FIRST
DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 188315 Present:
Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: August
25, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.
On appeal is the
In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for
the dates of the commission of the crime and the age of the complainant, filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
That
in or about and sometime during the month of _________, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the adopting father of complainant who
was then _________ years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge with [AAA] by means of force and intimidation
and against the will of the complainant.[3]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the parties
stipulated on the following facts:
1.
AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;
2.
Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and
3.
AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his
wife since AAA was one and a half years old.[4]
Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
The following facts are undisputed:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB,[5]
since she was just a few months old.[6] BBB is married to appellant, who was working
abroad for six (6) years. Appellant came
home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB.
BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from
Five (5) witnesses
testified for the prosecution. They are
the victim herself, Marvin Suello (Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor (PO1 Babor),
P/Sr Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz (P/Sr Insp. Ortiz), and Maximo Duran (Duran).
The prosecution’s version of the facts follows—
In February 1999 at around
The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was
at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist but appellant threatened
that he will kill her and BBB.
Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when
she suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife. While pointing the knife at AAA’s neck,
appellant removed his shorts, as well as AAA’s pajamas. He slowly parted AAA’s legs and inserted his
penis into AAA’s vagina. Meanwhile, AAA
struggled and hit appellant’s shoulders.
Appellant was able to penetrate her twice before he got out of the
house. Two (2) days after, appellant
again raped her by inserting his organ into AAA’s vagina. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at
least three (3) times a week at around the same time until
On
AAA stayed at her mother’s friend’s house and came back on
PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Women’s and
Children Desk of Makati Police Station on
P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz confirmed that she conducted the medico-legal
examination on AAA. Results of the
examination, as indicated in the medico-legal report, show that the “hymen is
with presence of deep healed laceration at
Duran and another Bantay
Bayan member were at the barangay outpost at
Only appellant testified in his
defense. While appellant admitted that
he was a strict father to AAA in that he would scold and spank her whenever the
latter would ran away, he denied raping AAA.[14] He alleged that AAA has the propensity to make
up stories and was even once caught stealing money from her grandmother. Appellant recalled that on
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, finding accused ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-ONE (181) counts of RAPE penalized by RA 8353, Chapter 3, Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B par. 1. Taking into account the minority of [AAA], adopted daughter of the accused, at the time of rape, and the fact the offender is the adoptive father of the minor complainant, accused, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each count of rape, and to pay [AAA] the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 150,000.00) for moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 50,000.00) for exemplary damages for each count of rape.[16]
The trial court found that force and
intimidation attended the commission of the crime of rape through the testimony
of the victim, which the trial court deemed “straightforward, consistent and
credible.” The trial court also
established that appellant is the adoptive father of AAA since 1989 and that
AAA was then a minor, as proven by the birth certificate, testimonies of
witnesses, and admission made by AAA.[17] Finally, the trial court dismissed
appellant’s defense of denial as self-serving and which cannot prevail over
AAA’s positive testimony.[18]
Upon denial of appellant’s motion for
reconsideration, the case was initially elevated to the Court of Appeals for
its review pursuant to People v. Mateo.[19]
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the case in
On
The fallo of the
Decision reads:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases
Nos. 03-082 to 03-260, inclusive, is found not guilty on the ground of
reasonable doubt and is hereby acquitted;
2.
Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases
Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each count without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim AAA (to be
identified through the Information in this case), the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count.[22]
The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the
first and last incidents of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261,
respectively, was proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.[23] With respect to the other incidents,
according to the appellate court, the testimony of AAA was merely based on
general allegations that she was raped on the average of three (3) times a week
from February 1999 to
On
Appellant harps on the failure of AAA
to actively defend herself or resist the alleged assaults. Moreover, considering that the relatives of
AAA live only meters away from her and the frequency of the alleged
molestation, appellant proffers that it was impossible for them not to notice
the abuses. Appellant also questions the
appreciation of the circumstances of minority and relationship as basis for the
imposition of the death penalty. He
contends that an adopting parent is not included within the purview of
qualifying relationships under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Assuming arguendo
that an adopting parent may be construed as similar to a parent, appellant
argues that the term “adopting parent” must be given a definite and technical
meaning in that the process of adoption must first be undertaken and a judicial
decree to that matter must have been issued.[26]
The OSG, on the other hand, avers that
the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that appellant sexually abused
her, in tandem with the medico-legal report, are more than sufficient to
establish appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, appellant failed to impute any ill
motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of rape.[27]
The OSG insists that AAA’s failure to
report promptly the previous incidents of rape does not dent her
credibility. Appellant’s exercise of
moral ascendancy over AAA and that fact that she was under physical threat during
those times, could have instilled fear on AAA from reporting said incidents.[28]
The OSG moved for modification of the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole in light of Republic Act No. 9346.[29]
After an extensive review of the
records, we find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Appellant was charged with 181 counts
of rape, all of which were committed within the span of three (3) years or from
February 1999 until
In rape cases, “the victim’s
credibility becomes the single most important issue. For when a woman says she
was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused
may be convicted on the basis thereof.”[30]
Both the trial court and the appellate
court found AAA’s testimony credible.
