Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
FREDDIE CABILDO, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF
THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 189971 Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 23, 2010 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the January 15, 2009 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30871, finding petitioner Freddie
Cabildo (Cabildo) and his co-accused Jesus Palao, Jr. (Palao) and Rodrigo Abian
(Abian) guilty of attempted homicide. Likewise assailed is the CA’s October 7,
2009 Resolution[2] denying
the motion for reconsideration.
The
CA Decision affirmed with modification the February 5, 2007 decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Palawan and
The
RTC and the CA similarly arrived at the following factual findings:
On
March 19, 1999, at 11:00 p.m., a certain Joy Herrera was driving a tricycle
bound for Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay,
Meanwhile,
Rocky Daquer passed by the same road on board his own tricycle with passengers
John Ryan Macula, Cris Magdayao, and Dary Puno. Daquer noticed the commotion,
so he alighted from his tricycle and approached the group to pacify them.
Instead, Palao turned his ire to Daquer and threatened: “Putang-ina mo Rocky, papatayin
kita!” before drawing a fan knife from his waist. This prompted Herrera and
Daquer to run away in separate directions.[5]
The
group pursued Daquer and after covering about 10 meters, petitioner was able to
grab Daquer’s jacket, causing the latter to fall down on one knee. While
petitioner held on to Daquer by his jacket, Palao thrust his knife at the
latter but missed. Palao stabbed again and hit Daquer at the lower left side of
his back causing him to fall face down on the ground. Petitioner and his group
then proceeded to maul Daquer until the police arrived.[6]
The
responding police officers brought petitioner and his group to the police
station. The knife recovered at the crime scene was turned over to the Office
of the Prosecutor. On the other hand,
the wounded Daquer was brought to the
On
June 1, 1999, Cabildo, Palao, and Abian were charged with frustrated homicide.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 19th day of March, 1999, more or less 11:00 o’ clock in the evening, at Barangay Tenga-Tenga, Municipality of Cuyo, Province of Palawan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, while armed with a bladed weapon and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, box and stab with a knife, one ROCKY DAQUER, hitting him in the vital parts of his body and inflicting upon him injuries which would ordinarily cause his death thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Rocky Daquer, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]
When
arraigned, petitioner Cabildo and Palao both pleaded not guilty. Their
co-accused Abian remained at large.[10]
Cabildo and Palao denied any complicity in the stabbing of Daquer, and
submitted different versions of the story.
Petitioner
Cabildo claimed that, on his way home from watching the “Seniors’ Night” show,
he saw Tamba, Palao and Abian blocking the tricycle of Herrera. He saw Tamba
box Herrera, after which Abian boxed Daquer and the latter ran away. After
seeing this, he left the scene and went home.[11]
According
to Palao, he and Abian watched the Seniors’ Night together on March 19, 1999.
On their way home, they saw their friend Tamba engaged in a fistfight with
Herrera. Palao admitted seeing Daquer that night while the latter was being
chased by Abian. He further testified that Abian caught up with Daquer and the
latter fell down. Thereafter, the two engaged in a fistfight until the police
arrived. When the police brought Abian
to the police station, Palao allegedly went with him because he wanted to look
after his friend.[12]
The
RTC accorded more weight to the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses
over the denial and inconsistent declarations of the accused. The trial court
declared them to have conspired and connived with one another in committing frustrated
homicide. The accused were sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, which is the
medium of prision correccional, as
the minimum, to eight (8) years, which is the medium of prision mayor, as maximum. They were likewise ordered to jointly
and severally pay Daquer P3,190.00 for his medical expenses and P6,000.00
for loss of earnings.[13]
On
appeal, the CA sustained
the trial court’s finding of conspiracy but modified the conviction of the
accused to attempted homicide, noting that the wounds inflicted on Daquer were
not fatal.[14]
Consequently,
the accused were meted the new sentence of imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor medium, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as maximum. The rest of the trial court’s disposition was
affirmed.[15]
Accused-appellants
Cabildo and Palao moved for the reconsideration[16]
of the foregoing decision but the same was denied.[17]
Hence, the present petition interposed solely by petitioner Cabildo.
We
deny the petition.
