Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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Equitable PCI Bank (Now Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc.),* |
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G.R. Nos. 163293 & 163297 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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- versus - |
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ABAD,⃰ ⃰ and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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Castor A. Dompor,⃰ ⃰ ⃰ |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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December 8, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
A bank manager’s abuse of authority
in implementing bank policies is an abuse of the trust reposed in him by his
employer which constitutes as a just cause for his termination.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the Decision[2]
dated November 29, 2002 and Resolution[3]
dated April 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 63948 and
65259, which reversed the Resolution[4]
dated August 31, 2000 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) finding
respondent Castor A. Dompor to have been dismissed for cause.
Factual
Antecedents
On
October 1, 1975, respondent was employed by then Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB), which came to be Equitable PCI Bank and now herein
petitioner Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc.[5]
In 1995, he was assigned as branch
manager of PCIB’s Makati Cinema Branch.
On July 24, 1996,
PCIB’s Operations Subcenter Head, Gerardo C. Gabriel (Gabriel), called the
attention of PCIB’s Ayala-Makati Area Head, Cora Mallillin (Mallillin),
regarding a number of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
dividend checks being sent for clearing by PCIB Makati Cinema Branch. It appears that respondent allowed Luz Fuentes
(Fuentes), a client-depositor of PCIB Makati Cinema Branch who opened checking
account no. 0672-04408-0 on July 14, 1995, to deposit several second-endorsed
PLDT dividend checks beginning the last quarter of 1995.
A special audit
was then conducted from August 14-21, 1996. The audit report[6]
showed that 67,748 PLDT second-endorsed dividend checks, covered by 332 deposit
slips, and with a total amount of P6.713 million, were drawn on Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation-Makati and made payable to different payee corporations and
prominent personalities. These checks were thereafter fraudulently negotiated
in favor of Fuentes and deposited to her account from September 1995 to July
1996. The audit report also revealed
striking similarities of strokes in the signatures of the different payees appearing
on the checks. The report further noted that
the transactions, which were inadequately documented, have exposed the bank to
probable losses and could make the bank liable under its endorsement as the
checks’ drawer may claim reimbursement on the ground of wrong payment or forgery.
Thus, from its findings and evaluation,[7]
the audit committee recommended respondent’s dismissal from employment and setting
up of a contingent liability for the potential loss for violation of bank’s
policies and failure to exercise prudence expected of a branch head.
On September 2,
1996, a hearing was held by the investigating committee whereby several
officers and personnel including respondent were queried in relation to the
irregular transactions involving the account of Fuentes. Due to the ongoing investigation, respondent
was placed under preventive suspension from September 9-27, 1996,[8]
which was further extended until October 8, 1996.[9]
In a Memo[10]
dated October 23, 1996, respondent was asked to explain in writing why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for committing the following serious
policy violations: 1) Failure to comply with PCIB Accounting Procedure Manual
(APM) No. 26B.5A.1b[11]
which states that checks payable to corporations, societies, firms, etc. for
credit to a personal account and/or checks with unusual endorsement should not
be accepted; 2) Allowing/approving the acceptance of second-endorsed checks
despite Ayala-Makati Area management’s instruction to stop accepting this type
of deposits on June 27, 1996; and 3) Failure to comply with Credit Policy
Supervision (CPS) No. 6[12]
which prohibits the purchase of second-endorsed PLDT checks totaling P56,435.26
in the absence of approved credit line on October 25, 1995.
On November 28,
1996, respondent submitted his reply[13]
explaining that, on the alleged failure to comply with APM No. 26B.5A.1b, his
acceptance of second-endorsed checks was solely for marketing considerations;
that he only accepted checks which are payable to individuals and duly endorsed
by the individual payees; and, that he made Fuentes sign an Agreement on
Acceptance of Second-Endorsed Checks[14]
in order to protect the interest of the bank. Respondent explained that on two occasions he
still accepted second-endorsed checks despite the June 27, 1996 instruction because,
in the first instance, Mallillin gave her verbal approval thereto. On the second instance, the deposit was
nevertheless cancelled since it included checks payable to corporations. Respondent further claimed that there was no
violation of CPS No. 6 since no Bills Purchased Line was established for
Fuentes. He claimed that the acceptance
of the checks was made in good faith, and did not in any way benefit him but in
fact benefited the bank. Above all, the
bank was amply protected from injury in view of the Agreement.
