G.R. No. 192935 — Louis ‘Barok’ C.
Biraogo versus The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010
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G.R. No. 193036 — Rep. Edcel C. Lagman et al. versus Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. and Department
of Budget Secretary Florencio B. Abad.
Promulgated:
December
7, 2010
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SEPARATE OPINION
CORONA,
C.J.:
Of Truth and Truth Commissions
The
fundamental base upon which a truth commission is created is the right to the truth.[1] While the right to the truth is yet to be
established as a right under customary law[2]
or as a general principle of international law,[3]
it has nevertheless emerged as a “legal concept at the national, regional and
international levels, and relates to the obligation of the state to provide
information to victims or to their families or even society as a whole about
the circumstances surrounding serious violations of human rights.”[4]
A
truth commission has been generally defined[5]
as a “body set up
to investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a particular
country ...,”[6]
and includes four elements:
... First, a truth commission focuses on the past.
Second, a truth commission is not focused on a specific event, but attempts to
paint the overall picture of certain human rights abuses, or violations of
international humanitarian law, over a period of time. Third, a truth
commission usually exists temporarily and for a pre-defined period of time,
ceasing to exist with the submission of a report of its findings. Finally, a
truth commission is always vested with some sort of authority, by way of its
sponsor, that allows it greater access to information, greater security or
protection to dig into sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its report.[7]
As
reported by Amnesty International,[8]
there are at least 33 truth commissions established in 28 countries from 1974
to 2007 and this includes the Philippines, which created the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights (PCHR) in 1986 under the post-Marcos administration
of Pres. Corazon C. Aquino.
The
Philippine Experience
Notably,
Pres. Corazon C. Aquino created not one but two truth commissions.[9]
Aside from the PCHR, which was created to address human rights violations, the
Presidential Commission on Good Government or PCGG was also established. The
PCGG was tasked with assisting the President in the “recovery of all in-gotten
wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover
or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship,” among others.[10]
Unlike the present embattled and controversial Truth Commission, however, the
PCGG was created by Pres. Corazon C. Aquino pursuant to her legislative powers
under Executive Order No. 1,[11]
which in turn, was sanctioned by Proclamation No. 3.[12]
And
unlike the PCGG, the present Truth Commission suffers from both legal and
constitutional infirmities and must be struck down as unconstitutional.
Power To Create Public Offices:
Inherently Legislative
The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government.[13] This principle
is one of the cornerstones of our constitutional democracy and it
cannot be eroded without endangering our government.[14]
The 1987 Constitution divides governmental power into three co-equal branches:
the executive, the legislative and the judicial. It delineates the
powers of the three branches: the legislature is generally limited to
the enactment of laws, the executive department to the enforcement of laws and
the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and
controversies.[15] Each branch is independent and supreme within
its own sphere and the encroachment by one branch on another is to be avoided
at all costs.
The power under
scrutiny in this case is the creation of a public office. It is settled that, except for the offices
created by the Constitution, the creation of a public office is primarily a
legislative function. The legislature decides what offices are suitable,
necessary or convenient for the administration of government.[16]
The question is whether Congress, by law, has
delegated to the Chief Executive this power to create a public office.
In creating
the Truth Commission, Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. No. 1) points to Section 31,
Chapter 10, Book III of E.O. No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 as its
legal basis:
Section
31. Continuing
Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. — The President, subject
to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of
the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support
System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of
the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions
to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of
the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to
the Office of the President from other departments or agencies. (Emphasis supplied)
This provision pertains to the President’s
continuing delegated power to reorganize the
Office of the President. The well-settled
principle is that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with his
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of
his delegated legislative power to reorganize them under existing statutes.[17] Needless to state, such power must always be
in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.[18]
In creating the Truth Commission, did
the President merely exercise his continuing authority to reorganize the
executive department? No.
