Republic of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
LEONARDO U. FLORES, Petitioner, - versus - HON. RAUL S. GONZALEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of Justice, and EUGENE LIM, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 188197
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 3,
2010 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This
is a petition[1] for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[2]
dated March 6, 2008 and the Resolution[3]
dated May 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CEB SP No. 02726.
The
antecedent facts and proceedings follow:
On
June 24, 2004, petitioner Leonardo U. Flores (
Briefly, the complaint alleged that,
during the pre-incorporation stage of Enviroboard Manufacturing, Inc. (EMI) in
October 1996, Lim tricked Flores and the other EMI’s incorporators (Flores, et
al.) to purchase two compact processing equipments, CP15 and CP14, from Compak
System Limited, Inc. (Compak) in P60,106,000.00,
with the assurance that Lim could effect the cancellation of the purchase for
the CP15. P38,174,618.16 (at the conversion of P41.80) per
the Letter of Credit (LC) No. 263-C-6-00073[5],
Proforma Invoice No. CP627A dated June 18, 1996[6]
and the Ocean Bill of Lading[7]
relative to these documents.
Lim filed his counter-affidavit[8]
denying all the accusations against him.
Among others, he insisted that the CP14 was actually priced at P60,106,000.00,
and LC No. 263-C-6-00073 represented only part of the payment for the purchase
price. To support his refutations, he
submitted a Contract Payment Receipt[9]
dated August 20, 1996 showing that the full price of a CP14, in reference to
Proforma Invoice No. CP627B dated March 4, 1996, was actually £1,466,000.00 or P60,106,000.00. He also submitted documents showing that a
CP10, an older model of the CP14 was already priced at £1,031,585.00.[10]
After
further exchange of pleadings and the case was submitted for resolution, the
City Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution[11]
dated January 16, 2005 dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause. The motion for reconsideration[12]
filed by
On
July 12, 2005,
In
a Resolution[16] dated
March 2, 2006, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the petition on the ground
that there was no showing of any reversible error on the part of the handling
prosecutors, and for Flores’ failure to append several documents to his
petition.
In
his Resolution[20] dated
May 31, 2006, the Secretary of Justice reconsidered, disposing thus—
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The City Prosecutor of Cebu City is hereby directed to file an
information for other deceits defined and penalized under Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, and
to report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Pursuant
to the said directive, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC),
Lim
thus filed a motion for reconsideration[23]
of the May 31, 2006 Resolution.
On
March 22, 2007, the Secretary of Justice reconsidered anew and issued another
Resolution,[27]
disposing as follows—
WHEREFORE, finding respondent’s motion for
reconsideration to be meritorious, the Resolution dated May 31, 2006 is
REVERSED. The instant petition for
review is hereby DISMISSED WITH FINALITY.
Consequently, the Office of the City
Prosecutor is hereby directed to withdraw the information, if any had been
filed in Court, and report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Accordingly,
on May 3, 2007, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed with the MTCC a Motion to
Withdraw Information.[29]
Seeking
to nullify the March 22, 2007 Resolution,
Meanwhile,
on June 20, 2007, the MTCC issued its Resolution[31]
denying the Motion to Withdraw Information.
Ratiocinating on the denial of the motion, it declared—
The
Court notes the flip-flopping of the Public Prosecutors, notably the Secretary
of Justice in the instant case. On
January 16, 2005, the Investigating Prosecutor dismissed the case for lack of
probable cause. After his Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, the private complainant appealed to the Secretary
of Justice who, however, dismissed the same on a technicality. Private complainant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the Secretary of Justice granted on Mary 31, 2006. In that Resolution, the City Prosecutor of
Cebu was directed to file within ten (10) days from receipt, an Information
charging Accused with the crime of “Other Deceits” under Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code. Now the same
Secretary of Justice has reversed himself again and, through his subordinates,
is asking the Court to withdraw the Information.