On February 7,
1997, respondent received a Memo[15]
dated January 7, 1997 dismissing him from employment on the grounds of serious
policy violations, willful breach of trust, and loss of confidence, with
further sanction of forfeiture of benefits and contingent restitution of the
total amount of P6,712,756.61 including costs. Respondent thereafter submitted his appeal[16]
to reverse the management’s decision, maintaining that he handled his duties
with no ineptness or depravity and in accordance with his authority and
responsibility consistent with 21 years of loyal and dedicated service.
Proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter
On August 21,
1997, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Respondent
averred that his dismissal was without just cause as the alleged loss of trust
and confidence is not substantial. He
maintained that his acceptance of the second-endorsed checks did not violate
any existing bank policy; that he accepted said checks in good faith, solely
for marketing considerations, and after compliance with bank requirements; that
the bank did not suffer damage since all the checks were cleared by the drawee
bank and none were dishonored; and, that he is not an incorrigible offender with
previous derogatory record. Respondent
also claimed denial of due process alleging that his dismissal was
predetermined as evidenced by the fact that no further investigation was
conducted after the submission of his reply-explanation.
On the other hand,
petitioner claimed that respondent committed flagrant and willful disobedience
of bank policies and procedures that exposed it to risk of huge losses when
respondent accepted checks endorsed by corporations or firms for credit to the
personal account of Fuentes as well as checks with unusual endorsements; when
he accepted deposits which exceed his single approving limit of P15,000,000.00
per transaction; when he failed to close the account of Fuentes despite the
mishandling of her account; and, when respondent failed to ensure that all
procedures and approval requirements are complied with and being followed by
designated staff and officer, thereby abusing the discretion and authority as
branch manager. It was also advanced
that respondent’s fraudulent infractions gave rise to petitioner’s loss of
confidence and breach of trust as would constitute enough basis for termination
and that due process was accorded to respondent after giving him an opportunity
to be heard and be informed of the charges.
On May 26, 1999,
the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[17]
finding respondent’s dismissal valid. The Labor Arbiter concluded that there were
enough infractions committed by respondent which constitute serious misconduct
or willful disobedience and willful breach of trust and that petitioner need
not incur damages to sustain the validity of dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, however, awarded respondent
separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of
service for equity considerations after giving due regard to respondent’s 22
years of service. The dispositive
portion of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit.
Respondent PCI Bank is, however, ordered to pay
complainant Castor A. Dompor a separation pay of P495,000.00.
All other claims are also dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Proceedings
before the National Labor Relations Commission
Both parties appealed to the NLRC. Respondent again questioned
the
legality of his
dismissal for want of substantive and procedural due process.[19]
For its part, petitioner partially
appealed the decision insofar as the award of separation pay in favor of
respondent is concerned stating that PCIB’s Code of Discipline provides for the
automatic forfeiture of all benefits in cases of dismissal; that respondent’s
length of service should have instead been taken against him; and, that the
amount granted is exorbitant.[20]
In its Resolution dated August 31,
2000,[21]
the NLRC dismissed both appeals for lack of merit and, consequently, affirmed
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. It held
that petitioner, as employer, has the discretion of terminating an employee who
holds a position of trust and confidence on the ground of lack or absence
thereof. According to the NLRC, there
was enough basis for the loss of trust and confidence on respondent by
petitioner on account of the former’s evident disobedience, in that:
Clear
from the records is that Complainant accepted second-endorsed PLDT dividend
checks for deposit to the account of Ms. Luz Fuentes after Ayala-Makati Area
Management’s instruction to stop accepting this type of deposit on P45.00 to P90.00) held by the
Area Office, which were endorsed on July 24, 1996 at the Makati Cinema Branch
where Complainant is Manager. The Area Office found out that of these 3,028
PLDT dividend checks, 211 of them were made payable to 211 different payees,
i.e., prominent families, schools, private corporations and government
agencies. Moreover, despite an order dated
The NLRC also
ruled that respondent was accorded due process before his termination when he
was apprised of the charges against him in the October 23, 1996 Memo and was
given a chance to refute the charges by virtue of a written reply-explanation
submitted on November 28, 1996. The NLRC likewise sustained the award of
separation pay as a form of equitable relief.