Considering
that the President was exercising a delegated power, his actions should have
conformed to the standards set by the law, that is, that the reorganization be
in the interest of “simplicity, economy and efficiency.” Were such objectives met? They were not. The
Truth Commission clearly duplicates and supplants the functions and powers of
the Office of the Ombudsman and/or the Department of Justice, as will be
discussed in detail later. How can the
creation of a new commission with the same duplicative functions as those of
already existing offices result in economy or a more efficient bureaucracy?[19] Such a creation becomes even more
questionable considering that the 1987 Constitution itself mandates the
Ombudsman to investigate graft and corruption cases.[20]
The Truth Commission in the Light of
The
Equal Protection Clause
Equal
protection is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution reads:
... nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
It is a right afforded every
man. The right to equal protection does
not require a universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction.[21]
It requires simply that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[22]
In
certain cases, however, as when things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.[23] In Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,[24]
the Court declared:
The equal protection of the laws clause of
the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation
or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law
is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally
to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied
if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Thus, for a
classification to be valid it must pass the test of reasonableness,[25]
which requires that:
(1) it be based on
substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane
to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be
limited to present conditions; and
(4) it must apply
equally to all members of the same class.
All four requisites must be
complied with for the classification to be valid and constitutional.
The
constitutionality of E. O. No. 1 is being attacked on the ground that it
violates the equal protection clause.
Petitioners
argue that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it deliberately
vests the Truth Commission with jurisdiction and authority to solely target
officials and employees of the Arroyo Administration.[26] Moreover, they claim that there is no substantial
distinction of graft reportedly committed under the Arroyo administration and
graft committed under previous administrations to warrant the creation of a
Truth Commission which will investigate for prosecution officials and employees
of the past administration.[27]
Respondents,
on the other hand, argue that the creation of the Truth Commission does not
violate the equal protection clause. According to them, while E.O. No. 1 names
the previous administration as the initial subject of the investigation, it
does not confine itself to cases of graft and corruption committed solely
during the past administration. Section 17 of E.O. No. 1 clearly speaks of the
President’s power to expand its coverage to previous administrations. Moreover,
respondents argue that the segregation of the transactions of public officers
during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a
valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the
evils which the executive order seeks to correct.[28]
On its face,
E.O. No. 1 clearly singles out the previous administration as the Truth
Commission’s sole subject of investigation.
Section 1.
Creation of a Commission – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION”, which shall primarily
seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft
and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people committed by public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action to be taken to ensure that the full measure of justice shall
be served without fear or favor.
Section 2.
Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section
1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. x x x” (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding
Section 17, which provides:
If
and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand
the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior
administration, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of
supplemental Executive Order.” (Emphasis supplied),
such expanded mandate of the
Truth Commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the
President. If the President decides not
to expand the coverage of the investigation, then the Truth Commission’s sole
directive is the investigation of officials and employees of the Arroyo
administration.
Given
the indubitably clear mandate of E.O. No. 1, does the identification of the
Arroyo administration as the subject of the Truth Commission’s investigation
pass the jurisprudential test of reasonableness? Stated differently, does the
mandate of E.O. No. 1 violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution?
Yes.
I rule in
favor of petitioners.
(1) No Substantial Distinction –
There is no
substantial distinction between the corruption which occurred during the past
administration and the corruption of the administrations prior to it.
Allegations of graft and corruption in the government are unfortunately
prevalent regardless of who the President happens to be. Respondents’ claim of
widespread systemic corruption is not unique only to the past administration.
(2) Not Germane to the Purpose of the Law –
The purpose of
E.O. No. 1 (to put an end to corruption in the government) is stated clearly in
the preamble of the aforesaid order:
WHEREAS,
the President’s battle-cry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last
elections “kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap” expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption
and the evil it breeds; xxx
In the light
of the unmistakable purpose of E.O. No. 1, the classification of the past
regime as separate from the past administrations is not germane to the purpose
of the law. Corruption did not occur only in the past administration. To stamp
out corruption, we must go beyond the façade of each administration and
investigate all public officials and employees alleged to have committed graft
in any previous administration.
(3) E.O. No. 1 does Not Apply to Future
Conditions –
As correctly
pointed out by petitioners, the classification does not even refer to present
conditions, much more to future conditions vis-avis the commission of graft and
corruption. It is limited to a particular past administration and not to all
past administrations.[29]
We go back to
the text of the executive order in question.
x
x x
Whereas,
there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and
finding out the truth concerning the reported cases if graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the
prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
x
x x
Section 1.
Creating of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION”, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end investigate reports of graft and corruption, x x x if any, during the previous administration;
xxx
Section 2. Power and Functions. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption x x x, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. x x x
The
above-quoted provisions show that the sole
subject of the investigation will be public officers and employees of the
previous administration only, that is, until such time if and when the
President decides to expand the Truth Commission’s mandate to include other
administrations (if he does so at all).
