Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD
DIVISION
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ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR y
ALUNAN,
Petitioner, -
versus - ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR and
REPUBLIC OF THE
Respondents.
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G.R. No. 170729 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION,
BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: December 8, 2010 |
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D E C I S
I O N |
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BRION, J.: |
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Enrique
Agraviador y Alunan (petitioner) challenges through his
petition for review on certiorari[1] the
decision dated May 31, 2005[2]
and the resolution dated December 6, 2005[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 75207.The challenged decision reversed
the resolution[4] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, declaring the marriage of the petitioner and
Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (respondent)
null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The
assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
The
petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter
worked. The petitioner, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the
Bureau of Customs, while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their
meeting led to a courtship, and they eventually became sweethearts. They often
spent nights together at the respondent’s rented room, and soon entered into a
common-law relationship.
On
On
The petitioner likewise claimed that
the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became “very
close” to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their love notes
to each other, and caught them inside his room several times.
The respondent moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was
not medically identified and alleged in the petition.[6]
The RTC denied this motion in its order dated
In her answer,[8] the
respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs and maintained that
it was the petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the
petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry
their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one
who took care of their son at the hospital before he died.
The RTC ordered the city prosecutor
and/or the Solicitor General to investigate if collusion existed between the
parties.[9]
The RTC, in its Order of
In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed
what he stated in his petition, i.e.,
that the respondent was carefree, irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly
did what she wanted; did not stay long in the conjugal dwelling; refused to do
household chores; refused to take care of him and their children; and consulted
a witch doctor in order to bring bad luck upon him.
The petitioner further confirmed that
the respondent abandoned their sick child, which led to the latter’s death. The
petitioner further stated that the respondent became very close to a male
border of their house; he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught
them inside his room several times.
The petitioner declared that he filed
the petition for nullity because the respondent refused to change; he loves his
children and does not want their children to be affected by their mother’s
conduct. He intimated that he might remarry if it would benefit their children.
Aside from his testimony, the
petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract
(Exh. “B”)[11] and the psychiatric
evaluation report (Exh. “A”)[12]
of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.
In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report,
Dr. Patac made the following findings:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son and their helper, the psychological report and the mental status examination, Enrique is found to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. He coped with Erlinda’s selfish and irresponsible behavior as he dutifully performed what she failed to do for the family. He patiently tried to understand her and exerted every effort to make her realize the harm caused by her neglect to the family. Throughout their marriage, he provided emotional and material support for the family. He engaged in other business endeavors aside from his employment as he maintained to be financially productive.
The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. She manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time before their marriage. She is known to be stubborn and uncaring who did things her way without regard to the feelings of others. She is an irresponsible individual who selfishly ignored and neglected her role as daughter to her parents as wife to Enrique and mother to their children. Before the marriage at a young age of 17, Erlinda defied her parents as she lived alone, rented a room for herself and allowed Enrique to sleep with her. She did not care about the needs of Enrique before and after marriage and she maintained to be so with her children. She abandoned and relegated her duty to her family to their helper. She never stayed long in their house despite pleadings from her children and Enrique. Her irresponsible, uncaring behavior even led to the death of one of their children. Likewise, she does not show concern and ignores a daughter who is presently manifesting behavioral problem. She kept secrets as she never allowed her husband and children know where she stays when she’s not at work. She falsified documents as she hid her marital status when she used her maiden surname in her present employment. She is having illicit affairs and is reported to be presently having an affair with a lesbian. Her desire to bring bad fate and death to Enrique through her consultation with a “mangkukulam” point out her lack of care, love, and respect to Enrique.
Erlinda’s lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and support to her family.
The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She has been having this disorder since her adolescence. There is no definite treatment for this disorder. She is deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform the obligations of marriage.
In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same examination as Enrique underwent.[13]
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the marriage of the
petitioner and the respondent in its decision of
Without
contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the findings of the doctor show
that Respondent is indeed suffering from “Mixed Personality Disorder” that
render her incapable of complying with her marital obligations. Respondent’s refusal
to commit herself to the marriage, her tendencies to avoid a close relationship
with Petitioner, preferring to be with her lover and finally abandoning their
home for a lesbian, a disregard of social norm, show that she was never
prepared for marital commitment in the first place. This incapacity is deeply
rooted from her family upbringing with no hope for a cure. Therefore, for the
good of society and of the parties themselves, it is best that this marriage
between ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN and ERLINDA AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled
as if it never took place at all. The Civil Registrar of the City of
The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL AGRAVIADOR, EVELYN AGRAVIADOR and EYMAREY AGRAVIADOR will however remain as their legitimate children.
