Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
|
THE COCA-COLA EXPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner, -
versus - CLARITA P.
GACAYAN, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 149433 Present: CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PERALTA,* and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: December
15, 2010 |
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before
the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner The
Coca Cola Export Corporation against respondent Clarita P. Gacayan, assailing
the Decision[1]
dated May 30, 2001 and the subsequent Resolution[2]
dated August 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49192. The
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated April 14, 1998[3]
and June 19, 1998[4] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and ordered the immediate
reinstatement of respondent to her former position or to a substantially
equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages.
The
attendant facts are as follows:
Petitioner
The Coca Cola Export Corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, is engaged in the manufacture, distribution and export of
beverage base, concentrate, and other products bearing its trade name.
Respondent
Clarita P. Gacayan began working with petitioner on October 8, 1985. At the time her employment was terminated on
April 6, 1995, for alleged loss of trust and confidence, respondent was holding
the position of Senior Financial Accountant.
Under petitioner’s
company policy, one of the benefits enjoyed by its employees was the
reimbursement of meal and transportation expenses incurred while rendering
overtime work. This reimbursement was
allowed only when the employee worked overtime for at least four hours on a
Saturday, Sunday or holiday, and for at least two hours on weekdays. The maximum amount allowed to be reimbursed
was one hundred fifty (P150.00) pesos.
It was in connection with this company policy that petitioner called the
attention of respondent and required her to explain the alleged alterations in
three receipts which she submitted to support her claim for reimbursement of
meal expenses, to wit: 1) McDonald’s
Receipt No. 875493 dated October 1, 1994 for P111.00;[5]
2) Shakey’s Pizza Parlor Receipt No. 122658 dated November 20, 1994 for P174.06;[6]
and 3) Shakey’s Pizza Parlor Receipt No. 41274 dated July 19, 1994 for P130.50.
On November 21, 1994,
petitioner issued a memorandum[7]
to respondent informing her of the alteration in the date of the McDonald’s
Receipt No. 875493, which she submitted in support of her claim for meal
allowance allegedly consumed on October 1, 1994, and requiring her to explain
the said alteration.
Respondent wrote her
explanation on the same note and stated that the alteration may have been made
by the staff from McDonald’s as they sometimes make mistakes in issuing receipts. Respondent also narrated that her sister,
Odette, sometimes buys food for her and that she is not quite sure if the
receipt in question was the correct one which Odette gave her.
Upon verification with
the Assistant Branch Manager of the McDonald’s Makati Cinema Square outlet
which issued the subject receipt, petitioner discovered that the date of
issuance of the receipt was altered.
The receipt was actually issued for a meal bought on October 2, 1994 and
not on October 1, 1994.[8]
On December 9, 1994,
petitioner sent another memorandum[9]
to respondent and required her to explain in writing why her November 21, 1994
claim for reimbursement of meal expense should not be considered fraudulent
since there was an alteration in the receipt which she submitted. The second receipt contained a handwritten
alteration which read “1 PF extra mojos” which was superimposed on the computer
generated print-out of the food item actually purchased.
On December 19, 1994,
respondent submitted her explanation[10]
and claimed that what she ordered for lunch was a “buddy pack and an extra
mojos.” Respondent explained that the
delivery staff brought a wrong receipt as it did not correspond to the food
that she actually ordered. Respondent
added that she asked the delivery staff to alter the receipt thinking that he
could just write the correct items ordered and sign the said receipt to
authenticate the alterations made thereon.
She further stated that there was no intention on her part to commit
fraud since she was just avoiding the hassle of waiting for a replacement
receipt.
Petitioner then
referred respondent’s explanation to the Assistant Manager of the Shakey’s
Pizza Parlor which issued the subject receipt.
Upon verification,[11]
it was discovered that the receipt was actually for three orders of Bunch of
Lunch, and not for Buddy Pack which has an item code of CH5, not BP, as claimed
by respondent. The Assistant Manager
also denied respondent’s claim that it was their representative, specifically
their delivery staff, who made the alteration on the receipt.[12]
On January 3, 1995,
petitioner sent respondent a letter[13]
directing her to explain why she should not be subjected to disciplinary
sanctions for violating Section II, No. 15, paragraph (d) of the company’s
rules and regulations which punishes with dismissal the submission of any
fraudulent item of expense.