The Court has conformably to the doctrine
laid down in Crespo and other cases made its own independent assessment of the
evidence thus far submitted and is convinced that there exists probable cause
to hold accused to trial where the parties can better ventilate their
respective claims and defense[s].[32] (Emphasis
supplied.)
On
June 29, 2007,
Meanwhile,
Lim, on July 20, 2007, moved to reconsider the June 20, 2007 MTCC Resolution.[34]
On
August 20, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court
of Appeals its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment.[35] The OSG’s position was that the Secretary of
Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and
directing the withdrawal of the Information.
Lim filed his Comment[36]
on September 28, 2007.
In
the meantime, on November 26, 2007, the MTCC issued an Order[38]
holding in abeyance the proceedings pending before it, including the resolution
of Lim’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of the Motion to Withdraw
Information. It held—
In
a manner of speaking, the subject incident is straddling on two horses. The ardent desire of the private complainant
to prosecute the accused is evident when he filed the petition before the Hon.
Court of Appeals to question the Resolution of the Hon. Secretary of
Justice. There is nothing wrong to be zealous
in prosecuting an accused except that his chosen approach coupled with the fact
that this court chose to disregard the subject Resolution and insists on its
jurisdiction over the case result in a procedural disorder or confusion. This is taking into account the
unquestionable primacy of the Hon. Court of Appeals over this court by virtue
of which any action or resolution by this court on the issue can be negated or
voided by the former. By reason of such
primacy, this court ought to defer to the Hon. Court of Appeals and observe
judicial courtesy to a superior court.
The
outcome of the pending case before the Hon. Court of Appeals questioning the
resolution and order of the Hon. Secretary of Justice will eventually determine
the merit of the resolution of this court in denying the motion to withdraw
filed by the prosecution acting on the order of the Hon. Secretary of Justice.
Hypothetically,
if the Hon. Court of Appeals will sustain the Hon. Secretary of Justice, how
can this court take a posture different from that of a superior court and
insist[s] on hearing this case.
Conversely, if the Hon. Court of Appeals will sustain the private
complainant, it will, in effect, sustain the resolution of this court denying
the motion to withdraw Information, and render the motion for reconsideration
of the public prosecution moot and academic.
In such a case, the prosecution of the accused will have to proceed.
If
the court will proceed with this case but the Hon. Secretary of Justice will be
eventually upheld by the Hon. Court of Appeals, all the proceeding[s] already
had in this court would become useless and wasted, including the time and
efforts of all parties concerned.
Furthermore,
to continue with the proceedings in this case while a case that matters is
pending in the Hon. Court of Appeals will constitute discourtesy and disrespect
to a superior court. That there is no
injunction or restraint on this court to proceed with this case is not an issue
since in the first place it was the private complainant and not the public
prosecutor or the accused who initiated the petition for certiorari in the Hon.
Court of Appeals. In fact, judicial
courtesy and respect dictate that the private complainant ought to initiate the
suspension of the proceedings of the case in this court while the petition is
pending, or if he wants the proceedings herein to continue, then he should have
initiated the withdrawal or termination of the case he filed in the Hon. Court
of Appeals.[39]
On
March 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated the questioned Decision finding
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice in issuing
his March 22, 2007 Resolution.
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE JUNE 20, 2007 RESOLUTION
OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, DENYING RESPONDENT LIM’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
INFORMATION AND FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE, RENDERED THE DISPOSITION OF THE PETITION
BEFORE [THE] COURT OF APPEALS ACADEMIC?
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
COULD RULE IN A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE VALIDITY, WEIGHT,
ADMISSIBILITY, AND MERITS OF PARTIES’ DEFENSES, EVIDENCE, AND ACCUSATION?
In gist, Flores asserts in his
petition that the June 20, 2007 Resolution of the MTCC denying the Motion to
Withdraw filed by the prosecution and finding probable cause to hold Lim for
trial for the crime of Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code rendered his petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals moot and academic.
