Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
|
SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS
REYES and SPOUSES ROLANDO DELOS REYES and EUGENE DELOS REYES Petitioners, - versus - SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES
and ARWENIA R. ODONES, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 186979
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August
11, 2010 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 14, 2008 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. GR. SP No. 97668 and its Resolution[2]
dated March 9, 2009 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The impugned Decision affirmed the
resolution dated November 16, 2006[3]
and Order dated January 5, 2007[4] of
the trial court, which respectively denied petitioners’ Motion to Set for
Preliminary Hearing the Special and Affirmative Defenses[5] and motion for reconsideration.[6]
The
antecedents:
On
June 17, 2005, private respondents-spouses Francisco Odones and Arwenia Odones,
filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Socorro
Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes and Spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes,
docketed as Civil Case No. 05-33 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68.
The
complaint alleged that spouses Odones are the owners of a 940- square meter
parcel of land located at Pao 1st, Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of an
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale dated, January 29, 2004, executed
by the surviving grandchildren and heirs of Donata Lardizabal in whom the original
title to the land was registered. These heirs were Soledad Razalan Lagasca,
Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca Razalan and Dominador Razalan.
It
took a while before respondents decided to register the document of conveyance;
and when they did, they found out that the land’s Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) was cancelled on April 27, 2005 and replaced by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 329427 in the name of herein petitioners.
Petitioners were able to secure TCT
No. 329427 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Donata
Lardizabal and her husband Francisco Razalan on April 18, 1972.
Petitioners then subdivided the lot
among themselves and had TCT No. 329427 cancelled. In lieu thereof, three new
TCTs were issued: TCT No. 392428 in the names of Socorro Limos and spouses
Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, TCT No. 392429 in the names of
Spouses delos Reyes and TCT No. 392430 in the name of Rosa Delos Reyes.
Respondents sought the cancellation
of these new TCTs on the ground that the signatures of Donata Lardizabal and
Francisco Razalan in the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries, because
they died on June 30, 1926 and June 5, 1971, respectively.[7]
In response, petitioners filed a
Motion for Bill of Particulars[8]
claiming ambiguity in respondents’ claim that their vendors are the only heirs
of Donata Lardizabal. Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court denied
the same and ordered petitioners to file their answer to the complaint.[9]
In their answer,[10]
petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also constitute grounds for
dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1) failure to state a cause of
action inasmuch as the basis of respondents’ alleged title is void, since the
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was not published and it contained
formal defects, the vendors are not the legal heirs of Donata Lardizabal, and
respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question the title of
petitioners, because no transaction ever occurred between them; (2) non-joinder
of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable parties; and (3)
respondents’ claim is barred by laches.
In their Reply, respondents denied
the foregoing affirmative defenses, and insisted that the Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and Sale was valid. They maintained their standing as
owners of the subject parcel of land and the nullity of the 1972 Absolute Deed
of Sale, upon which respondents anchor their purported title.[11]
They appended the sworn statement of Amadeo Razalan declaring, among other
things that:
(2) Na hindi ko minana at ibinenta ang nasabing
lupa kay Socorro Limos at Rosa delos Reyes at hindi totoo na ako lang ang
tagapagmana ni Donata Lardizabal;
x x x x
(4) Ang aming lola na si Donata Lardizabal ay
may tatlong (3) anak na patay na sina Tomas Razalan, Clemente Razalan at Tomasa
Razalan;
(5) Ang mga buhay na anak ni Tomas Razalan ay
sina; 1. Soledad Razalan; 2. Ceferina Razalan; 3. Dominador Razalan; at 4.
Amadeo Razalan. Ang mga buhay na anak ni Clemente Razalan ay sina 1. Rogelio
Lagasca (isang abnormal). Ang mga buhay na anak ni Tomasa Razalan ay sina 1.
Sotera Razalan at 2 pang kapatid;
x x x x[12]
Thereafter, petitioners served upon
respondents a Request for Admission of the following matters:
1. That the husband of the deceased Donata Lardizabal is Francisco Razalan;
2. That the children of the deceased Sps. Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan are Mercedes Razalan, Tomasa Razalan and Tomas Razalan;
3. That this Tomasa Razalan died on April 27, 1997, if not when? [A]nd her heirs are (a) Melecio Partido surviving husband, and her surviving children are (b) Eduardo Partido married to Elisa Filiana, (c) Enrique Razalan Partido married to Lorlita Loriana, (d) Eduardo Razalan Partido, (e) Sotera Razalan Partido married to James Dil-is and (f) Raymundo Razalan Partido married to Nemesia Aczuara, and all residents of Camiling, Tarlac.
