Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
DANTE
HERNANDEZ DATU, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. |
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G.R. No.
169718
Present: CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD,*
and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: December
13, 2010 |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26159, which
affirmed the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Manila, Branch 38 dated August
28, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 95-144230 that found petitioner Dante Hernandez
Datu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness
penalized under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act.
The full text of the Information filed against
petitioner reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor upon sworn
complaint of Rolando Registrado, complainant herein, in representation of his daughter,
Jerica Registrado, whose statement is hereto attached as Annex “A”, accuses
DANTE DATU Y HERNANDEZ of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness punishable under
RA 7610 otherwise known as the “Special Protection Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act”, committed as follows:
That on or about February 24, 1995, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd design, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon JERICA
REGISTRADO, 5 years of age, by then and there inserting his finger in the
latter’s genitals, against her will and consent.[3]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty;
thus, trial ensued.
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the
morning of February 24, 1995, at about 7:00 a.m., Jerica, aged 5, was playing
with her friends Khamil and Neeca near the house of their neighbor Boyet Rama
(or “Boyet”) situated at the corner of a street in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila; that
suddenly, [petitioner] grabbed Jerica and inserted his middle finger in her
vagina, after which, he warned her not to tell it to anyone; that immediately,
Jerica ran to her house; that while her mother was giving Jerica a bath, she
found bloodstain in her (Jerica) panty and blood in her vagina; that upon being
informed of her mother’s discovery, Rolando, Jerica’s father, looked at her
vagina and found it swollen; and that asked by her father who did it, Jerica
disclosed that it was appellant.
On the same date, February 24, 1995, Jerica was
brought to the NBI where she was examined by Dr. Villena, whose findings are as
follows:
“GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora,
coaptated (sic). Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa, congested. Contusion,
purplish, peri-urethral area. Hymen, thin, short, intact. Hymenal orifice
measures 0.5 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls and rugosities, cannot be reached
by the examining finger.
CONCLUSION:
Physical Virginity Preserved.”
Professing innocence, appellant claimed that
commission of the alleged sexual molestation is highly improbable as it
supposedly took place in a busy street; that the charge was concocted upon
inducement of David Escalo (or “Escalo”), a friend of Jerica’s parents, as
admitted by Escalo to Zaragosa during one of their drinking sprees; and that a
case for oral defamation was filed by him against Jerica’s parents for their
false accusation.[4]
In the end, the trial court convicted petitioner of
the crime charged in a Decision dated August 28, 2000, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness
penalized under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act 7610 and sentences him
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal together with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify
private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00 as and by way of moral
damages and to pay the costs.[5]
Taking issue with the said
judgment, petitioner appealed the same to the Court of Appeals but the
appellate court merely affirmed the assailed lower court ruling in a Decision
dated March 31, 2005.
Undaunted, petitioner
filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court[6]
assailing the aforesaid Court of Appeals’ Decision. This Court gave due course to the petition
and required both parties to submit their respective Memoranda. However, in petitioner’s Memorandum, his
counsel indicated that petitioner died on August 3, 2006.[7] As proof of petitioner’s death, a certified
photocopy of his Death Certificate with Registry No. 2006-859[8]
was attached as Annex “1” of the said pleading.
In light of this
supervening event which occurred while petitioner’s appeal of the judgment of
his conviction was pending resolution before this Court, we are constrained by
both law and jurisprudence to dismiss the present case for the appeal has been
rendered moot.
Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code instructs us that criminal liability is totally extinguished
by the death of the offender, to wit:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
In the seminal case of People v. Bayotas,[9] we
formulated the following principles which guide this Court as regards to the
application of the foregoing penal provision, to wit:
1.
Death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.”
2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of
the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a)
Law
b)
Contracts
c)
Quasi-contracts
x x x x
d)
Quasi-delicts
3.
Where the civil liability
survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
4.
Finally, the private offended
party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription.[10]
It is therefore evident from the foregoing
discussion that venturing into the merits of petitioner’s appeal given the
circumstance of his untimely demise has become superfluous because, even
assuming this Court would proceed to affirm the lower court’s judgment of
conviction, such a ruling would be of no force and effect as the resultant
criminal liability is totally extinguished by his death. Consequently, his civil liability arising
from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, is likewise
extinguished by his death. Since his
appeal was still pending before this Court, there was no final judgment of
conviction upon which an award of civil indemnity could be based.
Accordingly, this Court
holds that the death of petitioner extinguished his criminal liability and the
civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., acts of
lasciviousness. Thus, the assailed Court
of Appeals’ Decision dated March 31, 2005, affirming petitioner’s conviction by
the trial court, had become ineffectual.[11] As a result thereof, the instant petition is
hereby dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of petitioner Dante Hernandez
Datu, the Decision dated March 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26159 is SET
ASIDE and Criminal Case No.
95-144230 before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
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ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice |
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JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
* Per Special Order No. 917 dated November 24, 2010.
[1] Rollo, pp. 63-71; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court), concurring.
[2] Id. at 58-61; penned by then Presiding Judge and now Court of Appeals Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla.
[3] CA rollo, p. 5.
[4] Rollo, pp. 64-65.
[5] Id. at 60.
[6] Id. at 14-57.
[7] Id. at 162.
[8] Id. at 215.
[9] G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 239.
[10] Id. at 255-256.
[11] De Guzman v. People, 459 Phil. 576, 580 (2003).