Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
BEATRIZ
SIOK
Petitioner, - versus - SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 162575 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: December
15, 2010 |
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PERALTA, J.:
Before
us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Beatriz
Siok Ping Tang seeking to annul and set aside the Decision[1]
dated
The antecedent
facts are as follows:
Petitioner is doing business under
the name and style of Able Transport. Respondent Subic Bay Distribution, Inc. (SBDI)
entered in two Distributorship Agreements with petitioner and Able Transport in
April 2002. Under the Agreements, respondent, as seller, will sell, deliver or
procure to be delivered petroleum products, and petitioner, as distributor,
will purchase, receive and pay for its purchases from respondent. The two
Agreements had a period of one year, commencing on October 2001 to October
2002, which shall continue on an annual basis unless terminated by either party
upon thirty days written notice to the other prior to the expiration of the
original term or any extension thereof.
Section 6.3 of the Distributorship Agreement
provides that respondent may require petitioner to put up securities, real or
personal, or to furnish respondent a performance bond issued by a bonding
company chosen by the latter to secure and answer for petitioner's outstanding
account, and or faithful performance of her obligations as contained or arising
out of the Agreement. Thus, petitioner applied for and was granted a credit
line by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), International Exchange Bank
(IEBank), and Security Bank Corporation (SBC). Petitioner also applied with the
Asia United Bank (AUB) an irrevocable domestic standby letter of credit in
favor of respondent. All these banks separately executed several undertakings
setting the terms and conditions governing the drawing of money by respondent
from these banks.
Petitioner
allegedly failed to pay her obligations to respondent despite demand, thus,
respondent tried to withdraw from these bank undertakings.
Petitioner then filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
On
On
ACCORDINGLY,
let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued restraining and enjoining herein
Respondent UCPB, IEB, SB and AUB from releasing any funds to SBDI, pursuant to
the Bank Undertakings and/or Domestic Standby Letter of Credit until further
orders from this Court. Consequently, Petitioner is hereby DIRECTED to post a
bond in the amount of TEN MILLION PESOS
(P10,000,000.00), to answer for whatever damages respondent banks and
SBDI may suffer should this Court finally decide that petitioner was not
entitled thereto. [6]
The RTC found that both respondent and petitioner have
reasons for the enforcement or non-enforcement of the bank undertakings,
however, as to whether said reasons were justifiable or not, in view of the
attending circumstances, the RTC said that these can only be determined after a
full blown trial. It ruled that the
outright denial of petitioner's prayer for the issuance of injunction, even if
the evidence warranted the reasonable probability that real injury will occur
if the relief for shall not be granted in favor of petitioner, will not serve
the ends of justice.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Pizarro and petitioner. Subsequently,
petitioner filed her Comment and respondent filed its Reply.
On July 4, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution[7]
granting the TRO prayed for by respondent after finding that it was apparent
that respondent has a legal right under the bank undertakings issued by UCPB,
SBC, and IEBank; and that until those undertakings were nullified, respondent's
rights under the same should be maintained.
On
July 11, 2003, the CA issued a Supplemental Resolution[8]
wherein the Domestic Standby Letter of Credit issued by AUB was ordered
included among the bank undertakings, to which respondent has a legal right.
On
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Order dated
In so ruling, the CA said that the
grant or denial of an injunction rests on the sound discretion of the RTC which
should not be intervened, except in clear cases of abuse. Nonetheless, the CA continued that the RTC
should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would, in effect,
dispose of the main case without trial. It found that petitioner was questioning the
validity of the bank undertakings and letter of credit for being oppressive,
unreasonable and unconscionable. However,
as provided under the law, private transactions are presumed to be fair and
regular and that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The CA ruled that the RTC's issuance of the
injunction, which was premised on the abovementioned justification, would be a
virtual acceptance of petitioner's claim, thus, already a prejudgment of the
main case. It also said that contracts
are presumed valid until they are voided by a court of justice, thus, until
such time that petitioner has presented sufficient evidence to rebut such
presumption, her legal right to the writ is doubtful.
As to petitioner's claim of
respondent's non-filing of a motion for reconsideration before resorting to a
petition for certiorari, the CA said that it is not a rigid rule, as
jurisprudence had said, that when a definite question has been properly raised,
argued and submitted in the RTC and the latter had decided the question, a
motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary before filing a petition for certiorari.
The court found that both parties had fully presented their sides on the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and that the RTC had squarely
resolved the issues presented by both parties.
Thus, respondent could not be faulted for not filing a motion for
reconsideration.