Consequently,
respondent submitted her explanation[14]
on January 4, 1995, and denied any personal knowledge in the commission of the
alterations in the subject receipts.
Respondent asserted that she did not notice the alteration in the
McDonald’s receipt since she “did not give close attention to it.” She further stated that her sister’s
driver/messenger may have caused the alteration, but she could not be certain
about it. With regard to the Shakey’s
receipt, respondent maintained that what she ordered was a buddy pack with
extra mojos.
On January 12, 1995,
petitioner sent respondent a memorandum[15]
inviting her to a hearing and formal investigation on January 17, 1995, to give
her an opportunity to explain the issues against her. Respondent was also advised that she was free
to bring along a counsel of her choice.
On January 17, 1995,
respondent appeared at the hearing. She
was reminded of her right to have her own lawyer present at the proceedings of
the investigation and was extensively questioned regarding the alterations on
the McDonald’s and Shakey’s Pizza Parlor receipts which she submitted in
support of her claim for reimbursement of meal expenses.[16]
On January 19, 1995,
petitioner notified[17]
respondent that the continuation of the investigation was set on January 23,
1995 for the presentation of the delivery personnel of Shakey’s Pizza
Parlor. Petitioner also informed
respondent of a third receipt with an alteration which she submitted in support
of her claim for reimbursement for meal allowance - Shakey’s Pizza Parlor
Receipt No. 41274 dated July 19, 1994,[18]
which contained an annotation “w/ CAV 50% only – P130.50.” Such annotation meant that respondent was
claiming only half of the total amount indicated in the receipt as the said
meal was supposedly shared with another employee, Corazon A. Varona. Said employee, however, denied that she
ordered and shared the food covered by the receipt in question.[19]
Upon
verification by petitioner with the restaurant supervisor of the Las Piñas
branch of the Shakey’s Pizza Parlor which issued the subject receipt, it was
discovered that said receipt was issued for food purchased on July 17, 1994 and
not for July 19, 1994,[20]
as claimed by respondent.
Respondent did not
attend the January 23, 1995 hearing, citing her doctor’s advice[21]
to rest since she was suffering from “severe mixed migraine and muscle
contraction headache.” Respondent also
complained of the alleged partiality of the investigating committee against
her.
At the said hearing,
the delivery personnel of Shakey’s Pizza Parlor was presented. He maintained that what he delivered to
respondent was her order for three Bunch of Lunch packs and not one order of
Buddy Pack with extra mojos.[22]
On January 24, 1995,
respondent filed an application for leave[23]
from January 13, 1995 up to February 3, 1995.
Again on January 31, 1995, respondent filed another application for
leave[24]
for the period February 6, 1995 to February 24, 1995.
On February 23, 1995,
petitioner sent another notice[25]
to respondent informing her of the re-setting of the continuation of the formal
investigation on March 15, 1995.
Respondent was also advised that the said scheduled hearing was her last
opportunity to fully explain her side, and that she had the option of bringing
a lawyer at the hearing.
Respondent did not
attend the March 15, 1995 hearing.
Petitioner then concluded the formal investigation.
Thereafter, in a letter[26]
dated April 4, 1995, petitioner dismissed respondent for fraudulently
submitting tampered and/or altered receipts in support of her petty cash
reimbursements in gross violation of the company’s rules and regulations.
On June 6, 1995,
respondent filed a complaint[27]
for illegal dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave, sick leave and
vacation leave with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages as well as
for damages and attorney’s fees, against petitioner with the NLRC, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-06-04000-95. After the mandatory conciliation proceedings
failed, the parties were required to submit their respective position papers.