He says that this is pursuant to the ruling in the landmark case of Crespo v. Mogul[40]
that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case resulting either in the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the court, who is the best and sole judge on what action
to take in the case before it.
Our Ruling
With
respect to the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. Indeed, as Crespo declared—
[O]nce
a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In
order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the
trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.[41]
In
this case, on a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice found probable
cause for Other Deceits against Lim; thus, the proper Information was filed in
Court pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice. Upon filing of the Information, the MTCC
acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Lim
filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice. There was nothing
procedurally infirm in this course of action inasmuch as there is nothing in Crespo that bars the Secretary of
Justice from reviewing resolutions of his subordinates in an appeal or petition
for review in criminal cases. The
Secretary of Justice was merely advised in Crespo
that, as far as practicable, he should not take cognizance of an appeal when
the complaint or information is already filed in court.[42]
This is also true with respect to a
motion for reconsideration before the Secretary of Justice. Review, whether on appeal or on motion for
reconsideration, as an act of supervision and control by the Secretary of
Justice over the prosecutors, finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an
administrative agency may be corrected by higher administrative authorities,
and not directly by courts. As a rule,
only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be
allowed.[43] In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss
or a motion to withdraw the information, which the prosecution may file after
the Secretary of Justice reverses the finding of probable cause, is subject to
the discretion of the court.[44]
In
this case, the Secretary of Justice, reversed himself in his March 22, 2007
Resolution, and directed the withdrawal of the Information against Lim. In compliance with this directive, the
prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information on May 3, 2007. Flores, on the other hand, filed on May 22,
2007 a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals to assail the March 22, 2007 Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice. Then, on June 20, 2007, the
MTCC denied the Motion to Withdraw Information on the ground that, based on its
own assessment, there exists probable cause to hold Lim for trial for the crime
of Other Deceits. In view of the June 20,
2007 MTCC Resolution,
We
wish to point out that, notwithstanding the pendency of the Information before
the MTCC, especially considering the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of
his May 31, 2006 Resolution, a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, anchored on the alleged grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of Secretary
of Justice, was an available remedy to Flores as an aggrieved party.[45]
In
the petition for certiorari, the
Court of Appeals is not being asked to cause the dismissal of the case in the
trial court, but only to resolve the issue of whether the Secretary of Justice
acted with grave abuse of discretion in either affirming or reversing the
finding of probable cause against the accused.
But still the rule stands—the decision whether to dismiss the case or
not rests on the sound discretion of the trial court where the Information was
filed.[46] As jurisdiction was already acquired by the
MTCC, this jurisdiction is not lost despite a resolution by the Secretary of
Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case, notwithstanding the
deferment or suspension of the arraignment of the accused and further
proceedings, and not even if the Secretary of Justice is affirmed by the higher
courts.[47]
Verily,
it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice, in spite of being affirmed by the appellate courts,
since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case
and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice. Reliance on the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty
and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case.[48] Thus, the trial court may make an independent
assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and
counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the
records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to
produce before it; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the
accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.[49] The trial court should make its assessment
separately and independently of the evaluation of the prosecution or of the
Secretary of Justice. This assessment
should be embodied in the written order disposing of the motion to dismiss or
the motion to withdraw the information.[50]
This
was precisely what the MTCC did when it denied the Motion to Withdraw
Information in its June 20, 2007 Resolution, and it correctly did so. In view of the above disquisitions, and while
the disposition of the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice acted
with grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause against Lim may be
persuasive, the MTCC is not bound to dismiss the case or to withdraw the
Information. For these reasons, the
petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals has effectively become moot and academic upon the issuance by
the MTCC of its June 20, 2007 Resolution.
The March 6, 2008 Decision and the May 28, 2009 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals affirming the Secretary of Justice will really make no difference
anymore.
As
held in Auto Prominence Corporation v.
