Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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ENRIQUE MIGUEL L. LACSON, |
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G.R. No. 168840 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus- |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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ABAD,⃰ and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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MJ LACSON
DEVELOPMENT |
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COMPANY, INC., |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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December 8, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
After a futile attempt to have
the amicable settlement he entered into with respondent partially modified,
petitioner now comes before us for relief.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari
assails the Decision[1]
dated February 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79859
which denied the petition for certiorari before it, as well as the
Resolution[2]
dated
Factual Antecedents
Respondent MJ Lacson Development
Company, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of sugar production. It owns and operates Hacienda
Respondent alleged
that petitioner, as its former president who managed Hacienda P5,565,643.58,
excluding an undetermined amount of sugar and molasses proceeds and other
incentives obtained from sugar canes milled thru Association de Agriculture de
La Carlota y Pontevedra, Inc. (ALPI) and the Binalbagan-Isabela Planters
Association (BPA). Moreover, petitioner
caused the preparation and planting of the sugar fields for Sugar Crop Year
2003-2004 despite the decision of the Board of Directors that it will no longer
continue the cultivation of Hacienda
In an Order[5]
dated January 27, 2003, the RTC issued a 20-day temporary restraining order
(TRO) reckoned from petitioner’s receipt thereof ordering him to cease and
desist from: (1) exercising the duties and responsibilities as president of
respondent corporation; (2) continuing with the active management of Hacienda San Benito; (3) harvesting the
standing crops of said hacienda and from milling sugar cane already
harvested with any cooperative sugar central or milling company; and (4) from
withdrawing the monetary proceeds of the sugar production from any cooperative
or sugar central, or from any banking or financial institution where the money
is deposited.
However, the
parties were thereafter able to arrive at an Amicable Settlement,[6]
the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
AMICABLE SETTLEMENT
x x x
x
1.
Defendant
Enrique Miguel Lacson agrees to immediately execute a Promissory Note in favor
of plaintiff corporation in the amount of P7,531,244.84 representing
cash advances to defendant by plaintiff-corporation for expenses incurred for
sugar crop year 2003-2004;
2.
That the
Promissory Note shall be secured by a pledge to be immediately executed by
defendant over his Two Thousand Fifty (2,050) shares of stock in MJ Lacson
Development Company, Incorporated;
3.
Defendant
shall pay the amount subject matter of the Promissory Note in seven (7) equal
month(ly) installments, the first installment to be due on October 30, 2003 and
the final or last installment on April 30, 2004, with interest at the rate of
twelve (12%) percent per annum to be computed starting on the date of the
Promissory Note;
4.
The proceeds
or profits of the corporation in Hacienda
5.
The plaintiff
shall conduct an inventory within one (1) week from approval of this amicable
settlement of all existing farm x x x equipment. The said farm equipment and implements will
be leased by the plaintiff corporation to the defendant for sugar crop year
2003-2004 at a fixed rental of P300,000.00. The defendant shall have the right to inspect
and note the condition of the equipment or implements in the presence of the
representative of the plaintiff corporation and at the expiration of the lease
which is the end of sugar crop year 2003-2004, defendant shall return the
equipment or implements leased [in] the same condition as defendant received
the same without need of further demand. If the plaintiff corporation decides
to sell the equipment or implements leased, the defendant has the first option
to buy at such price to be agreed upon by both plaintiff and defendant;
6.
The remaining
property belonging to plaintiff corporation consisting of a five (5) hectare
portion representing retention area and an additional six (6) hectares
belonging to the plaintiff corporation not covered by land reform program,
shall likewise be leased to the defendant for one (1) year at the rate of twelve
(12) piculs per hectare for sugar crop year 2003-2004. Parties may agree to extend the lease subject
to the terms and condition they may agree upon;
The residential house, office and garage of
plaintiff corporation at Hacienda
7.
All sugar and
molasses proceeds and incentives for sugar crop year 2002-2003 except those
intended for the sugar farm workers such as Social Amelioration benefits shall
belong to plaintiff. The plaintiff
corporation thru its President Miguel Antonio Lacson is authorized to take
delivery and dispose of the remaining unsold quedans still in possession of
various sugar centrals and/or cooperatives.
The defendant shall endorse the quedans and the proceeds thereof [shall]
be deposited in the corporate account of MJ Lacson Development Co., Inc.;
8.
The remaining
balance under Current Account No. 13100544-0 with Equitable PCIBank, Mandalagan
Branch,
9.
All standing canes,
expenses, sugar and molasses proceeds and incentives for sugar crop year
2003-2004 shall belong to the defendant.
Defendant is solely responsible for salaries and benefits of laborers
for sugar crop year 2003-2004;
10.
Plaintiff
corporation shall not exercise its right to lease back Hacienda
They submitted
the above-quoted Amicable Settlement on April 15, 2003 for the trial court’s
approval and same was eventually approved through a Judgment by Compromise[7]
dated April 23, 2003.
