Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, -
versus - RICKY
ALFREDO y Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 188560 Present: VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: December
15, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the September 30, 2008 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 entitled People of the Philippines v. Ricky Alfredo y
Norman, which affirmed an earlier decision[2] in
Criminal Case Nos. 01-CR-4213 and 01-CR-4214of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 62 in La Trinidad, Benguet. The
RTC found accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo y Norman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of rape.
Accused-appellant was charged
in two (2) separate Informations, the accusatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213
That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA],[3] a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214
That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault by inserting a flashlight into the vagina of one [AAA], a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
On
During the trial, the prosecution offered the oral
testimonies of the victim, AAA; her 10-year old son, BBB; Ernesto dela Cruz; Police
Officer 3 James Ruadap; and Dr. Alma Ged-ang. On the other hand, the defense presented as
its witnesses accused-appellant himself; his mother, Remina; his sister,
Margaret; Hover Cotdi; Jona Canuto; and Pina Mendoza.[6]
The Prosecution’s Version of Facts
In March 2001, AAA, who was six months pregnant, went
home to Butiyao, Benguet, along with her family, to harvest the peppers planted
in their garden. On
In the middle of the night, AAA was awakened by a beam
of light coming from the gaps in the walls of the shack directly illuminating
her face. She then inquired who the person was, but nobody answered. Instead,
the light was switched off. After a few minutes, the light was switched on
again.[8]
Thereafter, a male voice shouted, “Rumwar
kayo ditta no saan kayo nga rumwar paletpeten kayo iti bala!”[9]
AAA remained seated. Then, the male voice uttered, “Lukatam daytoy no saan
mo nga lukatan bilangan ka, maysa, duwa…”[10]
AAA immediately woke BBB up. Just then,
the male voice said, “Pabitaken kayo iti bala.”[11]
AAA cried out of fear.[12]
Anxious that the person outside would kill her and her
son, AAA lit the gas lamp placed on top of the table, and opened the door while
her son stood beside it. As the door
opened, she saw accused-appellant directly in front of her holding a
flashlight. AAA did not immediately
recognize accused-appellant, as his hair was long and was covering his face. She invited him to come inside the shack, but
the latter immediately held her hair and ordered her to walk uphill.[13]
Helpless and terrified, AAA obeyed him.
All the while, accused-appellant was behind her.[14]
Upon reaching a sloping ground, accused-appellant
ordered AAA to stop. Thereafter,
accused-appellant placed the lit flashlight in his pocket and ordered AAA to
remove her clothes. When she refused,
accused-appellant boxed her left eye and removed her clothes. When she also attempted to stop
accused-appellant, the latter angrily slapped her face. Completely naked, AAA was again ordered to
walk uphill.[15]
Upon reaching a grassy portion and a stump about one
foot high, accused-appellant ordered AAA to stop and lie on top of the stump,
after accused-appellant boxed her thighs. Accused-appellant then bent down and spread
open AAA’s legs. After directing the beam of the flashlight on AAA’s naked
body, accused-appellant removed his pants, lowered his brief to his knees, went
on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant
threatened to box her if she moves.[16]
Accused-appellant also held AAA’s breast, as well as
the other parts of her body. He shifted
the flashlight from one hand to another while he moved his buttocks up and
down. AAA cried as she felt severe pain
in her lower abdomen. Accused-appellant
stood up and directed the beam of the flashlight on her after he was satisfied.[17]
Ten minutes later, accused-appellant went on top of
AAA again and inserted his penis into her vagina and moved his buttocks up and
down. After being satisfied, accused-appellant stood up and lit a cigarette.[18]
Afterwards, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again
and tried to insert his penis in the latter’s vagina. His penis, however, has
already softened. Frustrated,
accused-appellant knelt and inserted his fingers in her vagina. After removing his fingers, accused-appellant
held a twig about 10 inches long and the size of a small finger in diameter
which he used to pierce her vagina. Dissatisfied,
accused-appellant removed the twig and inserted the flashlight in her vagina.[19]
After accused-appellant removed the flashlight from
AAA’s vagina, he went on top of her again, pressing his elbows on her upper
breasts and boxing her shoulders and thighs. Subsequently, accused-appellant stood up and
warned her not to report the incident to the authorities. Immediately after, he left her at the scene.[20]
