G.R. No. 192935 Louis
“Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
G.R. No. 193036 Rep.
Edcel C. Lagman, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et
al.
Promulgated:
December
7, 2010
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DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed
for being unconstitutional in the present consolidated cases is Executive Order
(EO) No. 1 of July 30, 2010 that created the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (Truth Commission).
In
issue is whether EO No. 1 violates the Constitution in three ways, viz.,
(i) for usurping the power of Congress to create public office and appropriate public
funds, (ii) for intruding into the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman,
and (iii) for infringing on the equal protection clause with its limited scope
of investigation.
The
ponencia submits the following findings and conclusions which have been synthesized:
1. The Truth Commission is an ad hoc body
formed under the Office of the President.
It has all the powers of an investigative body under the Administrative
Code.[1] It is a fact-finding body, and not a
quasi-judicial body;
2. The President has the power to create a new
office like the Truth Commission. The
power inheres in his powers as Chief Executive and springs from the constitutional
duty to faithfully execute the laws.[2] Otherwise stated, the President has the power
to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring that laws are faithfully
executed. It does not emanate from the President’s
power of control under the Constitution,[3] nor
by virtue of the power to reorganize under the Administrative Code[4]
which pertains to certain modifications of existing offices, nor by authority
of a stale law[5]
governing reorganization of the national government;
3. There is no transgression of the legislative
power to appropriate public funds since what is involved is only an allotment
or allocation of existing funds that have already been appropriated and which
shall equally be subject to auditing rules;
4. The Truth Commission does not duplicate,
supersede or erode the powers and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman and
the Department of Justice, since its investigative function complements the two
offices’ investigative power which is not exclusive. This investigative function is not akin to
the conduct of preliminary investigation of certain cases, over which the
Ombudsman exercises primary jurisdiction; and
5. EO
No. 1 violates the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution,[6] for
it singles out the previous administration as the sole subject of
investigation.
Sustaining only the fifth ground – that
the EO violates the equal protection clause, the ponencia disposes:
WHEREFORE, the petition is (sic) GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents
are enjoined from implementing (sic) and operating the Truth Commission.[7]
(underscoring supplied)
I
submit that the petitions should be DISMISSED.
It
bears noting at the outset that none of the petitioners properly raises the
issue of equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners
in G.R. No. 193036, with legal standing as legislators, cannot properly assert the
equal protection claim of the previous administration. While legislators have locus standi in
certain cases, their legal standing as
such is recognized only insofar as the assailed issuance affects their
functions as legislators. In the absence
of a claim that the issuance in question violated the rights of petitioner-legislators
or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, they have no
legal standing to institute the present action in their capacity as members of
Congress.[8]
No
doubt, legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action upon a claim of usurpation of legislative power.[9] That is why, not every time that a Senator or
a Representative invokes the power of judicial review, the Court automatically
clothes them with locus standi.[10] The Court examines first, as the ponencia
did, if the petitioner raises an issue pertaining to an injury to Congress as
an institution or a derivative injury to members thereof,[11]
before proceeding to resolve that particular issue.
The
peculiarity of the locus standi of legislators necessarily confines the
adjudication of their petition only on matters that tend to impair the exercise
of their official functions. In one case,
the Court ruled:
We find that among the petitioners, only Senator Pimentel has the legal standing to file the instant suit. The other petitioners maintain their standing as advocates and defenders of human rights, and as citizens of the country. They have not shown, however, that they have sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the non-transmittal of the signed text of the Rome Statute to the Senate. Their contention that they will be deprived of their remedies for the protection and enforcement of their rights does not persuade. The Rome Statute is intended to complement national criminal laws and courts. Sufficient remedies are available under our national laws to protect our citizens against human rights violations and petitioners can always seek redress for any abuse in our domestic courts.
As regards Senator Pimentel, it has
been held that 'to the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution. Thus, legislators have the standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators. The
petition at bar invokes the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its
concurrence to a treaty entered into by the executive branch, in this case, the
Rome Statute. The petition seeks to
order the executive branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to
allow it to exercise such authority. Senator
Pimentel, as member of the institution, certainly has the legal standing
to assert such authority of the Senate.[12] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Breach
of the equal protection clause, as presently raised by petitioner-legislators on
behalf of the Executive Department of the immediate past administration, has
nothing to do with the impairment of the powers of Congress. Thus, with respect to the issue in Pimentel,
Jr. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita[13]
that did not involve any impairment of the prerogatives of Congress, some
Senators who merely invoked their status as legislators were not granted
standing.