Just less than a
month after said approval, however, petitioner filed on May 13, 2003 a Motion
for Partial Modification of the Judgment by Compromise.[8] In said motion, petitioner alleged that prior
to the submission of the Amicable Settlement for approval, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) installed a group of farmer-beneficiaries who were not
workers or laborers of Hacienda
On
In an Order[11]
dated June 30, 2003, the trial court granted respondent’s Motion for Execution,
in effect denying petitioner’s Motion for Partial Modification of the Judgment
by Compromise. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[12]
thereto but same was denied in an Order[13]
dated
Ruling of the Court
of Appeals
Before the
CA, petitioner averred that the trial court failed to rule on his motion, made
in open court, to be allowed to present evidence in support of his motion for
partial modification. He claimed that
had said court allowed him to do so, he could have shown that the DAR’s
installation of the farmer-beneficiaries was with the knowledge and consent of
respondent because, as owner of the hacienda, it must have been served
with a prior Notice of Installation.
However, petitioner claimed that this fact was not made known or
revealed to him by respondent; otherwise, he would not have entered into the
amicable settlement. Moreover,
petitioner alleged that respondent did not even lift a finger to prevent said
installation. These, according to
petitioner, are vices of consent or fraudulent acts which justify the partial
modification of the Judgment by Compromise.
Hence, petitioner posited that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his Motion
for Partial Modification of the Judgment by Compromise as well as his Motion
for Reconsideration thereto.
On the other hand, respondent
reiterated its stand that as the Judgment by Compromise is immediately
executory, the trial court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for
partial modification and in granting respondent’s motion for execution. Respondent also countered petitioner’s claim
of lack of knowledge of the farm’s coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) by pointing out that when Hacienda San Benito was put under the coverage of the CARP in 1998, petitioner
was still the President and Chairman of the Board of respondent corporation and
was in fact the one managing and administering the farm. Respondent also negated petitioner’s claim
that he was powerless to prevent the cutting of the sugarcanes because at the
time said incident occurred on April 23, 2003 up to May 19, 2003, the TRO
issued by the trial court enjoining petitioner from managing Hacienda San Benito had already expired on
March 27, 2003 and the control and possession of the hacienda during said period was already in petitioner’s hands pursuant to the
Judgment by Compromise approved by the court on April 23, 2003.
In a Decision[14]
dated February 18, 2005, the CA stressed the well-settled rule that the
finality of a judgment based on a compromise agreement, would, as a matter of
right, make the issuance of an order for the execution of said judgment a mere
ministerial duty on the part of the court a
quo. The CA did not give credence
to petitioner’s contention that respondent’s non-disclosure of the impending
installation of CARP farmer-beneficiaries and its subsequent inaction
constituted vices of consent or fraudulent acts that would justify the partial
modification of the judgment by compromise, taking into consideration the
following: (1) petitioner was the President and Chairman of the hacienda
from 1994 until 2002 and during said period, it is improbable that he did not
know that portions of the same had been covered by the land reform program,
especially so when Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) were already
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries as early as September 12, 1999 and the
latter were installed in the landholdings on March 27, 2003 or almost a month
prior to the court’s approval of the Amicable Settlement; and (2) said Amicable
Settlement even mentions the coverage of certain areas of the hacienda
under the land reform program. Hence, the
CA concluded that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court when it issued the orders
complained of and consequently denied the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit.
His Motion for Reconsideration[15]
of said Decision having been likewise denied in a Resolution[16]
dated
Issues
Petitioner advances the following
grounds:
1.
THE
PETITIONER WAS DENIED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN HE WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION FOR PARTIAL MODIFICATION OF
THE JUDGMENT BY COMPROMISE.
2.
THE
NON-DISCLOSURE BY RESPONDENT OF THE IMPENDING INSTALLATION OF THE CARP FARMER-BENEFICIARIES
AND ITS SUBSEQUENT (INACTION) CONSTITUTED VICES OF CONSENT OR FRAUDULENT ACTS.[17]
The Parties’ Arguments
Petitioner claims that
during the hearing of his Motion for Partial Modification of the Judgment by
Compromise, he moved in open court that he be allowed to present evidence in
support of said motion. Unfortunately,
the trial court failed to rule on the same. Because of this, petitioner argues that he was
denied due process and faults the CA for disregarding this issue although same
was properly brought before it.
Petitioner likewise reiterates his assertion before the CA
that respondent’s failure to disclose to him the impending installation of the
farmer-beneficiaries in the hacienda when they executed the Amicable Settlement, as well as its inaction after
the farmer-beneficiaries were actually installed therein and started cutting
the standing crops, constitute vices of
consent or fraudulent acts which
justify the
partial modification of the
judgment by compromise. He insists that
had he known of said installation, he would not have signed the Amicable Settlement. This is for the simple reason that he would
not anyway be able to pay the amount he is obliged to pay under the settlement since
he cannot anymore utilize the hacienda if same is to be occupied by farmer-beneficiaries.