In her position paper,
respondent averred that, assuming arguendo
that she altered the receipts in question, dismissal was too harsh a penalty
for her considering that: “(a) it was
her first offense in her 9 ½ years of service; (b) the offense imputed was
minor, as only the dates and items, not the amounts, were altered or the amounts
involved were very minimal; (c) the company did not suffer material damage, as
she was really entitled to the P150.00 allowance even without
accompanying receipt; and (d) respondent acted without malice, as she really
rendered (unpaid) overtime work on those three dates.”[28]
On the other hand,
petitioner maintained in its position paper that respondent was dismissed for
cause, that of “tampering official receipts to substantiate her claim for
(meal) reimbursement which reflects her questionable integrity and honesty.”[29] Petitioner added that in terminating the
services of an employee for breach of trust, “it is enough that the misconduct
of the employee tends to prejudice the employer’s interest since it would be
unreasonable to require the employer to wait until he is materially injured before
removing the cause of the impending evil.”[30]
In a Decision[31]
dated June 17, 1996, Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes ruled in favor of
petitioner and dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of merit. The relevant portions of the Decision read:
[T]he
termination of complainant is clearly valid.
Respondent
[herein petitioner] complied with the notice requirement strictly to the
letter. Complainant [herein respondent]
was given the first notice which the Supreme Court amply termed in the foregoing
jurisprudence as the “proper charge”.
This Office further notes that more than one notice was given to the
complainant [respondent]. In fact,
complainant [respondent] was repeatedly directed to answer the charges against
her. As she in fact did.
x
x x x
It
was only after the evidence against complainant [respondent] was received and
her fraudulent participation morally ascertained that respondent [petitioner]
finally decided to terminate his (sic)
services. And after arriving at a
conclusion, complainant [respondent] was consequently informed of her
termination which was the sanction imposed on her.
Again,
following the yardstick laid down by the Tiu doctrine cited above, the
procedure in terminating complainant [respondent] was definitely followed. Her termination is therefore valied (sic) and must be upheld for all
intents and purposes.
x
x x x
Going
now to the substantive aspect of complainant’s [respondent’s] termination, this
Office likewise finds that there existed just cause to terminate her services.
Complainant
[Respondent] was terminated for repeatedly submitting fraudulent items of
expense, clearly in violation of respondent’s [petitioner’s] company rules and
regulations which consequently resulted in loss of trust and confidence.[32]
Undaunted, respondent appealed the
Labor Arbiter’s decision to the NLRC.
In
a Resolution[33]
dated April 14, 1998, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, thus:
After
a careful review of the evidences presented before Us, including the jurisprudence
cited, We decided to look deeper into what led or motivated herein complainant
[respondent] to do as she did.
It
had been established that three (3) receipts were altered/tampered with and
were subsequently submitted by complainant [respondent] to the company so that
she could claim her allowed meal allowance of P150.00 per meal on days
she rendered overtime work. Complainant
[Respondent] admitted the alterations were done by her but she was quick to
retort and tries to justify why she should not be held guilty of a fraudulent
act.
As
if the company owes her so much for rendering overtime work gratuitously, she
now tries to “collect”, so to speak, from the company by way of emphasizing the
benefits it gets from her (in terms of the alleged savings of about more than P900.00,
had it paid her overtime pay and basic and premium pay). She now hastens to conclude that since the
company had greatly benefitted from her overtime services, she did not violate
company rules and regulations when she tampered the receipts which she attached
as her justification for reimbursement for meal allowance.
This
line of reasoning is absurd, if not utterly dangerous. Admitting the commission of the act but at
the same breath denying any fraudulent intent is inconsistent. Under no circumstances was her misconduct
excusable. Here the amount becomes
immaterial, her position irrelevant. As
correctly ruled by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the disciplinary action taken by
respondent company [petitioner] on complainant [respondent] applies to all
employees regardless of rank. We also
agree with the findings of the Labor Arbiter below that complainant
[respondent] was afforded due process.
In
fine, in the absence of showing that the decision was rendered whimsically and
capriciously, We Affirm.
WHEREFORE,
in the light of the foregoing, the assailed Decision dated 17 June 1996 is
hereby AFFIRMED.[34]
Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution[35]
dated June 19, 1998.