It is SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA Decision
The
Republic of the
The
CA held that Dr. Patac’s psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that
the respondent’s personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent; it
likewise did not mention the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled
that Dr. Patac had no basis in concluding that the respondent’s disorder had no
definite treatment because he did not subject her to a mental assessment.
The CA added that the “psychiatric
remarks” in the Report were nothing but a showcase of respondent’s character
flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a natal or supervening factor that
effectively incapacitated the respondent from accepting and complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may only
give rise to a legal separation suit.
The petitioner moved to reconsider
this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution of
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner now comes to us via
the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling,
based on the following arguments:
I.
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE THAN
SUBSTANTIAL TO ESTABLISH THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE RESPONDENT[;]
II.
THE GUIDELINES SET
III.
THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION
REPORT XXX STILL STANDS FOR NOT HAVING BEEN CONTESTED XXX BY THE STATE AND/THE
RESPONDENT[; and]
IV.
THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES HAD BEEN
SATISIFIED[.]
The issue in this case
essentially boils down to whether there
is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent on the ground
of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The
Court’s Ruling
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no
sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The totality of evidence presented
failed to establish the
respondent’s
psychological
incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "[a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization." It introduced the concept of psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this concept eludes
exact definition.
The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not involve a
species of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary
consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights
and obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that
this “psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations
does not affect the consent to the marriage.”[17]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[18]
the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer
to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."[19]
It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
We laid down more definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals[20]
(the Molina case) where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the
foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,”
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their “I do's.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we
established in
A
later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[22]
declared that it may
have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We stated
that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound
by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic
as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be
considered as on "all fours" with another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of
time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina.
Ting
v. Velez-Ting[23] and
the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo[24] squarely
met the issue and laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina;
far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for
a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity.
Under these
established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence
insufficient to prove the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
a. Petitioner’s
court testimony
For clarity, we reproduce the
pertinent portions of the petitioner’s testimony that essentially confirmed what
the petition alleged:
Q: Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed with children, and how many?
A: Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2) girls.
Q: Where are they now?
A: All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the neglect and fault of my said wife who abandone[d] him at the time of his illness.
Q: Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?
A: It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.
Q: Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?
A: She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature, whimsical and used to impose what she wanted to get, she refused to do household chores, like cooking, caring for the husband and children, used to stay from the conjugal dwelling, initially for weeks, then for months and lately fully abandoned the family house and stay with a lesbian. [sic]
At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive and used to be very close to a male renter in the ground floor of their house and caught them several times alone in his room, thus explaining the reason why she refused to have sex since 1993, up to and until the present time.
Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult “mangkukulam” to bring bad fate against the family and death for me.
Q: By the way did you give her the chance to change?
A: I gave her but she refused to reform.
x x x x
Q: Can you not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?
A: I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she does not want to change for the sake of our family.[25]
These exchanges during trial significantly
constituted the totality of the petitioner’s testimony on the respondent’s
supposed psychological or mental malady. We glean from these exchanges the
petitioner’s theory that the respondent’s psychological incapacity is premised
on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a
number of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and
unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise
to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect,” in
the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.[26] The
intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders – existing at the time of
the marriage – clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.[27] The
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she is about to assume.[28]
In the present case, the petitioner’s
testimony failed to establish that the respondent’s condition is a manifestation
of a disordered personality rooted on
some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her
completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the
petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed
their manifestation during the
marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the
respondent’s defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the
gravity of the respondent’s
condition; neither did he mention that the respondent’s malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the respondent’s means to undertake. The petitioner’s
declarations that the respondent “does not accept her fault,” “does not want to
change,” and “refused to reform” are insufficient to establish a psychological
or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code.
In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,[29] we
ruled that it was not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations – had to be shown.
b.
Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric
Evaluation Report
The Court finds that Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric
Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We emphasize that Dr.
Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact,
recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to “undergo the same
examination [that the petitioner] underwent.”[30] Dr.
Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties’
second child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, the
doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report
can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioner’s own psychological
condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically
capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot
be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required
depth and comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.[31]
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought
to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non
to arrive at such declaration.[32] If
a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists
why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.[33] No
such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in
this case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to
establish the juridical antecedence
of the respondent’s condition by stating that the respondent manifested
“inflexible maladaptive behavior” before marriage, pointing out how the respondent
behaved before the marriage – the respondent defied her parents and lived
alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her.
