Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
|
FEDERICO JARANTILLA, JR., Petitioner, - versus - ANTONIETA JARANTILLA, BUENAVENTURA REMOTIGUE, substituted by CYNTHIA REMOTIGUE, DOROTEO JARANTILLA and TOMAS JARANTILLA, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No.
154486
Present: CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PERALTA,* ABAD,** and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: December 1, 2010 |
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari[1]
seeks to modify the Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals dated July 30, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 40887, which set aside the Decision[3]
dated December 18, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 98 in Civil Case No. Q-50464.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
The spouses Andres Jarantilla and Felisa Jaleco were survived by eight
children: Federico, Delfin, Benjamin, Conchita, Rosita, Pacita, Rafael and
Antonieta.[4] Petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr. is the
grandchild of the late Jarantilla spouses by their son Federico Jarantilla, Sr.
and his wife Leda Jamili.[5] Petitioner also has two other brothers:
Doroteo and Tomas Jarantilla.
Petitioner was one of the defendants in the complaint before the RTC
while Antonieta Jarantilla, his aunt, was the plaintiff therein. His co-respondents before he joined his aunt
Antonieta in her complaint, were his late aunt Conchita Jarantilla’s husband
Buenaventura Remotigue, who died during the pendency of the case, his cousin
Cynthia Remotigue, the adopted daughter of Conchita Jarantilla and Buenaventura
Remotigue, and his brothers Doroteo and Tomas Jarantilla.[6]
In 1948, the Jarantilla heirs extrajudicially partitioned amongst themselves
the real properties of their deceased parents.[7] With the exception of the real property
adjudicated to Pacita Jarantilla, the heirs also agreed to allot the produce of
the said real properties for the years 1947-1949 for the studies of Rafael and Antonieta
Jarantilla.[8]
In the
same year, the spouses Rosita Jarantilla and Vivencio Deocampo entered into an
agreement with the spouses Buenaventura Remotigue and Conchita Jarantilla to
provide mutual assistance to each other by way of financial support to any
commercial and agricultural activity on a joint business arrangement. This business relationship proved to be
successful as they were able to establish a manufacturing and trading business,
acquire real properties, and construct buildings, among other things.[9] This partnership ended in 1973 when the
parties, in an “Agreement,”[10]
voluntarily agreed to completely dissolve their “joint business
relationship/arrangement.”[11]
On April 29, 1957, the spouses Buenaventura and Conchita Remotigue
executed a document wherein they acknowledged that while registered only in
Buenaventura Remotigue’s name, they were not the only owners of the capital of
the businesses Manila Athletic Supply (712 Raon Street, Manila), Remotigue
Trading (Calle Real, Iloilo City) and Remotigue Trading (Cotabato City). In this same “Acknowledgement of
Participating Capital,” they stated the participating capital of their
co-owners as of the year 1952, with Antonieta Jarantilla’s stated as eight thousand
pesos (P8,000.00) and Federico Jarantilla, Jr.’s as five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00).[12]
The present case stems from the amended complaint[13]
dated April 22, 1987 filed by Antonieta Jarantilla against Buenaventura
Remotigue, Cynthia Remotigue, Federico Jarantilla, Jr., Doroteo Jarantilla and
Tomas Jarantilla, for the accounting of the assets and income of the
co-ownership, for its partition and the delivery of her share corresponding to
eight percent (8%), and for damages.
Antonieta claimed that in 1946, she had entered into an agreement with Conchita
and Buenaventura Remotigue, Rafael Jarantilla, and Rosita and Vivencio Deocampo
to engage in business. Antonieta alleged
that the initial contribution of property and money came from the heirs’
inheritance, and her subsequent annual investment of seven thousand five
hundred pesos (P7,500.00) as additional capital came from the proceeds
of her farm. Antonieta also alleged that
from 1946-1969, she had helped in the management of the business they co-owned
without receiving any salary. Her salary
was supposedly rolled back into the business as additional investments in her
behalf. Antonieta further claimed
co-ownership of certain properties[14]
(the subject real properties) in the name of the defendants since the only way
the defendants could have purchased these properties were through the
partnership as they had no other source of income.
The respondents, including petitioner herein, in their Answer,[15]
denied having formed a partnership with Antonieta in 1946. They claimed that she was in no position to
do so as she was still in school at that time.