Petitioner
insists on an acquittal by impugning the credibility of prosecution witnesses
Macula and Magdayao, who were not consistent in declaring whether Herrera was a
passenger or a driver of the tricycle blocked by petitioner and his cohorts.
Petitioner also questions the competency of prosecution
witness Herrera who admittedly did not
witness the stabbing of Daquer, and who proffered
contradicting declarations as to the length of the knife he
saw on Palao. Petitioner further posits that his guilt was not established by
the requisite quantum of evidence.
We
do not agree.
First, we emphasize that the findings
of fact of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies, and the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
based on the said findings, will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears
that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances
which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.[18]
In the present case, the
inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner are too trivial and immaterial as to
considerably affect the trial court’s conclusions. Whether Herrera was a driver
or a passenger of the blocked tricycle does not relate to the essential
elements of the crime committed against Daquer. Meanwhile, the competency of
Herrera as a witness to the stabbing incident should have been raised at the
most opportune time, that is, during trial and not on appeal.
At any rate, Herrera’s testimony was merely intended to
establish the fact that a commotion preceded the attack on Daquer and not the
stabbing incident itself. Also, Herrera’s contradicting estimates of the length
of the knife brandished by Palao do not detract from the undisputed fact that a
stab wound was inflicted on Daquer.
More importantly, the RTC’s
conclusions, as affirmed by the CA, were based mainly on the testimony of the
victim himself, who clearly and positively identified his assailants and the
manner by which they committed the crime. We quote the pertinent testimony of
Daquer as summarized by the RTC:
Daquer saw accused
Abian, Palao and Cabildo flag down the tricycle of Herrera. Since Daquer could
not drive on, he alighted from his tricycle and approached the group of Palao
and he saw that the accused were mauling Herrera. Daquer tried to stop Palao and his group from
hurting Herrera, but instead of stopping, the accused turned to Daquer and
Palao threatened to stab Daquer. Daquer
stepped back when accused Palao and Abian faced him. Then Daquer ran away but Palao
and Abian chased him. After running a distance of about ten (10) meters accused
Cabildo held on to his jacket so he fell down on one knee. While Cabildo was
holding Daquer, he (Daquer) looked back and saw Palao thrust a twenty-two (22)
inch fan knife at him but missed. Then Palao stabbed him again and this time
Daquer was hit on the lower left side of his back and he fell face down on the
sand. While on the ground all the accused still boxed Daquer until the police
arrived.[19]
It is settled that the testimony of a
single yet credible and trustworthy witness suffices to support a conviction.[20]
This principle finds more compelling application when the lone witness is the
victim himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailants is
almost always regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural
tendency of victims to seek justice, and thus strive to remember the faces of
their malefactors and the manner in which they committed the crime. [21]
Petitioner
tenaciously argues that conspiracy was not established sufficiently, as the CA
merely inferred the same from the hollow threat made by Palao to Daquer.
Petitioner further claims that the attack on Daquer was a spontaneous outburst
of violence when the latter unexpectedly intervened in the skirmish between
petitioner, his cohorts and their original target, Herrera. As such, there was
no opportunity for the assailants to conspire and hatch a deliberate plan to
attack or even attempt to kill Daquer.
We
disagree.
First,
the threat uttered by Palao to Daquer was not at all empty or, as petitioner
puts it, a mere angry remark. Records show that after throwing invectives at
and threatening to kill Daquer, Palao almost simultaneously pulled out the fan
knife tucked in the waistband of his pants.
Palao clearly intended to make good his threat; and if he merely wanted
to warn Daquer not to meddle in the commotion, he would not have chased the latter,
who ran away upon seeing the knife. Cabildo and Abian agreed with Palao when
they assisted him in carrying out his illicit purpose – Abian in chasing Daquer,
and herein petitioner Cabildo in holding Daquer by his jacket, thus depriving
him the chance to parry the knife and emboldening Palao to execute his devious
plan with ease.
True,
if taken alone, the words “Putang-ina mo
Rocky, papatayin kita!” would hardly lend support to a finding of criminal
intent or common criminal design among the accused. But the acts they performed
simultaneous with and subsequent to such utterance spell the difference between
a harmless outburst of anger and an injurious retaliation.
Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.[22]
The agreement need not be proven by direct evidence;[23]
it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during, and after
the commission of the offense,[24]
pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest.[25] Complicity of the accused in the criminal design may be
determined by their concerted action at the moment of consummating the crime
and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered to the person
inflicting the wound.[26]
Here,
the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s finding that conspiracy can be deduced from
the concerted acts of petitioner Cabildo, Palao, and Abian towards the
realization of their common unlawful goal of stabbing Daquer, viz.:
Palao unequivocally announced his intention to kill Daquer and immediately drew his batangas knife and ran after the latter, while Cabildo and Abian readily agreed with this desire by pursuing Daquer and actually catching up with him. Cabidlo’s act of grabbing Daquer’s jacket and pulling him to the ground provided the opportunity for Palao to stab him twice. After getting hit on the second try Cabildo and Abian readily proceeded to maul him together with Palao.[27]
We likewise agree with the CA that the crime committed was
attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide. The stab wound sustained by
Daquer
was considerably superficial, hence, not life-threatening. This is clear from
the medical certificate issued by Dr. Vicente stating that the stab wound was
only 2 centimeters long and 5 centimeters deep. The doctor also testified that
no vital organ of Daquer was hit.
The CA imposed the correct penalty. The
imposable penalty for attempted homicide is prision correccional, which is two
degrees lower than reclusion temporal,
the penalty for homicide. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the imposable penalty of prision
correccional, taking into account the modifying circumstances, if any. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the maximum penalty should be imposed in its medium period (Art.
64, Revised Penal Code). To determine
the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision correccional has to be reduced by one degree, which is arresto mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate
penalty shall be taken from the full range of arresto mayor in any of its periods. Hence, petitioner was correctly sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE,
foregoing considered, the Petition is DENIED.
The January 15, 2009 Decision and the October 7, 2009 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and
Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo,
pp. 45-55.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; id. at 60-61.
[3] Penned by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Sundiang Dilig; id. at 86-99.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] People v. Amazan, et
al., 402 Phil. 247-271 (2001), citing
People v. Perez, 372 Phil. 425 (1999);
People v. Tan, 373 Phil. 990, 991
(1999); People v. Accion, 371 Phil.
176, 177 (1999); People v. Pulusan, 352
Phil. 953, 954 (1998).
[19] Rollo, p. 88, citing the testimony of Rocky Daquer, TSN, July 9, 2003.
[20] Ureta, et al. v. People, 436 Phil. 148, 163 (2002), citing People v. Hinault, 427 Phil. 486, 498 (2002); People v. Toyco, Sr., G.R. No. 138609, January 17, 2001, 349 SCRA 385; People v. Pascual, 387 Phil. 266, 268 (2000); People v. Pirame, 384 Phil. 286, 289 (2000).
[21]
People v. Hamton, et al., 443 Phil. 198, 200 (2003); People v. Bacungay, 428 Phil. 798, 799 (2002); People v. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158, 164-165 (2002); People v. Lieterio, 390 Phil. 337
(2000); People v. Aquino, 385 Phil.
887-888 (2000); People v. Candelario,
370 Phil. 506, 515 & 523 (1999); People
v. Teves, 321 Phil. 837 (1995); People
v. Teehankee, G.R. No. 111206-08, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 54.
[22] REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 8.
[23] People v. Tejero, 431 Phil. 91 (2002); People v. Pacificador, 426 Phil. 563, 565 (2002); People v. Garcia, supra note 21; Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 641, 647 (2001).
[24] People v. Matic, 427 Phil. 564, 573 (2002); People v. Bejo, 427 Phil. 143, 160 (2002); People v. Macabales, 400 Phil. 1221, 1223 (2000); People v. Gungon, G.R. No. 119574, March
19, 1998, 287 SCRA 618, 619; People v.
Lumiwan, 356 Phil. 521, 524 (1998); People v. Quitlong, 354 Phil. 372, 390
(1998); People v. Alas, G.R. No.
118335-36, June 19, 1997; 274 SCRA 310.
[25] People v. Licayan, 415 Phil. 459, 475 (2001); People v. Domasian, G.R. No. 95322, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 245, 247.
[26] Li v. People, 471
Phil. 129, 148 (2004), citing People v.
Mozar, et al., 215 Phil. 501, 511
(1984).
[27] Rollo,
p. 52.