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PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - MANUEL AGUILAR, Accused-Appellant. |
G.R. No. 185206
Present: CORONA,
C. J., Chairperson, VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, DEL CASTILLO, and PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: August 25, 2010 |
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PEREZ, J.:
We
review in this appeal the
In
line with the ruling of this Court in People
v. Cabalquinto,[2] the real name and identity
of the rape victim, as well as the members of her immediate family, are not
disclosed. Instead, the rape victim shall herein be referred to as XYZ; her
mother, AAA; and her aunt, CCC.
THE FACTS
Appellant
was charged before the RTC with the crime of rape in an Information,[3] the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That
on February 4, 1998 at about 12:00 o’clock midnight at Sitio Sawa-an, Sto. Rosario,
Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation,
with abuse of confidence, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, did lie and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with a 13 year old minor [XYZ], accused’s Step-daughter.
Contrary to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Upon
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The prosecution presented XYZ, AAA and Dr.
Rosita Muñoz as its witnesses. The
appellant took the witness stand as the sole witness for the defense.
The
victim in this case was, at the time of the incident, a 13-year-old lass, who,
together with her siblings, lived with her mother and the latter’s live-in
partner, appellant Manuel Aguilar. XYZ
is AAA’s daughter with her deceased husband.
The four other siblings of XYZ are AAA’s children with accused-appellant.
XYZ
testified that she was born on 26 January 1985.
She declared that on that fateful evening of 4 February 1998, while she
was asleep, accused took off her shorts and panty, laid on top of her and had
sexual intercourse with her against her will.
She wanted to shout but accused-appellant gagged her mouth with his hand
and threatened to kill her if she will utter a word. She averred that she felt intense pain in her
vagina. Accused-appellant, who was at
that time naked, was caught in the act by AAA.
In
the morning of
Dr.
Rosita Muñoz testified for the prosecution and declared that XYZ came to her
clinic at the Rural Health Unit of Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental. She physically examined the victim and found that
she had vaginal discharges. Considering
that the clinic lacked laboratory equipments, she forwarded the vaginal discharges
of the victim to the District Hospital of Bayawan, Negros Oriental for
examination. The examination yielded the
presence of spermatozoa, positively establishing that XYZ had undergone a very
recent sexual activity. Dr. Muñoz issued
a medical certificate certifying the presence of spermatozoa based on the
laboratory results.
AAA
testified that at about 12
The
accused, for his part, denied having raped XYZ.
He declared during the direct-examination that in the evening of
Accused-appellant
denied the allegations against him. He maintained
that his wife testified against him because he urinated in the urinal near the
place where XYZ was sleeping. Moreover,
AAA allegedly felt bad and jealous about his having conversations with their
female neighbors. The filing of the
complaint was AAA’s way of getting back at him. With regard to XYZ, accused-appellant
claimed that she harbored a grudge against him since he forbade her from going
out with her male friends.
Accused-appellant
also claimed that it was improbable for him to commit the offense considering
that there were seven of them then sleeping in the house that evening. He
argued that even assuming that he had carnal knowledge of XYZ, there was some
sort of consent on the part of the victim since she failed to struggle and
shout for help. He alleged that the absence
of any showing of resistance casts reasonable doubt upon his guilt.
After
trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the
capital penalty of death. The RTC
further ordered accused-appellant to indemnify XYZ in the amount of P75,000.00. The dispositive portion of its judgment
reads:
Wherefore, xxx the Court finds accused
Manuel Aguilar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and
[p]enalized under Article 335, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659, and sentence said accused the capital penalty of death. And, xxx, accused is hereby ordered to
indemnify [XYZ] the amount of P75,000.00.[4]
On
intermediate review, the appellate court partially affirmed the ruling of the
RTC. The Court of Appeals convicted the
accused not of qualified rape but of simple rape in the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated P50,000.00
as civil indemnity. However, to conform
with existing jurisprudence, he is likewise directed to pay P50,000.00
as moral damages.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
The
case is now on final review before us.
OUR RULING
We
affirm the ruling of the appellate court that appellant Aguilar is guilty only
of simple rape and not of qualified rape.
Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise
known as the “Anti-Rape Law of 1997,” provides in part that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1)When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.
The concurrence of the
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender being special
qualifying circumstances, which increases the penalty as opposed to a generic
aggravating circumstance which only affects the period of the penalty, should
be alleged in the information, because of the accused’s right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him.[6] Existing jurisprudence instructs that the
death penalty may be imposed only if the complaint or information has alleged
and the evidence has proven both the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender by the quantum of proof required for conviction.[7]
The information in this
case alleged that accused-appellant, who is the step-father of XYZ, succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of the latter, who was then thirteen (13) years of
age. The birth certificate of XYZ presented during the trial clearly
established that she was below 18 years old when the rape was committed on
All told, the guilt of the accused has been clearly
established beyond reasonable doubt. However, the death penalty was
erroneously imposed for, as correctly argued by the accused and sustained by
the Solicitor General, the qualifying circumstance of relationship has not been
properly alleged in the Information. It appears that while the accused
was the common-law spouse of Michelle's mother, Michelle was referred to in the
Information as his "step-daughter." A step-daughter is defined as the
daughter of one of the spouses by a former marriage. We have consistently
ruled that any of the circumstances under Sec. 11 of RA 7659 the attendance of
which mandates the penalty of death, is in the nature of qualifying
circumstances which cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the Information. Evidently, the technical flaw committed by
the prosecution spared the accused from the gallows of death and it constrains
us to reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua.[13] (Emphasis supplied.)
Three
principles guide the courts in resolving rape cases: (1) an accusation for rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of
the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[14]
In
the determination of guilt for the crime of rape, primordial is the credibility
of the complainant’s testimony because, in rape cases, the accused may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided it is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.[15] Here, the victim, in the painstaking and
well-nigh degrading public trial, related her painful ordeal that she was raped
by accused-appellant. Her testimony was
found by the trial court, which had the undisputed vantage in the evaluation
and appreciation of testimonial evidence, to be more credible than that of the
defense.[16]
The accused-appellant was convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on the basis of the following: (1) XYZ’s
credible testimony concerning the rape incident; (2) XYZ’s positive
identification of the accused-appellant as the person who raped her; (3) AAA’s
testimony regarding the alleged incident; (4) medical examination report
showing the presence of spermatozoa in XYZ’s vagina evidencing recent sexual
intercourse; and (5) absence of ill motive on XYZ’s and AAA’s part in filing
the complaint.
Testimonies
of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a
girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and maturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity.[17]
The
Court rebuffed accused-appellant’s defense of denial. Aside from being weak, it is merely negative
and self-serving evidence which pales in comparison to XYZ’s and AAA’s clear
narration of facts and positive identification of the appellant. The testimony of XYZ, coupled with the
medical findings of Dr. Muñoz, is enough to confirm the truthfulness of the
charge. Deeply entrenched in
jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect and are not to be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which would have affected the result of the case.[18]
Accused-appellant’s
contention that the criminal complaint filed against him was caused by ill motive
on the part of AAA and XYZ deserves scant consideration. We cannot accept the claim that it was an
offshoot of AAA’s jealousy and of XYZ’s grudge against him for living in with
her mother and for forbidding her to go out with her male friends. It is a negative self-serving evidence which
cannot be given greater weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters. Between
the positive declarations of a prosecution witness and the negative statements
of the accused, the former deserves more credence.[19]
Accused-appellant’s
contention that it was improbable for the crime of rape to be committed
considering that the whole household was sleeping almost side by side at that
time the rape was allegedly committed is likewise devoid of merit. For the crime of rape to be committed, it is
not necessary for the place to be ideal or the weather to be fine, for rapists
bear no respect for locale and time when they carry out their evil deed.[20]
In numerous cases, the Court held that rape can be committed even in places
where people congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in school premises, in
a house where there are other occupants, in the same room where other members
of the family are also sleeping, and even in places which to many, would appear
unlikely and high risk venues for its commission. Besides, there is no rule that rape can be
committed only in seclusion.[21]
We,
likewise, find no merit in appellant’s contention that there was some sort of
consent on the part of the victim since she failed to struggle and shout for
help. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish force
or intimidation; absence of which creates reasonable doubt upon his guilt. The
presence of intimidation, which is purely subjective, cannot be tested by any
hard and fast rule, but should be viewed in the light of the victim’s
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the rape.[22]
Not all victims react in the same way - some people may cry out, some may
faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield
to the intrusion.[23]
Records of the case revealed that XYZ was coerced into submission because of
her fear that she will be killed.[24]
She categorically declared that she tried to shout for help but
accused-appellant gagged her and threatened to kill her if she will say anything.
