Republic of the
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD
DIVISION
ARNALDO
G. GABUNAS, SR., G.R. No. 188637
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO
MORALES, J.,
-versus-
Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA,
JR.,
SCANMAR
MARITIME SERVICES SERENO,
JJ.
INC.,
MR. VICENTE BRILLANTES
AND
IUM SHIP MANAGEMENT, Promulgated:
Respondents . December 15, 2010
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D E C I S I O N
SERENO,
J.:
Before us is a Petition
for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
Petition seeks to reverse the Decision[1]
dated 24 December 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. SP No. 99242.
The CA Decision affirmed the Decision[2]
dated 24 August 2006 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in CA G.
R. No. 045232-05.
The following are the established
facts of the case:
Petitioner
Arnaldo G. Gabunas, Sr. was a seafarer registered with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA) under Seafarer’s Registration Certificate No.
0263209-95 and also with the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).[3]
On 22 December 2000, petitioner signed
a contract with respondent Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. (Scanmar) to work as
2nd Assistant Engineer for its principal, IUM Ship Management, on
board the ocean vessel M/V Chaiten
for nine months.[4]
Prior to boarding his assigned vessel,
petitioner was subjected to a pre-employment medical examination, on the basis
of which he was declared by the company-designated physician “fit to work.”[5]
On 27 December 2000, petitioner left the
Sometime in July 2001, petitioner
experienced a throbbing pain in his left leg while on board his vessel of
assignment. He informed his officer about it and requested medical attention,
but was ignored.[7]
After his contract expired, petitioner
disembarked from the vessel on 16 October 2001 and arrived in the
On 02 February 2002, petitioner felt
pain and numbness in his left leg. He sought medical attention at the
Philippine Heart Center, where he was diagnosed with “Critical Limb Ischemia.” Petitioner
sought medical assistance from respondent Scanmar, but he was ignored.[11]
On
20 February 2002, petitioner underwent a femoro-popliteal bypass surgery on his
left leg. Due to the failure of the first operation, he was required to undergo
a “redo” of the femoro-popliteal bypass. Despite undergoing these medical procedures,
petitioner’s condition did not improve. He finally underwent a below-knee
amputation of his left leg.[12]
Due to the amputation of his leg,
petitioner was prevented from engaging in his line of work. He consulted Dr.
Efren Vicaldo, an internist-cardiologist at the Philippine Heart Center. Dr.
Vicaldo opined that petitioner’s disease incapacitated the latter from engaging
in normal work, and that it was “work-aggravated.”[13]
Hence, petitioner demanded sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits
from respondent. His demands were, however, ignored by respondent.[14]
On 10 June 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint
with the National Labor Relations Commission, docketed as Case No. (M)
04-06-01636-00. On 25 May 2005, the Labor Arbiter found for petitioner and
rendered the following monetary awards:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to pay
complainant Arnaldo G. Gabunas his Permanent Disability Benefit in the amount
of EIGHTY THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US $ 80,000.00), Sickness Allowance in the
amount of US$3,800.00 or its equivalent in local currency at the time of actual
pa yment plus ten (10%) percent of the total award as Attorney’s Fees.[15]
Respondent
Scanmar appealed the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter at the NLRC. On 24
August 2006, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and dismissed
petitioner’s Complaint as follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby ordered SET ASIDE and a
new one entered declaring the DISMISSAL of complainant-appellee’s complaint for
lack of merit.[16]
Aggrieved
by the NLRC’s Decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the
following issues:
1.
Whether or not the Honorable Commission
erred in holding that the sickness of petitioner was not work-related and not
acquired during the term of his contract contrary to the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter;
2.
Whether or not the Honorable Commission
erred in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits for
failure to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement;
3.
Whether or not the Honorable Commission
erred in giving credence to the affidavit of Mr. Esta while disregarding the
assertion of petitioner;
4.
