice



[1]               See David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.

[2]               Kilosbayan, Incorporated  v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110.

[3]              Sec. 1.  The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

[4]               Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.  He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

[5]               G.R. No. 152845, August 5, 2003, 408 SCRA 337.

[6]               Id. (Emphasis supplied.)

[7]               Id. (Emphasis supplied.)

[8]               Enacted on June 9, 1978.

[9]               Emphasis supplied.

[10]             Conducted on September 28,  2010.

[11]             Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, Vol. II, First edition,  pp. 70-73, citing Legaspi v. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418. (1982).

[12]             Id. at 73.

[13]             G.R. No. 112745, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 713.

[14]            Id.

[15]              G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718.

[16]             G.R. No. 138200, February 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 128.

[17]             Supra note 5.

[18]             G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003, 409 SCRA 359.

[19]             G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 746.

[20]             G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 673.

[21]             G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.

[22]             OSG Memorandum, p. 43.

[23]             496 Phil. 886, 896-897 (2005).

[24]             Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications  v.  Mabalot,  supra note 16.

[25]             Emphasis supplied.

[26]             Supra note 23.

[27]             Department of Health v. Camposano, supra note 23.

[28]             G.R. No. 145184, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 295.   In this case, President Fidel V. Ramos issued on October 8, 1992, Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee), which reads:

WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest”;

WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The right of the state to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel”;

WHEREAS, there have been allegations of loans, guarantees, or other forms of financial accommodation granted, directly or indirectly, by government owned and controlled bank or financial institutions, at the behest, command or urging by previous government officials to the disadvantage and detriment of the Philippine government and the Filipino people;

ACCORDINGLY, an “Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS” is hereby created to be composed of the following:

 

Chairman of the Presidential                                           

Commission on Good Government                 - Chairman

 

The Solicitor General                                          - Vice-Chairman

 

Representative from the

Office of the Executive Secretary                    - Member

 

Representative from the

Department of Finance                                      - Member

 

Representative from the

Department of Justice                                        - Member

 

Representative from the

Development Bank of the Philippines             - Member

 

Representative from the

Philippine National Bank                                   - Member

 

Representative from the

Asset Privatization Trust                                    - Member

 

Government Corporate Counsel                      - Member

 

Representative from the

Philippine Export and Foreign

Loan Guarantee Corporation                           - Member

 

The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:

 

1.                   Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers, including the principal officers and stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for granting the loans or who influenced the grant thereof;

2.                   Identify the borrowers who were granted “friendly waivers”, as well as the government officials who granted these waivers; determine the validity of these waivers;

3.                   Determine the courses of action that the government should take to recover those loans, and to recommend appropriate actions to the Office of the President within sixty (60) days from the date hereof.

 

        The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any department, bureau, office, agency, instrumentality or corporation of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for such assistance as it may need in the discharge of its function.

[29]             See Footnote 28.

[30]             E.O. No. 1, Section 2 (i).

[31]             E.O. No. 1, Section 2 (j).

[32]             E.O. No. 1, Section 5.

[33]             E.O. No. 1, Section 2 (e).

[34]             E.O. No. 1.  Section 9.

[35]             Id.

[36]             The Constitution, Article VI, Section 1.  The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

[37]             Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, Vol. II, supra note 11, at 70, 140-141, 161. 

[38]             Emphasis supplied.

[39]             G.R. No. 167711, October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA 327, 339. 

[40]             Republic Act No. 6770, Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

 (1)  Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases x x x.

[41]             City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308.

[42]             E.O. No. 1, Section 2. Powers and functions.-- The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is  primarily  tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration x x x.   (Emphasis supplied.)

[43]             Emphasis supplied.

[44]             Memorandum, p. 89.

[45]             Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 446 SCRA 299, citing Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54. (1974).          

[46]             City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308, 348.

[47]             Id. at 348-349.

[48]             No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30.

[49]              Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.

[50]             Id.