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ERNESTO MARCELO, JR. and LAURO LLAMES, Petitioners, - versus - RAFAEL R. VILLORDON, Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 173081 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: December 15, 2010 |
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CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the
Court is a petition for review on certiorari1
assailing the Orders dated 5 January 20062
and 30 May 20063 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 105, in Civil Case No. Q-05-56367.
The Facts
On 2 April
2004, petitioners Ernesto Marcelo, Jr. and Lauro Llames, together with two
others, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City a criminal
complaint4
against their former employer Eduardo R. Dee, Sr. (Dee). The criminal complaint
stemmed from Dee’s non-payment of their wages as President and General Manager
of New Sampaguita Builders Construction Incorporated.5
On 28
April 2004, respondent Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City Rafael R.
Villordon (Villordon) issued a subpoena against Dee to appear at the
preliminary investigation of the case set on 18 May 2004. Dee failed to appear.
The case was again set for preliminary investigation on several dates but Dee
failed to appear in all of them. Each time the case was reset, petitioners
asked that the case be declared submitted for resolution.
On 29 July
2004, Villordon declared the case submitted for resolution.
On 5
November 2004, Dee filed a motion to reopen the case and attached his
Counter-Affidavit. Assistant City Prosecutor Rogelio Velasco, Villordon’s
Division Chief, approved the motion on 8 December 2004. Villordon then called
the parties to a hearing on 28 December 2004. At the hearing, Dee failed to
appear but petitioners were present and signed the minutes of the hearing
confirming that they would appear and submit their Reply-Affidavit on 18
January 2005. Another hearing was also scheduled on 3 February 2005. On both
dates, Dee failed to appear and petitioners did not submit their
Reply-Affidavit.
On 22
March 2005, petitioners filed a proceeding for grievance/request for assistance
with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB). After several follow-ups for the early
resolution of the case without receiving any action on the matter, petitioners
later filed a case for violation of Section 3(f)6
of Republic Act No. 30197 against Villordon with the OMB.8
On 31 July 2007, the OMB dismissed the case.
Meanwhile,
on 19 September 2005, petitioners filed a petition for mandamus9 against Villordon with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 105. Petitioners prayed that Villordon
be ordered to resolve the criminal complaint and pay petitioners (1) moral
damages in the amount of P25,000 each; (2) exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000; (3) attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000,
plus P2,000 per court appearance; and (4) cost of suit.10
In an
Order dated 5 January 2006, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit. The
RTC explained that petitioners failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies before resorting to the court. The RTC stated that petitioners should
have first referred the matter to the Chief City Prosecutor, being Villordon’s
superior, to correct Villordon’s error, if any. The RTC added that petitioners
filed an administrative charge against Villordon with the OMB for neglect of
duty without waiting for the final determination of the case.11 The RTC explained further:
While
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron clad rule, the
circumstances availing in this case does not categorized as an exception. The
pending case for Estafa and violation of Article 116 of the Labor Code before
the respondent, assuming they raise only legal questions, will not justify the
petitioners to compel the former to make an immediate resolution of the same.
As the record of preliminary investigation will show, a Motion to Re-open Case
was granted as per notation of his Division Chief and was scheduled for
preliminary investigation on 18 January 2005 and 3 February 2005, respectively,
which the petitioners themselves conformed with. On [the] 18 January 2005
hearing, petitioners appeared and signed the minutes giving [chance] for
the last time to Eduardo Dee, Sr. to show up on the next hearing which was 3
February 2005. However, came the 3 February 2005 hearing, none of the parties
appeared. This development has led the respondent to wait for the petitioners
to file any pleading on account of the Counter-Affidavit filed by Eduardo Dee,
Sr.[,] a copy of which was furnished the petitioners.
As respondent reasoned out, he waited for a move from the petitioners to enable
him to dispose [of] the cases accordingly. Until and after the case is
submitted for resolution, any motion asking for immediate resolution to that
sort is still unavailing. Thus, from the foregoing circumstances, the
petitioners have not shown [any] legal right to compel the respondent to
perform the relief they are suing for.
WHEREFORE,
in the light of the foregoing considerations, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.12
Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied for lack of merit in an
Order dated 30 May 2006.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The main
issue is whether petitioners are entitled to the extraordinary writ of
mandamus.
The Court’s Ruling
The
petition lacks merit.
Petitioners
submit that the petition for mandamus was not prematurely filed with the RTC.
Petitioners insist that under the Rules of Court it is the assistant city
prosecutor’s function as investigating prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation to make his resolution, while it is the chief city prosecutor’s
function to either approve or disapprove the same. The chief city prosecutor
then will get the chance to correct the errors committed by the investigating
prosecutor only after the latter’s resolution is submitted to him. In the
present case, Villordon, as the investigating prosecutor, has not yet made any
resolution. Thus, petitioners assert that Villordon committed grave abuse of
discretion by unreasonably refusing to file an information
despite the fact that the evidence clearly warrants such action.