Petitioner then filed
a Partial Motion for Reconsideration[23]
[sic] to again question the grant of separation pay, claiming that there were no
legal and equitable bases for the award.
Said motion was however denied in an October 26, 2000 Resolution[24]
of the NLRC. Respondent also filed his
Motion for Reconsideration[25]
which was likewise denied by the NLRC in its Resolution[26]
dated February 28, 2001.
Proceedings
before the Court of Appeals
Petitioner and respondent then filed
their separate petitions for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 63948 and CA-G.R. SP No. 65259, respectively. On respondent’s motion, the CA consolidated
both petitions in a Resolution[27]
dated October 16, 2001.
On November 29, 2002, the CA rendered
its Decision reversing the ruling of the NLRC and holding that respondent’s dismissal
was effected without due process of law and without just cause. The CA opined that respondent’s termination
was preordained as manifested by petitioner’s lack of intention to even
consider his explanation before the decision to terminate him was arrived at. This is shown by the fact that even before
respondent received the show cause memorandum, the management, thru the audit
team, had already recommended his dismissal. In addition, the CA noted that respondent’s
appeal from the notice of dismissal was left unheeded by petitioner. On the
substantive aspect, the CA found no transgression of bank internal rules but rather,
compliance with the limitations and restrictions imposed in connection with the
acceptance for deposit of second-endorsed checks, thereby exhibiting good faith,
if not, mere lapses in judgment in respondent’s handling of the transactions. According to the CA, the potential loss that
petitioner may incur was merely speculative as no material harm was actually
sustained by the bank due to respondent’s actuations and thus concluded that
the sanction of dismissal is unjustified. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
The petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 63948 is DENIED for lack of merit; and
2.
The petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 65259 is GRANTED. Petitioner Castor A. Dompor is awarded FULL
BACKWAGES from the time of his dismissal until the rendition of this Decision,
plus all other accrued benefits as of the latter date.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Respondent filed
a motion[29]
to clarify and amend the dispositive portion of the CA Decision to include his
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges as provided
for by the Labor Code. Petitioner, on
the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration[30]
to reverse the finding of illegal dismissal. In a Resolution[31]
dated April 23, 2004, the CA denied both motions.
Issues
Hence, this
petition on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER 12TH
DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. SP
NO. 65259 CONSIDERING THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NLRC (2ND
DIVISION), AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER BARTOLABAC, HAD SUFFICIENT
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER 12TH
DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT’S DISMISSAL WAS NOT
JUSTIFIED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER 12TH
DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT’S DISMISSAL WAS NOT
ATTENDED BY DUE PROCESS.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER 12TH
DIVISION) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN
Petitioner
submits that the CA committed serious error in rendering the assailed Decision
as it should have accorded due respect and finality to the concurrent factual
findings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC. It should have instead sustained the legality
of respondent’s termination from employment on the ground of willful disobedience
of lawful rules since strict adherence to bank’s policies and procedures is
expected of him as branch head. According to petitioner, pecuniary damage is
not an issue as it is enough that respondent committed an infraction of
existing rules considered as misconduct or willful breach of trust. Furthermore, petitioner denies that the
dismissal was preordained and advances that it complied with due process
requisites of notice and hearing before terminating respondent. Lastly, petitioner argues that separation pay
was unjustly awarded since willful disobedience, as a ground for termination,
does not warrant the grant of such equitable relief.
Our Ruling
The petition is impressed with
merit.
While the Court
finds that the CA, by express mandate of the law, may review the decision of
quasi-judicial and administrative agencies and may thus resolve factual issues,[33]
the Court, however, disagrees with its resultant decision.
Respondent committed willful
disobedience and willful breach of trust sufficient as just causes for his
dismissal.
