Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
FRANCISCO TAYCO, substituted
by lucresia tayco and noel tayco, Petitioners, -versus- heirs of concepcion tayco-flores, namely: luceli f. diaz, ronele f. besa, monele
flores, perla flores, RUPERTO FLORES, WENCESLAO FLORES, PURISIMA FLORES, and FELIPE FLORES, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 168692 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: December 13, 2010 |
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PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Decision[2] dated
November 17, 2004 and the reinstatement of the Regional Trial Court's Decision[3] dated
October 2, 2001.
The records contain the following facts:
Upon the death of the spouses Fortunato Tayco and Diega
Regalado, their children, petitioner Francisco Tayco, Concepcion Tayco-Flores
and Consolacion Tayco inherited the following parcels of land:
1. A parcel of land (Lot 1902pt.), situated at
Buswang New, Kalibo, Aklan with the area of 9,938 square meters, bounded on the
NE by Lots 1848 & 1905; on the SE by Lots 1903 & 1904; on the NW by
Lots 1895, 1887, 1890 and 1808, covered by OCT No. (24360) RO-1569 under ARP/TD
No. 01025 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of P15,210.00;
2. A parcel of land (Lot 1896), situated at Buswang
New, Kalibo, Aklan, with the area of 2,123 square meters, bounded on the NE by
Lot 1898-C; on the SE by Lot 1897; on the SW by New Provincial Road; and on the
NW by Lot 1893, covered by OCT No. (24101) RO-1570, under ARP/TD No. 01087
& 01088 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of P6,910.00;
and
3. A parcel of land (P4,820.00.[4]
Sometime in September of 1972,
petitioner Francisco Tayco and his sister Consolacion Tayco executed a document
called Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega
Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares,[5] transferring
their shares on the abovementioned properties to their sister Concepcion
Tayco-Flores. The said document was
notarized and, on
Consolacion Tayco died on
The RTC ruled in favor of
petitioner Francisco Tayco, the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in favor of the plaintiff and judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Declaring the document entitled, Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares (Annex A, Complaint), and the document entitled Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land (Annex B, Complaint), as null and void;
b) Declaring the three (3) parcels of land subject of the above documents to be co-owned by the plaintiff (˝ share) and defendants (˝ share);
c) Ordering the parties to submit to the court a Project of Partition indicating the specific portion allotted to them within 30 days from receipt of this decision; in case of disagreement, the Court shall order the sale of all the three (3) parcels with the proceeds to be divided equally between plaintiff on the one hand and the defendants on the other;
d) Ordering the defendants to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 representing litigation expenses, and P5,000.00
as attorney's fees, plus cost.
e) The claim for moral and exemplary damages are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In ruling that the assailed documents were null and void,
the RTC ratiocinated that the extrajudicial settlement is a simulated document
to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores was the owner of the properties,
so that it would be easy for her to use the same as a collateral for a
prospective loan and as evidence disclosed that the intended loan with any
financial institution did not materialize, hence, the document had no more
effect. Consequently, according to the
trial court, since the first document was simulated and had no force and
effect, the second document had no more purpose and basis.
The respondent-heirs appealed the decision of the RTC to the
Court of Appeals, and on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us REVERSING the assailed decision of the lower court and a new one entered declaring defendants-appellants absolute owners of Lot Nos. 1902, 1896 and 2620. The complaint of plaintiff-appellee is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In
reversing the trial court's findings, the CA reasoned out that the genuineness
and due execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement was not disputed and was duly
signed by the parties and notarized. It
added that the recital of the provisions of the said document is clear that it
is an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of deceased Diega Regalado and
that petitioner and his sister Consolacion confirmed the sale of their shares
to
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[9]
but was denied[10]
by the same court. Thus, the present petition.
The
petitioner raised this lone issue:
CAN THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED DIEGA REGALADO WITH CONFIRMATION OF
Under
question is the validity of the document that contains the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased, Diega Regalado. The trial court ruled that it is null and
void based on its assessment of the facts, while the CA adjudged it valid based
on its examination of the said document. Under Section 1, Rule 45, providing
for appeals by certiorari before the
Supreme Court, it is clearly enunciated that only questions of law may be set
forth.[12]
Questions of fact may not be raised unless the case falls under any of the
following exceptions:[13]
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
This
case clearly falls under one of the exceptions and after a careful review of
the facts of the case, this Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action for partition. x x x.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
x x x x
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of making it a public document[14] that can bind third parties. However, this formal requirement appears to be superseded by the substantive provision of the Civil Code that states:
ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to “put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs.” Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property regardless of the form it takes. x x x[15]
The trial
court, after a keen determination of the facts involved in the case, clearly
articulated its findings as to the inconclusiveness of the required publication
and the notarization of the document purportedly containing the extrajudicial
settlement in question, thus:
At the outset, the document, Exhibit A, was executed at Lezo, Aklan which is about ten kilometers from Kalibo where all the parties are residents. Defendant had to hire a tricycle from Kalibo to bring the parties to Lezo. Assuming that a certain Engr. Reynaldo Lopez was helping the defendants at that time in this transaction, he is also a resident of Kalibo, Aklan which is the center of Aklan where almost all the lawyers have their offices. Engr. Lopez has also his office here. Why would he still recommend the execution of this document particularly in Lezo and before that particular alleged Notary Public? This sounds incredible.
Defendants alleged that the document was published in a newspaper of general circulation of Aklan but no affidavit of such publication was presented. Only an alleged receipt from Engr. Lopez was presented (Exh. 2) but does not prove its purpose.[16]
The above findings of fact
of the trial court must be accorded respect.