Physical resistance need not be established in rape cases when intimidation is
exercised upon the victim who submits against her will because of fear for her
life and personal safety. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a
relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties
but also on their relationship with each other. A child like XYZ can only cower
in fear and yield into submission. Rape is nothing more than a conscious
process of intimidation by which a man keeps a woman in a state of fear and
humiliation. Thus, it is not even impossible
for a victim of rape not to make an outcry against an unarmed assailant.[25] In
fact, the moral ascendancy and influence of accused-appellant, who during trial
was established to be the live-in partner of the victim’s mother and was
exercising parental authority over the victim, can take the place of threat and
intimidation.
Although
we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, we find it necessary to modify
the civil liability of the appellant to include exemplary damages. The appellate court correctly ordered
accused-appellant to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages consistent with
current jurisprudence on simple rape.
However, the exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should
also be included in line with recent case laws.
In
People vs. Anthony R. Rante,[26]
citing People vs. Antonio D. Dalisay[27] and People
vs. Cristino Cañada,[28] the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a
public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the
youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby affirm with modification the decision dated 12 December 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00154 finding Manuel Aguilar GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Simple Rape. In addition to the
awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
each, he is further ordered to pay P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
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JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate
Justice |
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WE CONCUR: RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief Justice Chairperson |
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[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla with Associate Justices Isaias
P. Dicdican and Francisco N. Diamante, concurring; CA rollo, pp 126-141.
[2] G.R.
No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
[3] Records,
p. 1.
[4] Id. at 107.
[5] Rollo, p. 19.
[6] People
v. Ramos, G.R. No. 129439, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA 559, 575.
[7] People
v. Mauro, 447 Phil. 207, 228-229 (2003).
[8] People
v. Escaño, 427 Phil. 162, 180 (2002).
[9] G.R.
No. 181246, 20 March 2009, 582 SCRA 189, 197-198.
[10] G.R.
No. 145305, 26 June 2003, 452 SCRA 1046, 1067.
[11] G.R.
No. 127904, 5 December 2002, 393 SCRA 472, 481.
[12] G.R.
No. 136848, 29 November 2001, 371 SCRA 143, 150.
[13] Citing People v. Dimapilis, G.R. Nos. 128619-21, 17 December 1998, 300
SCRA 279; People v. Medina, G.R. No. 126575, 11 December 1998, 300 SCRA 98.
[14] People
v. Glivano, G.R. No. 177565, 28 January 2008, 542 SCRA 656, 662 citing People
v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301, 318 (2004).
[15] People
v. Pascua, 462 Phil. 245, 252 (2003).
[16] Records,
p. 106.
[17] People
v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA 435, 448.
[18] People
v. Sta. Ana, G.R. Nos. 115657-59, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 188, 202.
[19] People
v. Amante, 440 Phil. 561, 669-670 (2002).
[20] People v. Barcena, G.R. No.
168737, 16 February 2006, 482 SCRA 543, 555.
[21] People
v. Tan, Jr., G.R. Nos. 103134-40, 20 November 1996, 264 SCRA 425, 439.
[22] People
v. Santos, 452 Phil. 1046, 1061 (2003).
[23] People
v. Baldo, G.R. No. 175238, 24 February 2009, 580 SCRA 225, 233.
[24] TSN,
1 October 2001, pp. 7-8.
[25] People
v. Barcena, supra note 14 at 554.
[26] G.
R. No. 184809, 29 March 2010.
[27] G.
R. No. 188106, 25 November 2009, 605 SCRA 807.
[28] G. R. No. 175317, 02 October 2009, 602 SCRA 378.