To justify
willful disobedience or insubordination as a valid ground for termination, “the
employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful [or] characterized by a
wrongful or perverse attitude and the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had
been engaged to discharge.”[34]
On the other hand, willful breach of
trust requires that “the loss of confidence must not be simulated; it should
not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper or
unjustified; it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary; it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to
justify earlier action taken in bad faith; and, the employee involved holds a
position of trust and confidence.”[35]
In the case at bench, we hold that
respondent was validly dismissed on the grounds of willful disobedience and
willful breach of trust under Article 282 of the Labor Code.[36]
While petitioner’s
manual of procedures does not absolutely prohibit the negotiation or acceptance
of second-endorsed checks for deposits, it does expressly disallow the
acceptance of checks endorsed by corporations, societies, firms, etc. and
checks with unusual endorsements.[37]
As shown by the records, this explicit
policy was transgressed by respondent intentionally and willfully. It was not denied that on June 27, 1996,
respondent was instructed by management to stop accepting second-endorsed
checks due to the irregularities attendant to the transactions with Fuentes. Despite such reasonable order, on two occasions,
respondent unhesitatingly accommodated the request of Fuentes to accept her
checks allegedly on the strength of the Area Head’s approval on the first
instance and on the second instance, respondent justifies his acceptance of the
checks as the same were nevertheless returned and cancelled on the ground that
the checks include those payable to corporations. Indeed, the return and cancellation of these
checks do not change the fact that respondent had accepted for deposit checks which
are payable to corporations, thereby flagrantly violating bank guidelines. Respondent
admittedly disobeyed not only his superiors’ directives but also simple bank rules.
Moreover, in the investigation conducted on September 2, 1996, Gabriel observed
that the signatures appearing at the back of the checks accepted by respondent bore
the same strokes.[38]
As correctly noted by the Labor Arbiter, the negotiation of checks by hundreds
of payees to only one individual should have alerted respondent as to the authenticity
of the endorsements. These considerations have convinced the Court that the
PLDT dividend checks indeed contain unusual and suspicious endorsements and
cannot be overruled by the mere denial of respondent.
The CA put
premium on respondent’s efforts in doing his job well by increasing the
branch’s deposit level and protecting the interest of petitioner notwithstanding
lapses in judgment, thus discounting bad faith in respondent’s acts. The CA held that the penalty of dismissal is
discordant with the infraction as no monetary prejudice was caused to
petitioner and in consideration of his many years of valuable service.
We disagree. Respondent unduly yielded to the whims of a
client and gave undue advantage to her instead of performing his duties towards
the best interest of the bank. From the
start, respondent was perceived to have been extending special favors to
Fuentes even though such entails contravention of strict bank guidelines. As narrated by one of the branch staff
personnel, Carmela C. Exconde, Fuentes was able to open an account thru
respondent’s approval even without the requisite documents.[39]
Also, all transactions coursed by
Fuentes were approved by respondent even if questionable. Despite several recommendations and orders by
his superiors to close the account of Fuentes due to several infractions
committed and mishandling of the account, respondent defied the instructions. Respondent even accommodated the negotiation
of second-endorsed checks deposited by Fuentes even if the latter was not
extended any credit line. It bears
stressing that respondent failed to prove that Fuentes is a valued client, as to
warrant the undue accommodation given her, as mere allegation does not suffice
especially since petitioner contradicts the same.
Respondent, as
bank manager, has the duty to ensure that bank rules are strictly complied with
not only to ensure efficient bank operation which is imbued with public
interest but also to serve the best interest of the bank as he holds a position
of trust and confidence. As emphasized
by petitioner, respondent was in charge of the overall administration of the
branch and is tasked to ensure that all policies and procedures are strictly
followed. Indubitably, any negligence in
the exercise of his responsibilities can be sufficient ground for loss of trust
and confidence demanded by his position. As held in Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines,
Inc.,[40] “the
mere existence of a basis for believing that [a managerial] employee has
breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal x x x. [P]roof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required.”
Respondent’s
wanton violation of bank policies equates to abuse of authority and, therefore,
abuse of the trust reposed in him. Such
intention to violate the trust of petitioner is enough for his dismissal from
service.
The requirements of due process
were satisfied.
The requirements of procedural due
process were complied with when petitioner sent a Memo dated October 23, 1996
to respondent informing him of the specific charges and giving him opportunity
to air his side. Subsequently, in a
letter dated January 7, 1997, respondent was informed that on the basis of the
results of the investigation conducted, his written explanation, the written
explanation of other employees as well as the audit report, the management has
decided to terminate him. The two-notice
requirement, which includes a written notice of the cause of dismissal to
afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and
written notice of the decision to terminate him which states the reasons
therefor,[41]
was thus complied with.
