Republic
of the
Supreme Court
|
SPOUSES
MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA SORDEVILLA,
Petitioners, - versus - MARIA COPRADA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 152423
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: December 15, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Decision[1] and the Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals, dated April 6, 2001 and February 15, 2002, respectively,
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49994.
The
antecedents are as follows:
On
February 24, 1997, petitioners, spouses Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla
(Victoria) filed an ejectment case[3]
against respondent Maria V. Coprada before the 2nd Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Magdalena, Liliw and Majayjay Laguna. Petitioners claimed
that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in M.H. Del
Pilar St., Barangay San Miguel,
Majayjay, Laguna, containing an area of Two Hundred Fifty-Three (253) square
meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-93542. In 1945, respondent was able to persuade the
petitioners to allow her and her family to use and occupy the land for their
residence, under the condition that they will vacate the premises should
petitioners need to use the same. Respondent
and her family were allowed to construct their residential house. Since then, the petitioners never made an
attempt to drive them away out of pity, knowing that respondent and her eight children
have no other place to live in. Also, respondent
and her family have been occupying the subject premises free of rent, including
payment of realty taxes. Respondent's
present circumstances have completely improved, i.e., some of her children are already working; they are regularly
sending her financial assistance; and she has acquired her own residential
house at Barangay Panglan, Majayjay,
Laguna. Because of this, petitioners
verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land, but the latter
refused. Thus, petitioners were forced to
send a demand letter dated August 22, 1996, giving respondent until November
30, 1996 to vacate the subject premises.
However, respondent still ignored said demand, which prompted
petitioners to bring a complaint before the barangay
authorities. No settlement was reached,
hence, a certification to file action in Court was issued. Petitioners were,
therefore, constrained to lodge an ejectment case against the
respondent before the MCTC.
Respondent admitted that petitioners
are the registered owners of the subject land. However, she averred that in
1945, it was Emiliana Coprada (petitioner Victoria Sordevilla's mother and
original owner of the subject land) and not the petitioners who gave permission
to her late husband Brigido Coprada to use the subject lot. Emiliana allowed
her nephew Brigido and his family to occupy the lot as their permanent abode,
because of her love and affection for her nephew, and also, due to the fact
that the said lot is virtually a wasteland. Thereafter, Brigido and his family
cleared the area and built therein a nipa hut to dwell in. When Emiliana died,
the ownership of the property was inherited by her only child, petitioner
Victoria Sordevilla. Respondent alleged that sometime in the early 1960's,
petitioner Victoria offered the said lot for sale for P2,000.00 to
respondent, who readily agreed. The purchase price was paid in installments and
was fully paid in 1962. Due to their close relationship, the agreement was
never reduced to writing. Respondent further maintained that since the
execution of the oral sale of the subject lot, she has been the one paying the
realty taxes due on the property. After the sale, respondent built on the
subject land a semi-concrete structure.
Respondent stated that petitioners' claim is barred by laches. Even
granting, without admitting, that respondent's claim of ownership over the
property is improper because petitioners are the registered owners thereof,
respondent argued that she is a builder in good faith, because she was able to
build the structure on the subject lot with the prior permission of the owner.
In its Decision[4]
dated September 11, 1997, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.
It held that laches had already set in which prevented petitioners from questioning
the validity of the purported sale between Victoria and Maria.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
reversed the MCTC’s judgment. The RTC ruled that respondent's occupation of the
subject property was by virtue of petitioners' tolerance and permission. Hence,
respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate the property
upon demand. Thus, her possession over the subject property became unlawful
after the petitioners demanded her to vacate the property. The RTC found that
respondent failed to prove the alleged oral sale and that petitioners have
adequately proven that they are entitled to the possession of the subject land
as registered owners thereof. The RTC ordered the respondent and all other
persons claiming rights under her to vacate and surrender the possession of the
subject land to the petitioners and to remove any and all improvements she
introduced on the parcel of land.[5]
Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in an Order[6] dated
November 24, 1998. Obviously dissatisfied by the
Decision, respondent filed with the CA a petition for review with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.[7]
In its
Decision dated April 6, 2001, the CA granted respondent's petition, reversed
the Decision of the RTC and affirmed in
toto the Decision of the MCTC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA in a Resolution[8]
dated February 15, 2002. Hence, the instant petition raising the following
grounds:
I
THE RIGHT OF THE REGISTERED OWNERS TO
RECOVER POSSESSION IS NEVER BARRED BY LACHES AND/OR THE PERSON WHO HAS A TORRENS
TITLE OVER A PARCEL OF LAND IS ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION THEREOF.