Since she was too weak to walk, AAA rested for about
15 minutes before she got up and went back to the shack where she immediately
woke her son up. Thereafter, they proceeded to the highway and boarded a jeep
to Camp 30, Atok, Benguet. She also went
to Sayangan, Atok, Benguet the following day to report the incident to the
police authorities.[21]
Upon medical examination, Dr. Ged-ang found that AAA
had a subconjunctival hemorrhage on the right eye and multiple head injuries,
which may have been caused by force such as a blow, a punch, or a hard object
hitting the eye. There was also tenderness
on the upper part of the back of AAA, as well as on her left infraclavicular
area below the left clavicle, left flank area or at the left side of the waist,
and medial aspect on the inner part of the thigh. Moreover, there were also
multiple linear abrasions, or minor straight open wounds on the skin of her
forearms and legs caused by sharp objects with rough surface.[22]
Apart from the external examination, Dr. Ged-ang also
conducted an internal examination of the genitalia of AAA. Dr. Ged-ang found that there was confluent
abrasion on the left and medial aspects of her labia minora about five
centimeters long and a confluent circular abrasion caused by a blunt, rough
object that has been forcibly introduced into the genitalia.[23]
Version of the Defense
In the morning of April 28, 2001, accused-appellant
was allegedly working in the sayote
plantation near his house. At noontime,
he went home to eat his lunch. After
having lunch, his mother told him to bring the pile of sayote she harvested to the edge of the road. Accused-appellant went to the place where the
pile of harvested sayote was placed.
However, when he reached that place, he claimed that he saw AAA gathering the sayote harvested by his mother and
placing them in a sack.[24]
Upon seeing what AAA was doing, accused-appellant
shouted at her, prompting AAA to run away with her son and leave the sack of sayote. When they left,
accused-appellant started placing the harvested sayote in the sack. He was
able to fill eight sacks. Remembering that his mother told him that he would be
able to fill 10 sacks all in all, accused-appellant went to the shack of AAA
after bringing the eight sacks near the road. He suspected that she and her son were the
ones who took the two missing sacks of sayote.[25]
When he arrived at the place where AAA and her son
were staying, accused-appellant allegedly saw them packing sayote, and he also supposedly saw a sack of sayote with the name of his father printed on it. For this reason,
accused-appellant got mad and told AAA to go away and leave the place because
what they were doing was wrong. AAA replied by saying that she would wait for
Hover Cotdi, the owner of the sayote
plantation and the shack, to ask for permission to leave. All this time,
accused-appellant was allegedly speaking in an angry but non-threatening voice.
Nonetheless, while he was confronting
AAA, her son ran into the shack and stayed there.[26]
Before leaving the place, accused-appellant told AAA
that the sacks of sayote belonged to
his family, although he decided not to take them back anymore. He supposedly left after five o’clock in the
afternoon and arrived at their house at around seven o’clock in the evening. During this time, all his family members were
watching television on Channel 3. Accused-appellant joined them in watching a
Tagalog movie. He then allegedly went to
bed at 10 o’clock in the evening, while his parents continued to watch television
until 11 o’clock in the evening.[27]
The following morning, on April 29, 2001,
accused-appellant woke up between six to seven o’clock in the morning. After
having breakfast, he helped his mother clean the sayote farm. At around eight o’clock in the morning, he saw AAA by
the road waiting for a ride with a baggage placed in a carton box. His mother then went down the road and talked
to AAA, leaving accused-appellant behind. He claimed to pity AAA upon seeing her but
could not do anything.[28]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Between the two conflicting versions of the incident,
the trial court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and rendered
its Decision dated February 17, 2006, finding accused-appellant guilty of two
counts of rape. The decretal portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds RICKY
ALFREDO y
The Court, likewise, finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, and eight (8) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
For each count of rape, he shall pay [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity and the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province is directed to immediately transfer the said accused, Ricky Alfredo y Norman to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the expiration of fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail
Warden of
SO ORDERED.[29]
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[30]
modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to
this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition,
to the CA.