Respondent, however, harps on the
fact that his dismissal was preconceived because there was already a decision
to terminate him even before he was given the show cause memorandum and that no
further investigation was conducted after his written explanation.
Respondent’s contentions are not
tenable. The accusation that his
dismissal was preordained lacks factual basis. Further, contrary to respondent’s allegations,
he was given more than enough opportunity to defend himself. As early as September 1996, a hearing was
conducted wherein respondent as well as other personnel took part and were
questioned regarding the transactions involving respondent’s acceptance of
second-endorsed checks and the handling of Fuentes’s account. Respondent’s argument that he was not
furnished with a copy of the audit report and therefore was not able to refute
its findings cannot persuade this Court.
The audit report merely served as basis for petitioner’s issuance of the
show cause memorandum. The audit committee’s conclusion to dismiss respondent
from the service was merely recommendatory.
It was not conclusive upon the petitioner. This is precisely the reason why the
petitioner still conducted further investigations. To reiterate, respondent was properly informed
of the charges and had every opportunity to rebut the accusations and present
his version. Respondent was not denied
due process of law for he was adequately heard as “the very essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard.”[42]
Separation pay should not be
awarded in favor of respondent.
We are aware that in several instances this Court has awarded
separation pay as a measure of social justice.[43] However, the matter of the award of
separation pay based on social justice has been clarified in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
v. National Labor Relations Commission[44] where the Court categorically declared
that “separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in
those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for cause other than serious misconduct x x
x.” Likewise, we ruled in Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Workers
Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission[45] that in addition to serious misconduct,
separation pay should not be conceded to an employee who was dismissed based on
willful disobedience.
In
the instant case, the Labor Arbiter’s basis for the award of separation pay was
respondent’s length of service and the fact that petitioner sustained no
losses. However, as already discussed,
it was established that the infractions committed by the respondent constituted
serious misconduct or willful disobedience resulting to loss of trust and
confidence. Clearly therefore, even
based on equity and social justice, respondent does not deserve the award of
separation pay. Consequently, the same
should be deleted.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The
November 29, 2002 Decision and April 23, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 63948 and 65259 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Resolution dated August 31, 2000 of
the National Labor Relations Commission, affirming the Labor Arbiter’s Decision
upholding the legality of respondent’s dismissal, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the award of separation pay in the amount of P495,000.00
is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief Justice
* Formerly Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. See Notice of Change of Name, rollo, p. 611.
⃰ ⃰
In lieu of Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 917 dated November 24, 2010.
⃰ ⃰ ⃰
Also referred to as Castor A.
Dompor, Jr. in some parts of the records.
[1]
[2] Annex “A” of the Petition, id. at 59-70; penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Danilo B. Pine.
[3] Annex “B” of the Petition, id. at 72-74.
[4] Annex “P” of the Petition, id. at 268-282; penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan.
[5] In the latter part of 1999, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) merged with Equitable Banking Corporation to form Equitable PCI Bank. Then, on May 31, 2007, Equitable PCI Bank entered into a merger with Banco De Oro Universal Bank, thus creating Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. (See petitioner’s Notice of Change of Name dated March 10, 2008, id. at 611-612).
[6] Audit Report dated October 21, 1996, Annex “D” of the Petition, id. at 94-100.
[7] SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS.
1.
The Branch Head approved the purchase of checks
totaling P56M. The transactions were beyond his (Branch Head) single
approving limit of P15M. There were no records presented showing the
details of the checks purchased.
2. The account of Ms. Luz Fuentes (CA No. 0672-04408-0) was not closed by the Branch Head despite improper handling. From 12.01.95 to 7.31.96, 25 checks drawn on said account were lodged to Returned Checks and Other Cash Items, of which 11 were returned due to insufficiency of account balance.
In the OD Items Report dated 4.30.96 where retention of the account was approved by the Area Head, it was indicated that the account (CA #0672-04408-0) will be closed on next infraction. However, the account was not closed despite continuous infraction.
3. There were no documents or records presented by the Branch Head which serve as valid justification on the retention of the account and the acceptance of the second-endorsed PLDT dividend checks.