Winterkorn,[51]
pursuant to our ruling in Crespo and
in the subsequent related cases, this Court held—
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess or
jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of probable cause, the party
seeking the writ of certiorari must
be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law. Grave
abuse of discretion is not enough, it must amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction
signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case, but (he) transcended the same
or acted without authority.
There
is no escaping the fact that resolving the issue of whether the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction would necessarily entail a review of his finding of lack of
probable cause against the respondents AUDI AG officers.
If
we should sustain the DOJ Secretary in maintaining that no probable cause
exists to hold respondents AUDI AG officers liable to stand trial for the crime
they were charged with, our ruling would actually serve no practical or useful
purpose, since the RTC had already made such a judicial determination, on the
basis of which it dismissed Criminal Case No. 4824-A. Lest it be forgotten, the fact that the
Information against respondents AUDI AG officers had already been filed in
court, its disposition, i.e., its
dismissal or the conviction of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of
the Court. And although the fiscal
retains direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while
the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole
judge of what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. Thus, the court may deny or
grant the motion to withdraw an Information, not out of subservience to the
(Special) Prosecutor, but in faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative. For these very same reasons, we must now
refrain from resolving the issues raised by petitioners PPC and APC,
considering that the information against respondents AUDI AG officers had
already been filed before the RTC; the RTC acquired exclusive jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 4824-A; and it has already rendered judgment dismissing the
charges against respondents AUDI AG officers.
This
is not to say that we are already affirming the 2 July 2008 Order of the RTC
dismissing Criminal Case No. 4824-A. To
the contrary, we are much aware that petitioners PPC and APC’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the said order of dismissal is still pending resolution by
the trial court. By refusing to go into
the merits of the instant Petition, we are only respecting the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC over Criminal Case No. 4824-A and avoiding any
pronouncement on our part which would preempt its independent assessment of the
case. Irrefragably, a determination by
us that probable cause against respondents AUDI AG officers does or does not
exist would strongly influence, if not directly affect, the resolution by the
RTC of the matter still pending before it.
In any case, the party that would feel aggrieved by the final judgment
or order of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 4824-A has the option of
elevating the same to the higher courts.
And if only for the orderly administration of justice, the proceeding in
Criminal Case No. 4824-A, that is, the resolution of the pending motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners PPC and APC, should be allowed to continue
and take its course.
Under
the circumstances, the denial of the present Petition is clearly warranted for
being moot. Where a declaration on an
issue would have no practical use or value, this Court will refrain from
expressing its opinion in a case where no practical relief may be granted in
view of a supervening event. Thus, it is
unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot
question, as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in
the nature of things, cannot be enforced.[52]
Anent the second issue, suffice it to
state that these matters are best addressed to the MTCC, where they will be
thoroughly ventilated and threshed out in the resolution of Lim’s motion for
reconsideration of the MTCC June 20, 2007 Resolution, and eventually, if the
trial court denies the motion, during the trial on the merits before it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02726 is
declared MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Consequently, the assailed Decision dated
March 6, 2008 and the Resolution dated May 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
the said case are SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-33.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla and Franchito N. Diamante, concurring; id. at 35-45.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice
Franchito N. Diamante, with Associate Justices Edgardo L. delos
[4]
[5] See Peso Debit Memo; id. at 92.
[6] See Compak Invoice No. 4520 dated June 30, 1996; id. at 94.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Motion for Reconsideration; id. at 299-306.
[18] Comments/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration; id. at 361-366.
[19] Reply; id. at 372-375.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40] L-53373, June 30, 1987, 235 Phil. 465, 476 (1987).
[41]
[42] Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 598 (1996), citing Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106695, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 39, 48-49.
[43] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, 230 (1997).
[44] Caoili v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 791, 796 (1997).
[45] Chan v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147065, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 337, 350.
[46]
[47] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra note 43, at 232; Caoili v. Court of Appeals, supra note 44, at 796.
[48] People
of the
[49]
[50] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra note 43, at 235.
[51] G.R. No. 178104, January 27, 2009, 577 SCRA 51.
[52]