On August 17, 2006, accused-appellant filed his Brief for Accused-Appellant,[31]
while the People of the
Ruling of the Appellate Court
As stated above, the CA, in its Decision dated
September 30, 2008, affirmed
the judgment of conviction by the trial court.[33]
Undaunted, accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated March 19, 2009.[34]
On April 21, 2009, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal[35] from the CA Decision
dated September 30, 2008.
In our Resolution dated September 14, 2009,[36]
we notified the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs
if they so desired. On November 9, 2009,
the People of the
Accused-appellant contends in his supplemental brief that:
I.
BY THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IN THE TWO (2) INFORMATIONS FILED AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THE LATTER HAS NO OTHER PLAUSIBLE DEFENSE EXCEPT ALIBI THAT SHOULD NOT JUST BE BRUSHED ASIDE IF THERE ARE MATERIAL INCONSISTENSIES IN THE CLAIMS OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION;
II.
THE
DECISION CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT HEAVILY RELIED ON THE DEMEANOR OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION DURING THE TRIAL WHEN THE PONENTE OF THE
DECISION DID NOT HAVE ANY
III.
THE THEN AND THERE CONDUCT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS UNLIKELY TO YIELD A GUILTY VERDICT.[38]
We sustain accused-appellant’s conviction.
Alibi is
an inherently weak defense
In his supplemental
brief, accused-appellant contends that he could not offer any other
defense except denial and alibi, as he could not distort the truth that he was
in his house at the time of the alleged rape in the evening of April 28, 2001
up to the wee hours of April 29, 2001. He
contends that although denial and alibi are the weakest defenses in criminal
cases, consideration should also be given to the fact that denial becomes the
most plausible line of defense considering the nature of the crime of rape
where normally only two persons are involved.[39]
It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the
accused to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. He
must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at
the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[40]
A review of the records in the instant case would reveal that
accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence that he did not leave
his house, which is only about 150 meters away from the shack of AAA, in the
evening of April 28, 2001. Significantly, it was also not physically impossible
for accused-appellant to be present on the mountain where he allegedly raped
AAA at the time it was said to have been committed.
Moreover, it has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is
inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful
witnesses.[41] It is evidence negative in nature and
self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[42] Thus, there being no strong and credible
evidence adduced to overcome the testimony of AAA, no weight can be given to
the alibi of accused-appellant.
In addition, even if the alibi of accused-appellant appears to have been
corroborated by his mother, Remina, and his sister, Margaret, said defense is
unworthy of belief not only because accused-appellant was positively identified
by AAA, but also because it has been held that alibi becomes more unworthy of
merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his or her
relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms,[43]
and not by credible persons.[44]
As between the statement
made in an affidavit and that given in open court, the latter is superior
Accused-appellant contends also that there were
material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in
the latter’s respective affidavits, to wit: (1) whether accused-appellant’s
penis was erect or not; and (2) whether AAA indeed recognized accused-appellant
when they were already on the mountain or while they were still in the shack.[45]
AAA testified in open court that
accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina several times but
was unable to do so since his penis has already softened.[46]
On the other hand, AAA stated in her affidavit that “the suspect ordered me to
lay [sic] flatly on the ground and there he started to light and view my whole
naked body while removing his pant [sic] and tried to insert his pennis [sic]
on [sic] my vagina but I wonder it does not errect [sic].”[47]
There is no inconsistency between AAA’s
testimony and her affidavit. The only difference is that she failed to state in
her affidavit that before accused-appellant unsuccessfully tried to insert his
penis into AAA’s vagina, he had already succeeded twice in penetrating her
private organ.