Whether or not the Honorable Commission
erred in ruling that the belated filing of petitioner’s complaint weakens his
claim for disability benefit;
5.
Whether or not the Honorable Commission
erred in considering the assessment of the company-designated physician in the
PEME of petitioner as physically fit;
6.
Petitioner is entitled to permanent
disability; and
7.
Petitioner is entitled to attorney’s
fees.[17]
On
24 December 2008, the Court of Appeals, through its Twelfth Division, rendered
a Decision affirming the ruling of the NLRC. The penultimate part of the Decision
is worded as follows:
The
claim that the complaint was filed based merely on surmises and conjectures does
not deserve belief. The clinical abstracts issued by the attending physicians
of petitioner Gabuans, Sr. showed that his sickness was a reality, however,
petitioner’s claim thereon has prescribed.
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the NLRC
in NLRC-NCR OFW Case No. (M) 04006-01636-00 (sic) is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.[18]
Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the CA’s Decision, but his Motion was denied
through a Resolution dated 22 June 2009.[19]
Hence, this instant Petition for certiorari assailing the appellate court’s Decision.
Petitioner
argues before this Court that he is entitled to claim permanent disability and
other benefits, because his illness was work-related and his claim has not yet prescribed.
In addition, he also prays for the award of damages and attorney’s fees as a
consequence of his instituting the suit to enforce his claims against
respondents.
After
a careful perusal of the records of the case, we rule to DENY the Petition.
The
validity of petitioner’s claim for permanent disability benefits against
respondents hinges on whether or not his illness was work-related. The rest of
his prayers likewise depend on the resolution of the main issue mentioned.
We
have no compelling reason to deviate from the factual findings of the NLRC
stating that petitioner has failed to establish that his illness was work-related.
Hence, he is not entitled to claim permanent disability benefits. This Court
has, time and again, held that the factual findings of
quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are conclusive upon the parties and binding on this Court.[20]
This dictum is consistent with the settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, only questions of law may be raised before this Court.[21]
In De Jesus v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[22]
judicial review by the Supreme Court does not extend to a re-evaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence that served as the basis for the proper labor
tribunal’s determination. The doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts
is firm and applies with greater force to labor cases.[23]
The
NLRC dismissed the complaint after finding that petitioner’s claims were not
supported by substantial evidence. It noted that the records showed petitioner’s
failure to present credible evidence to prove that his illness was
work-related. In fact, the NLRC regarded as mere allegation, his statement that
“while busy doing his task, (he) felt a throbbing pain on his left leg,”
because he failed to support it with credible evidence, such as medical records
and the daily logbook of the vessel.[24]
Its finding was sustained by the Court of Appeals.
In
affirming the findings of the NLRC, the appellate court found that the clinical
abstracts presented by petitioner to support his permanent disability claims
were taken only after his disembarkation from his assigned vessel.[25]
The CA also noted that petitioner failed to present evidence that he had
notified the ship captain about his alleged medical complaint while on board
the vessel. Further, it found no proof, aside from mere allegations in the Complaint
of petitioner,[26] that
he had notified respondent of any medical problem upon disembarkation.
Contrary
to petitioner’s position, we do not find any error on the part of the appellate
court, which gave credence to the Affidavit of witness Victorio Q. Esta, respondent
Scanmar’s Manning Manager. The Affidavit attests to the fact that respondent did
not receive any complaint from petitioner, either while on board the vessel or
after disembarkation.[27]
We
scoured the records of the proceedings on the level of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC and agree that petitioner could not substantiate his claim that he had
complained of pain in his left leg while on board the vessel or upon his
disembarkation. We also note that even the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on this
matter is wanting in reference to any evidence that would support findings in
favor of petitioner. As between petitioner’s bare allegation and the Affidavit
of a witness to the contrary, we give credence to the latter.
In
Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, et al.,[28] we held that a notarized document carries
the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It
has in its favor the presumption of regularity, which may only be rebutted by
evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to
the falsity of the certificate. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be
upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of a
notarial document lies in the one contesting the same.