Moreover,
petitioner-legislators cannot take the cudgels for the previous administration/s, unless they admit that they are maintaining a confidential
relation with it/them or acting as advocates of the rights of a non-party who
seeks access to their market or function.[14]
The
petitioner in G.R. No. 192935, Louis Biraogo, does not raise the issue of
equal protection. His Memorandum
mentions nothing about equal protection clause.[15] While the ponencia “finds reason in Biraogo’s
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance,”[16] not
even his successful invocation of transcendental importance can push the Court
into resolving an issue which he never raised in his petition.
On
the foregoing score alone, the ponencia should not have dealt with the
issue of equal protection.[17]
Such
barriers notwithstanding, the claim of breach of the equal protection clause
fails to hurdle the higher barrier of merit.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The
ponencia holds that the previous administration has been denied equal
protection of the laws. To it, “[t]o restrict
the scope of the commission’s investigation to said particular administration
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.”[18]
I
find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the Truth Commission’s defined scope
of investigation.
In issues involving the equal
protection clause, the test developed by jurisprudence is that of reasonableness,
which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.[19]
The classification rests on
substantial
distinction
Reasonableness
should consider the nature of the truth commission which, as found by the ponencia,
emanates from the power of the President to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws. The ponencia
explains that the Executive Department is given much leeway in ensuring
that our laws are faithfully executed.
It adds:
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission, and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds ha[s] changed.[20] (underscoring supplied)
This
Court could not, in any way, determine or dictate what information the
President would be needing in fulfilling the duty to ensure the faithful
execution of laws on public accountability.
This sweeping directive of the ponencia
to include all past administrations in the probe tramples upon the
prerogative of a co-equal branch of government.
The
group or class, from which to elicit the needed information, rests on
substantial distinction that sets the class apart.
Proximity and magnitude of incidents
Fairly
recent events like the exigencies of transition and the reported large-scale
corruption explain the determined need to focus on no other period but the
tenure of the previous administration.
The
proximity and magnitude of particular contemporary events like the Oakwood
mutiny and Maguindanao massacre similarly justified the defined scope of the Feliciano
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, respectively. As applied to the two commissions whose
objective the ponencia itself recognizes, the same test of
reasonableness rejects the absurd proposition to widen their respective scopes
to include all incidents of rebellion/mutiny and election-related
violence since the
This
explained need for specific information removes the arbitrariness from recognizing
the previous administration as a distinct class of its own.
Without a complete and definitive report
The
ponencia brushes aside the proffered reasons for limiting the investigation
to the previous administration since “earlier administrations have also been
blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety.”[21]
The
ponencia employs the premise that previous administrations have all been
blemished by reports of improprieties similar[22]
to those of the previous administration. Whether reports of such nature exist is not
borne by the pleadings submitted by petitioners who allege unequal protection. Without any factual basis, the statement is
inconclusive and, at best, arguable.
Assuming
arguendo that comparable reports of large-scale graft and corruption
existed during administrations previous to the last, petitioners do not allege
that information regarding these reported activities is not yet available in
the Executive Department. On the
contrary, respondents disclose that the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and the Saguisag Commission have already probed into certain
anomalous transactions that occurred during the Marcos and Ramos
administrations, respectively. During past
administrations, parallel functions had been discharged by the Integrity Board,
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), Presidential Committee on
Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE), and Presidential Anti-Graft
Committee (PAGCOM, later replaced by the Presidential Committee on Administering
Performance Efficiency), that were created by former Presidents Quirino,
Magsaysay, Garcia and Macapagal, respectively.[23] Not to mention the plunder committed during
the Estrada administration, the facts of which – already judicially ascertained,
at that – are contained in public records.
The
Executive Department’s determination of the futility or redundancy of
investigating other administrations should be accorded respect. Respondents having manifested that pertinent and
credible data are already in their hands or in the archives, petitioners’ idea of
an all-encompassing de novo inquiry becomes tenuous as it goes beyond
what the Executive Department needs.
The
exclusion of other past administrations from the scope of investigation by the Truth
Commission is justified by the substantial distinction that complete and
definitive reports covering their respective periods have already been
rendered. The same is not true with the immediate
past administration. There is thus no
undue favor or unwarranted partiality. To
include everybody all over again is to insist on a useless act.