These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish
that the incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the
marriage. Dr. Patac failed to elucidate on the circumstances that led the
respondent to act the way she did, for example, why she “defied her parents”
and decided to live alone; why she “neglected her obligations as a daughter;” and
why she often slept with the petitioner. This is an area where independent
evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the
respondent, could prove useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence
was gathered in this case. In the
absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation
failed to explain how and why the respondent’s so-called inflexible maladaptive
behavior was already present at the time of the marriage.
Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report
likewise failed to prove the gravity
or seriousness of the respondent’s
condition. He simply made an
enumeration of the respondent’s purported behavioral defects (as related to him
by third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be
suffering from mixed personality disorder. In the “Background History”
portion of his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the
respondent employed one of her siblings to
do the household chores; did not help in augmenting
the family’s earnings; belittled the petitioner’s income; continued her studies
despite the petitioner’s disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became “close” to
a male border; had an affair
with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her departure to Taiwan; threatened
to poison the petitioner and their children; neglected and ignored
their children; used her
maiden name at work; and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad fate
to the petitioner. Except for the isolated
and unfounded statement that “Erlinda’s lack of motivation and insight
greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and support
to the family,”[34] there
was no other statement regarding the degree of severity
of the respondent’s condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave, and
how it incapacitated her to comply with the
duties required in marriage.
There was likewise
no showing of a supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychological
condition that effectively incapacitated the respondent
from complying with the essential marital obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws mentioned
above, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant
a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Interestingly, Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric
Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondent’s negative behavioral traits
without balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of infidelity
and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the claim that the respondent
refused to engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the
petitioner, but these claims were not proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
accusations were true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness
or promiscuousness were traits that antedated or existed at the time of marriage.
Likewise, the accusation that the respondent abandoned her sick child which
eventually led to the latter’s death appears to be an exaggerated claim in the
absence of any specifics and corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioner’s
own questionable traits – his flirtatious nature before marriage and his admission
that he inflicted physical harm on the respondent every time he got jealous –
were not pursued. From this perspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report
appears to be no more than a one-sided diagnosis against the respondent that we
cannot consider a reliable basis to conclusively establish the root cause and the
degree of seriousness of her condition.
The Psychiatric
Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to
the conclusion that the respondent’s personality disorder had “no definite
treatment.” It did not discuss the
concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure,
and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this
disorder in order to create a necessary inference that the respondent’s
condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to
our mind, is the Psychiatric Evaluation Report’s failure to support its findings
and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply enumerated the respondent’s
perceived behavioral defects, and then associated these traits with mixed
personality disorder. We find it
unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself was not called on the witness stand to
expound on the findings and conclusions he made in his Psychiatric Evaluation Report.
It would have aided petitioner’s cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify.
Admittedly,
the
standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological
evaluation reports may be
deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.[35]
Marriage,
an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the
whim of the parties, especially where the prices of evidence presented are grossly
deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
condition of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume
and perform the essential marital duties.
The
petitioner’s marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be
without hope of reconciliation The remedy, however, is not always to have
it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. We stress
that Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to
assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less,
ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It is not to be confused
with a divorce
law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves. The State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to
decree that divorce should be available in this country. Neither should an Article 36 declaration
of nullity be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual
infidelity, abandonment, and the like.[36] Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable
psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was
incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then
have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility
of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, in
light of all the foregoing, we DENY
the petition and AFFIRM the Decision
and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
MARIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 39-55. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, and concurred in by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta.
[3]
[4]
[5] Records, pp. 1-4.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Supra note 4, at 37-38.
[15] Supra note 2.
[16] Supra note 3.
[17] See Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 367, citing Santos v. CA, 310 Phil. 21 (1995); A. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1988 ed.), 37; and A. Toletino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence (1990 ed.), 274-275.
[18] G.R. No. 112019,
[19]
[20] 335 Phil. 664, 676-680.
[21] G.R. No. 136490,
[22] G.R. No. 161793,
[23] G.R. No. 166562,
[24] G.R. No. 164493,
[25] TSN,
[26] See Padilla-Rumbaua
v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738,
[27] Republic
v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676,
[28] Supra note 23.
[29] G.R. No. 173294,
[30] Records, p. 33.
[31]Suazo v. Suazo, supra note 24.
[32]Supra at note 21.
[33]Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, supra note 26.
[34]Records, p. 32.
[35]Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523,
[36] See Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824,