In
a Resolution dated
Hence,
this petition, wherein petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS A QUO COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING DUE COURSE AND GRANTING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT SBDI, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL PARTIES IN THE TRIAL COURT, WHO ARE EQUALLY MANDATED BY THE QUESTIONED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT, NAMELY; UCPB, IEBANK, SBC AND AUB, AS DEFENDANTS IN THE MAIN CASE, WERE NOT IMPLEADED AS INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IN THE PETITION.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS A QUO COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING DUE COURSE AND GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT SBDI'S PETITION WHEN THE LATTER ADMITTEDLY FAILED TO FILE A PRIOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, MORESO WHEN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES WERE NOT IMPLEADED WHICH SHOULD HAVE RENDERED THE COURT OF APPEALS IN WANT OF JURISDICTION TO ACT.[10]
Petitioner
claims that the CA decision is void for want of
authority of the CA to act on the petition as the banks should have been
impleaded for being indispensable parties, since they are the original party
respondents in the RTC; that the filing
with the CA of respondent's petition for
certiorari emanated from the RTC Order wherein the banks were the ones
against whom the questioned Order was issued; that the banks are the ones who
stand to release hundred millions of pesos
which respondent sought to draw from the questioned bank undertakings
and domestic standby letter of credit through the certiorari proceedings,
thus, they should be given an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner claims that even the CA recognized
the banks' substantial interest over the subject matter of the case when, despite
not being impleaded as parties in the petition filed by respondent, the CA also
notified the banks of its decision.
Petitioner
argues that a petition for certiorari filed without a prior motion for reconsideration is a
premature action and such omission constitutes a fatal infirmity; that
respondent explained its omission only when petitioner already brought the same
to the attention of the CA, thus, a mere afterthought and an attempt to cure
the fatal defects of its petition.
In
its Comment, respondent contends that the banks which issued the bank
undertakings and letter of credit are not indispensable parties in the petition
for certiorari filed in the CA.
Respondent argues that while the RTC preliminarily resolved the issue of
whether or not petitioner was entitled to an injunctive relief, and the
enforcement of any decision granting such would necessarily involve the banks,
the resolution of the issue regarding the injunction does not require the
banks' participation. This is so because on one hand the entitlement or
non-entitlement to an injunction is a matter squarely between petitioner and
respondent, the latter being the party that is ultimately enjoined from
benefiting from the banks' undertakings. On the other hand, respondent contends
that the issue resolved by the CA was whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in granting the injunctive relief to respondent; that while the
enforcement of any decision enjoining the implementation of the injunction
issued by the RTC would affect the banks, the resolution of whether there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC does not require the banks'
participation.
Respondent
claims that while as a rule, a motion for reconsideration is required before
filing a petition for certiorari, the rule admits of exceptions, which
are, among others: (1) when the issues raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the RTC or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the RTC; (2) there is an urgent necessity and time is
of the essence for the resolution of the issues raised and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the petitioner; and (3) the issue raised is
one purely of law, which are present in respondent's case.
In
her Reply, petitioner claims that the decree that will compel and order the
banks to release any funds to respondent pending the resolution of her petition
in the RTC will have an injurious effect upon her rights and interest. She reiterates her arguments in her petition.
Respondent
filed a Rejoinder saying that it is misleading for petitioner to allege that
the decree sought by respondent before the CA is directed against the banks;
that even the dispositive portion of the CA decision did not include any
express directive to the banks; that there was nothing in the CA decision which
compelled and ordered the banks to release funds in favor of respondent as the
CA decision merely annulled the RTC Order and lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction. Respondent contends that the
banks are not persons interested in sustaining the RTC decision as this was
obvious from the separate answers they filed in the RTC wherein they uniformly
maintained that the bank undertakings/letter of credit are not oppressive,
unreasonable and unconscionable. Respondent avers that petitioner is the only
person interested in upholding the injunction issued by the RTC, since it will
enable her to prevent the banks from releasing funds to respondent. Respondent
insists that petitioner's petition before the RTC and the instant petition have
caused and continues to cause respondent grave and irreparable damage.
Both
parties were then required to file their respective memoranda, in which they complied.
Petitioner's
insistence that the banks are indispensable parties, thus, should have been
impleaded in the petition for certiorari filed by respondent in the CA,
is not persuasive.
In Arcelona
v. Court of Appeals,[11]
we stated the nature of indispensable party, thus:
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only
an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest
of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his
interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It
has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose
absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the
court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable
party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go
forward.
A person is not an indispensable party,
however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from
the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly
or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them.
Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence
would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to
the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is
not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an
indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.[12]
Applying the foregoing, we find that
the banks are not indispensable parties in the petition for certiorari which
respondent filed in the CA assailing the RTC Order dated
First.