The distinction is not
discriminatory
I
find it contradictory for the ponencia to state, on the one hand, that
the Truth Commission would be labeled as a “vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution”[24]
and declare, on the other, that “its power to investigate is limited to
obtaining facts x x x and its findings “would at best be recommendatory
in nature[,] [a]nd x x x [the concerned agencies] have a wide degree of
latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation.”[25]
After
precisely explaining that “fact-finding is not adjudication,”[26]
the ponencia relates it to retribution which it depicts, in the context
of truth commissions, as a “retributory body set up to try and punish those
responsible for the crimes.”[27] The ponencia jumps into conclusion but
lands nowhere for it has no ground on which to stand.
Further,
the Court should not concern itself with the nebulous concept of “partisan hostility,”
a relatively redundant term that eludes exact definition in a political world
of turncoatism. Had the assailed
issuance provided exemption to former members of the previous administration
who have joined the prevailing political party, I would not hesitate to declare
EO No. 1 void.
Far
from being discriminatory, E.O No. 1 permits the probing of current
administration officials who may have had a hand in the reported graft and
corruption committed during the previous administration, regardless of party
affiliation. The classification notably rests
not on personalities but on period, as shown by the repeated use of the phrase
“during the previous administration.”[28]
The
ponencia treats adventures in “partisan hostility” as a form of undue
discrimination. Without defining what it
is, the ponencia gives life to a political creature and transforms it
into a legal animal. By giving legal
significance to a mere say-so of “partisan hostility,” it becomes unimaginable
how the Court will refuse to apply this novel doctrine in the countless
concerns of the inherently political branches of government under an invocation
of equal protection. And to think, the
present matter only involves the gathering of information.
To
knowingly classify per se is not synonymous to intentional
discrimination, which brings me to the next point that the classification is
germane to the purpose of the law.
The classification is germane
to the purpose
of the law
I
entertain no doubt that respondents consciously and deliberately decided to
focus on the corrupt activities reportedly committed during the previous
administration. For respondents to admit
that the selection was inadvertent is worse.
The ponencia, however, is quick to ascribe intentional
discrimination from the mere fact that the classification was intentional.
Good
faith is presumed. I find it
incomprehensible how the ponencia overturns that presumption. Citing an array of foreign jurisprudence, the
ponencia, in fact, recognizes that mere under-inclusiveness or
incompleteness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection
clause. Thus the ponencia pontificates:
The Court is not unaware that “mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection clause.” “Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its reach.” It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the “step by step” process. “With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.”
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no clear indicia of inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gathered from the fact that it was stressed three times in the assailed executive order. “The equal protection clause is voided by purposeful and intentional discrimination.”[29] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
According
to the ponencia itself, the
E.O.’s failure to include all evils within its reach, even by design, is
not vulnerable to an equal protection challenge. How the ponencia arrives at a contrary
conclusion puzzles.
Within
our own jurisprudential shores, the Court expounded in Quinto v. Comelec[30] on those classifications which, albeit not
all-inclusive, remain germane to the purpose of the law.
Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy an injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the evil at once; it may proceed "one step at a time." In addressing a societal concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some inequity as to those included or excluded. Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of reasonable choice" are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative judgment. We may not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been more fully achieved by expanding the class. Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it might be applied; that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law creates a classification that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious." He must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment, such that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is "fairly debatable." In the case at bar, the petitioners failed – and in fact did not even attempt – to discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a sphinx on this point even while we submitted the following thesis:
. . . [I]t is
not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statute’s
distinction is unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or not the best solution from a
public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find that there is no reasonably
rational reason for the differing treatment. (underscoring supplied)
The
“one step at a time” approach is thus not unconstitutional. E.O. No. 1 is not the first, but the latest,
step in a series of initiatives undertaken by Presidents, as earlier illustrated. Neither will it be the last step. E.O. No. 1 contains a special provision[31]
concerning the expansion of mandate.
There being no constitutional violation in a step-by-step approach, the
present and future administrations may release supplementary or comparable
issuances.
The
wisdom behind the issuance of the
E.O. No. 1 is “outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny.”[32] Analogous to Quinto’s instructions,
this Court cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain
and impose on the President the best or complete way of obtaining information
to eradicate corruption. Policy choices on
the practicality or desirability of data-gathering that is responsive to the
needs of the Executive Department in discharging the duty to faithfully execute
the laws are best left to the sound discretion of the President.
