EN
BANC
ATTY. EVILLO C.
PORMENTO, G.R. No. 191988
Petitioner,
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO,
JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
BRION,*
– versus – PERALTA,**
BERSAMIN,
DEL
CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA,
JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA
and
SERENO,
JJ.
JOSEPH “ERAP” EJERCITO
ESTRADA and COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
August 31, 2010
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R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, C.J.:
What
is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution: “[t]he President shall not be eligible for any
reelection?”
The novelty and complexity of the constitutional
issue involved in this case present a temptation that magistrates, lawyers,
legal scholars and law students alike would find hard to resist. However,
prudence dictates that this Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue
before it has already been mooted by subsequent events. More importantly, the
constitutional requirement of the existence of a “case” or an “actual
controversy” for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review constrains
us to refuse the allure of making a grand pronouncement that, in the end, will amount
to nothing but a non-binding opinion.
The petition asks whether private respondent
Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from “any
reelection.” Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the
presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner
Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondent’s candidacy and filed a
petition for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the Second
Division of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).[1]
His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.[2]
Petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari[3] on May
7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would
not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed.[4]
Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent
was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May
10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.[5]
Private respondent was not elected
President the second time he ran. Since
the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase “any reelection” will be
premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as President,
there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict
of legal rights exists.[6]
There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that
touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.[7]
No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case
that will benefit any of the parties herein.[8]
As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial
review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in
this case.
As a rule, this Court may only
adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.[9]
The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or
to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the
thing in issue in the case before it.[10] In
other words, when a case is
moot, it becomes non-justiciable.[11]
An
action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when
the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled
to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between
the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination
thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.[12]
Assuming an actual case or controversy
existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in
the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the
results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the
second time. Thus, any discussion of his “reelection” will simply be
hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
Accordingly, the petition is denied due course
and is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
|
|
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
|
(On Leave) ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice |
|
(On Official Leave) DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice
* On leave.
** On official leave.
[1] Resolution dated January 10, 2010 penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer and concurred in by Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph. Rollo, pp. 21-46.
[2] Resolution dated May 4, 2010 penned by Commissioner Armando C. Velasco and concurred in by Chairperson Jose A.R. Melo and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal. Id., pp. 47-51.
[3] Under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
[4] See Section 8, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
[5] Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III garnered the highest number of votes and was therefore proclaimed as President.
[6] See discussion on the concept of “case” or “contoversy” in Cruz, Isagani, Philippine Political Law, 2002 Edition, p. 259.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
[10] Id.
[11] While
there are exceptions to this rule, none of the exceptions applies in this case.
What may most probably come to mind is the “capable of repetition yet evading
review” exception. However, the said exception applies only where the following two circumstances concur:
(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration and (2) there is a reasonable expectation
that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again (Lewis v. Continental Bank Corporation,
494 U.S. 472 [1990]). The second of these requirements is absent in this case. It
is highly speculative and hypothetical that petitioner would be subjected to
the same action again. It is highly doubtful if he can demonstrate a
substantial likelihood that he will “suffer a harm” alleged in his petition.
(See Honig v. Doe, supra.)
[12]