Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
HEIRS OF JOSE BARREDO, namely, LOLITA BARREDO, ANNALIZA
BARREDO and MARICHU BARREDO-EPE, represented by MARICHU BARREDO-EPE,
Petitioners, -
versus - LAVOISER
BESAÑES, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 164695
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, ABAD,
and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 13, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
The facts of the case are as follows:
Estrella Javier (Javier) owned and operated J.M. Javier
Builders Corporation, a logging company located in Sta. Filomena,
Sometime in 1978, Barredo
was terminated from his employment due to the closure of Javier’s company which
experienced business reverses. This prompted Barredo to file with the then
Ministry of Labor a case for illegal dismissal and unpaid wages against Javier.
The parties, however, amicably settled the dispute in June 1978. The terms of the settlement were embodied in
the
x x x it
shall allow the complainant in the meantime that [ineligible phrase] no
available work for the latter to find a job and he shall not be considered as
having abandoned his job; that the
respondent shall allow the complainant to remain in the former’s camp situated
at Sta. Filomena free of charge; and that the respondent shall
extend financial assistance to the complainant in the sum of P200.00; x x x[4]
Complying
with the terms of the settlement, Javier allowed Barredo to stay and remain at
the bunkhouse of the company.
Three years
after, on
On
After selling
the properties, Javier ordered Barredo to vacate the land. Javier,
nevertheless, gave to the wife of Barredo the sum of P10,000.00 as a form of financial assistance. Subsequently, a fence
was constructed around the land and Besañes introduced substantial improvements
thereto such as a modern rice mill, warehouses, and office buildings.
In the intervening time, however, Barredo, claiming that he
was an agricultural tenant of Javier, filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) a claim for his right of pre-emption and redemption under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). After conducting a conference between
the parties, the MARO released a report, denominated as an “Office Finding,”[5]
where it declared that the determination of the existence of a tenancy
relationship could not be determined due to the insufficiency of evidence.
The complaint was then elevated to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Regional Adjudicator of
WHEREFORE,
all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING this case for lack of merit.
All claims and counterclaims are denied for lack of
evidence.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The Regional Adjudicator ruled that Barredo was not the
tenant of Javier, pointing out the fact that the continued stay of Barredo in
the premises of the company was due to the Order of the Ministry of Labor.
Because of this, the Regional Adjudicator agreed with the contention of Javier
that Barredo’s stay was only by mere tolerance. Furthermore, since Javier was subsequently
ordered by the Ministry of Labor to pay Barredo separation pay, the Regional
Adjudicator opined that in ordinary human experience, the landholder who had
been experiencing business reverses would not willingly enter into another
agreement that places a lien on the landholding to provide a remedy to his predicament.
Finally, the Regional Adjudicator held
that the very minimal produce of the alleged tenancy landholding negates
tenancy and that the mere fact that the land was agricultural in nature did not
immediately create tenancy relations between
Javier and Barredo.
Aggrieved, Barredo appealed the decision of the Regional
Adjudicator to the DARAB Central Office.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the
Honorable Adjudicator a quo is hereby REVERSED. Complainant-Appellant
Jose C. Barredo is declared a de jure tenant of the landowner, Estrella
F. Javier, now Lavoiser Besañes, who shall be maintained in peaceful possession
of the landholding subject of the controversy with rights appurtenant thereto.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In reversing the decision of the Regional Adjudicator, the
DARAB ruled that there was an implied contract of tenancy between Javier and
Barredo, because the latter was allowed to cultivate the land and that the
former was receiving her share of the produce through her niece. In addition, the DARAB held that Javier’s
offer of P10,000.00 and a land as a
homelot to Barredo was indicative of the existence of a tenancy relationship
between them. Being a tenant of Javier,
the DARAB concluded that Barredo was entitled to security of tenure and was
thus entitled to the possession of the properties in dispute in accordance with
law.
Both Javier
and Besañes appealed the decision of the DARAB to the CA.