4.
Various checks totaling P56M deposited on
6.11.96 were validated on the next banking day (6.13.96) instead on the
transaction date.
5. Erasures/alterations on 34 deposit slips were not signed by the depositor.
6.
Second-endorsed checks accepted for deposit were
processed without any officer’s signature. This is evident in the absence of
the Branch Head’s or any officer’s signature on 52 (of 328) deposit slips
totaling P5.697M.
7. From 5.16.96 to 7.24.96, the PLDT dividend checks accepted for deposit were no longer microfilmed. This is signified by the absence of an indication in the Microfilm Logbook.
8. Fifty-three deposit slips did not indicate details of the checks deposited while another four were not presented.
x x x x
EVALUATION.
1.
The Branch Head, Mr. Castor A. Dompor, Jr. committed
gross negligence tantamount to fraud and abuse of authority when he approved
the acceptance of checks for deposit/purchase beyond his single approving
authority of P15M. He (Mr. Castor A. Dompor, Jr.) failed to exercise
prudence when he approved the acceptance of voluminous second-endorsed PLDT
dividend checks in the name of different payees (individuals, schools, private
corporations and government agencies) for deposit. The magnitude of the checks
being deposited and large number of names of payees which included the names of
prominent personalities as payees should have prompted him (Mr. Castor Dompor,
Jr.) to question the legality of negotiation of the checks. These lapses
exposed the Bank to possible loss of P6.713M because the drawer of the
checks can claim reimbursement for wrong payment or forgery on the endorsement.
2. The magnitude of the PLDT dividend checks being deposited and the similarity of strokes of endorsement of different payees on the checks are strong indications that the checks were stolen and that the negotiation of the checks is fraudulent.
x x x x
[8] Memo dated September 2, 1996, rollo, p. 126.
[9] Memo dated September 27, 1996, id. at 127.
[10] Annex “G” of the Petition, id. at 107.
[11] Annex “E” of the Petition, id. at 102-103.
[12] Annex “F” of the Petition, id. at 104-106.
[13] Respondent’s Reply dated November 28, 1996, id. at 129-133.
[14]
[15] Annex “H” of the Petition, id. at 108-110.
[16] Respondent’s Appeal from Memo of Dismissal dated March 8, 1997, id. at 137-140.
[17] Annex “M” of the Petition, id. at 219-230.
[18]
[19] See Respondent’s Memorandum of Appeal, Annex “O” of the Petition, id. at 253-267.
[20] See Petitioner’s Memorandum on Partial Appeal, Annex “N” of the Petition, id. at 231-252.
[21] Annex “P” of the Petition, id. at 268-282.
[22]
[23] Annex “R” of the Petition, id. at 292-307.
[24]
[25] Annex “Q” of the Petition, id. at 284-291.
[26]
[27] CA rollo, Vol. I, p. 546.
[28] Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[29] Motion to Clarify or Amend the Dispositive Portion of the Decision Granting the Petition, CA rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 338-340.
[30] Annex “C” of the Petition, rollo, pp 75-93.
[31] Annex “B” of the Petition, id. at 72-74.
[32]
[33] Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. Nagrama, Jr., G.R. No. 164403, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 571, 588-590.
[34] St. Luke’s Medical Center, Incorporated v. Fadrigo, G.R. No. 185933, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 728, 738.
[35] Bank of the Philippine
[36] ART. 282. Termination by Employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
x x x x
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
x x x x
[37] See petitioner’s Accounting & Procedures Manual (APM) No. 26B.5A.1b, rollo, p. 103.
[38]
[39]
[40] 489 Phil. 483, 496-497 (2005); See also Abel v. Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 178976, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 683, 694.
[41] Sy v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 160618, November 2, 2006, 506 SCRA 580, 588.
[42] KLT Fruits, Inc. v. WSR Fruits, Inc., G.R. No. 174219, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 713, 732.
[43] Central
Philippines Bandag Retreaders, Inc. v. Diasnes, G. R. No. 163607, July 14,
2008, 558 SCRA 194, 205.
[44] 247
Phil. 641, 649 (1988). Emphasis supplied.
[45] G.R.
Nos. 158786 & 158789, 158798-99, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 171, 223.