The RTC considered it “straightforward and consistent on material points,”
while the Court of Appeals described it as “spontaneous, forthright, clear and
free-from-serious contradictions.” Well-entrenched
is the legal precept that when the “culpability or innocence
of an accused hinges on the issue of the credibility of witnesses, the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court, when duly
supported by sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest
respect, even finality, by this Court and are not to be disturbed on appeal.”[31] We see no
reason in this case to depart from the principle. Moreover, we give due deference to the
trial court’s assessment of AAA’s credibility, having had the opportunity to
witnesses firsthand and note her demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination.[32]
Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that “when
the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give
credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. When a
girl, especially a minor, says that she has been defiled, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape was inflicted on her.”[33]
Out of the 181 counts of rape
charged against appellant, the prosecution was only able to prove two
counts. Applying the ruling in People v. Garcia,[34]
the Court of Appeals correctly declared, thus:
As to the other counts of rape
(Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260) imputed against accused-appellant, We
find him not guilty beyond reasonable doubt as the testimony of AAA was merely
based on general allegations that she was raped by the accused-appellant on the
average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. AAA’s bare statement is evidently inadequate
and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape as each and every charge of
rape is a separate and distinct crime and that each of them must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. On that score
alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence that the victim was raped three
times a week is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the
guilt of accused-appellant therefore with the required quantum of evidence.[35]
As regards to
the first incident of rape in 1999, AAA recounted how appellant forced her to
have sexual intercourse with him, thus:
Q: What happened after
two (2) weeks?
A: I was sleeping when
somebody went on top of my head.
Q:
Tell us about what time was this when this happened, when you said you noticed
somebody climbing up your bed?
A:
Q: At that time again,
where was your [BBB]?
A: At work, sir.
Q: What happened after
you noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
A: I woke up and I saw
him holding a bread knife.
x x x x
Q:
Did you know who was this person who climbed your bed and who was holding a
knife?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was that person?
A: “Papa”
Q: When you said “Papa,”
you are referring to the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: “Tinusok nya yong
kutsilyo sa leeg ko” and he removed his shorts.
Q: At that time, what
were you then wearing?
A: Pajama, sir.
Q: What if any did the
accused do to what you were wearing then?
A: He undressed me.
Q: Which one did he
remove?
A: My pajama.
Q: What about your
upper garments?
A: He did not remove.
Q:
After you said the accused remove his shorts and removed your pajama, what
happened?
A: He slowly parted my
legs.
Q: And then?
A: He inserted his
penis into my vagina.
Q: What were you doing,
were you resisting when he was doing that?
A: I was resisting but
my strength is no match to him. He was
strong.
Q: What sort of
resistance were you putting up that time?
A: “Hinampas ko po
siya sa braso.”
Q: What was his
response to your act of hitting his arms?
A:
“Wag daw po akong papalag at bubutasin nya ang leeg ko.”[36]
Under Article 266-A(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman who
is below 12 years of age. At that time
of the commission of the first incident of rape, AAA was only 11 years old, as
evidenced by her birth certificate.[37]
As regards the final incident of rape in
Q: You said this happened always, approximately three (3)
times a week, until when?
A: The last time was in
Q: This last incident, describe to us where did it happen
again?
A: In our house.
Q: At about what time?
A:
Q: Narrate to us how
did this incident happen?
A: The same. He went to my bed, holding a bread knife,
pointing it to me and he removed my shorts and he also undressed himself.
Q: Then?
A: And he inserted his sexual organ into my
vagina and after the incident, he left the house.[38]
Since AAA was already 13 years old at
the time of the commission of the last incident of rape, the applicable rule is
Article 266-A(a) which states that rape is committed by a man having carnal
knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation.
AAA’s testimony that she was defiled
by appellant was corroborated by the medical findings of the medico-legal
expert. The presence of deep healed and
shallow healed laceration only confirms AAA’s claim of rape.
In both rape incidents, the trial
court applied Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in imposing the penalty
of death, which was later modified by the Court of Appeals to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9346. Article 266-B provides:
The death penalty
shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
x x x x
The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances
of minority and relationship in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It
relied on the established fact that AAA was still a minor when she was raped
and on the stipulated fact that appellant is her guardian. One of the instances wherein the crime of
rape may be qualified is when the victim is a minor AND the accused is her guardian.
At this point, we cannot subscribe to this interpretation and hence, we
hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the qualifying circumstance
of relationship.
Indeed, it was stipulated during the
pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this
admission to consider guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of
rape. “Circumstances
that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of
stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned
to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or
admissions. This strict rule is
warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution
must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender.”[39]
Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who
has legal relationship with his ward.
The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first
enunciated in the early case of People v.
De la Cruz.[40] The issue in said case was whether the aunt
of a rape victim could file a criminal complaint on behalf of her niece, when
the victim’s father was still living and residing in the
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows:
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor, perdon expreso por dichas partes, segun los casos." Without passing at this time on the question whether the tutor (legal guardian) may file a complaint in the temporary absence of the parents or grandparents of the offended party, it suffices to say that we cannot accept the view of the Government that an aunt who has the temporary custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position of a tutor (legal guardian). The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article 344, supra, must be given the same meaning as in section 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a guardian legally appointed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure.[41]
Garcia was more direct
in addressing the issue of when the accused will be considered a “guardian” as
a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape.