On
WHEREFORE, the decision of the DARAB Central Office
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Arbitrator
finding a lack of agricultural tenancy, being supported by substantial
evidence, is hereby affirmed and reinstated.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The CA ruled that no tenancy relationship existed between
Javier and Barredo for the following reasons: first, a landholder and
tenant relationship was wanting;[11]
second, Barredo failed to substantiate his claim of agricultural
production;[12] third,
the claimed sharing agreement presented some doubts;[13]
and fourth, it was contrary to ordinary human experience for Barredo,
who claimed he was a tenant, not to complain when the coconut trees found on
the properties were leased to tuba gatherers in 1993.[14]
In February
2002, Barredo died in
WHETHER OR NOT THE LATE JOSE BARREDO
WAS A DE JURE TENANT ON THE LAND COVERED UNDER TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE
At the crux
of the controversy is the determination of whether or not Barredo is an
agricultural tenant and, therefore, enjoys security of tenure.
Section 3 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 1199, or The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines,
defines agricultural tenancy as "the physical possession by a person of
land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by another, for
the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of
his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to
share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain, either in produce
or in money, or in both."
There is a tenancy relationship between parties if the following
essential elements concur:
1) The parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee;
2) The subject matter of the relationship
is an agricultural land;
3) There is consent between the parties to
the relationship;
4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6) The harvest is shared between landowner
and tenant or agricultural lessee.[16]
All the foregoing requisites must be proved by substantial evidence and
the absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant.[17]
Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is
not entitled to security of tenure or covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws.[18]
From this Court’s assessment of the evidence at hand, We find that
Barredo had failed to establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between
him and Javier.
In the first
place, it is undisputed that Barredo was an employee of Javier in the latter’s
logging business. Barredo, like his
co-employees, was allowed to live in the bunkhouse of the company for his
convenience. Clearly, therefore, the relationship of Javier and Barredo was one
between an employer and an employee, and not between a landowner and a tenant.
The continued stay of Barredo in the premises of the company was the result of
the Order of the then Ministry of Labor which recognized the terms of the
amicable settlement of Barredo and Javier in their labor dispute. It cannot be therefore claimed that such
order converted the relationship of Barredo and Javier into one of tenancy as
clearly Barredo’s stay in the property was by mere tolerance and was ordered by
the Ministry of Labor. Moreover, the
inexistence of tenancy relations is bolstered by the fact that Barredo’s stay
was “free of charge” as contained in the order of the Ministry of Labor, to
wit:
x x x that
the respondent shall allow the complainant to remain in the former’s camp
situated at Sta. Filomena free of charge; x x x[19]
Furthermore, this Court is inclined to believe that Barredo’s activities
in the properties cannot be classified as one for agricultural production. The
records show that Barredo did not plant any additional coconut trees other than
the ones already planted. While the
DARAB ruled that Barredo had planted crops and vegetables, the extent of such
production was not described and, more importantly, is not supported by
evidence on record. Other than his bare allegation, Barredo has failed to
substantiate the extent of his so-called agricultural production.
The MARO, in its report, made no mention that Barredo planted other
crops and vegetables on the properties as the only fact established therein was
that Barredo was harvesting from the 15 coconut trees already planted on the
land. The CA’s conclusion that such
harvest must have all gone to Barredo’s family consumption[20]
is, therefore, reasonable as the small yield from 15 coconut trees cannot
satisfy the requirement of agricultural production. In addition, the Regional Adjudicator was
even more emphatic in her decision that no agricultural production transpired,
to wit:
x x x The production of coconuts, by ordinary
consideration, cannot sustain the existence of tenancy. While complainant
alleged planting of other crops, no substantial evidence to buttress his
allegation had been presented. There was no explanation offered why despite the
availability of the area and the passage of time no additional planting of
coconut trees has been done. The need for all of this clearly shows the absence
of the requisite on the purpose which is agricultural production.[21]
This Court is not unmindful of the fact that Barredo alleged that Javier
was receiving her share of the produce through her niece. However, assuming
that the same were true, it was held in De Jesus v. Moldex Realty, Inc.[22]
that "the fact of receipt, without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso
facto create a tenancy."[23]
Applied to the case at bar, records are bereft of any indication that Javier
and Barredo agreed to any system of sharing. Highlighted is the fact that the
produce was not even delivered to Javier but to her niece. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that Javier
received a portion of the harvest, the CA was correct when it declared that
such fact alone will not per se prove the existence of the sharing
agreement, more so if other elements of agricultural tenancy are not present.[24]
The finding of the DARAB of the existence of an implied contract of
tenancy must necessarily fail in view of the foregoing discussion. For implied
tenancy to arise, it is necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy
must be present.[25] Moreover, even if Javier may have acquiesced
to Barredo’s cultivation of the land, the same does not create an implied
tenancy if Javier never considered Barredo a tenant in the first place.