Petitioner
failed to present convincing evidence to rebut the assertions made by Mr. Esta
on a crucial point. The CA stated that while it was ready to construe in favor
of labor in case of doubt, and while the Affidavit of Mr. Esta could be
considered self-serving, there was absolutely no evidence to rebut this Affidavit;
hence, the Affidavit must be believed.
On
another point, petitioner faults the ruling of the appellate court that his
illness is not work-related. Petitioner stresses that the law only requires a
probability of the connection between the risk of contracting the illness and
its aggravation due to the working conditions – not absolute certainty or
direct causal relation – to prove compensability.[29]
However, while petitioner correctly cites the principle, he must still adduce
substantial evidence to prove that the principle can be applied to his case.
In
Spouses Ponciano Aya-ay, Sr. and
Clemencia Aya-ay v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp. and Magna Marina, Inc.,[30]
the issue resolved by the Court was whether the petitioners therein were
entitled to death benefits provided under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract. Parenthetically, it was crucial to determine whether the death of the
deceased was reasonably connected with his work, or whether the working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease that resulted in the
employee’s death. In resolving the issue, the Court made this pronouncement:
Hence,
it was incumbent on petitioners to present substantial evidence, or such
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion, that the eye injury sustained by Aya-ay during the term of his
employment with respondents caused, or increased the risk of, CVA.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent;
for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by law is real
and not merely apparent.
x x x x x x x
x x
This
Court finds that under the circumstances petitioners’ bare allegations do not
suffice to discharge the required quantum of proof of compensability. Awards of
compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. The beneficiaries
must present evidence to prove a positive proposition.[31]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In
the instant case, it is apparent that petitioner’s allegations in his
supplications are bereft of any substantial proof that his illness was
contracted while working as a 2nd
Assistant Engineer on board the vessel, or that his illness was aggravated by
his working conditions then. At best, his allegations were mere conjectures. Paragraph
7 of his Position Paper submitted to the Labor Arbiter states:
7.
Sometime in July 2001, while busy doing
his task, complainant felt a throbbing pain on his left leg. Immediately, he
decided to inform his officer what he experienced. He requested for a medical
check up hoping that he would be referred to a physician and be given the
appropriate medical attention but such was not the case. No medical attention
was extended and was left with no recourse so he continued to work until he was
repatriated and was disembarked on board on 16 October 2001 and arrived in the
Attached
to the above paragraph is a record of his date of arrival upon disembarkation
from his assigned vessel. This fact is admitted by the parties and is
undisputed. The allegation that he complained of pain and numbness while on
board the vessel in July 2001 remains a bare allegation without any supporting
evidence. This fact is reflected in the Labor Arbiter’s overturned Decision, which
summarily ruled that petitioner’s sickness occurred during the term and
validity of his contract. There was a palpable lack of reference to any basis for
that ruling in the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.
The
proceedings before the NLRC and the CA reveal that even on appeal, petitioner
failed to produce any evidence to substantiate his claim that his illness was
work-related. The medical abstracts he introduced to support his case were all
taken after his disembarkation from his vessel of assignment. Unfortunately,
the pieces of documentary evidence that petitioner presented do not help in
establishing that his illness was work-related so as to sustain a finding
entitling him to compensation under his contract with respondents.
We
agree with petitioner’s argument that to establish whether the illness is work-related,
probability – not certainty – is the touchstone.[33]
However, the probability referred to must be founded on facts and reason. Government Service Insurance System v.
Emmanuel P. Cuntapay[34]
is instructive as regards the burden resting on a claimant’s shoulder – that of
proving the causal link between a claimant’s work and the ailment suffered:
The
claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of
the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature
of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not a
direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen’s
claim is based is probable. Probability,
not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
proceedings. And probability must be reasonable; hence it should, at least,
be anchored on credible information. Moreover, a mere possibility will
not suffice; a claim will fail if there is only a possibility that the
employment caused the disease. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner clearly failed to discharge
the duty imposed upon him by law to claim the benefits as prayed for in his Petition.
Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract provides:
B.
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR
INJURY OR ILLNESS
The
liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3.
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled
to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to
work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one
hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit
himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company designated
physician within three working days upon his return except when he is
physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the
agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer
to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer
disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and
binding on both parties. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The wording
of the section cited above clearly states that for an injury or illness to be
compensable under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, it must be
work-related. Petitioner has failed to convince this Court that the illness he
suffered can be reasonably linked to the performance of his work as 2nd
Assistant Engineer on board M/V Chaiten
or to prove that it was aggravated during his stint in the vessel. We therefore
find that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the findings of the NLRC
dismissing his appeal for lack of merit.
We now address the issue raised by
petitioner – whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the law governing
the contract he executed with respondents to determine the prescriptive period for
his claim.
The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal
on the ground that his Complaint was filed out of time. It applied Section 30
of POEA Circular No. 055, Series of 1996, and ruled that the prescription
period for filing claims is one year from disembarkation. Hence, petitioner,
having disembarked from his assigned vessel on 17 October 2001 and having filed
his complaint on 10 June 2004, the Complaint was deemed to have been filed out
of time.[35]
Petitioner, on the other hand,
contends that the law under which his contract should be governed in relation
to the prescription period for filing his action should be drawn from the terms
of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract, which grants him three years
from disembarkation within which to file his action.
The Court of Appeals erred in applying
POEA Circular No. 55, Series of 1996, to petitioner’s contract in relation to
the prescription period within which he should have filed his money claim. Section
30 of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract, which took effect on 25 June
2000, provides for the prescriptive period for filing claims arising from the
said contract:
SECTION 30.
PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION
All claims arising from this
Contract shall be made within three (3) years from the date the cause of action
arises, otherwise the same shall be barred.
Thus,
when petitioner signed his contract with respondent on 22 December 2001, it was
the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract that was already in effect.
Consequently, his action, which was filed on 10 June 2004, was filed within the
three year prescription period under the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract.
Despite having filed his action within the prescriptive period, his action must
fail.
As
regards the prayer for damages and attorney’s fees, we deny it for lack of legal
basis.
WHEREFORE,
the Petition is DENIED. The Decision (dated 24 December 2008)
of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 99242 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chairperson,
Third Division
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
* Additional member per Special
Order No. 921 dated 13 December 2010.
[1] Penned by Associate
Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by then Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and Associate Justice Romeo F.
Barza.
[2] Penned by NLRC Second
Division Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and concurred in by
Commissioners Victoriano R. Calaycay and Angelita A. Gacutan.
[3] Rollo, p. 6.
[4] Id.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Id. at
175.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Id. at 135.
[16] Id. at 53.
[17] CA rollo, pp. 332-333.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 392.
[19] Penned by Associate
Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by then Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza.
[20] Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Leonisa Delgado, G.R. No.
168210, 17 June 2008, 555 SCRA 590.
[21] Danny Mame v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167953, 03 April 2007, 520
SCRA 552.
[22] G.R. No. 151158, 17
August 2007, 530 SCRA 489.
[23]PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 153031, 14 December 2006, 511 SCRA 44 as cited in De Jesus v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra.
[24] Rollo, p. 50.
[25]
[26]
[27] Supra.
[28] G.R. No. 125283, 10 February
2006, 482 SCRA 164.
[29] Rollo, p. 14.
[30] G.R. No. 155359, 31
January 2006, 481 SCRA 282.
[31] Id.
[32] National Labor
Relations Commission rollo, pp.
25-26.
[33] Rollo, p. 14.
[34] G.R. No. 168862, 30
April 2008, 553 SCRA 520.
[35] Rollo, p. 69.