Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
THE HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN AND ROMANA BIGO, NAMELY:
PACITA PIDACAN VDA. DE ZUBIRI AND ADELA PIDACAN VDA. DE ROBLES,
Petitioners,
- versus - AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, represented by its Acting
Director BIENVENIDO MANGA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 186192 Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August
25, 2010 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition[1]
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
praying that the Orders[2]
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
Branch 46, dated June 23, 2008 and January 23, 2009, be set aside and that said
RTC be directed to issue a Writ of Execution enforcing this Court's Decision in
Heirs of Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo v. Air Transportation Office (ATO).[3]
The facts are
summarized as follows:
In
1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Bigo, predecessors-in-interest of
petitioners-heirs namely, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda.
de Robles (petitioners), acquired a parcel of land with an area of about 22
hectares, situated in
However, in 1948,
respondent Air Transportation Office (ATO)[4]
used a portion of the property as an airport. In 1974, the ATO constructed a
perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the property. The ATO also lengthened,
widened, and cemented the airport's runway. Petitioners demanded from ATO the
payment of the value of the property as well as the rentals for the use thereof
but ATO refused. Eventually in 1988, OCT No. 2204 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-7160 was issued in favor of petitioners. Despite
this development, ATO still refused to pay petitioners.
Petitioners filed a
complaint with the RTC against ATO for payment of the value of the property and
rentals due thereon. In 1994, the RTC promulgated a decision, ordering ATO to
pay rentals and the value of the land at P89.00 per square meter. ATO
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which remanded the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings. The CA also held that just compensation should
had been determined as of the time the property was taken for public use.
On remand, the RTC ruled
again in favor of petitioners, ordering ATO, among others, to pay petitioners
the amount of P304.00 per sq m for the area expropriated or a total of P65,584,048.00,
imposing interest at the rate of 12% per annum from February 1, 2001 until
full payment, and to pay monthly rentals for the use and occupation of the
property from January 1, 1957 to January 31, 2001, for a total amount of P6,249,645.40,
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum until the same is fully paid.
Undaunted, the ATO went to
the CA, which again remanded the case to the court a quo for the
determination of just compensation on the basis of the market value prevailing
in 1948. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the motion
was denied. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari
before this Court.
On June 15, 2007, we ruled in favor of petitioners, holding that ATO's
act of converting petitioners' private property into an airport came within the
purview of eminent domain and as a consequence, petitioners were completely
deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property. We declared
that justice and fairness dictate that the appropriate reckoning point for the
valuation of petitioners' property was when the RTC made its order of
expropriation in 2001. However, we deleted the RTC's award of rental payments
for lack of evidence. Thus, we disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated August 20, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72404 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. R-800 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. The actual area occupied by respondent ATO covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160, totaling 215,737 square meters[,] is declared expropriated in favor of the ATO.
2. The ATO is ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P304.39
per square meter for the area expropriated, or a total of P65,668,185.43
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from February 1, 2001, until
the same is fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On July 10, 2007, ATO filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration which
we denied with finality in our Resolution[6]
dated September 12, 2007. On October 25, 2007, Entry of Judgment[7]
was made. Thus, on February 20, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Execution[8]
before the RTC. On February 27, 2008, the ATO, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed an Opposition[9]
to petitioners' Motion.
On June 23, 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying
petitioners' Motion for Execution on the ground that the prosecution,
enforcement, or satisfaction of State liability must be pursued in accordance
with the rules and procedures laid down in Commonwealth Act No. 327,[10]
as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445.[11]
The RTC also relied on this Court's Administrative Circular No. 10-2000, dated
October 25, 2000, which enjoined all judges to observe utmost caution, prudence,
and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money
judgments against government agencies and local government units. Thus, the RTC
disposed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Motion For the Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by the plaintiffs is hereby DENIED. However, the plaintiffs are implored to file and pursue their monetary claims against the government with the Commission on Audit pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 6 of P.D. No. 1445 vis-a-vis Rule VIII of [the] 1997 COA Revised Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners
filed their Motion for Reconsideration[13]
which the RTC, however, denied in its Order dated January 23, 2009.