Furthermore,
this Court agrees with the observation of the CA that it was contrary to
ordinary human experience for Barredo, who claimed he was a tenant, not to complain
when the coconut trees found on the properties were leased to tuba gatherers in
1993, to wit:
Fourth, it must be noted that from the Office
Findings of the MARO, Barredo admitted that the coconut trees were leased to
tuba gatherers in 1993, and he ceased harvesting the trees from that time. He
never said that he objected to it. His seeming acquiescence to the lease
agreement is contrary to ordinary human experience if he was really the
rightful tenant of the land. He should have cried foul there and then, when he
was deprived of his harvest, which is supposed to be the lifeblood of a tenancy
relationship. Instead, he allowed the lease and made no assertion of his
alleged tenancy right whatsoever at that time. x x x[26]
Lastly, this Court finds that the offer of 100 square meters of land to
Barredo by Javier does not prove the existence of a tenancy agreement. Section
27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability. We share the observation of
the CA that such offer may have stemmed from a motivation to buy peace or as an
act of compassion for Barredo.
Based on the foregoing discussion, Barredo’s petition must fail. The existence of a tenancy relationship
cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically
give rise to security of tenure.[27]
Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make
one a de jure tenant.[28] Based on the evidence as presented by
Barredo, he has failed to discharge his burden of proving that all the
essential elements of tenancy exist. It
bears to stress that this Court has ruled time and again that all the requisites
of an agricultural tenancy must be proved by substantial evidence and the
absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant.
The MARO
declared that because of the insufficiency of evidence, the determination of
the existence of tenancy relationship could not be ascertained. Likewise, the Regional Adjudicator declared
that Barredo was not the tenant of Javier.
It was, therefore, incorrect for the DARAB to reverse such conclusions
and findings, more so since its own findings were not supported by evidence on
record. It bears to stress that the MARO
and the Regional Adjudicator were in a better opportunity to examine the claims
of the parties. Specifically, the Regional Adjudicator was located in the
locality where the dispute arose and had directly heard the parties and
examined the evidence they presented; thus, her assessment should have been
respected by the DARAB. Consequently, the CA acted within its jurisdiction when
it reversed the decision of the DARAB and reinstated the decision of the
Regional Adjudicator.
Withal, while
our agrarian reform laws significantly favor tenants, farmworkers and other
beneficiaries, this Court cannot allow pernicious practices that result in the
oppression of ordinary landowners as to deprive them of their land, especially
when these practices are committed by the very beneficiaries of these laws. Social justice was not meant to perpetrate an
injustice against the landowner.[29]
At any rate, this Court finds it imperative to state that R.A. No. 3844,
otherwise known as The Agricultural Land Reform Code, has abolished the
agricultural share tenancy.[30]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The March 26, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 74345, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-18.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores,
with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Edgardo A. Camello, concurring; id.
at 22-31.
[3] CA rollo, p. 80.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, p. 30.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Dalwampo v. Quinocol Farmers, Farm Workers and Settlers’ Association,
G.R. No. 160614,
[17] Suarez v. Saul,
G.R. No. 166664,
[18] Ambayec v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 162780,
[19]
[20] Rollo, p. 26.
[21] CA rollo, p. 50.
[22] G.R. No. 153595,
[23]
[24] Rollo, p. 28.
[25] Landicho
v. Sia, G.R. No. 169472,
[26] Rollo, p. 28.
[27] De Jesus v. Moldex Realty, Inc.,
supra note 22, at 321.
[28]
Ambayec v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18, at 545.
[29] Danan
v. Court of Appeals, 510 Phil. 596, 612 (2005).
[30]
Section 4 of the law provides:
Section 4.
Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy. − Agricultural share tenancy, as herein defined, is hereby declared to be
contrary to public policy and shall be abolished: Provided, That
existing share tenancy contracts may continue in force and effect in any region
or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Eleven Hundred and Ninety-nine, as amended, until the end
of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council proclaims that
all the government machineries and agencies in that region or locality relating
to leasehold envisioned in this Code are operating, unless such contracts
provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner exercise his option to elect
the leasehold system: x x x.