Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - MICHAEL
LINDO y VERGARA, Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R.
No. 189818 Present: VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: August
9, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before
this Court on appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals[1]
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00283 dated
The
facts of the case are as follows: AAA,[2]
the private complainant, born on
On
AAA
was examined by Dr. Evelyn B. Ignacio, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Medico-Legal Officer, on the same day, and was found to have extragenital
physical injuries as well as abrasions on her anal orifice. Dr. Ignacio theorized that the anal injuries
could have been caused by the insertion of a blunt object, such as a penis,
finger or pencil.
Lindo
raised the defenses of denial and alibi, claiming that as a painter working in
Ayala,
Lindo
was charged in an Information dated
That on or about April 3, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation commit sexual abuse to wit: by then and there carrying said [AAA], a minor, 11 years old, and bringing her to a vacant lot, trying to insert his penis into her vagina but said accused was not able to do so, thereafter inserting his penis into her anus, thereby endangering her normal growth and development.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[3]
The
RTC found the testimony of AAA to be more credible, and rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF Statutory Rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua with all the necessary penalties provided by law and to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Lindo appealed to the CA, assailing
the credibility of AAA.
Lindo failed to persuade the CA,
which affirmed his conviction, but modified the award of damages to AAA. The CA found the award of civil indemnity
proper, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
Exemplary damages were also found to be proper, for the purpose of being
a deterrent to crime. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from, being in accordance with law and the evidence, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant MICHAEL LINDO y VERGARA is further ORDERED to pay private complainant indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
Now before this Court, accused-appellant
Lindo reiterates his defense presented before the RTC and the CA, questioning
the weight given to AAA’s testimony and its credibility.
The Court’s Ruling
The conviction of accused-appellant
Lindo must be affirmed.
At the outset, it must be noted that
the RTC and the CA made reference to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC cited Art. 335 in the dispositive
portion of its decision, while the CA referred to Art. 335, paragraph 3, as
amended. Both courts were in error to do
so. The crime of rape is no longer to be
found under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code, or crimes against
chastity. As per Republic Act No. 8353,
or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the crime of rape has been reclassified as a
crime against persons. As of
That matter aside, the defense raised
by accused-appellant is a reiteration of his questioning of AAA’s
credibility. He claims that her
testimony is unworthy of belief as it runs counter to the course of human
experience. Specifically, he argues that
no rape could have taken place as the area was in public view. He also argues that the testimony of AAA, that
she was lifted while asleep, is incredible as his alleged lifting of her failed
to wake her up.
The arguments raised by accused-appellant
fail to discredit the victim and cast doubt upon her testimony.
That the act was carried out in a
public place does not make it unbelievable.
The evil in man has no conscience—the beast in him bears no respect for
time and place, driving him to commit rape anywhere, even in places where
people congregate such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises,
and inside a house where there are other occupants.[6] There is no rule that rape can only be
committed in seclusion.[7] The commission of rape is not hindered by
time or place as in fact it can be committed even in the most public of places.[8] Clearly,
the argument of accused-appellant that there could be no rape as the place was
in full view of the public does not have a legal leg to stand on. The fact that the area was in the public eye
would not prevent a potential rapist from carrying out his criminal
intent.
The RTC found the witness to be
credible, and it had the best opportunity to observe her testimony. She testified in a straightforward and clear
manner, detailing how accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.[9] The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, categorically
found thus:
In the case at bar, the story of the complaining witness even finds support in the medical findings of Dr. Ignacio who examined her immediately after the incident. The physician saw multiple abrasions on the victim’s neck supporting the latter’s testimony that she was strangled by the accused. Additionally, [wreckage] was seen in her anal area which could have been caused by insertion of a blunt object like a male penis buttressing the victim’s claim that accused inserted his private organ into her anus.
While
the victim testified that the accused did not succeed in inserting his penis into
her vagina, time and again [the Supreme Court] held that the slight penetration
of the labia by the male organ still constitutes rape (People vs. Borja, 267
SCRA 370). The lack of lacerated wound
does not negate sexual intercourse (People vs.
x x x x
It
is clear from the complainant’s narration that the accused did not only
penetrate her anus but also her vagina only that in the latter case, the
accused was not able to insert his penis into the cervical area or the vaginal
opening.[10] x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accused-appellant failed to show any
inconsistencies or discrepancies in AAA’s testimony, and failed to put the lie
to her words. We have held, time and
again, that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature, as in this
case, deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially one of
tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter testify about her ordeal in a public trial, if
she had not been motivated by a desire to obtain justice for the wrong
committed against her.[11]
Against AAA’s straightforward
testimony, accused-appellant raises the defense of alibi, stating that he was
at work from
Notable as well, as the trial and
appellate courts aptly pointed out, is the presentation of Dr. Ignacio, the NBI
Medico-Legal Officer, and the fact that she made a physical examination of AAA,
which supports AAA’s testimony. AAA
testified that accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina, and
inserted it as well in her anus. This
jibes with the findings of Dr. Ignacio from her physical examination of
AAA. When a rape victim’s account is
straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the
examining physician, it is sufficient to support a conviction for rape.[14]
It has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt that accused-appellant Lindo had carnal knowledge of AAA. The insertion of his penis into the vagina of
AAA, though incomplete, was sufficient. As
held in People v. Tablang,[15] the mere introduction of the male organ
in the labia majora of the victim’s
genitalia consummates the crime; the mere touching of the labia by the penis was held to be sufficient. The elements of the crime
of rape under Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are present. Under the said article, it provides that rape
is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman when the
offended party is under twelve years of age.