II
THE OWNERSHIP AND RIGHT OF
PETITIONERS TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY
UNPROVEN ORAL SALE.
III
LACHES HAD SET IN AGAINST [RESPONDENT].
IV
THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK.[9]
The petition is meritorious.
The pertinent point of inquiry in this case is whether
or not petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject
property.
An action
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
is governed by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.
- Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived
of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any
such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.
In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally
legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an
express or implied contract between them. However, defendant's possession
became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject
property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under
their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.[10]
The
sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the
parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the
right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional
and would not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the property.[11]
Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its
resolution boils down to which of the parties' respective evidence deserves
more weight.
In the case at bar, petitioners' cause
of action for unlawful detainer is based on their ownership of the land covered
by TCT No. T-93542 and on their claim that they merely tolerated respondent's
stay thereat. Respondent's possession, as well as those persons claiming
right under her, became unlawful upon her refusal to vacate the premises.
Petitioners contend that since they are the registered owners of the subject
land, they are entitled to the possession thereof and their right to recover
possession over it is never barred by laches. They maintain that respondent's claim of ownership is based on an
unproven oral sale, which does not exist. Further, respondent cannot rely on
the Tax Declarations as she was paying taxes in the petitioners' name, as the
declared owners of the property. Moreover, she started paying the taxes only in
1984 despite her claim that the property was sold to her in 1962. Even assuming
that the sale took place in 1962, respondent is guilty of laches as she failed
to take any positive action for the delivery and conveyance to her of the
portion of the property she is occupying. Finally, respondent cannot
collaterally attack the title of the petitioners to the subject land.
On her part, respondent, although
admitting that the property is registered in petitioners' name, claimed that
the 100-square-meters portion of the property, where her house was erected, was
already sold to her by petitioner Victoria. Thus, by virtue of the sale, she
and her family have the right to possess the said property. The
non-presentation of receipt and deed of sale, non-delivery of the owner's
certificate of title, and her payment of the real property taxes in the name of
the petitioners were due to the close relationship between the parties and the
existing practice of palabra de honor in their day to day transactions.
Respondent further alleged that she is not guilty of laches; rather, it is the
registered owners' right to recover possession of their property which is
barred by laches.
In the
present case, respondent failed to present evidence to substantiate her
allegation that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. In fact, when petitioners sent a letter[12]
to the respondent, demanding her to vacate the subject property, the
respondent, in reply[13]
to the said letter, never mentioned that she purchased the subject land in
1962. If the sale really took place, the respondent should have immediately and
categorically claimed that in her letter response. Clearly therefore, respondent's submission
that there was an oral sale is a mere afterthought.
On the
other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-93542, registered in the name of the
petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven claim that she acquired a
portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the
Torrens title of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject
property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle
in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. Moreover, the
age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled
to possession thereof.[14]
Further, respondent's argument that petitioners are no
longer the owners of a portion of the subject land because of the sale in her
favor is a collateral attack on the title of the petitioners, which is not
allowed. The validity of petitioners' certificate of title cannot be attacked
by respondent in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified or canceled, except in a direct
proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity
of the title of the petitioners can only be assailed in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the respondent has the right to
claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the trial court to
determine in an action for unlawful detainer.[15]
In Rodriguez
v. Rodriguez,[16]
citing the case of Co v. Militar,[17]
the Court held that:
[T]he Torrens System was adopted in
this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding
upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the
power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first
instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding
for cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the
property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. x x x
Anent the issue on laches, the CA's ruling
that petitioners' long inaction to assert their rights over the subject land
bars them from recovering the same is without basis. Also, the doctrine invoked
by the appellate court that a registered owner may loose his right to recover
its possession by reason of laches is not applicable here.