Aggrieved,
respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 49192.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the
Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 30, 2001, reversed and set
aside the Resolutions dated April 14, 1998 and June 19, 1998 of the NLRC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the penalty
of dismissal imposed on respondent was too harsh and further directed
petitioner to immediately reinstate respondent to her former position, if
possible, or a substantially equivalent position without loss of seniority
rights and with full backwages. The
Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus:
We consider the
penalty of dismissal imposed on the petitioner to be too harsh.
Petitioner
[Respondent] has held an unblemished record for nine-and-a-half (9 ½) years and
the respondent company [petitioner], in the same period, found her performance
satisfactory, as evidenced by the promotions she received over the years and
her being tasked to train in other countries.
The offenses she allegedly committed did not cause any prejudice or loss
to the company since the amounts were actually due her as part of her
compensation for overtime. On the other
hand, petitioner [respondent] sufficiently explained that in submitting the
falsified receipts, she was acting on the belief that the said requirement was
merely for record-keeping purposes for she was already entitled to the money
equivalent thereof as consideration for services already rendered. Hence, the presence of good faith on the part
of petitioner [respondent], her long years of exemplary service and the absence
of loss on the part of the employer, taken together, justify the application of
Yap vs. NLRC, supra. In the aforecited
case, the Supreme Court considered the employee’s long years of unblemished
service, the return of the funds borrowed from the employer and the employee’s
lack of intent to deviate from the rules, as circumstances justifying the award
of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement.
Considering however, that there was no evidence of strained relations
between the parties in the case at bench precluding a harmonious working
relationship should reinstatement be decreed, then the reinstatement of
petitioner [respondent] is proper. With
respect to the allegation of dishonesty on the part of private respondent, the
Court considers the “ignominy and mental torture” suffered by petitioner
throughout the proceedings, in view of her high position with respondent
company, to be practically punishment for said misdeed. (Philippine Airlines vs. Philippine Air Lines
Employees Association, supra.)
Finally,
the private respondent [petitioner] raised in issue the timeliness of the
filing of the herein petition. Based on
their computation, the petition was only filed four days after [the] sixty-day
period prescribed in the Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Considering however, that jurisprudence is
replete with instances where the Supreme Court has relaxed the technical rules
in the exercise of equity jurisdiction when there are strong considerations of
substantial justice that are manifest in the petition, (Soriano vs. Court of
Appeals, 222 SCRA 545, 553 [1993]; Orata vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 185
SCRA 148, 152 [1990]; Laginlin vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 159 SCRA
91, 96 [1988]; and, Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 179, 186
[1985]). Our finding that there was
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed resolutions of public
respondent merit the allowance of the herein petition.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED and the
Resolutions, dated April 14, 1998 and June 19, 1998, both issued by public
respondent NLRC, are hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent [Petitioner] Coca Cola
Export Corporation is hereby directed to immediately reinstate petitioner [respondent]
to her former position, if possible, otherwise, to a substantially equivalent
position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages, based on her
last monthly salary, to be computed from the date of her dismissal from the
service up to the date of finality of this decision, without any qualifications
or deductions. No costs.[36]
Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its second
impugned Resolution dated August 9, 2001, petitioner is now before us via the present recourse with the
following assignment of errors:
I
BY
BEING TOO LIBERAL IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW.
II
IN
DOING SO, THE COURT OF APPEALS DEVIATED FROM ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES LONG SETTLED
BY CONSISTENT JURISPRUDENCE ENUNCIATED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
On
the procedural issue, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals should have
dismissed outright the petition for certiorari for being filed out of
time and for failure to comply with the requirements set forth in Rule 42 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure mandating that the petition be accompanied by
clear copies of “all pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the material allegations of the petition.”
Moreover,
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals gave due course to respondent’s
petition purely on the basis of liberality, and that it anchored its decision
on the general principle that doubts must be interpreted in favor of
labor.
In her Comment dated February 10,
2002, respondent alleges that the Court of Appeals correctly gave due course to
her petition as it was actually filed on time.