Hence, this Petition raising the following
issues:
1. W[H]ETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT AIR
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE IS ALREADY IN LEGAL ESTOPPEL TO OPPOSE PETITIONERS'
MOTION FOR EXECUTION BECAUSE IT HAS LITIGATED AND OPPOSED THE CLAIM OF THE
PETITIONERS FROM THE RTC OF SAN JOSE, OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, THE COURT OF APPEALS,
AND ALL THE WAY UP TO THIS HONORABLE COURT[;]
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINAL DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT CANNOT BE EXECUTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE LIGHT OF PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 6 OF P.D. NO. 1445 VIS-A-VIS RULE VIII OF THE 1997 COA REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 10-2000, DATED OCTOBER 25, 2000[; AND]
3. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FINAL DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT[,] IS IT NOT THAT RESPONDENT AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE IS THE ONE WHO IS LEGALLY BOUND TO PURSUE AND GET THE MONETARY CLAIM OF THE PETITIONERS AS DECIDED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICES[?][14]
Petitioners
claim that ATO is now in estoppel because it did not invoke any doctrine which
provides that any decision against ATO cannot be executed; that Administrative
Circular No. 10-2000 is merely intended to prevent possible circumvention of Commission
on Audit (COA) rules and regulations which cannot happen in this case as this
Court already decided with finality on ATO's liability; that said circular only
enjoins judges to observe utmost caution but does not per se prohibit
the issuance of writs of execution for money claims against the government;[15]
and that it is incumbent upon the RTC to direct ATO to look for the necessary
funds in order to satisfy the decision of this Court. Moreover, petitioners
manifest that, on March 3, 2009, Ruben F. Ciron, Director General of ATO, wrote
petitioners' counsel,[16]
the pertinent portions of which state:
This is in connection with your claim for compensation
over the portion of lot occupied by
In this regard, we are pleased to inform you that the
funding for the initial payment for the acquisition of the above-described lot
encroached by San Jose Airport was earmarked in the 2007 General
Appropriation[s] Act for ATO-DOTC Infrastructure Program. However, its release
was held by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) with the advice to
file the individual claims directly with the Commission for Adjudication by the
Commission Proper, Commission on Audit,
In
its Comment,[18]
ATO, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), argues that
the RTC faithfully complied with Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 by not
indiscriminately issuing any writ of execution to enforce money claims against
the government in accordance with existing jurisprudence and the provisions of
P.D. No. 1445. Section 26[19]
of P.D. No. 1445 provides that all money claims against the government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities must be filed with the
COA. The OGCC also submits that petitioners failed to properly observe the
principle of the hierarchy of courts by directly filing their Petition before
this Court without raising pure questions of law.
We grant the Petition.
Well-settled in this jurisdiction that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial prerogative.[20]
Thus, in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Judge Dulay,[21]
we declared:
The determination of "just
compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination
shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded
from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
In
view of this mandate, this Court has finally spoken in our Decision on June 15,
2007, declaring the property to be expropriated in favor of ATO and ordering
the latter to pay petitioners just compensation. This ruling had already become
final and executory. Our Decision is clear and unambiguous. Nothing is left to
be done, save for its execution.
Moreover,
it bears stressing that the Director General of ATO informed petitioners that
the funding for the initial payment for the acquisition of the property was
already earmarked in the 2007 General Appropriations Act for ATO-Department of
Transportation and Communication Infrastructure Program. Under the
circumstances, such earmarking may be considered as the appropriation required
by law in order that petitioners may be paid just compensation long due them.
Our
ruling in EPG Construction Co. v. Hon. Vigilar,[22]
citing Amigable v.