Most
enlightening as to how the classification is germane to the purpose of the law
is knowing first what is the purpose of the law.
According
to the ponencia, the objective of E.O. No. 1 is the “stamping out [of] acts
of graft and corruption.”[33]
I
differ.
The
purpose of E.O. No. 1 is the gathering of needed information to aid the
President in the implementation of public accountability laws. Briefly stated, E.O. No. 1 aims to provide
data for the President.
The
ponencia, in fact, has earlier explained: “It should be stressed that the purpose
of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.”[34]
The
long-term goal of the present administration must not be confused with what
E.O. No. 1 intends to achieve within its short life. The opening clauses and provisions
of E.O No. 1 are replete with phrases like “an urgent
call for the determination of the
truth,” “dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth,” and
“primarily seek and find the truth.”
The
purpose of E.O. No. 1 is to produce a report which, insofar as
the Truth Commission is concerned, is the end in itself. The purpose of the report is
another matter which is already outside the control of E.O. No. 1.
Once
the report containing the needed information is completed, the Truth Commission
is dissolved functus officio. At
that point, the endeavor of data-gathering is accomplished, and E.O No. 1 has
served its purpose. It cannot be said,
however, that it already eradicated graft and corruption. The report would still be passed upon by
government agencies. Insofar as the
Executive Department is concerned, the report assimilates into a broader
database that advises and guides the President in law enforcement.
To
state that the purpose of E.O. No. 1 is to stamp out acts of graft and
corruption leads to the fallacious and artificial conclusion that respondents
are stamping out corrupt acts of the previous administration only, as if E.O.
No. 1 represents the entire anti-corruption efforts of the Executive
Department.
To
state that the purpose of E.O. No. 1 is to eradicate graft and corruption begs
the question. What is there to eradicate
in the first place, if claims of graft and corruption are yet to be verified by
the Truth Commission? Precisely, by
issuing E.O. No. 1, respondents saw the need to verify raw data before initiating
the law enforcement mechanism, if warranted.
The classification is not limited
to existing
conditions only
The
Truth Commission is an ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President. The nature of an ad hoc
body is that it is limited in scope. Ad hoc means for the particular end or case at hand without
consideration of wider application.[35] An ad hoc
body is inherently temporary. E.O. No. 1
provides that the Truth Commission “shall accomplish its mission on or before
That the classification should not be limited
to existing conditions only, as applied in the present case, does not mean the
inclusion of future administrations. Laws
that are limited in duration (e.g., general appropriations act) do not circumvent
the guarantee of equal protection by not embracing all that may, in the years
to come, be in similar conditions even beyond the effectivity of the law.
The requirement not to limit the
classification to existing conditions goes into the operational details of the
law. The law cannot, in fine print,
enumerate extant items that exclusively compose the classification, thereby
excluding soon-to-exist ones that may also fall under the classification.
In the present case, the circumstance of
available reports of large-scale anomalies that fall under the classification (i.e.,
committed during the previous administration) makes one an “existing condition.” Those not yet reported or unearthed but likewise
fall under the same class must not be excluded from the application of the law. There is no such exclusionary clause in E.O.
No. 1.
The ratiocination on this third requisite
so as to include previous administrations already goes into the “classifications,”
not the “conditions.” The ponencia
rewrites the rule leading to the absurd requirement that the classification
should not be limited to the existing “classification” only.
The classification applies equally
to all members of the same class
Petitioners
concede, by their failure to allege otherwise, that the classification applies
equally to all members within the same class (i.e., all reports
of large-scale graft and corruption during the previous administration). By this implied admission, this fourth
requirement meets no objection.
Petitioners’
only insistent contention, as sustained by the ponencia, is that all prior
administrations belong to the same class, citing that equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[37]
Petitioners
do not espouse the view that no one should be investigated. What they advocate is that all
administrations should be investigated or, more accurately, all reports of
large-scale graft and corruption during the tenure of past administrations
should be subjected to investigation.
Discrimination
presupposes prejudice. I find none.
First, no one complains of injury or
prejudice. Petitioners do not seek the
lifting of their own obligations or the granting of their own rights
that E.O. No. 1 imposes or disallows. As
earlier expounded, petitioner-legislators cannot plausibly invoke the equal
protection claims of other persons, while petitioner Biraogo did not invoke it
at all.