On the
other hand, respondent Villordon maintains that mandamus is a premature remedy
since the case was not yet submitted for resolution when petitioners filed an
action with the RTC. Villordon contends that after the hearing on 3 February
2005 which none of the parties attended, he was left hanging as to whether the
case should be submitted for resolution. Petitioners failed to submit a
Reply-Affidavit which should have rebutted the Counter-Affidavit filed by Dee.
Villordon states that petitioners opted to just engage in forum-shopping and
filed several cases against him in the RTC and the OMB.
Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure state:
Section 1. Preliminary investigation
defined; when required. – Preliminary
investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. x x x
Sec. 2. Officers
authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. – The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; x x x
A
preliminary investigation is conducted before an accused is placed on trial to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to
protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the
trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to
protect the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. Thus, a
preliminary investigation is not a mere formal or technical right but is a
substantive right.13
The
function of determining whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of
the information is executive in nature and rests with the prosecutor. It is the
prosecutor alone who has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court.
In
the present case, petitioners filed a criminal complaint against Dee with the
Office of the City Prosecutor. After several hearings where Dee did not appear,
Villordon declared the case submitted for resolution. After three months, Dee
showed up and filed a motion to reopen the case and simultaneously submitted
his counter-affidavit. Villordon’s superior approved the motion. Thereafter,
two hearings were scheduled on different dates. On the first hearing, Dee did not
appear but petitioners were present. Villordon then directed petitioners to
file their reply-affidavit on the next hearing to controvert the
counter-affidavit submitted by Dee. However, on the second hearing, Dee and
petitioners failed to appear. Since then, no other action was taken on the
matter. Due to the long delay, petitioners filed an anti-graft and corruption
case against Villordon with the OMB and a petition for mandamus with the RTC.
The OMB dismissed the case and the RTC denied the petition. Petitioners now
seek that we reverse the RTC’s decision and grant the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel Villordon to resolve the preliminary investigation and file a criminal information against Dee.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court states:
Sec. 3. Petition
for Mandamus. – When any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to
do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to
pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the respondent. x x x
The provision clearly defines that mandamus will lie
if (1) any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station; or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled; and (2) there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus
being invoked.
In
the present case, petitioners insist that mandamus is proper since Villordon
committed grave abuse of discretion by unreasonably refusing to file an information despite the fact that the evidence indicates
otherwise.
We disagree with petitioners. As mentioned
earlier, the matter of deciding who to prosecute is a prerogative of the
prosecutor. In Hipos v. Judge Bay,14 we held that the remedy of
mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Mandamus will not issue to control
the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him
the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court. The only time the discretion of the prosecutor will stand
review by mandamus is when the prosecutor gravely abuses his discretion.15
Here,
due to the non-appearance of Dee on several hearings and the non-submission of
the reply-affidavit by petitioners, Villordon cannot be faulted if he is still
not convinced that a criminal information should be
filed against Dee. Villordon may need to consider more evidence material to the
complaint and is giving both parties the chance to submit their supporting
documents.
Also,
the assertion of petitioners that the evidence against Dee is strong, amounting
to grave abuse of discretion on Villordon’s part in not filing the criminal
information, has not been clearly established. The records show that aside from
petitioners’ bare declarations, no other proof was submitted.
Moreover,
petitioners were not able to sufficiently demonstrate that they had no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in order to be entitled to mandamus. A more
expeditious and effective recourse could have been simply to submit their
reply-affidavit in order for Villordon to make the proper determination whether
there was sufficient ground to hold Dee for trial. Instead, petitioners
resorted to filing cases in different fora like the OMB and the RTC to compel
Villordon to file the criminal information against Dee immediately.
In
sum, since the institution of a criminal action involves the exercise of sound
discretion by the prosecutor and there being other plain, speedy and adequate
remedies available to petitioners, the resort to the extraordinary writ of
mandamus must fail.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the
petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 5 January 2006 and 30 May 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105, in Civil Case No. Q-05-56367.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
JOSE C.
MENDOZA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure.
2 Rollo, pp. 35-38. Penned by Presiding Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad.
3Id. at 48-49.
4 Docketed as I.S. No. 04-4682.
5Petitioners filed a case for estafa and
violation of Article 116 of the Labor Code (withholding of wages and
kickbacks); see rollo, p. 37.
6Sec. 3. Corrupt
practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
x x x
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or
request, without sufficient justification to act within a reasonable time on
any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining directly or
indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material
benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own interest or giving
undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested
party.
7 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which
took effect on 17 August 1960.
8 See Comment; rollo
p. 57.
9 Id. at 11-15.
10 Id. at 14.
11 Id. at 37.
12 Id. at 37-38.
13Uy v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 73, citing Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan, 352 Phil. 557 (1998).
14G.R. Nos. 174813-15, 17 March
2009, 581 SCRA 674, citing Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections, 407
Phil. 619 (2001). See also Knecht v. Hon. Desierto, 353 Phil.
494 (1998) and Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100311, 18 May 1993,
222 SCRA 279.
15Knecht v. Hon.
Desierto, supra note 14. See also D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra, 328
Phil. 1168 (1996).