Laches
is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it.[18]
There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances, with the question of laches
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Because laches is an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations
and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice.[19]
Respondent first acquired possession
of the subject lot by mere tolerance. From 1945 until the filing of the
complaint for ejectment in 1997, the nature of that possession has never
changed. Petitioners allowed the respondent to possess the property with the
knowledge that the respondent will vacate the same upon demand. Hence, until
such demand to vacate was communicated by the petitioners to the respondent,
petitioners are not required to do any act to recover the subject land,
precisely because they knew of the nature of the respondent's possession, i.e., possession by mere tolerance.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners are guilty of failure or neglect to
assert a right within a reasonable time. Further, after the petitioners gave a demand letter to the
respondent giving the latter until November 30, 1996 to vacate the subject
premises, which respondent failed to heed, they immediately filed a complaint before the barangay authorities and, thereafter, lodged an ejectment case
before the MCTC on February 24, 1997. In sum, We find
that petitioners are not guilty of laches as would bar their claim to the
property in question.
In
contrast, respondent, who is claiming that a portion of the property was sold
to her in 1962, has herself failed within a long period of time to have that
portion transferred in her name. Respondent had to wait for almost 35 years
since 1962, and were it not for the filing of the ejectment suit in 1997, she
would not have bothered to assert her rights under the alleged sale. Respondent's failure to assert that right
only goes to prove that no sale ever transpired between the parties.
Moreover, as the registered owners, petitioners' right to
eject any person illegally occupying their property is not barred by laches. In
Gaudencio Labrador, represented by Lulu Labrador Uson, as Attorney-in-Fact
v. Spouses Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas and Spouse Rogelio Pobre and
Melinda Fogata Pobre,[20]
the Court held that:
x x x As a registered
owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally
occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be
barred by laches. In Bishop
v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:
As registered owners of
the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it
be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the
property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners
have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never
barred by laches.
Since respondent's occupation of the
subject lot is by mere tolerance or permission of the petitioners, without any
contract between them, respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will
vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against her.[21]
In respondent's Answer filed before the MCTC, she claimed
that since she was able to build a
structure on the subject lot with the prior permission from the owner, she is a
builder in good faith and thus entitled to be reimbursed the necessary and
useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Without such reimbursement, she has the right of retention over the property
and she cannot just be ejected from the premises.
Respondent's argument does not hold water. Since
respondent's occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance,
she has no right to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code. She is aware that her tolerated possession
may be terminated any time and she cannot be considered as builder in good
faith.[22] It is well settled that both Article 448[23]
and Article 546[24]
of the New Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements
and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a
possessor in good faith, i.e., one
who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily,
persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are
not possessors in good faith.[25]
At the time respondent built the improvements on the premises in 1945, she knew
that her possession was by mere permission and tolerance of the petitioners;
hence, she cannot be said to be a person who builds on land with the belief
that she is the owner thereof.
Respondent's
reliance on her payment of realty taxes on the property is unavailing. She started paying taxes only in 1984 despite
her claim that she bought the property in 1962. Further, aside from the rule
that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove
title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive
evidence of the same,[26] the RTC found that although the payment for
said taxes were received from respondent, the declared owner was petitioner
Victoria.
It must be stressed, however, that the court's
adjudication of ownership in an ejectment case is merely provisional, and
affirmance of the RTC's decision would not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action is
brought seasonably before the proper forum.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 6, 2001
and February 15, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49994, affirming the
Decision of the 2nd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1875, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna,
Branch 26, in Civil Case No. SC-3580, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Alicia L. Santos, with Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, concurring; rollo, pp. 43-49.
[2] Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[3] Records, pp. 7-11.
[4] Rollo, pp. 97-102.
[5] Id. at. 137.
[6] Records, pp. 226-227.
[7] CA rollo, pp. 7-22.
[8] Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[9] Id. at 21.
[10] Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 81, 89.
[11] Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, G.R. No. 166941, December 14, 2009, 608 SCRA 169, 174.
[12] Records, p. 14.
[13] Id. at 41.
[14] Caña v. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157573, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 225, 238-239.
[15] Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 315, 330.
[16] G.R. No. 175720, September 11, 2007, 532 SCRA 642, 652-653.
[17] G.R. No. 149912, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 455.
[18] Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, G.R. No. 169356, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 486, 511.
[19] Id.
[20] G.R. No. 173900, August 9, 2010. (Emphasis supplied.)
[21] Arambulo v. Gungab, 508 Phil. 612, 621-622 (2005).
[22] Id. at 622, citing Del Rosario v. Manuel, 420 SCRA 128, 131 (2004).
[23] Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the owner who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
[24] Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
[25] Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 515, 529-530 (2000).
[26] Castillo v. Escutin, G.R. No. 171056, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 258, 285.
[27] Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion, supra note 15.