(4) E.O. No. 1 Does Not Apply to the Same Class
–
Lastly, E.O.
No. 1 does not apply to all of those belonging to the same class for it only
applies to the public officers and employees of the past administration. It excludes from its purview the graft and
the grafters of administrations prior to the last one. Graft is not exclusive to the previous
presidency alone, hence there is no justification to limit the scope of the
mandate only to the previous administration.
Fact-Finding
or Investigation?
The nature of the powers and functions allocated
by the President to the Truth Commission by virtue of E.O. No. 1 is
investigatory,[30] with the purposes of determining probable
cause of the commission of “graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws” and
referring such finding and evidence to the proper authorities for prosecution.[31]
The
respondents pass off these
powers and functions as merely fact-finding, short of investigatory. I do not think so. Sugar-coating the
description of the Truth Commission’s processes and functions so as to make it
“sound harmless” falls short of constitutional requirements. It has in its hands the vast arsenal of the
government to intimidate, harass and humiliate its perceived political enemies
outside the lawful prosecutorial avenues provided by law in the Ombudsman or
the Department of Justice.
The scope of the
investigatory powers and functions assigned by the President to the Truth
Commission encompasses all “public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from
the private sector, if any, during the previous administration.”[32]
There is no doubt in my mind that what the
President granted the Truth Commission is the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints of graft and corruption against his immediate
predecessor and her associates.
The respondents see nothing wrong with
that. They believe that, pursuant to his
power of control and general supervision under Article VII of the Constitution,[33] the President can create an ad-hoc committee
like the Truth Commission to investigate graft and corruption cases. And the President can endow it with authority
parallel to that of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigations. Citing
Ombudsman v. Galicia[34] the power
of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigations is not exclusive but
shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
I take a different
view. The operative word is
“authorized”.
Indeed, the power of control and supervision
of the President includes the power to discipline which in turn implies the
power to investigate.[35] No Congress or
Court can derogate from that power[36] but the
Constitution itself may set certain limits.[37] And the
Constitution has in fact carved out the preliminary investigatory aspect of the
control power and allocated the same to the following:
(a)
to Congress over
presidential appointees who are impeachable officers (Article XI, Sections 2
and 3);
(b)
to the Supreme Court over
members of the courts and the personnel thereof (Article VIII, Section 6); and
(c) to
the Ombudsman over any other public
official, employee, office or agency (Article XI, Section 13 (1)).
However, even as the
Constitution has granted to the Ombudsman the power to investigate other public
officials and employees, such power is not absolute and exclusive. Congress has the power to further define the
powers of the Ombudsman and, impliedly, to authorize other offices to conduct
such investigation over their respective officials and personnel.[38]
The Constitution has vested in Congress alone the power to grant
to any office concurrent jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation of cases of graft and corruption.
In
a myriad of cases, this Court has recognized the concurrent jurisdiction
of other bodies vis-ŕ-vis the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints of graft and corruption as authorized by law, meaning, for any other person or agency to
be able to conduct such investigations, there must be a law authorizing him or
it to do so.
In Ombudsman v. Galicia (cited in the ponencia) as
well as Ombudsman v. Estandarte,[39] the Court recognized the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Division School Superintendent vis-ŕ-vis the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints of graft and corruption committed by
public school teachers. Such concurrent
jurisdiction of the Division School Superintendent was granted by law,
specifically RA 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.[40]
Likewise, in Ombudsman
v. Medrano[41]
the Court held that by virtue of RA 4670 the Department of Education
Investigating Committee has concurrent jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to
conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints against public school
teachers.
Even the Sangguniang Panlungsod has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to look into complaints against the punong barangay.[42]
Such concurrent authority is found in RA 7160 or the Local Government Code.
The Department
of Justice is another agency with jurisdiction concurrent with the Ombudsman to
conduct preliminary investigation of public officials and employees.[43] Its concurrent jurisdiction is based on the
1987 Administrative Code.
Certainly,
there is a law, the Administrative Code, which authorized the Office of the
President to exercise jurisdiction concurrent with the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigation of graft and corruption cases. However, the scope and
focus of its preliminary investigation are restricted. Under the principle that
the power to appoint includes the power to remove, each President has had his
or her own version of a presidential committee to investigate graft and
corruption, the last being President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) under E.O. No. 268. The PAGC exercised concurrent authority with
the Ombudsman to investigate complaints of graft and corruption against
presidential appointees who are not impeachable officers and non-presidential
appointees in conspiracy with the latter. It is in this light that DOH v.