Respondent states that when her petition was still pending with the
Court of Appeals, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was amended by
Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which took effect on September 1,
2000, whereby the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari
shall now be counted from receipt of the notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. According to
respondent, she received the Order denying her motion for reconsideration on
August 10, 1998, thus, her filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals on
October 2, 1998, was well within the 60-day period.
The
Court agrees with respondent.
At
the time of the filing of the petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals on September 1, 1998, Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98, which
amended Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, had already
taken effect on September 1, 1998, after publication in several newspapers of
general circulation. The amended
provision reads:
SEC.
4. Where
and when petition to be filed. – The petition may be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the
petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time
after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed
shall be interrupted. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from
notice of such denial. No extension of
time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied.)
The
records of the instant case show that respondent timely filed on June 8, 1998,
a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution dated April 14, 1998, which
respondent received on May 28, 1998. A
copy of the Resolution dated June 19, 1998 on the denial of the said motion for
reconsideration was received by respondent on August 10, 1998. Applying the aforequoted amendment to the
given set of dates, 11 days had already elapsed from the date when respondent
received the NLRC Resolution dated June 19, 1998. Thus, respondent had a remaining period of 49
days reckoned from August 11, 1998 or until September 28, 1998 within which to
file the petition for certiorari.
The Court, however,
takes note that further amendments were made on the reglementary period for
filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. On September 1, 2000, Supreme Court Circular
No. 56-2000[37]
took effect. The latest amendment of
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
SEC.
4. When
and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of the said motion.
The
petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in
the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of
its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.
No
extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling
reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied.)
From
the foregoing, it is clear that the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari
should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial, if one was filed.
In
a number of cases,[38]
this Court applied retroactively Circular No. 56-2000. We ruled that a petition for certiorari
which had been filed past the 60-day period under Section 4 of Rule 65, as
amended by Circular No. 39-98, was deemed seasonably filed provided it was
filed within the 60-day period counted from the date of receipt of the notice
of the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial.
Instructive
on this point is the discussion of the Court in Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission,[39]
viz:
The
Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion
resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because, historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to
the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the
order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments brought about
by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been resolved on the
merits. Hence, the Court deemed it wise
to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Earlier this year, the Court resolved, in
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, to further amend Section 4, Rule 65 x x x.
x
x x x
The
latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication
in the Manila Bulletin on August 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
August 7, 2000, two newspapers of general circulation.
In
view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65 can
only be described as curative in nature, and the principles governing curative
statutes are applicable.
Curative
statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal
proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain
legal requirements. They are intended to
supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry
into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of
expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or
irregularity in their own action. They
make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts
done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with. Curative statutes,
therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.
Accordingly,
while the Resolution states that the same “shall take effect on September 1,
2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation,”
its retroactive application cannot be denied.
In short, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court on 17
December 1998 is deemed to be timely, the same having been made within the
60-day period provided under the curative Resolution. We reach this conclusion bearing in mind that
the substantive aspects of this case involves the rights and benefits, even the
livelihood, of petitioner-employees.
Given
the above, respondent had a fresh 60-day period from August 10, 1998, the date
she received a copy of the NLRC Resolution dated June 19, 1998, denying her
motion for reconsideration. Accordingly,
respondent had 60 days from August 10, 1998 within which to file the petition
for certiorari. Thus, when
respondent filed the petition with the Court of Appeals on October 2, 1998,
said petition was seasonably filed within the reglementary period provided by
the latest amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
We
now proceed to the main issue for resolution in this case, which is whether the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in reversing and setting aside
the Resolutions dated April 14, 1998 and June 19, 1998 of the NLRC.
According to the
petitioner, respondent’s repeated submission of altered or tampered receipts to
support her claim for reimbursement constitutes a betrayal of the employer’s
trust and confidence and a serious misconduct, thus, giving cause for the
termination of her employment with petitioner.