To our mind, it would be the apex
of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat petitioners-contractors'
right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered,
where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted
benefits from said housing project and reaped the fruits of
petitioners-contractors' honest toil and labor.
Incidentally, respondent likewise
argues that the State may not be sued in the instant case, invoking the
constitutional doctrine of Non-suability
of the State, otherwise known as the
Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
Respondent's argument is misplaced inasmuch as the
Principle of State Immunity finds no application in the case before us.
Under these circumstances,
respondent may not validly invoke the Royal
Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit,
considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True
enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the
state may not be sued under any circumstance.
Thus, in Amigable v. Cuenca,
this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud which shields the State from
suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of Ministerio v. CFI of
Cebu that "the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice on a citizen." It is just as important, if not more so,
that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of
law were to be maintained.
Although the Amigable and Ministerio
cases generously tackled the issue of the State's immunity from suit vis-a-vis the payment of just compensation
for expropriated property, this Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated
in the aforementioned cases applicable to the instant controversy, considering
that the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this
particular instance, the State's immunity from suit.
To be sure, this Court — as the
staunch guardian of the citizens' rights and welfare — cannot sanction an
injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the
perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State's cloak
of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that
petitioners-contractors be duly compensated — on the basis of quantum meruit —
for construction done on the public works housing project.
It is almost trite to say that
execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is the life of the law. A
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the
prevailing party. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and
efficient administration of justice requires that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts
must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should
frown upon any attempt to prolong them.[25]
Petitioners have been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their
property for a considerable length of time. Now that they prevailed before this
Court, it would be highly unjust and inequitable under the particular
circumstances that payment of just compensation be withheld from them. We,
therefore, write finis to this litigation.
WHEREFORE,
the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, dated June 23, 2008 and January
23, 2009, are hereby SET ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is hereby DIRECTED
to issue a Writ of Execution enforcing this Court's Decision in Heirs of Mateo
Pidacan and Romana Eigo v. Air Transportation Office (ATO)[26]
dated June 15, 2007. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
A T T
E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T
I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-21.
[2]
[3] Penned by Senior
Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (retired), with Associate Justices
Antonio T. Carpio, Dante O. Tinga (retired) and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,
concurring; G.R. No. 162779, June 15, 2007, 524 SCRA 679.
[4] Now known as Civil Aviation
Authority of the Philippines (CAAP).
[5] Heirs of Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo v. Air Transportation Office
(ATO), supra note 3, at 688-689.
[6] Rollo, p. 35.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] An Act Fixing the Time Within Which
the Auditor General Shall Render His Decisions and Prescribing the Manner of
Appeal Therefrom.
[11] The Government Auditing Code of the
[12] Rollo, p. 54.
[13]
[14] Supra note 1, at 13.
[15]
[16] Reply; rollo, pp. 94-97.
[17] Annex “A” of Reply.
[18] Rollo,
pp. 77-84.
[19] SECTION 26. General jurisdiction. − The authority
and powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters
relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the
general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining
thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books,
records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of
the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by
them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and
settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all
government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as
herein prescribed, including non-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of
the Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities
subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through the government,
those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the
government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the
government.
[20] Ortega
v. City of
[21] 233 Phil. 313, 326 (1987).
[22] 407 Phil. 53, 64-66 (2001).
[23] 150 Phil. 422 (1972).
[24] 148-B Phil. 474
(1971).
[25] National Power Corporation v. Omar G.
Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G.
Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom, Lumba G.
Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G. Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom, Mohamad M.
Ibrahim, Cairoronesa M. Ibrahim, and Lucman Ibrahim, represented by his heirs
Adora B. Ibrahim, Nasser B. Ibrahim, Jamalodin B. Ibrahim, Rajid Nabbel B.
Ibrahim, Ameer B. Ibrahim, and Sarah Aizah B. Ibrahim, G.R. No. 183297,
December 23, 2009, citing La Campana
Development Corporation v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
146157, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 137, 159.
[26] Supra note 3.