4. That Amadeo Razalan is claiming also to be a grandchild and also claiming to be sole forced heir of Donata Lardizabal pursuant to the Succession by a Sole Heir with Sale dated January 24, 2000, executed before Atty. Rodolfo V. Robinos.
5. That Amadeo Razalan is not among those who signed the Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale dated January 29, 2004 allegedly executed in favor of the plaintiffs, Sps. Francisco/Arwenia Odones;
6. That as per Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan which was submitted by the plaintiffs, the children of Tomasa Razalan are Sotera Razalan and 2 brothers/sisters. These children of Tomasa Razalan did not also sign the Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale;
7. That there is/are no heirs of Clemente Razalan who appeared to have executed the Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale;
8. That Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca Razalan and Dominador Razalan did not file any letters (sic) of administration nor declaration of heirship before executing the alleged Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale in favor of plaintiffs.[13]
Respondents failed to respond to the
Request for Admission, prompting petitioners to file a Motion to Set for
Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses,[14]
arguing that respondents’ failure to respond or object to the Request for
Admission amounted to an implied admission pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 26 of
the Rules of Court. As such, a hearing on the affirmative defenses had become imperative
because petitioners were no longer required to present evidence on the admitted
facts.
Respondents filed a comment on the Motion,
contending that the facts sought to be admitted by petitioners were not
material and relevant to the issue of the case as required by Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court. Respondents emphasized that the only attendant issue was
whether the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioners base their TCTs
is valid.[15]
In
its Resolution dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the Motion and held that item nos. 1 to 4 in the
Request for Admission were earlier pleaded as affirmative defenses in
petitioners’ Answer, to which respondents already replied on July 17, 2006.
Hence, it would be redundant for respondents to make another denial. The trial
court further observed that item nos. 5, 6, and 7 in the Request for Admission
were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and
Sale appended to the complaint and by the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan attached to respondents’ Reply.[16] Petitioners moved for reconsideration[17]
but the same was denied in an Order dated January 5, 2007.[18]
Petitioners
elevated this incident to the CA by way of a special civil action for
certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
issuing the impugned resolution and order.
On
August 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative
defenses raised by petitioners were not indubitable, and could be best proven
in a full-blown hearing.[19]
Their
motion for reconsideration[20]
having been denied,[21]
petitioners are now before this Court seeking a review of the CA’s
pronouncements.
In
essence, petitioners contend that the affirmative defenses raised in their
Motion are indubitable, as they were impliedly admitted by respondents when
they failed to respond to the Request for Admission. As such, a preliminary
hearing on the said affirmative defenses must be conducted pursuant to our ruling
in Gochan v. Gochan.[22]
We
deny the petition.
Pertinent
to the present controversy are the rules on modes of discovery set forth in
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Request for admission. – At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.
SEC. 2 Implied admission. – Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall be not less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters for which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
x x x x
Under these
rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed
to have impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be
emphasized, however, that
the
application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion
of the court.
As such, it is the duty of the courts to
examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability
of the modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an
expeditious administration of justice.[23]
The determination of the sanction to be imposed upon
a party who fails to comply with the modes of discovery also rests on sound
judicial discretion.[24] Corollarily, this discretion carries with it
the determination of whether or not to impose the sanctions attributable to
such fault.
As correctly observed by the trial court, the
matters set forth in petitioners’ Request for Admission were the same
affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents already traversed
in their Reply. The said defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in
the complaint and its annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to compel
respondents to deny once again the very matters they had already denied, a
redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the
proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of
discovery which is “to expedite trial
and relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on
trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.”[25]
A request for admission
is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the
requesting party’s pleading but should set forth relevant
evidentiary matters of fact
described in the request, whose
purpose is to
establish said party’s cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that
purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.[26]
Verily then, if
the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were already
admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter
cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party
cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or
even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule
26.
In this case, the redundant and
unnecessarily vexatious nature of petitioners’ Request for Admission rendered
it ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the
implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. There being
no implied admission attributable to respondents’ failure to respond, the
argument that a preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.
Moreover, jurisprudence[27]
has always been firm and constant in declaring that when the affirmative
defense raised is failure to state a cause of action, a preliminary hearing
thereon is unnecessary, erroneous, and improvident.