Petitioner also questions the Court of Appeals’ finding that the termination of respondent was too harsh. Petitioner maintains that respondent “had clearly been established to have authored and caused the submission of not only one but three different receipts which she intentionally altered to justify her claimed reimbursement,” thus warranting her dismissal from the company.
We
are not convinced.
The
Labor Code mandates that before an employer may validly dismiss an employee
from the service, the requirement of substantial and procedural due process
must be complied with. Under the
requirement of substantial due process, the grounds for termination of
employment must be based on just or authorized causes. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the
just causes for the termination of employment, thus:
ART.
282. Termination by employer. - An
employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a)
Serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b)
Gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c)
Fraud
or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d)
Commission
of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e)
Other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
In termination cases,
the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal was for
just cause. Otherwise, an employee who
is illegally dismissed “shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.”[40]
After examining the
records of the case, this Court finds that respondent’s dismissal from
employment was not grounded on any of the just causes enumerated under Article
282 of the Labor Code.
At the outset, it is
important to note that the term “trust and confidence” is restricted to
managerial employees.[41] In Samson
v. National Labor Relations Commission,[42]
the Court, citing Section 2(b), Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, enumerated the conditions for one to be properly
considered a managerial employee:
(1)
Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which
they are employed or of a department or sub-division thereof;
(2)
They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees
therein; [and]
(3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.
In the instant case,
respondent was the Senior Financial Accountant with the Job Description of a
Financial Project Analyst. Respondent,
among others, “provides support in the form of financial analyses and evaluation
of alternative strategies or action plans to assist management in strategic and
operational decision-making, x x x liaises with the Bottler to comply with
Corporate Bottler financial reporting requirements and to ensure Bottler’s
plans are aligned with TCCEC’s, x x x and assists management on various
initiatives on ad hoc basis.”[43]
In Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission,[44]
this Court set the guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of
confidence –
(a)
Loss
of confidence should not be simulated;
(b)
It
should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified;
(c)
It
may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the
contrary; and
(d)
It
must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad
faith.
In the instant case, the basis for terminating the employment of respondent was for gross violation of the company’s rules and regulations, as specified in the termination letter dated April 4, 1998, to wit:
Based on the
facts gathered during the investigation vis-avis (sic) the contradictory explanations you have given when you
testified, the testimony of the person who delivered the Shakey’s products you
ordered as well as McDonald’s and Shakey’s certifications to the effect that the
items and the dates appearing on the receipt/invoices issued to you were the
actual items and dates of said invoices and that the alteration on the face of
said invoice were not done at their respective establishments or by any of
their employees, morally convinced us that you were the one who caused such
alterations for personal gain. You have
thereby knowingly, willingly, deliberately and fraudulently submitted tampered
and/or altered receipts to support your petty cash reimbursements in gross
violation of the company’s rules and regulations which punishes with immediate
dismissal the “fraudulent submission of any item of expense” (Rule II, No
15(d).[45]
Evidently, no mention was made
regarding petitioner’s alleged loss of trust and confidence in respondent. Neither was there any explanation nor
discussion of the alleged sensitive and delicate position of respondent
requiring the utmost trust of petitioner.
It
bears emphasizing that the right of an employer to dismiss its employees on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised arbitrarily. For loss of trust and confidence to be a
valid ground for dismissal, it must be substantial and founded on clearly
established facts. Loss of confidence
must not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified; it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought, to justify earlier
action taken in bad faith. Because of
its subjective nature, this Court has been very scrutinizing in cases of
dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence because the same can easily be
concocted by an abusive employer.[46] Thus, when the breach of trust or loss of
confidence theorized upon is not borne by clearly established facts, as in the
instant case, such dismissal on the ground of loss and confidence cannot be
countenanced.
In
the instant case, it was only in the Reply to Respondent’s Comment[47]
dated October 11, 2002, that petitioner made mention of another ground for the
dismissal of respondent, that of serious misconduct, when she submitted altered
or tampered receipts to support her claim for reimbursement. Such allegation appears to be a mere
afterthought, being tardily raised only in the Reply.
In Marival Trading, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[48]
we held, thus:
Misconduct
has been defined as improper or wrong conduct.