In fact, the proceeds of the lands they partitioned were devoted to her
studies. They also averred that while
she may have helped in the businesses that her older sister Conchita had formed
with Buenaventura Remotigue, she was paid her due salary. They did not deny the existence and validity
of the “Acknowledgement of Participating Capital” and in fact used this as
evidence to support their claim that Antonieta’s 8% share was limited to the
businesses enumerated therein. With
regard to Antonieta’s claim in their other corporations and businesses, the
respondents said these should also be limited to the number of her shares as
specified in the respective articles of incorporation. The respondents denied using the
partnership’s income to purchase the subject real properties and said that the
certificates of title should be binding on her.[16]
During the course of the trial at the RTC, petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr., who was one
of the original defendants, entered into a compromise agreement[17]
with Antonieta Jarantilla wherein he supported Antonieta’s claims and asserted
that he too was entitled to six percent (6%) of the supposed partnership in the
same manner as Antonieta was. He prayed
for a favorable judgment in this wise:
Defendant Federico Jarantilla, Jr., hereby joins in plaintiff’s prayer
for an accounting from the other defendants, and the partition of the
properties of the co-ownership and the delivery to the plaintiff and to
defendant Federico Jarantilla, Jr. of their rightful share of the assets and
properties in the co-ownership.[18]
The RTC, in an Order[19]
dated March 25, 1992, approved the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement[20]
and on December 18, 1992, decided in favor of Antonieta, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises
above-considered, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff
Antonieta Jarantilla and against defendants Cynthia Remotigue, Doroteo
Jarantilla and Tomas Jarantilla ordering the latter:
1.
to deliver to the plaintiff her 8%
share or its equivalent amount on the real properties covered by TCT Nos.
35655, 338398, 338399 & 335395, all of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City; TCT Nos. (18303)23341, 142882 & 490007(4615), all of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal; and TCT No. T-6309 of the Registry of Deeds of Cotabato based
on their present market value;
2.
to deliver to the plaintiff her 8%
share or its equivalent amount on the Remotigue Agro-Industrial Corporation,
Manila Athletic Supply, Inc., MAS Rubber Products, Inc. and Buendia Recapping
Corporation based on the shares of stocks present book value;
3.
to account for the assets and
income of the co-ownership and deliver to plaintiff her rightful share thereof
equivalent to 8%;
4.
to pay plaintiff, jointly and
severally, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
5.
to pay, jointly and severally, the
sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
6.
to pay, jointly and severally, the
costs of the suit.[21]
Both the petitioner and the respondents appealed this decision to the
Court of Appeals. The petitioner claimed
that the RTC “erred in not rendering a complete judgment and ordering the
partition of the co-ownership and giving to [him] six per centum (6%) of the
properties.”[22]
While the Court of Appeals agreed to some of the RTC’s factual findings,
it also established that Antonieta Jarantilla was not part of the partnership formed in 1946, and that her 8% share
was limited to the businesses
enumerated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. On July 30, 2002, the Court of Appeals
rendered the herein challenged decision setting aside the RTC’s decision, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court,
dated 18 December 1992 is SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered ordering
that:
(1) after accounting, plaintiff Antonieta Jarantilla be given her share of
8% in the assets and profits of Manila Athletic Supply, Remotigue Trading in
Iloilo City and Remotigue Trading in Cotabato City;
(2) after accounting, defendant Federico Jarantilla, Jr. be given his share
of 6% of the assets and profits of the above-mentioned enterprises; and,
holding that
(3) plaintiff Antonieta Jarantilla is a stockholder in the following
corporations to the extent stated in their Articles of Incorporation:
(a)
Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc.;
(b)
MAS Rubber Products, Inc.;
(c)
Manila Athletic Supply, Inc.; and
(d)
B. Remotigue Agro-Industrial
Development Corp.
(4) No costs.[23]
The respondents, on August 20, 2002, filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied this in a Resolution[24]
dated March 21, 2003.