During the hearing of petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the RTC,
in open court, elicited from the lawyer-representatives of the four banks their
position in the event of the issuance of the TRO, and all these representatives
invariably replied that they will abide and/or submit to the sound judgment of
the court.[13]
Second. When the RTC issued its
Order dated
Third. When respondent filed
with the CA the petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, and a TRO was subsequently issued,
copies of the resolution were also sent[14]
to the banks, although not impleaded, yet the latter took no action to question
their non-inclusion in the petition.
Notably, the SBC filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification[15]
on whether or not the issuance of the TRO has the effect of restraining the
bank from complying with the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC
or nullifying /rendering ineffectual the said writ. In fact, SBC even stated that the motion was
filed for no other purpose, except to seek proper guidance on the issue at hand
so that whatever action or position it may take with respect to the CA
resolution will be consistent with its term and purposes.
Fourth. When the CA rendered its
assailed Decision nullifying the injunction issued by the RTC, and copies of
the decision were furnished these banks, not one of these banks ever filed any
pleading to assail their non-inclusion in the certiorari proceedings.
Indeed, the banks have no interest in
the issuance of the injunction, but only the petitioner. The banks' interests as defendants in the
petition for declaration of nullity of their bank undertakings filed against
them by petitioner in the RTC are separable from the interests of petitioner
for the issuance of the injunctive relief.
Moreover, certiorari, as a
special civil action, is an original action invoking the original jurisdiction
of a court to annul or modify the proceedings of a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[16] It is an original and independent action that
is not part of the trial or the proceedings on the complaint filed before the
trial court.[17] Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. - When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or respondents. the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.
x x x x
Clearly, in filing the petition for certiorari,
respondent should join as party defendant with the court or judge, the person
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court, and it shall be the duty
of such person to appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of
the court or judge affected by the proceedings.
In this case, there is no doubt that it is only the petitioner who is
the person interested in sustaining the proceedings in court since she was the
one who sought for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the banks from releasing funds to respondent. As earlier discussed, the banks are not
parties interested in the subject matter of the petition. Thus, it is only
petitioner who should be joined as party defendant with the judge and who
should defend the judge's issuance of injunction.
Notably, the dispositive portion of the
assailed CA Decision declared the annulment of the Order dated
Petitioner
contends that respondent filed its petition for certiorari in the CA
without a prior motion for reconsideration, thus, constitutes a fatal
infirmity.
We
do not agree.
Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.[18] Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for
the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[19] The rule is, however, circumscribed by
well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo had no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order
of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack
of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.[20]
Respondent
explained their omission of filing a motion for reconsideration before
resorting to a petition for certiorari based on exceptions (b), (c) and
(i). The CA brushed aside the filing of
the motion for reconsideration based on the ground that the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court. We agree.
Respondent
had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the injunction
prayed for by petitioner should not be granted.
However, the RTC granted the injunction. Respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA and presented the same arguments which were
already passed upon by the RTC. The RTC already
had the opportunity to consider and rule on the question of the propriety or
impropriety of the issuance of the injunction.
We found no reversible error committed by the CA for relaxing the rule since
respondent's case falls within the exceptions.
Petitioner's reliance on Philippine National Construction
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[21]
where we required the filing of a motion for reconsideration before the filing
of a petition for certiorari notwithstanding petitioner's invocation of
the recognized exception, i.e., the same questions raised before the
public respondent were to be raised before us, is not applicable. In said case, we ruled that petitioner failed
to convince us that his case falls under the recognized exceptions as the basis
was only petitioner's bare allegation. In
this case before us, the CA found, and to which we agree, that both parties
have fully presented their respective arguments in the RTC on petitioner's
prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and that
respondent's argument that petitioner is not entitled to the injunctive relief
had been squarely resolved by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A.
ABAD Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola, with Associate Justices Remedios
Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 39-45.
[2]
[3] Docketed as Civil Case Nos. Q-02-48334 to Q-02-48337.
[4] Rollo, pp. 149-151.
[5] Penned by Judge Normandie B. Pizarro (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals); id. at 285-288;
[6]
[7] Penned by Associate Justice Elvie John S. Asuncion, with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Mario L. Guariña III, concurring; id. at 433-434.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] 345
Phil. 250 (1997).
[12]
[13] Rollo,
p. 150.
[14] CA rollo, pp. 155, 158.
[15]
[16] San
Miguel Bukid Homeowners Association,Inc. v. City of
[17] Id.,
citing Tible and Tible Company, Inc. v.
Royal Savings and Loan Association, 550 SCRA 562, 574 (2008), citing Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holding
Corporation, 436 SCRA 123 (2004).
[18] Office
of the Ombudsman v. Laja, G.R. No. 169241,
[19]
[20]
[21] 342
Phil. 769 (1997).