It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment.
The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial and unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must
nevertheless be in connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause
for his separation. Thus, for misconduct
or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious;
(b) must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) must show
that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. Indeed, an employer may not be compelled to
continue to employ such person whose continuance in the service would be
patently inimical to his employer’s business.[49]
In
this light, the alleged infractions of respondent could hardly be considered
serious misconduct. It is well to stress
that in order to constitute serious misconduct which will warrant the dismissal
of an employee, it is not sufficient that the act or conduct complained of has
violated some established rules or policies.
It is equally important and required that the act or conduct must have
been done with wrongful intent. Such is,
however, lacking in the instant case.
While
this Court does not condone respondent’s act of submitting altered and/or
tampered receipts to support her claim for reimbursement, we nevertheless agree
with the finding of the Court of Appeals that, under the attendant facts, the
dismissal meted out on respondent appears to be too harsh a penalty.
The employer’s right to
conduct the affairs of its business, according to its own discretion and
judgment, is well-recognized. An
employer has a free reign and enjoys wide latitude of discretion to regulate
all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its
employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring
employees. This is a management
prerogative, where the free will of management to conduct its own affairs to
achieve its purpose takes form. The only
criterion to guide the exercise of its management prerogative is that the
policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees
must always be fair and reasonable and the corresponding penalties, when
prescribed, commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the
infraction.[50]
As respondent’s employer,
petitioner has the right to regulate, according to its discretion and best
judgment, work assignments, work methods, work supervision, and work
regulations, including the hiring, firing and discipline of its employees. Indeed, petitioner has the management
prerogative to discipline its employees, like herein respondent, and to impose
appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules and
regulations.[51] This Court upholds these management
prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of
the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
the rights of the employees under special laws and valid agreements.[52]
In the instant case,
petitioner alleged that under its rules and regulations, respondent’s
submission of fraudulent items of expense is punishable by dismissal. However, petitioner’s rules cannot preclude
the State from inquiring whether the strict and rigid application or
interpretation thereof would be harsh to the employee. Even when an employee is found to have
transgressed the employer’s rules, in the actual imposition of penalties upon
the erring employee, due consideration must still be given to his length of
service and the number of violations committed during his employ.[53] Respondent had no previous record in her 9½
years of service; this would have been her first offense. Respondent had also been a recipient of
various commendations attesting to her competence and diligence in the
performance of her duties, not only from petitioner, but also from petitioner’s
counterparts in Poland[54]
and Thailand.[55] Respondent also countered that she acted in
good faith and with no wrongful intent when she submitted the receipts in
support of her claim for reimbursement of meal allowance. According to respondent, only the dates or
items were altered on the receipts. She
did not claim more than what was allowed as meal expense for the days that she
rendered overtime work. She believed
that the submission of receipts was simply for records-keeping, since she
actually rendered overtime work on the dates that she claimed for meal
allowance. All told, this Court holds
that the penalty of dismissal imposed on respondent is unduly oppressive and disproportionate
to the infraction which she committed. A
lighter penalty would have been more just.
As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, by mandate of the law itself, the
provisions of the Labor Code are to be construed liberally in favor of
labor. Thus, in Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[56]
we held:
The Court is wont to reiterate that while an employer has its own interest to protect, and pursuant thereto, it may terminate a managerial employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay-off an employee must be exercised without abuse of discretion. Its implementation should be tempered with compassion and understanding. The employer should bear in mind that, in the execution of the said prerogative, what is at stake is not only the employee’s position, but his very livelihood. The Constitution does not condone wrongdoing by the employee; nevertheless, it urges moderation of the sanction that may be applied to him. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the worker ought not be visited with a consequence so severe as dismissal from employment. Indeed, the consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for justifiable cause.