Second, petitioners do not allege that previous
administrations, other than the immediate past administration, have been denied
the right to appear before or be examined by the Truth Commission. Neither do petitioners identify the specific fact-finding
obligations exclusively imposed upon the immediate past administration by the
Truth Commission whose primary duty is merely to “investigate reports of graft
and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action.”[38]
Third,
assuming that there already exists an imposition of obligation from the mere
recommendation for prosecution (as one of the possible appropriate measures) by
the Truth Commission, the act of not recommending the prosecution of all those
who could be probably guilty of graft and corruption is not violative of the
equal protection clause. Even in the succeeding
stage of preliminary investigation, which is already “out of the Truth
Commission’s sphere of functions,”[39] jurisprudence
instructs that the right to equal protection of the laws “may not be perversely
used to justify desistance by the authorities from prosecution of a criminal
case, just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were
charged.”[40]
Verily,
where there is claim of breach of the due process and equal protection clauses,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards,
there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a
conclusion. Absent such a showing, the
presumption of validity must prevail.[41]
Finally, even assuming arguendo that all prior administrations
should be included within the scope of investigation of the Truth Commission,
E.O. No 1 is saved by a separability clause,[42]
considering that the remaining portions can stand independently of the assailed
portions and constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries
out the intent of the law.[43] There is thus no basis for denying the other
provisions of their continued force and enjoining the operation of the Truth
Commission.
I,
therefore, submit that there exists a “reasonable
foundation or rational basis”[44] for
defining the subject of the special fact-finding investigation by the Truth
Commission.
For
the foregoing reasons, I vote to DISMISS
the petitions.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
[1] Executive Order No. 292 (July 25, 1987), Book I, Chapter 9, Sec. 37.
[2] Constitution,
Art. VII, Secs. 1 & 7 (2nd sentence), respectively.
[3]
[4] Executive Order No. 292 (July 25, 1987), Book III, Title III, Chapter 10, Sec. 31.
[5] Presidential Decree No. 1416 (June 9, 1975), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772 (January 15, 1982).
[6] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1.
[7] Ponencia, p. 41.
[8] Vide Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization, PNCC, 316 Phil. 414 (1995).
[11] Ponencia, pp. 13-14, citing Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.
[12] Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622, 631-632.
[13] 509
Phil. 567 (2005).
[14] Vide White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416, 431-432, which reads:
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
The rights of husband and wife,
pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those
rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of
confidential relation to them.
An even more analogous example
may be found in Craig v. Boren, wherein the United States Supreme Court
held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection
claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of
beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The
United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by
acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their
market or function."
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[15] Consequently, A.M. No. 99-2-04-SC
(effective
[16] Ponencia, p. 16.
[17] It
can be argued that the danger of otherwise resolving one issue not raised by
the proper party, which issue is personal to him, is the effect of
foreclosing certain defenses known only to him.
If the issue concerning the “injured non-party” is defeated, it then
becomes the “law of the case” (vide Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc. v.
Tansipek, G.R. No. 181235, July 22, 2009, 593 SCRA 456 on “law of the case”). The injured party can no longer resurrect the
issue in a later case, even if he can present arguments more illuminating than
that of the current “uninjured” petitioner.
[18] Ponencia, p. 36.
[19] Quinto
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698,
[20] Ponencia, pp. 24-25.
[21]
[22] “x x x reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people x x x;” vide Executive Order No. 1 (July 30, 2010), Sec. 1.
[23] Respondents’ Memorandum, Annex 1, citing Executive Order No. 318 (May 25, 1950) and Executive Order No. 1 (December 30, 1953); vide Executive Order No. 306 (July 15, 1958), Executive Order No. 378 (February 18, 1960) later repealed by Executive Order No. 457 (December 29, 1961).
[24] Ponencia, p. 36.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Executive
Order No. 1 (
[29] Ponencia, p. 39.
[30] G.R. No. 189698,
[31] Executive
Order No. 1 (
[32] Quinto v. Commission on Elections, supra.
[33] Ponencia, p. 37.
[34]
[35] <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ad+hoc> [visited: November 10, 2010].
[36] Executive
Order No. 1 (
[37] Ponencia, p. 33.
[38]
[39]
[40] Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities,
Inc., G.R. No. 171435,
[41] British American Tobacco v.
Camacho, G.R. No. 163583,
[42] Executive
Order No. 1 (
[43] Vide Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251, 298-299; Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 164171, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 673.
[44] Ambros v. Commission on Audit (COA), G.R. No. 159700, June 30, 2005, 462
SCRA 572, 597.