Camposano, et al.[44] as cited in the ponencia should be
understood. At that time, the PCAGC (now
defunct) had no investigatory power over non-presidential appointees; hence the
President created an ad-hoc committee to investigate both the principal
respondent who was a presidential appointee and her co-conspirators who were
non-presidential appointees. The PAGC (now also defunct), however, was
authorized to investigate both presidential appointees and non-presidential
appointees who were in conspiracy with each other.
However,
although pursuant to his power of control the President may supplant and
directly exercise the investigatory functions of departments and agencies
within the executive department,[45] his power of control under the Constitution
and the Administrative Code is confined only to the executive department.[46]
Without any law authorizing him, the
President cannot legally create a committee to extend his investigatory reach
across the boundaries of the executive department to “public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration” without setting apart
those who are still in the executive department from those who are not. Only the Ombudsman has the investigatory
jurisdiction over them under Article XI, Section 13. There is no law granting
to the President the authority to create a committee with concurrent investigatory
jurisdiction of this nature.
The President acted in violation of the
Constitution and without authority of law when he created a Truth Commission
under E.O. No. 1 to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to
conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints of graft and corruption
against public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration.
Investigation or
Quasi-Adjudication?
Respondents argue that the Truth Commission is merely an
investigative and fact-finding body tasked to gather facts, draw conclusions
therefrom and recommend the appropriate actions or measures to be taken. Petitioners, however, argue that the Truth
Commission is vested with quasi-judicial powers. Offices with such awesome powers cannot be
legally created by the President through mere executive orders.
Petitioners are correct.
The definition of investigation was extensively discussed in Carińo v. Commission on Human Rights:[47]
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition
of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically: "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an
official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is
to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy
involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of
"investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;"
"to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation"
being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."[48] (Italics in the original)
The exercise of quasi-judicial power
goes beyond mere investigation and fact-finding. Quasi-judicial power has been
defined as
… the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when
it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to
or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative
duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions
from them as basis for their official
action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
Despite respondents’ denial that the
Truth Commission is infused with quasi-judicial powers, it is patent from the
provisions of E.O. No. 1 itself that such powers are indeed vested in the Truth Commission,
particularly in Section 2, paragraphs (b) and (g):
b) Collect, receive, review, and evaluate evidence related to or
regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to
investigate, …
x x x
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the
appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all
evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and their private sector
co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that
there is reasonable ground to believe they are liable for graft and corruption
under pertinent applicable laws;
x x x
The powers to “evaluate evidence”
and “find reasonable ground to believe that someone is liable for graft and
corruption” are not
merely fact-finding or investigatory. These are
quasi-judicial in nature because they actually go into the weighing of evidence, drawing up of legal
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and the exercise of
discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature.
The evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence is a quasi-judicial/judicial function.
It involves an assessment of the evidence which is an exercise of
judicial discretion. We have defined discretion
as
the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for
which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed.[50]
It is the “the act or the liberty
to decide, according to the principles of justice and one’s ideas of what is
right and proper under the circumstances, without willfulness or favor.”[51]
Likewise, the power to establish if there is reasonable
ground to believe that certain persons are liable for graft and corruption
under pertinent applicable laws is quasi-judicial in nature because it is akin to the discretion
exercised by a prosecutor in the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation. It involves a judicial (or quasi-judicial) appraisal
of the facts for the purpose of determining if a violation has in fact been
committed.
Although
such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the
function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting
the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of
the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may
be prepared against the accused. Indeed,
a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the
merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be
adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter
of law to order an acquittal. A
preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a
judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to
be heard and for, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is
rendered thereon.
The
authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or
to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal
judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a
"judge," by the nature of his functions he is and must be considered
to be a quasi judicial officer.[52]
Hence, the Truth Commission is vested with
quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of its functions.
As a mere creation
of the executive and without a law granting it the power to investigate person
and agencies outside the executive department, the Truth Commission can only
perform administrative functions, not quasi-judicial functions. “Administrative agencies are not considered courts;
they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial
tribunals.”[53]
Executive Order No. 1 and the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, being
contrary to the Constitution, should be nullified.