Under
Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
After
a finding of illegal dismissal herein, we apply the foregoing provision
entitling respondent Clarita P. Gacayan to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the
compensation was not paid up to the time of her reinstatement. Thus, the award of backwages by the Court of
Appeals is in order. However, the Court
of Appeals’ period of computation of the award of backwages must be
modified. The Court of Appeals ruled
that:
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED and the
Resolutions, dated April 14, 1998 and June 19, 1998, both issued by public
respondent NLRC, are hereby SET ASIDE. [Petitioner] Coca Cola Export Corporation is
hereby directed to immediately reinstate [respondent] to her former position,
if possible, otherwise, to a substantially equivalent position without loss of
seniority rights and with full backwages, based on her last monthly salary, to
be computed from the date of her dismissal from the service up to the date of
finality of this decision, without any qualifications or deductions. No costs.[57]
In
line with Article 279 of the Labor Code and prevailing jurisprudence,[58]
the award of backwages should be modified in the sense that backwages should be
computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of
reinstatement.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated May 30, 2001 and
subsequent Resolution dated August 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION that backwages be
awarded from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of her
actual reinstatement.
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
JOSE PORTUGAL
PEREZ Associate Justice |
|
*
Per Raffle dated December
15, 2010.
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-26; penned by Associate
Justice Teodoro P. Regino with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and
Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring.
[2] Id.
at 27.
[3] Id.
at 321-341.
[4] Id.
at 356-357.
[5] Id.
at 139.
[6] Id.
at 141.
[7] Id. at 142.
[8] Id.
at 144.
[9] Id.
at 145.
[10] Id.
at 146.
[11] Id.
at 147.
[12] Id.
at 148.
[13] Id.
at 149-150.
[14] Id.
at 115.
[15] Id.
at 152.
[16] Id.
at 153-160.
[17] Id.
at 161.
[18] Id.
at 162.
[19] Id.
at 163.
[20] Id.
at 164.
[21] Id. at 119.
[22] Id.
at 166-167.
[23] Id.
at 117.
[24] Id.
at 118.
[25] Id.
at 168.
[26] Id.
at 169-170.
[27] Id. at 88-89.
[28] Id.
at 95-96.
[29] Id.
at 121.
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
at 266-289.
[32] Id.
at 282-284.
[33] Id.
at 321-341.
[34] Id.
at 339-341.
[35] Id.
at 356-357.
[36] Id.
at 23-25.
[37] Per
Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated August 1, 2000 in A.M. No.
00-2-03-SC.
[38] Lascano v. Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc., G.R. No. 146019, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 248; Ong v. Mazo, G.R. No. 145542, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 56; Webb v. Secretary of Justice, 455 Phil. 307 (2003); Unity Fishing Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 876 (2001).
[39] 395
Phil. 758, 763-765 (2000).
[40] Labor
Code, Article 279.
[41] Dela
Cruz v. National Labor Relations Commission, 335 Phil. 932, 943 (1997).
[42] 386
Phil. 669, 687 (2000).
[43] Rollo, p. 196.
[44] 390
Phil. 1228, 1244 (2000), citing Vitarich Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 367 Phil. 1, 12 (1999).
[45] Rollo, p. 170.
[46] Labor
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110388, September 14,
1995, 248 SCRA 183, 199-200.
[47] Rollo,
pp. 511-527.
[48] G.R.
No. 169600, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 708.
[49] Id.
at 726-727.
[50] St. Michael’s Institute v. Santos, 422
Phil. 723, 732-733 (2001).
[51] Deles,
Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 384 Phil. 271, 281-282 (2000).
[52] Challenge
Socks Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165268, November 8, 2005,
474 SCRA 356, 362-363.
[53] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, 362 Phil. 352, 358 (1999).
[54] Rollo, p. 111.
[55] Id.
at 113.
[56] 494 Phil. 697, 728 (2005), citing Maglutac v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78345, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 767, 778; Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission, 371 Phil. 340, 361 (1999); Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission, 414 Phil. 329, 341-342 (2001).
[57] Rollo,
p. 25.
[58] Cocomangas Hotel Beach Resort v. Visca,
G.R. No. 167045, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 705, 722; Marival Trading, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra
note 48 at 731-732; Kay Products, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 502 Phil. 783, 797-798 (2005).