Antonieta Jarantilla filed before this Court her own petition for review
on certiorari[25]
dated September 16, 2002, assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision on “similar
grounds and similar assignments of errors as this present case”[26]
but it was dismissed on November 20, 2002 for failure to file the appeal within
the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.[27]
Petitioner filed before us this petition for review on the sole ground
that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER FEDERICO JARANTILLA, JR. IS ENTITLED TO A SIX PER
CENTUM (6%) SHARE OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE REAL PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY THE OTHER
DEFENDANTS USING COMMON FUNDS FROM THE BUSINESSES WHERE HE HAD OWNED SUCH SHARE.[28]
Petitioner asserts that he was in a partnership with the Remotigue
spouses, the Deocampo spouses, Rosita Jarantilla, Rafael Jarantilla, Antonieta
Jarantilla and Quintin Vismanos, as evidenced by the Acknowledgement of
Participating Capital the Remotigue spouses executed in 1957. He contends that from this partnership,
several other corporations and businesses were established and several real
properties were acquired. In this
petition, he is essentially asking for his 6% share in the subject real
properties. He is relying on the
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, on his own testimony, and Antonieta
Jarantilla’s testimony to support this contention.
The core issue is whether or not
the partnership subject of the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital funded
the subject real properties. In other
words, what is the petitioner’s right over these real properties?
It is a
settled rule that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised by the parties
and passed upon by this Court.[29]
A
question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law,
the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it
is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of
law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is
a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.[30]
Since the Court of Appeals did not
fully adopt the factual findings of the RTC, this Court, in resolving the
questions of law that are now in issue, shall look into the facts only in so
far as the two courts a quo differed
in their appreciation thereof.
The RTC
found that an unregistered partnership existed since 1946 which was affirmed in
the 1957 document, the “Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.” The RTC used this as its basis for giving
Antonieta Jarantilla an 8% share in the three businesses listed therein and in
the other businesses and real properties of the respondents as they had
supposedly acquired these through funds from the partnership.[31]
The
Court of Appeals, on the other hand, agreed with the RTC as to Antonieta’s 8%
share in the business enumerated in the Acknowledgement of Participating
Capital, but not as to her share in the other corporations and real
properties. The Court of Appeals ruled
that Antonieta’s claim of 8% is based on the “Acknowledgement of Participating
Capital,” a duly notarized document which was specific as to the subject of its
coverage. Hence, there was no reason to
pattern her share in the other corporations from her share in the partnership’s
businesses. The Court of Appeals also
said that her claim in the respondents’ real properties was more “precarious”
as these were all covered by certificates of title which served as the best
evidence as to all the matters contained therein.[32] Since petitioner’s claim was essentially the
same as Antonieta’s, the Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner be given
his 6% share in the same businesses listed in the Acknowledgement of
Participating Capital.
Factual findings of the trial
court, when confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive except
in the following cases: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when
the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.[33]
In this case, we find no error in
the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Both
the petitioner and Antonieta Jarantilla characterize their relationship with
the respondents as a co-ownership, but in the same breath, assert that a verbal
partnership was formed in 1946 and was affirmed in the 1957 Acknowledgement of
Participating Capital.
There is a co-ownership when an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.[34] It is a partnership when two or more persons
bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund,
with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.[35] The Court, in Pascual v. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,[36] quoted the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Angelo Bautista in Evangelista v.
The Collector of Internal Revenue[37] to further elucidate on the distinctions between a co-ownership and a
partnership, to wit:
I wish
however to make the following observation:
Article 1769 of the new Civil Code lays down the rule for determining
when a transaction should be deemed a partnership or a co-ownership. Said article paragraphs 2 and 3, provides;
(2)
Co-ownership or co-possession does not itself establish a partnership, whether
such co-owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use
of the property;
(3) The
sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or
not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any
property from which the returns are derived;
From
the above it appears that the fact that those who agree to form a co- ownership
share or do not share any profits made by the use of the property held in
common does not convert their venture into a partnership. Or the sharing of the
gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership whether or not the
persons sharing therein have a joint or common right or interest in the
property. This only means that, aside from the circumstance of profit, the
presence of other elements constituting partnership is necessary, such as the
clear intent to form a partnership, the existence of a juridical personality
different from that of the individual partners, and the freedom to transfer or
assign any interest in the property by one with the consent of the others.
It is
evident that an isolated transaction whereby two or more persons contribute
funds to buy certain real estate for profit in the absence of other
circumstances showing a contrary intention cannot be considered a partnership.