There is likewise no incompatibility between
AAA’s affidavit stating that she came to know of accused-appellant as the
culprit when they were on the mountain and his flashlight illuminated his face
as he lay on top of her, and her testimony that while they were still in the
shack, AAA was “not then sure” but already suspected that her rapist was
accused-appellant “because of his hair.”[48]
In other words, AAA was not yet sure whether accused-appellant was the culprit
while they were still in the shack, as she only became positively certain that
it was him when the flashlight illuminated his face while they were on the
mountain.[49]
Nevertheless, discrepancies do not necessarily impair the
credibility of a witness, for affidavits, being taken ex parte, are
almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial
suggestions, and are, thus,
generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.[50]
The validity of conviction
is not adversely affected by the fact that the judge who rendered judgment was
not the one who heard the witnesses
Accused-appellant contends further that the
judge who penned the appealed decision is different from the judge who heard
the testimonies of the witnesses and was, thus, in no position to render a
judgment, as he did not observe firsthand their demeanor during trial.
We do not agree. The fact that the trial judge
who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the
case, does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to
support its conclusion.[51]
As this Court held in People v. Competente:
The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the Decision would show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions from the Court carefully passed upon.[52] (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial were extant and complete. Hence, there was no impediment
for the judge to decide the case.
The guilt of
accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt
After a careful examination of the records of
this case, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution’s evidence established
the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations
should be made: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only
two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.[53] Nonetheless,
it is also worth noting that rape is essentially committed in relative
isolation or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify
with regard to the fact of forced coitus.[54]
In the instant case, accused-appellant is charged with two counts of rape¾one
under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and the other
under par. 2 of Art. 266-A.
Pertinently, the elements of rape under par. 1(a) of Art. 266-A of the
Code are the following: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender
had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using
force or intimidation.[55]
On the other hand, the elements of rape under par. 2 of Art. 266-A of the
Code are as follows: (1) that the offender commits an act of sexual assault;
(2) that the act of sexual assault is committed by inserting his penis into
another person’s mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any instrument or object
into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and that the act of sexual
assault is accomplished by using force or intimidation, among others.[56]
Notably, the prosecution has sufficiently
established the existence of the foregoing elements. When AAA was called to the
witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of the incident that transpired in
the evening of
Particularly, AAA testified that
accused-appellant threatened to riddle her and her son with bullets if they do
not open the door of their shack. Accused-appellant thereafter forcibly pulled
her hair and dragged her to the mountains. AAA pleaded for her life. Nonetheless, accused-appellant boxed her every
time she did not yield to his demands. He
boxed her thighs forcing AAA to sit, and he threatened to box her if she moves
while he carried out his bestial desires.[57]
AAA testified further that after
accused-appellant satisfied his lust, he sexually assaulted her. He inserted his fingers into her vagina and
then he tried to pierce the same with a twig. Subsequently, he inserted his flashlight into
her vagina.[58]
AAA was too weak to stop him. She had
struggled to free herself from accused-appellant from the moment she was
dragged from the shack until they reached the mountains. However, accused-appellant still prevailed
over her. Notably, AAA was six months
pregnant at that time. She was
frightened and hopeless.[59]
Also, it should be noted that the findings in the medical examination of
Dr. Ged-ang corroborated the testimony of AAA. While a medical examination of
the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, and no law
requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution of the case, the
medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are veritable
corroborative pieces of evidence, which strongly bolster AAA’s testimony.[60]
Moreover, the police found the red t-shirt and blue shorts of AAA in the
place where accused-appellant was said to have removed her clothes. In
addition, AAA’s son, BBB, testified as to how accused-appellant threatened them
in the evening of April 28, 2001, how he was able to identify accused-appellant
as the perpetrator, and what his mother looked like when she returned home in
the early morning of April 29, 2001. According to BBB, his mother was naked
except for a dirty white jacket she was wearing. He also noticed that his
mother had wounds and blood all over her body. All these are consistent with
the testimony of AAA.[61]
All told, we accordingly sustain accused-appellant’s conviction.