Respondent, for its part, counters petitioner’s claim of
denial of due process. It claims that when
petitioner orally moved in open court to be allowed to present evidence in
support of his Motion for Partial Modification of the Judgment by Compromise, the
trial court required him to reduce the same into writing but petitioner never
did so. Respondent thus advances that petitioner
has no one to blame but himself for not being able to present evidence and
cannot now be allowed to assert that he was denied due process.
Respondent also belies petitioner’s allegations of vices
of consent and fraudulent acts which call for the modification of the judgment
by compromise by reiterating the factual findings of the CA that (1) it is
improbable that petitioner has no knowledge of the impending installation of
the farmer-beneficiaries considering that he was the President and Chairman of
respondent corporation and was managing the hacienda
from 1994 until 2002 and that as early as September
1999, CLOAs have already been distributed to farmer-beneficiaries; and (2) the
amicable settlement itself mentions about some portions of the hacienda being
covered by CARP. In any event,
respondent contends that this issue is a question of fact which this Court
cannot pass upon in this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
In addition, respondent posits that the implementation of
the writ of execution issued by the trial court through the sale of
petitioner’s properties in a public auction where respondent emerged as the
highest bidder and consequently issued a Certificate of Sale,[18] renders this case moot
and academic.
Our Ruling
We shall first tackle the issue
of mootness as raised by respondent.
Respondent contends that the
execution of the judgment by compromise renders this
present action moot and academic.
We hold otherwise.
“A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value.”[19] In the case at bench, petitioner put forward
for this Court’s determination the issues of whether he was deprived due
process when he failed to present evidence in support of his Motion for Partial
Modification of the Judgment by Compromise and, whether vices of consent or
fraudulent acts attended the execution of the Amicable Settlement. From these issues, it is not difficult to see
that their favorable resolution would necessarily have the effect of permitting
a modification of the Judgment by Compromise or at the very least, of allowing
petitioner to present evidence in support of his motion for partial
modification. And, if in the ultimate,
the Judgment by Compromise is eventually modified, the prior execution of said
judgment would likewise necessarily have to be set aside or adjusted in order
to conform with the modifications.
Clearly therefore, the implementation of the writ of execution of the
subject Judgment by Compromise does not make the present case moot and academic
because despite the same, a favorable resolution of this case would still be of
practical value.
Going now to the grounds relied
upon by petitioner, we find the same devoid of merit.
We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s claim that he was denied due process. “Denial of due process means the total lack
of opportunity to be heard or to have one’s day in court. There is no denial of due process where a
party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case.”[20]
Here, petitioner alleges that the trial
court conducted a hearing on his Motion for Partial Modification of the
Judgment by Compromise. Clearly, he was given the opportunity to be heard
thereon. The failure of the lower court
to rule on his oral motion to present evidence during said hearing is not
denial of due process. The fact is that
the trial court heard his motion for partial modification and his failure to
present further evidence to support the same cannot be equated with lack of due
process. Besides, respondent, in its Memorandum[21]
advances a plausible explanation for the trial court’s failure to rule on
petitioner’s oral motion to allow him to present evidence, that is, petitioner
was ordered by the trial court to reduce into writing his oral motion but he did
not do so. Petitioner did not dispute
this allegation in his Memorandum despite his having the opportunity to do so, since
as shown by the records, respondent served upon petitioner a copy of its memorandum
way ahead of petitioner’s filing before this Court of his own memorandum.[22]
As to the second issue, we agree with respondent that same involves a question
of fact which this Court cannot pass upon in this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
“A question of fact x x x exists when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when
the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation.”[23] Here, the ultimate question to be answered in order to resolve
the second issue raised is: Is
petitioner’s
consent to the execution of the amicable settlement vitiated? Certainly, this is a question of fact that
entails re-evaluation of factual findings which cannot be brought before this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari. In
Diokno v. Cacdac,[24]
we held that:
It is aphoristic that a
re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as earlier
stated, this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of
law. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound
to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings
below. This is already outside the
province of the instant Petition for Certiorari. (Citations omitted)
In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to deny the instant
petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition
for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
⃰ In lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 917 dated November 24, 2010.
[1] CA rollo, pp. 147-153; penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
[2]
[3] Rollo, pp. 36-43.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 27-34.
[5]
[6] Rollo, pp. 56-58.
[7] CA rollo, pp. 39-41; penned by Judge Pepito B. Gellada.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[18]
[19] Integrated
Bar of the
[20] J. D. Legaspi Construction v. National Labor Relations Commission, 439 Phil. 13, 20 (2002) citing Development Bank of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 100264-81, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 183, 187.
[21] Rollo, pp. 161- 189.
[22] Record shows that petitioner was served with a copy of Memorandum for Respondent on October 30, 2006 (id. at 188) while he mailed to this Court a copy of his own Memorandum only on November 21, 2006 (id. at 214).
[23] Segundo G. Dimaranan v. Heirs of Spouses
Arayata, G.R. No. 184193,
[24] G.R. No. 168475, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 440, 460-461.