AAA was 11 years old at the time accused-appellant had carnal knowledge
of her. As such, that constitutes
statutory rape. The two elements of the
crime are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that
the woman was below 12 years of age.[16] Thus, the CA correctly upheld the conviction
of accused-appellant by the RTC.
Both the RTC and the CA, however, erred
in finding only one count of rape in the present case. It is settled that in a criminal case, an
appeal throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed
from, whether they are made the subject of the assignment of errors or not.[17] From the information filed, it is clear that accused-appellant
was charged with two offenses, rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1 (d) of the Revised
Penal Code, and rape as an act of sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2. Accused-appellant was charged with having
carnal knowledge of AAA, who was under twelve years of age at the time, under
par. 1(d) of Art. 266-A, and he was also charged with committing “an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person” under the second paragraph of Art. 266-A. Two instances of rape were indeed proved at
the trial, as it was established that there was contact between accused-appellant’s
penis and AAA’s labia; then AAA’s
testimony established that accused-appellant was able to partially insert his
penis into her anal orifice. The medical
examination also supports the finding of rape under Art. 266-A par. 1(d) and
Art. 266-A par. 2, considering the extragenital injuries and abrasions in the
anal region reported.
The information, read as a whole, has
sufficiently informed accused-appellant that he is being charged with two
counts of rape, as it relates his act of inserting his penis into AAA’s anal
orifice, as well as his trying to insert his penis into her vagina. We held in People
v. Dimaano:
For
complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not
the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions
of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The
acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to
be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient
if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined
by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused
has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[18]
Two offenses were charged, a
violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which states, “A complaint or information must charge only one offense, except
when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.” Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure states, “When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial,
the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and
impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings
of fact and law in each offense.” As accused-appellant
failed to file a motion to quash the Information he can be convicted of two
counts of rape.
The CA modified the award of damages
by the RTC, adding civil indemnity and exemplary damages. This is but proper, considering that was done
to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The
award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon finding that rape
took place.[19] As to the award of exemplary damages, it
finds support in People v. Dalisay.[20] Art. 2229 of the Civil Code serves as
the basis for the award of exemplary damages as it pertinently provides, “Exemplary
or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.” Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender.[21] By subjecting a child to his sexual
depredations, accused-appellant has displayed behavior that society has an
interest in curbing. Thus, the purpose
of exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent finds application to the present
case, to protect the youth from sexual abuse.
Accused-appellant was found guilty of
two counts of rape, rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d) and rape through sexual
assault, under Art. 266-A, par. 2. The
decision of the CA must therefore be modified.
Accused-appellant would then be sentenced for one count of rape and
another count for rape through sexual assault.
For rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d), the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. For rape through sexual assault under Art.
266-A, par. 2, the imposable penalty is prision
mayor; and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant would
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two years, four months and one day
of prision correccional as minimum,
to eight years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum.
As to the damages awarded,
considering that accused-appellant is guilty of committing rape under Art.
266-A, par. 1(d) and rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, the award should reflect that: for rape under Art.
266-A, par. 1(d), civil indemnity is pegged at PhP 50,000, moral damages at PhP
50,000, and exemplary damages increased to PhP 30,000, as per prevailing
jurisprudence;[22] and for
rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
the award of damages will be PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 30,000 as moral
damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.[23]
Children should be protected from
sexual predators, and the conviction of accused-appellant, with the award of
damages as well to the victim, serves this purpose.
WHEREFORE, the
Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00283. Accused-appellant
Lindo is found guilty of one count of rape under Art. 266-A par. 1(d), Revised
Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the victim, AAA, PhP 50,000 as civil
indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. Accused-appellant is likewise found guilty of
one count of rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Code,
and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the victim, AAA, PhP 30,000 as
civil indemnity, PhP 30,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DECASTRO MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R
T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam and concurred in by Associate Justices Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa and Ramon M, Bato, Jr.
[2] The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, “An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes”; Republic Act No. 9262, “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes”; Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the “Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,” effective November 5, 2004; and People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
[3] Rollo, p. 3.
[4]
[5]
[6] People v. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285,
[7] People v. Montinola, G.R. No. 178061,
[8] People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 177136,
[9] Rollo, p. 9. AAA testified on
Q. And then when the accused undressed himself, what
happened after?
A.
That was when he
raped me, sir.
Q. When you
say he raped you, what did you do?
A. He inserted
his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q. Did he
succeed in inserting his penis into your vagina?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because it
does not fit, sir.
x x x x
Q. And when he
was unable to insert his penis, what did he do if any?
A. Pinatuwad niya po ako.
Q. And after
he made you [bend over], what did he do?
A. He inserted
his penis into my anus (puwit), sir.
Q. Did he
succeed in inserting his penis into your anus?
A. A little, sir.
[10] CA rollo, pp. 82-83; citing the RTC Decision.
[11] People v. Cańada, G.R. No.175317,
[12] People v. Agustin, G.R. No. 175325,
[13] People v. Ranin, Jr., G.R. No. 173023,
[14] People v. Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619,
[15]
G.R. No. 174859,
[16] People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 187531,
[17] People v. Jabiniao, G.R. No. 179499,
[18]
G.R. No. 168168,
[19] People v. Tablang, supra note 15, at 774.
[20]
G.R. No. 188106,
[21]
[22] People v. Ofemiano, G.R. No. 187155, February 1, 2010; citing People v. Pabol, G.R. No. 187084, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 522, 532-533.
[23] Flordeliz v. People, G.R. No. 186441, March 1, 2010.