Persons
who contribute property or funds for a common enterprise and agree to share the
gross returns of that enterprise in proportion to their contribution, but who
severally retain the title to their respective contribution, are not thereby
rendered partners. They have no common stock or capital, and no community of
interest as principal proprietors in the business itself which the proceeds
derived.
A joint
purchase of land, by two, does not constitute a co-partnership in respect
thereto; nor does an agreement to share the profits and losses on the sale of
land create a partnership; the parties are only tenants in common.
Where
plaintiff, his brother, and another agreed to become owners of a single tract
of realty, holding as tenants in common, and to divide the profits of disposing
of it, the brother and the other not being entitled to share in plaintiff’s
commission, no partnership existed as between the three parties, whatever their
relation may have been as to third parties.
In
order to constitute a partnership inter sese there must be: (a) An intent to
form the same; (b) generally participating in both profits and losses; (c) and
such a community of interest, as far as third persons are concerned as enables
each party to make contract, manage the business, and dispose of the whole
property. x x x.
The
common ownership of property does not itself create a partnership between the
owners, though they may use it for the purpose of making gains; and they may,
without becoming partners, agree among themselves as to the management, and use
of such property and the application of the proceeds therefrom.[38] (Citations omitted.)
Under Article 1767 of the Civil
Code, there are two essential elements in a contract of partnership: (a) an
agreement to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund; and (b)
intent to divide the profits among the contracting parties. The first element is undoubtedly present in
the case at bar, for, admittedly, all the parties in this case have agreed to,
and did, contribute money and property to a common fund. Hence, the issue narrows down to their
intent in acting as they did.[39] It is not denied that all the parties in this
case have agreed to contribute capital to a common fund to be able to later on
share its profits. They have admitted
this fact, agreed to its veracity, and even submitted one common documentary
evidence to prove such partnership - the Acknowledgement of Participating
Capital.
As this case revolves around the
legal effects of the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, it would be
instructive to examine the pertinent portions of this document:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
PARTICIPATING CAPITAL
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That
we, the spouses Buenaventura Remotigue and Conchita Jarantilla de Remotigue,
both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Loyola Heights, Quezon City, P.I.
hereby state:
That
the Manila Athletic Supply at 712 Raon, Manila, the Remotigue Trading of Calle
Real, Iloilo City and the Remotigue Trading, Cotabato Branch, Cotabato, P.I.,
all dealing in athletic goods and equipments, and general merchandise are
recorded in their respective books with Buenaventura Remotigue as the
registered owner and are being operated by them as such:
That they are
not the only owners of the capital of the three establishments and their
participation in the capital of the three establishments together with the
other co-owners as of the year 1952 are stated as follows:
1.
Buenaventura Remotigue (TWENTY-FIVE P25,000.00
THOUSAND)
2.
Conchita Jarantilla de Remotigue (TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND)… 25,000.00
3.
Vicencio Deocampo (FIFTEEN THOUSAND)…… 15,000.00
4.
Rosita J. Deocampo (FIFTEEN THOUSAND)….... 15,000.00
5.
Antonieta Jarantilla (EIGHT THOUSAND)……….. 8,000.00
6.
Rafael Jarantilla (SIX THOUSAND)…………….. ... 6,000.00
7.
Federico Jarantilla, Jr. (FIVE THOUSAND)……….. 5,000.00
8.
Quintin Vismanos (TWO THOUSAND)…………... 2,000.00
That aside from the persons
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, no other person has any interest in
the above-mentioned three establishments.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, they sign this
instrument in the City of Manila, P.I., this 29th day of April,
1957.
[Sgd.]
BUENAVENTURA REMOTIGUE
[Sgd.]
CONCHITA JARANTILLA DE REMOTIGUE[40]
The
Acknowledgement of Participating Capital is a duly notarized document
voluntarily executed by Conchita Jarantilla-Remotigue and Buenaventura
Remotigue in 1957. Petitioner does not
dispute its contents and is actually relying on it to prove his participation
in the partnership. Article 1797 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 1797. The losses and profits shall be distributed
in conformity with the agreement. If only the share of each partner in the
profits has been agreed upon, the share of each in the losses shall be in the
same proportion.
In the absence of stipulation,
the share of each partner in the profits and losses shall be in proportion to
what he may have contributed,
but the industrial partner shall not be liable for the losses. As for the profits, the industrial partner
shall receive such share as may be just and equitable under the
circumstances. If besides his services
he has contributed capital, he shall also receive a share in the profits in
proportion to his capital. (Emphases
supplied.)
