Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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PEOPLE
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G.R. No. 179044 |
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Appellee, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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ABAD,⃰ and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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RODRIGuez
LUCERO y
PAW-AS alias
“Kikit,” |
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Promulgated: |
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Appellant. |
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December 6, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
On appeal is the November 29, 2006
Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00340 which affirmed with
modifications the July 19, 2002 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Bislig City, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, finding
appellant Rodriguez Lucero y Paw-as
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Factual
Antecedents
On October 20,
1998, an Information[3]
was filed charging appellant with the crime of murder committed as follows:
That on or about 1:30 [a.m.] of July 21, 1998, at
Purok 6, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Municipality of Tagbina, Province of Surigao del
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to
kill, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and hack one Edgar Aydaon, a Barangay Kagawad, with the use of a bolo,
thereby hitting the victim[']s head, which wound and injury caused the
instantaneous death of the victim, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said Aydaon.
CONTRARY TO LAW x x x
Appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
thereafter ensued.
Version of the
Prosecution
The prosecution
presented Leonito Maceda (Maceda), Rafael Ampis and SPO1 Daniel Barrios as
witnesses. Based on their combined
testimonies, the prosecution established the following:
At about midnight of July 20, 1998,
Maceda went out of his house to get “kasla,”
a medicinal herb for his sick child.
After getting the herb, he went to a waiting shed located about 10
meters away from his house as he saw a certain Linda Basalo (Basalo) thereat
waiting for a ride. While at the waiting
shed, the victim Edgar Aydaon passed by.
But after a while, the victim returned and helped Basalo load the
vegetables in the jeepney.
After the jeepney left, appellant
arrived and called out the victim.
Appellant pleaded that he be allowed by the victim to go with him as he
(appellant) was allegedly being pursued by a certain Pandeta. The victim acceded to the request and even
invited appellant to sleep in his house.
However, after walking a distance of about 10 meters, appellant suddenly
hacked the victim at the left side of his head causing the victim to fall to
the ground. In spite of the fact that the
victim was already lying on the ground, appellant further stabbed him on his
waist. Thereafter, appellant left the
premises.
Version of the
Defense
The defense presented appellant as
its lone witness who could only offer denial and alibi. He claimed that on July 21, 1998, he was at
his farm located at Nyholm, Agusan del Sur.
He alleged that he had no prior disagreement with the victim or any of
the prosecution witnesses. Hence, he
could not understand why he was being implicated in the crime.
Ruling of the
Regional Trial Court
The trial court
found appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery. It noted that appellant “beguiled [the victim
by] pleading for help”[4]
but after walking a distance of about 10 meters, suddenly hacked him on the
head leaving him with no opportunity to defend himself.
The trial court however found that
the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not present. It noted that the prosecution failed to prove
“(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.”[5]
The trial court disregarded
appellant’s denial and alibi for being uncorroborated. Besides, appellant himself admitted that the
distance between his farm and the scene of the crime is only 10 kilometers and
could be traversed by motorcycle in one hour or even less. Thus, he failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time it was
committed. Besides, appellant’s alibi
could not stand scrutiny vis-à-vis the testimony of Maceda positively identifying
appellant as the author of the crime.
Finally, the trial court found the
inconsistencies in the testimony of Maceda only minor and trivial as they did
not touch on the elements of the crime.
The dispositive portion of the
Decision of the trial court reads:
Wherefore, finding the accused RODRIGUEZ LUCERO Y
PAW-AS alias “KIKIT” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua with all the
accessory penalties provided for under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
To
pay the heirs of the victim the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
as [civil] indemnity and ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as exemplary
damages.
To
pay the costs.
The
accused shall serve his sentence at the National Penitentiary now New Bilibid
Prisons,
SO
ORDERED.[6]
Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed with modifications
the Decision of the trial court, thus:
FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appealed Decision
convicting RODRIGUEZ LUCERO Y PAW-AS alias “[K]ikit of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION[S] that he is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as indemnity, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P3,000.00
as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs
de officio.
SO ORDERED.[7]
As did the trial court, the
appellate court found the alleged inconsistencies adverted to by the appellant
minor and did not impair the credibility of Maceda. According to the CA, there was no
inconsistency in “the narration of the principal occurrence [or] the positive
identification of the assailant.”[8] Further, “minor inconsistencies, far from
detracting from the veracity of the testimony, even enhance the credibility of
the witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that the testimony was contrived
or rehearsed.”[9]
The appellate court also affirmed
the findings of the trial court that treachery attended the commission of the
crime. According to the CA, treachery
was –
clearly demonstrated when appellant suddenly
attacked and stabbed the victim who offered the accused to sleep in his house
and having conversation at that time, with absolutely no inkling of the
impending danger as the accused suddenly and without warning, hacked and
stabbed the victim, giving the victim no x x x chance to defend himself. x x x[10]
Hence, this appeal.
On October 15, 2007, we notified
both parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs. However,
in separate manifestations, both parties opted not to file their briefs.
Assignment of
Errors
Appellant raises the following
assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT A
QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS LEONITO MACEDA AND IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED
BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[11]
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The defense basically assails the
credibility of prosecution eyewitness Maceda.