I therefore vote that the
petitions be GRANTED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights (Study on the Right to the Truth): Report of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations
Economic and Social Council (E/CN.4/2006/91), 8 February 2006.
[2] See Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?, International Review of the Red Cross (2006), 88:862:254-268.
[3] Ibid., 268.
[4] Ibid., 245.
[5] But
see Eric Brahm, What is a Truth Commission and Why Does it Matter?, Peace and Conflict Review (Spring
2009), 3:2:1-14, which proposes that “Mark Freeman’s (2006) typology of human
rights investigations as the definition offering the most analytical clarity
and the strongest potential to move the field forward.” Freeman [Truth
Commissions and Procedural Fairness (2006), New York: Cambridge University
Press; E.H.R.L.R., 2008, 2, 294-297] defines a truth commission as an “ad hoc, autonomous, and
victim-centered commission of inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for
the primary purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on the principal causes
and consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of severe violence or
repression that occurred in the state during determinate periods of abusive
rule or conflict, and (2) making recommendations for their redress and future
prevention.”
[6] Priscilla
B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions –
1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, Human Rights Quarterly (Nov. 1994),
16:4:600.
[7] Ibid., 604.
[8] http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/009/2007/en/7988f852-d38a-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/
pol300092007en.html, viewed on 9 November 2010.
[9] Ruben
Carranza, Plunder and Pain: Should
Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes?, The International Journal of Transitional
Justice, Vol. 2, 2008, 322.
[10] Bataan Shipyard &
Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 75885, May 27,
1987, 150 SCRA 181, 202.
[11] Promulgated on
[12] Promulgated on
[13]
[14] Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R.
No. 139465,
[15] Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v.
The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052,
[16] Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, 312 Phil. 1145, 1152 (1995) citing AM JUR 2d on Public Officers and Employees.
[17] Banda
v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620,
[18] Ibid.
[19] Buklod ng Kawaniang EIIB v. Sec. Zamora, 413 Phil. 281, 295.
[20] Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No.
175573,
[21] Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. v. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo (G.R. No. 160756, 2010)
[22] Quinto v. Comelec (G.R. No. 189698, 2009)
[23] Abakada Guro v. Hon. Cesar V. Purisima (G.R. No. 166715, 2008)
[24] 59 SCRA 54, 1974.
[25] League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 176951; G.R. No. 177499; 2008; G.R. No. 178056, 2008)
[26] Par. 69, Lagman, et al’s Petition
[27] Par. 67, Lagman, et al’s Petition
[28] OSG Memorandum, pp. 88-90.
[29] Par. 73, Lagman, et al’s Petition
[30] Section 2. xxx b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other papers xxx.
[31] Section 2. xxx g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws xxx.
[32]
[33] Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
[34] 568 SCRA 327 (2008)
[35] Joson v. Executive Secretary, et al.,
G.R. No. 131255,
[36] Rufino v. Endriga, G.R.
No. 139554,
[37] Ang-Angco v. Hon. Natalio Castillo, et al.,
G.R. No. L-17169,
[38] Article XI states:
Section
13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:
x x x
(8)
x x x exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law.
[39] G.R.
No. 168670,
[40] See also Emin
v. De Leon (G.R. No. 139794,
[41] G.R.
No. 177580,
[42] See Ombudsman v. Rolson Rodriguez, G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010 citing Laxina, Sr. v.Ombudsman, G.R. No. 153155, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 542.
[43] Sevilla Decin
v. SPO1 Melzasar Tayco, et al., G.R. No. 149991,
February 14, 2007; Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of
the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 159747,
[44] G.R. No. 157684.
[45] See Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180046 , April 2, 2009; Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999.
[46] KMU v. Director General, et al., G.R.
No. 167798,
[47] G.R. No. 96681,
[48]
[49] Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115,
[50] Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
130974,
[51] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. Inc.
v. Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas, G.R. No. 162783,
[52] Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, G.R. Nos. 92319-20, 2 October 2, 1990. This is an En Banc case that had been
reiterated in two other En Banc cases, namely, Olivas v. Office of the Ombudsman (G.R. No. 102420, 20 December
1994) and Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman
(G.R. Nos. 156399-400, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 73). Thus it cannot be said to have been
overturned by Balangauan v. Court f
Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division,
[53] Meralco v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R.
No. 145399,