It is clear from the
foregoing that a partner is entitled only to his share as agreed upon, or in
the absence of any such stipulations, then to his share in proportion to his
contribution to the partnership. The
petitioner himself claims his share to be 6%, as stated in the Acknowledgement
of Participating Capital. However, petitioner fails to realize that this document
specifically enumerated the businesses covered by the partnership: Manila
Athletic Supply, Remotigue Trading in Iloilo City and Remotigue Trading in
Cotabato City. Since there was a clear
agreement that the capital the partners contributed went to the three
businesses, then there is no reason to deviate from such agreement and go
beyond the stipulations in the document.
Therefore, the
Court of Appeals did not err in limiting petitioner’s share to the assets of
the businesses enumerated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.
In Villareal v. Ramirez,[41] the Court held that since a partnership
is a separate juridical entity, the shares to be paid out to the partners is
necessarily limited only to its total resources, to wit:
Since it
is the partnership, as a separate and distinct entity, that must refund the
shares of the partners, the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its
total resources. In other words, it can
only pay out what it has in its coffers, which consists of all its assets. However, before the partners can be paid
their shares, the creditors of the partnership must first be compensated. After
all the creditors have been paid, whatever is left of the partnership assets
becomes available for the payment of the partners’ shares.[42]
There is no evidence
that the subject real properties were assets of the partnership referred to in
the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital.
The petitioner further
asserts that he is entitled to respondents’ properties based on the concept of
trust. He claims that since the subject
real properties were purchased using funds of the partnership, wherein he has a
6% share, then “law and equity mandates that he should be considered as a
co-owner of those properties in such proportion.”[43] In Pigao
v. Rabanillo,[44] this Court explained the concept of
trusts, to wit:
Express trusts
are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while implied
trusts come into being by operation of law, either through implication of an
intention to create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the
trust irrespective of, and even contrary to, any such intention. In turn,
implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. Resulting trusts
are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal
title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to
have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or
circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person
thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold
his legal title for the benefit of another.[45]
On proving the
existence of a trust, this Court held that:
Respondent has
presented only bare assertions that a trust was created. Noting the need
to prove the existence of a trust, this Court has held thus:
“As a rule, the
burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence,
and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust
and its elements. While implied trusts may be proved by oral evidence, the
evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution,
and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be
fabricated.” [46]
The petitioner has
failed to prove that there exists a trust over the subject real
properties. Aside from his bare
allegations, he has failed to show that the respondents used the partnership’s
money to purchase the said properties.
Even assuming arguendo that some partnership income was used to
acquire these properties, the petitioner should have successfully shown that
these funds came from his share in the partnership profits. After all, by his own admission, and as
stated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, he owned a mere 6%
equity in the partnership.
In essence, the
petitioner is claiming his 6% share in the subject real properties, by relying
on his own self-serving testimony and the equally biased testimony of Antonieta
Jarantilla. Petitioner has not presented evidence, other than
these unsubstantiated testimonies, to prove that the respondents did not have
the means to fund their other businesses and real properties without the
partnership’s income. On the other hand,
the
respondents have not only, by testimonial evidence, proven their case against
the petitioner, but have also presented sufficient documentary evidence to
substantiate their claims, allegations and defenses. They presented preponderant proof on how they acquired and funded such
properties in addition to tax receipts and tax declarations.[47] It has been held that “while
tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership,
they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession
for a period sufficient for prescription.”[48] Moreover, it is a rule in this jurisdiction
that testimonial evidence cannot prevail over documentary evidence.[49] This Court had on several occasions,
expressed our disapproval on using mere self-serving testimonies to support
one’s claim. In Ocampo v. Ocampo,[50] a case on partition of a co-ownership,
we held that:
Petitioners
assert that their claim of co-ownership of the property was sufficiently proved
by their witnesses -- Luisa Ocampo-Llorin and Melita Ocampo. We disagree.
Their testimonies cannot prevail over the array of documents presented
by Belen. A claim of ownership cannot be
based simply on the testimonies of witnesses; much less on those of interested
parties, self-serving as they are.[51]
It is true that a
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein.