The
decision of the CA as to the damages awarded must be modified. For rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, the CA was correct in awarding PhP 50,000 as civil
indemnity and PhP 50,000 as moral damages. However, for rape through sexual assault under
Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Code, the award of damages should be PhP 30,000 as
civil indemnity and PhP 30,000 as moral damages.[62]
We
explained in People v. Cristobal that
“for sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral
corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the
institution of marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by way of
example to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the
public good is warranted.”[63] Notably,
there were instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the absence
of an aggravating circumstance. As we held in People v. Dalisay:
Prior to the
effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally
awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission
of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in
accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of
the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not
alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of
damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not
alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. x x x
x x x x
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the
principle that courts may still award exemplary damages based on the
aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been
alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the
effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig
reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not
adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our
body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape,
dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating
circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently
alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another
awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both been
alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set
are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor,
People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the
Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime
Cadag Jimenez, and People of the
Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the
x x x x
Nevertheless, by
focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary
damages — taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very
reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this
point, thus —
Also
known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages, exemplary or corrective damages
are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured
or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally,
but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the
use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result
of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being
that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendant — associated with such circumstances as
willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression,
insult or fraud or gross fraud — that intensifies the injury. The terms
punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of
damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter
the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore,
can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but
also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender.
In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary
damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very
basis of the award. Thus, in People v.
Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,
the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption,
perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant
married woman. Recently, in People of the
Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People
of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court
awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to
elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual
abuse.
It must be noted
that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than
Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow
Justice Carpio Morales’ words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, “[t]he
application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats
the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages — to set a
public example or correction for the public good.”[64]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Concomitantly,
exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 should be awarded for each count
of rape, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[65]
WHEREFORE, the
appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated September 30, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 finding accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo guilty of
rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As thus
modified, accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213 is ordered to pay PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral
damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214, accused-appellant is
likewise ordered to pay PhP 30,000
as civil indemnity, PhP 30,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-13. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 16-56. Penned by Judge Agapito K. Laoagan, Jr.
[3] The real names of the
victim and her immediate family members are withheld to protect their identity
and privacy pursuant to Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 and Section 40 of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. See People v.
Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
[4] CA rollo, p. 16.
[5]
[6] Rollo, p. 3.
[7]
[8]
[9] “You better come out if you will not come out I will riddle you with bullets.”
[10] “You better get out or else I will count, one, two…”
[11] “I will explode the bullet.”
[12] Rollo, p. 4.
[13]
[14] CA rollo, p. 20.
[15] Rollo, p. 4.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] CA rollo, p. 31.
[23]
[24] Rollo, p. 6.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] CA rollo, p. 56.
[30] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[31] CA rollo, pp. 62-83.
[32]
[33] Rollo, p. 13.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] CA rollo, pp. 68-69.
[39] Rollo, p. 32.
[40] People v. Guerrero,
G.R. No. 170360, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 666, 683; People v. Garte,
G.R. No. 176152,
[41] People v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 78, 91; Velasco v. People, G.R. No. 166479, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 649, 664-665.
[42] People v. Ranin, Jr., G.R. No. 173023, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 297, 309; Velasco v. People, supra note 41.
[43] People v. Manzano,
G.R. No. 108293,
[44] People v. Panganiban,
G.R. No. 97969,
[45] Rollo, pp. 36-38.
[46] TSN, March 11, 2003, p. 6.
[47] Rollo, p. 48.
[48] TSN, June 16, 2003, p. 8.
[49] Rollo, p. 10.
[50] People v. Sara,
G.R. No. 140618,
[51] People v. Hatani,
G.R. Nos. 78813-14,
[52] G.R. No. 96697, March 26, 1992, 207 SCRA 591, 598.
[53] People v.
[54] People v. Resurreccion, G.R. No. 185389, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 269, 276; citing People v. Baylen, G.R. No. 135242, April 19, 2002, 381 SCRA 395, 404.
[55] Luis B. Reyes, Revised Penal Code 525 (16th ed., 2006).
[56]
[57] CA rollo, pp. 44-45.
[58]
[59]
[60] See People v. Ferrer,
G.R. No. 142662,
[61] CA rollo, p. 46.
[62] People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, August 9, 2010.
[63] G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996, 252 SCRA 507, 517-518.
[64] G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807, 817-821.
[65] People v. Lindo, supra note 62; citing Flordeliz v. People, G.R. No. 186441, March 1, 2010.