In any event, a perusal of
respondents’ complaint shows that it was sufficiently clothed with a cause of
action and they were suited to file the same.
In
an action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the following
allegations: (1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff
prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant;
and (2) that the defendant perpetuated a
fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the
parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.[28]
Such action
goes into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title, hence,
the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the
land’s true owner.[29]
Thus, the real
party-in-interest is the person claiming title or ownership adverse to that of
the registered owner.[30]
The
herein complaint alleged: (1) that respondents are the owners and occupants of
a parcel of land located at Pao 1st Camiling, Tarlac, covered by OCT
No. 11560 in the name of Donata Lardizabal by virtue of an Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and Sale; and (2) that petitioners fraudulently caused the
cancellation of OCT No. 11560 and the issuance of new TCTs in their names by
presenting a Deed of Absolute Sale with the forged signatures of Donata
Lardizabal and her husband, Francisco Razalan.
The
absence of any transaction between petitioners and respondents over the land is
of no moment, as the thrust of the controversy is the respondents’ adverse
claims of rightful title and ownership over the same property, which arose
precisely because of the conflicting sources of their respective claims.
As to the validity of the Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and
Anent the alleged non-joinder of
indispensable parties, it is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by
order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
the latter may dismiss the complaint.[31] In this case, no such order was issued by the
trial court.
Equally settled
is the fact that laches is evidentiary in nature and it may not be established
by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to
dismiss.[32]
Finally,
we cannot subscribe to petitioners’ contention that the status of the heirs of
Donata Lardizabal who sold the property to the respondents must first be
established in a special proceeding. The pronouncements in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. Del Rosario[33] and in Reyes
v. Enriquez[34] that the
petitioners invoke do not find application in the present controversy.
In both cases, this Court held that
the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding and not in
a civil action. It must be noted that in
Yaptinchay and Enriquez, plaintiffs’ action for annulment of title was anchored
on their alleged status as heirs of the original owner whereas in this case,
the respondents’ claim is rooted on a sale transaction. Respondents herein are
enforcing their rights as buyers in good faith and for value of the subject
land and not as heirs of the original owner. Unlike in Yaptinchay and Enriquez,
the filiation of herein respondents
to the original owner is not determinative of their right to claim title to and
ownership of the property.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the
instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August
14, 2008 and its Resolution dated
March 9, 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 40-48; penned by Associate Justice Rosalina Asuncion-Vicente, with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring.
[2] Id. at 50-52; penned by Associate Justice Rosalina Asuncion-Vicente and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
[3] Id. at 144-146.
[4] Id. at 158-161.
[5] Id. at 126-130.
[6] Id. at 147-157.
[7] Id. at 55-68.
[8] Id. at 69-71.
[9] Id. at 80.
[10] Id. at 81-91.
[11] Id. at 118-120.
[12] Id. at 121-123.
[13] Id. at 124-125.
[14] Id. at 126-130.
[15] Id. at 132-133.
[16] Supra note 3.
[17] Id. at 147-157.
[18] Supra note 4.
[19] Supra note 1.
[20] Rollo, pp. 282-297.
[21] Supra note 2.
[22] 423 Phil. 491, 505 (2001).
[23] Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97654, November 14, 1994, 238 SCRA 88, 93.
[24] Dela Torre v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 130243, October 30, 1998, 298 Phil. 363, 374-75 (1998).
[25] Lañada v. Court of Appeals and Nestle Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 249, 261 (2002), citing Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 77 (1997).
[26]
[27] Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David, 505 Phil. 181-192 (2005), citing The Heirs of Juliana Clavano v. Genato, 170 Phil. 275-288 (1997).
[28] George Katon v. Planca, et al., 481 Phil. 169, 184 (2004); Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, 428 Phil. 249, 252 (2002).
[29] Goco et al., v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010; Heirs of Rolando N. Abadilla v. Galarosa, G.R. No. 149041, July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 675, 688.
[30] Goco et al., v. Court of Appeals et al., id.
[31] Plasabas et al., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 686, 687; PepsiCo. Inc. v. Emerald Pizza, Inc., G.R. No. 153059, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 58, 67.
[32] Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, 456 Phil. 569, 571 (2003), citing Santos v. Santos, 418 Phil. 681, 692 (2001).
[33] 363 Phil. 393, 394-395 (1999).
[34] G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 86.