As it did before the CA, the defense claims that credence should not
have been given to the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Maceda as it bore
several inconsistencies.
We find this contention
untenable. Basic is the rule that the
Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to the findings of
credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as
in this case. Besides, upon our review
of the records of this case, we find that both the trial court and the CA did
not overlook or misunderstand any substance or fact which would have materially
affected the outcome of this case.
Our ruling in People v. Elarcosa[12]
is instructive, thus:
In this regard, it should be noted that questions
concerning the credibility of a witness are best addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, since it is the latter which is in the best
position to observe the demeanor and bodily movements of a witness. This
becomes all the more compelling when the appellate court affirms the findings
of the trial court. Thus, we generally defer to the trial court’s assessment,
unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. x x x
Moreover, the alleged
inconsistencies referred to by the defense indeed refer to minor details which
are very inconsequential to the outcome of the case. According to the defense, “Maceda first
testified that when the victim was about to leave, [appellant] came out and
mauled the victim. However, he
contradicted himself when he further testified that when [appellant] came out,
the latter conversed with the victim and it was only after the victim and the
[appellant] reached the distance of ten (10) meters that he saw the appellant
[hack] the victim.”[13]
This contention was satisfactorily
debunked by the prosecution. We thus
agree that whether the appellant immediately mauled the victim or he mauled him
only after walking a distance of 10 meters does not deviate from the fact that
appellant did indeed maul and hack the victim.
Moreover, the prosecution correctly argued that “appellant quoted x x x
Maceda’s testimony separately and took it out of context.”[14] The records show that after making a general
statement that appellant came out and mauled the victim, Maceda further
explained when pressed for details that appellant hacked the victim after they
conversed and walked the distance of about 10 meters.[15]
The defense also pointed out that
Maceda was inconsistent whether he got the “kasla”
in the morning or evening of July 20, 1998.
However, whether Maceda got the “kasla”
in the morning or evening has no bearing with the crime of murder committed by
the appellant against the victim. The
fact remains that Maceda positively identified appellant as the person who
hacked the victim on the head and stabbed him on the waist. No ill motive could be attributed to Maceda
for testifying against the appellant. In
fact, appellant even admitted that he had no quarrel or previous
misunderstanding or disagreement with Maceda.
“Pertinently, the absence of such improper motive on the part of the
witness for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no
such improper motive exists and that [his] testimony is worthy of full faith
and credit. Indeed, there is no reason to deviate from
the factual findings of the trial court.”[16]
Finally, we agree with both the
trial court and the CA that treachery attended the commission of the
crime. Records show that appellant
lulled the victim into believing that he was being pursued by somebody. Believing in the tale being spun by the
appellant, the victim even offered appellant the security and protection of his
house. However, appellant reciprocated
the victim’s trust and hospitality by suddenly hacking him on the head and
stabbing him on the waist. “The settled rule is that treachery can exist
even if the attack is frontal, as long as the attack is sudden and unexpected,
giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or to defend himself. What is
decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation
from an unarmed victim, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate.”[17]
The Penalty
Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. If no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attended the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. In this case, the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were both alleged in the
Information. However, only the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was found to have attended the commission
of the crime which nevertheless qualified the killing to murder. There being no
other aggravating or mitigating circumstances, both the trial court and the CA
therefore correctly imposed upon the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Damages
“Based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Thus, when death occurs due to a crime, the
following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6)
interest, in proper cases. In cases of murder and homicide, civil
indemnity of PhP75,000.00 and moral damages of PhP50,000.00 are awarded
automatically. Indeed, such
awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death
of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.”[18]
In the instant
case, we note that the CA awarded the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P3,000.00 as actual damages. Thus, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence,[19]
the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity must be increased to P75,000.00. The award of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages is likewise increased to P30,000.00.
Anent the actual damages, we note that the CA
awarded P3,000.00 representing the amount spent for the embalming as shown by the
receipt. However, the prosecution also
presented a list of expenses such as those spent for the coffin, etc., which
were not duly covered by receipt. “Under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it
cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although
the exact amount was not proved.”[20] “The award of P25,000.00 as temperate
damages in x x x murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral
expenses is presented in the trial court.”[21]
Thus, we delete the award of P3,000.00 as actual damages given by the CA. In lieu thereof, we hereby award to the heirs
of the victim the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The November 29,
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00340 which affirmed
with modifications the July 19, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bislig City, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, finding appellant Rodriguez Lucero y Paw-as guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS that the awards
of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00, exemplary damages is
increased to P30,000.00; the award of P3,000.00 as actual damages
is deleted and in lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
⃰ In lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 917 dated November 24, 2010.
[1] CA rollo, pp. 88-96; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Carmelo and concurred in by Associate Justices Sixto C. Marella, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Id at 92.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010.
[13] CA rollo, p. 42.
[14]
[15] TSN, September 14, 1999, pp. 7-8.
[16] People v. Elarcosa, supra note 12.
[17] Id. citing People v. Lacaden, G.R.
No. 187682, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784.
[18]
[19]
[20] People v. Gidoc, G.R. No. 185162, April 24, 2009, 586
SCRA 825, 837.
[21]