In said case, appellant therein raped a 12-year-old girl. The victim was left to the care of appellant,
who is the live-in partner of the victim’s aunt. The issue of whether appellant is considered
a guardian in the contemplation of the
amendment to the law on rape such that, the victim being a minor, he should be
punished with the higher penalty of death for the nine (9) crimes of rape was answered in
the negative by the Court. The
underlying reason behind its ruling was explained in this discourse:
In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, specifically as one who, aside from the offended party, her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file the sworn written complaint to commence the prosecution for that crime. In People vs. De la Cruz, it was held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on civil procedure.
x x x x
It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from the "guardian" in the recent amendments of Article 335 where he is also mentioned in the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion of the guardian is only to invest him with the power to sign a sworn written complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the imposition of the death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should the restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or judicial guardian, be required in the latter article.
The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification that he should be a legal or judicial guardian. It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward.
They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty of death.
x x x x
The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.
In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.[42]
People v. De la Cuesta[43] adhered to Garcia
when it ruled that the mere fact that the mother asked the accused to look
after her child while she was away did not constitute the relationship of
guardian-ward as contemplated by law.[44]
Garcia was further
applied by analogy in People v. Delantar[45]
where it was held that the “guardian” envisioned in
Section 31(c) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a person who has a legal relationship
with a ward. In said case, accused was
charged for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 when
he pimped an 11 year old child to at least two clients. The Court held that the prosecution failed to
establish filiation albeit it
considered accused as a de facto
guardian. However, this was not
sufficient to justify the imposition of the higher penalty pursuant to the
ruling in Garcia. In addition,
the Court construed the term “guardian” in this manner:
Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase
susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering
the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.87
Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the
imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an
"ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the
second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the
words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote
a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the
guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a
ward. This relationship may be established either by being the ward’s
biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant
is neither AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s adoptive father. Clearly,
appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law.[46]
Be that as it may, this qualifying
circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in the Informations.
What was clearly stated was that appellant was the “adopting father” of AAA,
which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.
For failure of the prosecution to
prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only be convicted
for two (2) counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.
We likewise reduce the Court of
Appeals’ award of civil indemnity from P75,000.00
to P50,000.00 and moral damages from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.[47] The award of exemplary damages in
the amount of P25,000.00 should be
increased to P30,000.00 pursuant to People
v. Guillermo.[48] While no aggravating circumstance attended
the commission of rapes, it was established during trial that appellant used a
deadly weapon to perpetrate the crime.
Hence, the award of exemplary damages is proper.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO
ORDERED.
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JOSE
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WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos with Associate Justices Mario L.
Guariña III and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-24.
[2] The
victim’s real name is withheld to protect her privacy, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2000
and People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No.
167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 425-426.
[3] Records,
pp. 1-341
[4]
[5] Likewise,
the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information
tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their
immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed per Cabalquinto.
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8] TSN,
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11] Records,
p. 350.
[12] TSN,
[13] TSN,
[14] TSN,
[15] TSN,
17 July 2003, pp. 3-14.
[16] CA rollo,
p. 26.
[17]
[18]
[19] G.R.
Nos. 147678-87,
[20] CA rollo,
p. 31.
[21]
[22] Rollo,
p. 23.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] CA rollo,
pp. 80-85.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
People v. Paculba, G.R. No. 183453, 9 March 2010 citing People
v. Mingming, G.R. No. 174195, 10 December 2008, 573 SCRA 509, 532; People
v. Capareda, 473 Phil. 301, 330 (2004); People v. Galido, G.R. Nos.
148689-92, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 502, 516.
[31] People v. Guillera, G.R. No. 175829,
[32] People v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724, 5
June 2009, 588 SCRA 816, 825 citing People v. Bantiling, 420 Phil. 849,
862-863 (2001).
[33]
People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633,
[34] 346
Phil. 475 (1997).
[35] Rollo,
p. 21.
[36] TSN,
[37] Records,
p. 351.
[38]
[39] People v. Dalipe, G.R. No. 187154, 23 April
2010 citing People v. Ibarrientos, G.R. Nos. 148063-64, 17 June 2004, 432 SCRA 424,
440.
[40] 59 Phil. 531 (1934).
[41]
[42] People
v. Garcia, supra note 34 at 500-503.
[43] 363 Phil. 425
(1999).
[44]
[45] G.R.
No. 169143,
[46]
[47] People v. Ofemiano, G.R. No. 187155, 1
February 2010; People v. Pabol, G.R.
No. 187084, 12 October 2009, 603 SCRA 522, 532; People v. Gragasin, G.R. No. 186496, 25 August 2009, 597 SCRA 214,
233; People v. Arcosiba, G.R. No.
181081, 4 September 2009, 598 SCRA 517, 536.
[48] G.R.
No. 177138,