Registration in the Torrens system does not create or vest title as
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership; hence, this cannot deprive
an aggrieved party of a remedy in law.[52] However, petitioner asserts ownership over
portions of the subject real properties on the strength of his own admissions
and on the testimony of Antonieta Jarantilla.
As held by this Court in Republic
of the Philippines v. Orfinada, Sr.[53]:
Indeed, a Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership
of the land referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens
title was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is
incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria, of other title
existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens
title. Moreover, persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens
certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face.[54]
As we have settled that
this action never really was for partition of a co-ownership, to permit
petitioner’s claim on these properties is to allow a collateral, indirect
attack on respondents’ admitted titles.
In the words of the Court of Appeals, “such evidence cannot overpower
the conclusiveness of these certificates of title, more so since plaintiff’s
[petitioner’s] claims amount to a collateral attack, which is prohibited under
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree.”[55]
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
– A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
This Court has deemed
an action or proceeding to be “an attack on a title when its objective is to
nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title
was decreed.”[56] In Aguilar
v. Alfaro,[57] this
Court further distinguished between a direct and an indirect or collateral
attack, as follows:
A collateral
attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as
an incident to the present action, an attack is made against the judgment
granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct
attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main
objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if
not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the
judgment had been disposed of. x x x.
Petitioner’s only piece
of documentary evidence is the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, which
as discussed above, failed to prove that the real properties he is claiming
co-ownership of were acquired out of the proceeds of the businesses covered by
such document. Therefore, petitioner’s
theory has no factual or legal leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 40887, dated July 30, 2002 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice
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ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
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JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
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* Per Special Order No. 913 dated November 2, 2010.
** Per Special Order No. 917 dated November 24, 2010.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Rollo, pp. 34-45; penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Perlita J. Tria Tirona concurring.
[3] Id. at 105-110.
[4] Id at 34.
[5] Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
[6] Rollo, p. 49.
[7] Id at 34-35.
[8] Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
[9] Id at 7.
[10] Id at 7-9.
[11] Id at 7.
[12] Id at 6.
[13] Rollo, pp. 48-57.
[14] Rollo, p. 18; the subject real properties are covered by TCT Nos. 35655, 338398, 338399 & 335395, all of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City; TCT Nos. (18303)23341, 142882 & 490007(4615), all of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal; and TCT No. T-6309 of the Registry of Deeds of Cotabato.
[15] Id. at 72-76.
[16] Id. at 111-197.
[17] Id. at 83-87.
[18] Id. at 85-86.
[19] Id. at 102-104.
[20] Id. at 83-87.
[21] Id. at 109-110.
[22] Id. at 205.
[23] Id. at 44.
[24] CA rollo, p. 564.
[25] Docketed as G.R. No. 154722.
[26] Rollo, p. 313.
[27] CA rollo, p. 284.
[28] Rollo, p. 20.
[29] Vector
Shipping Corporation v. Macasa, G.R. No. 160219, July 21,
2008, 559 SCRA 105.
[30] Binay v. Odeña, G.R. No. 163683, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 248, 255-256, citing Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 320, 329-330.
[31] Rollo, pp. 105-110.
[32] Id. at 42.
[33]
Go v. Court of Appeals,
403 Phil. 883, 890 (2001).
[34] Civil Code, Art. 484.
[35] Civil Code, Art. 1767.
[36] 248 Phil. 788 (1988).
[37] 102 Phil. 140 (1957).
[38] Pascual v. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra note 36 at 795-796.
[39] Id. at 795.
[40] Records, Vol. I, p. 6.
[41] 453 Phil. 999 (2003).
[42] Id. at 1008-1009.
[43] Rollo, p. 24.
[44] G.R. No. 150712, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 546.
[45] Id. at 560-561.
[46] Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348.
[47] Records, Vol. I, pp. 7-9, 54-62, Vol. II, pp. 482-486, 535-564, 567-653.
[48] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, 451 Phil. 368, 378 (2003).
[49] Romago Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 964, 976 (2000).
[50] 471 Phil. 519 (2004).
[51] Id. at 539.
[52] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, supra note 48 at 377.
[53] G.R. No. 141145, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 342.
[54] Id. at 359.
[55] Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[56] Oño v. Lim, G.R. No.
154270, March 9, 2010.
[57] G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010.