Republic of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, - versus - JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant. |
G.R.
No. 186529
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 3,
2010 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On
appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial
Court[2]
(RTC) Joint Decision[3]
dated
The
case stemmed from the following facts:
On
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m.,
appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis
bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and
white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the
national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a
Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the
person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant
stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his
final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team
approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the
accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.[5]
The
team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned over to Police
Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with
appellant’s name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of
the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.[6]
Appellant
was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same
law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:
“That
at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession five
point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly
known as “Shabu”, a regulated drug without any permit or license from the
proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”[7]
“That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on
May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused did then and there, unlawfully,
feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or
4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the proper authorities
to transport the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”[8]
During
the arraignment, appellant pleaded “Not Guilty” to both charges.
At
the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora
to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him
were false and that no shabu was
taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the
police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in;
forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and
underwear; then brought him to the police station for investigation.[9]
On
July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment[10] convicting
appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00;
but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A.
9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.[11]
Hence,
the present appeal.
In his brief,[12]
appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed
to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the team’s failure
to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief,
appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the
validity of the subsequent warrantless search.
He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground
that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The
appeal is meritorious.
We
have repeatedly held that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have
reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight
and substance that would have affected the case.[13]
Appellant
focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of
the sachet of shabu and, consequently,
the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that although the
circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of
the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant
were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the
trial and appellate courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a
criminal case opens the whole case for review. This Court is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in
arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the
accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate
that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.[14]
After
a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be
discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of
his arrest, but the sachet of shabu
seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The records show that appellant never
objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact,
this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse,
coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide
with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over his person. Appellant’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot,
in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. [15]
As to the admissibility of the seized
drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the search
which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.[16]
The 1987 Constitution states that a
search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[17]
Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest;
2. Search of evidence in “plain view;”
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]
What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.[19]
The
RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he
was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a
crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler,
Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.[20] Consequently, the warrantless search
was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in
searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally,
the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.[21] Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we
have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest
appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.[22]
The determination of the existence or
absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the established
facts. On
Clearly,
what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was
the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler,
The long standing rule in this
jurisdiction is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some
overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense.[24]
We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,[25] People v. Tudtud,[26] and
People v. Nuevas.[27]
In
People v. Aruta, a police officer was
tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be arriving from
The
facts in People v. Tudtud show that in
July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City, received a report
from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were
complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana
in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted
surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud
was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed
the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day
with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of
police officers posted themselves to await Tudtud’s arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two
men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police
officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of
the box which yielded marijuana leaves.[29]
In
People v. Nuevas, the police officers
received information that a certain male person, more or less 5’4” in height,
25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually
wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While
conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking,
they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The
police accosted the accused and informed him that they were police officers.
Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape
charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a
delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later
identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them,
introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were
carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana
leaves.[30]
In
all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely
because there was no adequate probable cause.
We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal
design.
As
in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence
of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant
had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant
was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground
for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or
intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the
informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have
been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu
would not have been confiscated.
We
are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems “reliable
information” sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest. As cited
in People
v. Tudtud, these include People
v.
Maspil, Jr.,[31] People v. Bagista,[32] People v. Balingan,[33] People v. Lising,[34] People v. Montilla,[35] People v. Valdez,[36]
and People v. Gonzales.[37] In
these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches
notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that
would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or
attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in
Neither
were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do
away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio
Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the “tipped
information” on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only
the appellant’s physical description but also his name. Although it was not
certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an
assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the
police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.[39]
Obviously,
this is an instance of seizure of the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section
3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, “any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”
Without
the confiscated shabu, appellant’s
conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an
acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to
question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active
participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of
an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest.[40]
One
final note. As clearly stated in People
v. Nuevas,[41]
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would
have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist
on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may
still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law
enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the
name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown
of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this
Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish
them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.[42]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero
Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency
of evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless the
latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the
date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days
from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-17.
[2] Branch 96, Baler,
[3] Penned by Judge Corazon D. Soluren; records, pp. 152-157.
[4] Transcript of Stenographic Notes, July 31, 2003, pp. 4-6.
[5] Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[6]
[7] Records (Criminal Case No. 3054), p. 1
[8] Records (Criminal Case No. 3038), p. 1.
[9] Rollo, p. 6.
[10] Supra note 3.
[11] Supra note 1.
[12] CA rollo, pp. 56-69.
[13]
[14] People v. Chua, supra.
[15]
[16]
[17] Section 2 and 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
[18] People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, 475-476 citing People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 771 (2003).
[19] People
v. Nuevas, id. at 476.
[20] Records, p. 156.
[21] People v. Nuevas, supra at 477; People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752 (2003).
[22] People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998).
[23] Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[24] People v. Nuevas, supra; People v. Tudtud, supra.
[25] Supra note 22.
[26] Supra.
[27] Supra.
[28] People v. Aruta, supra at 875.
[29] People v. Tudtud, supra at 765-766.
[30] People v. Nuevas, supra at 468-469.
[31] G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA 751.
[32] G.R. No. 86218, September 12, 1992, 214 SCRA 63.
[33] 311 Phil. 290 (1995).
[34] 341 Phil. 801 (1997).
[35] 349 Phil. 640 (1998).
[36] 363 Phil. 481 (1999).
[37] 417 Phil. 342 (2001).
[38] People v. Tudtud, supra at 776.
[39] People v. Tudtud, supra at 782; People v. Aruta, supra at 894.
[40] People v. Nuevas, supra at 483-484; People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729, 748 (2003).
[41] Supra.
[42] People
v. Nuevas, supra at 484-485.