GR No. 173138

GR No. 173138 - Noel Baccay v. Maribel Calderon Baccay and Republic of the Philippines

Promulgated:

December 1, 2010

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CONCURRING OPINION

SERENO, J.:

Justice Eduardo Caguioa, member of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, explained that the definition of psychological incapacity “has been left [by the Family Code] for the determination by the judges since to define it in the Code would be straight-jacketing the concept.”[1] I disagree with the wisdom of leaving to the judiciary the task of defining psychological incapacity. The legislature should have provided clear standards that the judiciary can apply even while the latter takes into account the peculiar circumstances of each case brought before it. However, I recognize that it has been twenty-two (22) years since the Family Code took effect and so much water has passed under the bridge. It is not an ideal situation and is not compatible with the constitutional design of the division of labor among the three great branches of government. The situation speaks poorly of the ability of the legislature to provide sufficient legal standards for application by the judiciary of a law as important as the law on declaration of nullity of marriages.

To clarify the meaning of Article 36, we need to look closely at its origin and the journey it has gone through in the courts. Article 36 of the Family Code was taken from paragraph 3 of Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law which took effect on 27 November 1983.[2] The Court at one time explained the essence of “psychological incapacity” under the Family Code by referring to Canon Law discussions comparing marriage in the context of the psychological incapacity of one of the parties to a contract between the parties to sell a house, which, unknown to both, had already burned down. In such a case, “the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.”[3]

Refining the concept, we held in Santos v. Court of Appeals[4] that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity – the incapacity must be grave or serious, such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; (b) juridical antecedence – it must be rooted in the party's history antedating the marriage, although overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability – it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure must be beyond the means of the party involved.[5]

After observing that Article 36 was being abused as a convenient divorce law,[6] the Court laid down the procedural requirements for its interpretation and application in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[7] While a majority concurred in the decision, three justices concurred only “in the result” and another three rendered their individual Separate Opinions.[8] Justice Padilla warned that “each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.” Justice Vitug preferred the earlier simpler legal standard set in Santos v. Court of Appeals.

In Antonio v. Reyes,[9] the Court reinstated the trial court's declaration of nullity of the subject marriage based on “the totality of the evidence,” with the caveat that “Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception.” We held that granting a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 is not incompatible with the Constitution's recognition of the sanctity of the family. Rather, it “should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.”

In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[10] after tracing the origin and development of jurisprudence relating to Article 36, the Court noted that “(t)he resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. ... Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. ... The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency .... The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.”

In Ting v. Velez-Ting,[11] the Court clarified that “(f)ar from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein.” Requiring petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of the accredited psychologist or psychiatrist proved to be too expensive and adversely affected poor litigants' access to justice. This was the finding of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC).

In Azcueta v. Republic of the Philippines and Court of Appeals, we then concluded that “(w)ith the advent of Te v. Te, the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36, although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine.”[12]

In this instance, whether we apply the Molina standard or a more relaxed interpretation and application of Article 36, petitioner was unable to prove his case with preponderant evidence. Since the presumption in favor of the validity of marriage[13] was not ably rebutted, this presumption prevails. I therefore concur in the Decision denying the Petition, but I reach this conclusion based solely on the insufficiency of the evidence presented by petitioner. However, I disagree with the import this Decision conveys that Molina, in its undiluted form, should be reiterated and emphasized in this case. Had the case gone forward to a choice between the strict application of Molina and the more recent decisions cited, I would have submitted that a second hard look at Molina is warranted.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

[1] Proceedings of the Public Hearing on the Family Code, 3 February 1988, p. 7.

[2] Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1997).

[3] Edward Kenneth Ngo Te vs. Rowena Gutierrez Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA 193.

[5] The Court adopted the opinion of Justice Sempio-Diy, who in turn cited the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I).

[6]Brenda Marcos v. Wilson Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755.

[7]G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.

[8] Edward Kenneth Ngo Te vs. Rowena Gutierrez Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA 193.

[9]G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 353.

[10]G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA 193.

[13] Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422.