SPOUSES REUBEN DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 185899
AND
MINERVA DELA CRUZ,
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
and
MENDOZA,
JJ.
RAMON C. PAPA IV, in his capacity
as Co-Administrator of the Estate
of Promulgated:
Angela M. Butte,
Respondent. December 8, 2010
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ABAD, J.:
This case is about the plaintiff’s lone
witness who passed away due to illness before the adverse party could cross-examine
him.
The Facts and the Case
In 1994, the Intestate Estate of
Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an action for cancellation of titles,
recovery of properties, and damages against several defendants, including petitioner
spouses Reuben and Minerva Dela Cruz (the Dela Cruzes) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City in Civil Cases 94-3447 and 95-3816. On October 21, 1999 the Estate presented
Myron C. Papa (Myron), its executor, to testify on the substance of the
complaint. At the conclusion of Myron’s
testimony on that day, the RTC required the Estate and the latter agreed to
present Myron anew at the next scheduled hearing to identify the originals of certain
exhibits, after which counsels for the defendants, would begin to cross-examine
him.
But the Estate never got around recalling
Myron to the witness stand. He was taken
ill and diagnosed as suffering from stage four colon and liver cancer, prompting
respondent Ramon C. Papa IV (Ramon), the Estate’s co-administrator, to seek repeated
postponements of hearings in the case to allow Myron undergo intensive
treatment. Later, the Estate filed a
motion for leave to have the defendants cross-examine Myron by deposition at
the hospital where he was confined. The RTC
granted the motion on February 22, 2001[1]
and eventually set the deposition-taking on September 7, 2001 but Myron passed
away on August 16, 2001.
On November 15, 2001 one of the
defendants moved to expunge Myron’s direct testimony. The Dela Cruzes for their part moved to
dismiss the case for failure of the Estate to prosecute it. On March 13, 2002 the RTC issued an order,
denying the two motions based on the ground that the Estate had no control of
the circumstances that caused the delay in the case.
On December 3, 2003 the Estate asked leave
of court to file its formal offer of exhibits.
On December 5, 2003 the Dela Cruzes filed a motion to strike out Myron’s
testimony on the ground of failure to cross-examine him. Meanwhile, the Estate filed its formal offer
of evidence.
In a March 4, 2005 Order,[2]
the RTC granted the Dela Cruzes’ motion to strike out Myron’s testimony on the
ground that, due to the Estate’s fault, such testimony was never completed,
depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine him. Because the RTC denied the Estate’s motion
for reconsideration,[3]
it filed a special civil action of certiorari
and mandamus before the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 91074, assailing the March 4, 2005 Order. Meanwhile, on August 16, 2005 the RTC
admitted the Dela Cruzes’ demurrer to evidence.
On July 25, 2008 the CA rendered a Decision,[4]
granting the petition and setting aside the RTC’s order that struck out Myron’s
testimony. The CA denied the Dela
Cruzes’ motion for reconsideration.
Although the CA likewise set aside
the RTC’s denial of the respondent’s documentary evidence and its admission of
the Dela Cruzes’ demurrer, it held that the RTC may not be compelled by mandamus to admit the documentary exhibits
in issue, since the matter of admitting them is discretionary upon it. Because the CA declined to reconsider,[5] the Dela Cruzes filed this petition for
review, seeking reinstatement of the RTC’s Order dated March 4, 2005.
The Issue Presented
The key issue in this case is whether
or not the CA erred in reinstating Myron’s testimony after the RTC ordered the
same stricken out for depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine
him.
The Court’s Ruling
The CA said that the defendants were
guilty of unreasonable delay in objecting to Myron’s testimony. Myron died on August 16, 2001 yet the other
defendants moved to expunge his testimony only on November 15, 2001. On the other hand, the Dela Cruzes filed a
similar motion only in December 2003.
Citing Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,[6]
the CA held that they should have objected to Myron’s testimony when it was
offered or soon after the reason for objecting to its admission became apparent. When they failed to do so, said the CA, the
defendants waived their right to object to the same.
The CA characterized the defendants’
actions as betraying an “intention to defeat the (Estate’s) action through a
technicality.”[7] Because Myron’s testimony was expunged after
the respondent Estate had rested its case, it could no longer present other
witnesses who may testify on and identify its documentary evidence, thus
resulting in its inadmissibility. The CA
ruled that as a result of the RTC’s error in sustaining the defendants’
actions, the Estate was thus “effectively deprived of an opportunity to meet
the consequences of the expunction of Myron’s testimony.”[8]
But it is evident that the
defendants’ right to cross-examine Myron did not yet come up when he finished
his direct testimony on October 21, 1999.
The Estate undertook to return him to the witness stand to identify for
it the originals of certain documents. Consequently,
when Myron was taken ill, the obligation to move the case forward continued to
be on the Estate’s side. Rather than
move it, however, the Estate repeatedly asked for the deferment of Myron’s
testimony on the chance that he could recover and return to court. It took the Estate more than a year to remedy
the situation by asking the RTC to allow the cross-examination of Myron in the
hospital where he was confined. Thus,
only when the Court granted this motion on February 22, 2001 did it become
evident that the Estate was waiving the additional direct examination that it
reserved on October 21, 1999. Thus, the
turn of the Dela Cruzes to cross-examine Myron came only after February 22,
2001.
But having their turn to
cross-examine Myron is different from their being accorded an opportunity to
cross-examine him. The RTC set the
deposition taking on September 7, 2001 but Myron died before that date, on
August 16, 2001. Consequently, it was
not the defendants’ fault that they were unable to cross-examine him.
The CA appears too hasty in blaming
the defendants for the further delays that followed. When Myron died on August 16, 2001, the
obligation to close his aborted testimony and proceed with its other evidence
remained with the Estate. But it did
nothing, prompting one of the defendants to ask the RTC on November 15, 2001 to
strike down Myron’s testimony on the ground of the defendants’ failure to
cross-examine him. The Dela Cruzes
themselves asked that the case be dismissed for the Estate’s failure to
prosecute after such a long time.
Still, wanting to give the Estate the
chance to present additional evidence, on March 13, 2002 the RTC denied the
defendants’ motions. But the Estate did
nothing for about a year and eight months until December 3, 2003 when, rather
than present additional evidence, it asked leave to close its case with a
formal offer of its documentary exhibits. Clearly, it was only at this stage that the
Estate signaled its intention to still avail itself of Myron’s unfinished
testimony. And the Dela Cruzes did not
lose time to act. On December 5, 2003 they
renewed the defendants’ earlier motion to expunge such testimony. And this time, the RTC granted the
motion. It did so correctly since the
Estate showed a lack of interest in offering a substitute testimony for that of
Myron’s.
Since the Estate presented its
documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated through Myron’s testimony,
it stands to reason that the striking out of the latter’s testimony altogether
wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits. They become inadmissible unless the RTC, in
its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid ground and permits the Estate to
rectify its mistakes.
ACCORDINGLY, the
Court GRANTS the petition and SETS
ASIDE the Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution in CA-G.R. SP 91074
dated July 25, 2008 and January 12, 2009, respectively, and REINSTATES the order of the
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 226.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Sec. 36. Objection. — Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
[7] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[8]