It is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court
are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for
strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of
this Court to analyze and weigh evidence by the parties all over again.[17]
Anent the true intent of the signatories of the questioned
document appearing to be an extrajudicial settlement of an estate, the trial
court found the following facts:
Plaintiff alleged that Exhibit A was executed just to accommodate his sister Concepcion Tayco to be able to offer as collateral the property in order to raise money for the marriage of her son Ruperto Flores. But the property was never encumbered because it was then Martial Law (TSN, 10/14/98, pp. 3-4; 5/6/99, pp. 5-6). This testimony of the plaintiff was never rebutted or denied by the defendant, Ruperto Flores, who himself testified for the defendants. In fact, he even admitted that he got married after the execution of Exhibit A (TSN, 2/16/01, pp. 15-16). This allegation by the plaintiff, therefore, must stand.
Defendants argue that if their intention was to mortgage the property in raising money, there was no need for the execution of Exhibit A but only a Special Power of Attorney would suffice. This would be the quickest way if the bank would be amenable, but the latter would be more protected if the title of the property are already transferred in the name of the mortgagor. For them, it has only to rely on the certificate of tile if it decides to deal with it.[18]
An extrajudicial settlement
is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not
relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the
required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply
because the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise investment.[19] However, in the construction or interpretation
of an instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be
pursued.[20]
If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.[21] If the
contract appears to be contrary to the evident intentions of the parties, the
latter shall prevail over the former.[22] The
denomination given by the parties in their contract is not conclusive of the
nature of the contents.[23] In
this particular case, the trial court, based on its appreciation of the pieces
of evidence presented, rightfully concluded that the intent of the signatories
was contrary to the questioned document's content and denomination.
Furthermore, the trial court, before stating its final
conclusion as to the nullity of the document in question, correctly discussed
the lack of consideration in so far as that part of the document which embodies
the confirmation of the sale of shares of siblings Francisco and Consolacion to
The consideration of P50.00 for a 1/3 share of about 16,000 sq.
meters real property in Kalibo, Aklan even way back in 1972 is definitely way
below the market value. Even if we take
into consideration the filial love between siblings (Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA
233), still, the difference between the market value then and the purchase
price is very great. Even for a market
value of P1,000.00, a consideration of P50.00 only plus
filial love would still be greatly disproportionate. Certainly, the 1/3 share of plaintiff exceeds
P1,000.00. The filial love
between siblings may affect the discrepancy only if the difference between the
market value over the selling price is slight. (ibid.). It would appear, therefore, that Exhibit A is
merely a simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores is
the owner of the properties so that it will be easy for her to use the same as
collateral for a prospective loan.
Should the encumbrance not materialize or if it did after the obligation
thereunder has been paid, the document shall become null and void and without
effect. As the evidence disclosed that
the intended loan with any financial institution did not materialize, hence,
immediately thereafter, the document had no more effect.[24]
As
to the other questioned document or the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in
Three Parcels of Land, the nullity of the first document renders it void
because its effectivity is anchored on the validity of the first document. The Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in
Three Parcels of Land came into fruition merely to confirm the existence of the
first document. It was executed on
As to Exhibit B, it is surprising why only the two sisters participated in its execution while the plaintiff who is still very much alive and also a resident of New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan was excluded. This document is a confirmation of the execution of Exhibit A where the plaintiff is a party. The plaintiff would have also been made a party to this document so that he could have confirmed the sale of his share had it been so. Could it be, therefore, that defendants did not want the plaintiff to know this document so that they can obtain the transfer of the titles and the tax declarations in their names without his knowledge? Unfortunately, however, plaintiff accidentally discovered the transfer when he tried to survey the property for ultimate partition.[25]
To reiterate, in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power
of review, this Court is not a trier of facts, and unless there are excepting
circumstances, it does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.[26] The
CA, therefore, erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court
without providing any substantial evidence to support its own findings.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the Court of Appeals' Decision
dated
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 6-50.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; id. at 28-34.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, G.R. No. 169356,
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
[13] It should be stressed that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review before this Court. However, this Rule is not absolute, it admits of the exceptions, as provided in the text. [Id., citing Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil, 450 SCRA 421, 427-428 (2005); Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot, 385 Phil. 720, 729-730 (2000); Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, 451 SCRA 63, 68-69 (2005); Halili v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 906, 912 (1998); Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168-1169 (1997); Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 494, 498-499 (1993); and Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 1074, 1079-1080 (1996)]. (Emphasis supplied.)
[14] Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 851, 866 (1998). (Emphasis
supplied.) A public document is “any instrument authorized by a notary public
or a competent public official, with the solemnity required by law.” (MORENO,
PHILIPPINE LAW DICTIONARY, 3rd ed., p. 763, citing Cacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742 (1906).
[15]
[16] Rollo,
pp. 22-23.
[17] Arangote v. Maglunob, G.R. No. 178906,
[18] Rollo,
pp. 23-24.
[19] Heirs of Joaquin Teves v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 96, 113 (1999), citing Divina v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 597 (1993) and Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647 (1997).
[20] Valdez v. Court of Appeals, 482 Phil. 250, 271 (2004), citing Golden Diamond, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 605 (2000).
[21]
[22]
[23] Valdez, v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20, citing Romero v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 223 (1995).
[24] Rollo,
p. 24. (Emphasis supplied.)
[25]
[26] Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, supra note 12, at 505, citing The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Gramaje, 442 SCRA 274, 283 (2004), citing Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 79, 85-86 (2004); New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 460 SCRA 220, 227 (2005); Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Gan, 493 SCRA 239, 242-243 (2006); and Pleyto v. Lomboy, 432 SCRA 329, 336 (2004).