Republic of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
ERNESTO VILLEZA, Petitioner, - versus - GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES,
INC., DOMINGO RENE JOSE, PIO DIOKNO, SESINANDO FAJARDO,
BAYANI OLIPINO, ROLANDO ROMILO and JOHN DOES, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 182937 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 8, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This
petition sprouted from an earlier Supreme Court ruling in German
Management v. Court of Appeals,[1] G.R. Nos. 72616-76217,
September 14, 1989, which has
already become final and executory. The
decision, however, remains unenforced due to the prevailing party’s own inaction. This petition, therefore, is the struggle of
a victor trying to retrieve the prize once won.
It appears that German Management v. Court of Appeals stemmed from a forcible entry case instituted by petitioner Ernesto
Villeza against respondent German Management, the authorized developer of the
landowners, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Antipolo City (MeTC). The Decision of this Court favoring the
petitioner became final and executory on October 5, 1989.[2] In ruling
against German Management, We wrote:
Although
admittedly, petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of
title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of
prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the
actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession,
can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria.[3]
On
More than three (3) years
had passed before petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
As the sheriff was
implementing the writ, an Opposition with Motion to Quash Writ of Execution was
filed by German Management and Services, Inc. On
Considering the provision of Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, after the lapse of five years from the date of entry, judgment may no longer be enforced by way of motion but by independent action.[5]
On
Respondent
German Management moved to dismiss the complaint. It alleged that it had been more than 10
years from the time the right of action accrued, that is, from October 5, 1989,
the date of the finality of the Court's decision to October 3, 2000, the date
of the filing of the complaint for its revival.
It further argued that, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court in relation to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, the complaint is now
barred by the statute of limitations.
On March 29, 2001, the MeTC
granted the motion to dismiss reasoning that Article 1144 of the Civil Code was
categorical that an action to enforce a judgment must be brought within ten
years from the time such right accrues. Since
it had been almost 11 years from the time the 1989 Court’s decision became
final and executory, the action to revive it was barred.
Aggrieved, petitioner Villeza appealed the decision to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) which affirmed in toto the MeTC order of dismissal in its April 24, 2004 Decision.
Petitioner
Villeza elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing that the 10-year
prescriptive period was tolled by the suspension granted him by the MeTC of
Antipolo pursuant to his request to hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ
of execution. He claimed that he could
not be considered to have slept on his rights as he filed the necessary action
to enforce the final decision. Nevertheless, the CA ruled against him. Thus:
Petitioner's
claim that the prescriptive period should be deemed interrupted by the grant of
his move to defer action on the motion to execute cannot be countenanced. While there had been many instances where the Hon.
Supreme Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years,
said exceptions were occasioned by delay attributed to the judgment debtor. In the case at bar, the delay in the excution
of the judgment is attributable to the petitioner, the party in whose favor
judgment was issued.
x
x x x
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED.[6]
Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner
Villeza reiterates his argument that he never slept on his right as he pursued
several remedies. Still, he insists that
the interruption or suspension granted by the MeTC must be considered in
computing the period because it has the effect
of tolling or stopping
the counting of the
period for execution.[7]
Besides, the Court has in the past provided several exceptions affording
extension of the prescriptive period. Thus,
he averred: “It is revolting to the conscience to allow respondents to further
avert the satisfaction of its obligation because of the sheer literal adherence
to technicality.”[8]
The Court finds no merit
in this petition.
An action for revival of
judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil Code and
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
x x x x
(3) Upon a judgment
Article
1152 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of
actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment
commences from the time the judgment became final.
Apropos,
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action.
–A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date
of its entry. After the lapse of such
time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from
the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute
of limitations. (emphasis
supplied)
The rules are clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory,
the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere
motion within five years from the date of entry of
judgment. If the prevailing party fails to
have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said
judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the
institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time
the judgment becomes final.
When petitioner Villeza
filed the complaint for revival of judgment on
Petitioner Villeza,
however, wants this Court to agree with him that the abeyance granted to him by
the lower court tolled the running of the prescriptive period. He even cited
cases allowing exceptions to the general rule. The Court, nevertheless, is not persuaded.
The cited cases are, in fact, not
applicable to him, despite his endeavor to tailor them to fit in to his position.
The same cases lamentably betray him.
Republic
v. Court of Appeals[9] deals with the stay of the period
due to the acts of the losing party. It
was impossible for the winning party to have sought the execution of the
judgment because of the dilatory schemes and maneuvers resorted to by the other
party.[10]
In
Torralba
v. delos Angeles,[11] the running of the period was
interrupted when the winning party filed a
motion for the
issuance of the writ
of
execution. The order of ejectment was not carried out, however,
due to the judgment debtor’s begging to withhold the execution of judgment
because of
financial difficulties.[12] The agreement of the parties to defer or
suspend the enforcement of the judgment interrupted the period of prescription.[13]
In Casela v. Court of Appeals,[14]
it was the judgment obligor who moved to suspend the writ of execution. The judgment obligee was not in delay because
he exhausted all legal means within his power to eject the obligor from his
land. The writs of execution issued by
the lower court were not complied with and/or were suspended by reason of acts
or causes not of obligee’s own making and against his objections.[15]
Unlike the cases cited
above, the records reveal that it was petitioner Villeza, the prevailing party
himself, who moved to defer the execution of judgment. The losing party never had any hand in the
delay of its execution. Neither did the
parties have any agreement on that matter. After the lapse of five years (5) from the
finality of judgment, petitioner Villeza should have instead filed a complaint
for its revival in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He, however, filed a motion to execute the
same which was a wrong course of action. On the 11th year, he finally sought
its revival but he requested the aid of the courts too late.
The Court has pronounced
in a plethora of cases that it is revolting to the conscience to allow someone
to further avert the satisfaction of an obligation because of sheer literal
adherence to technicality;[16] that
although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
interpretation
is warranted in cases
where a strict enforcement of the rules
will not serve
the ends of justice;[17] and
that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not
be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of
laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.[18] These
cases, though, remain exceptions to the general rule. The purpose of the law in
prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgment by action is precisely to
prevent the winning parties from sleeping on their rights.[19] This
Court cannot just set aside the statute of limitations into oblivion every time
someone cries for equity and justice. Indeed,
“if eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on one's right
for more than a 10th of a century and expect it to be preserved in
pristine purity.”[20]
WHEREFORE, the
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] 177 SCRA 495, 500.
[2] Rollo, p. 40.
[3] Supra note 1.
[4] Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[5] Cited in CA Decision, rollo, p. 29.
[6]
Mariano C.
del Castillo (now
a member of
this Court) and
Associate Justice Ricardo
R.
concurring.
[7]
[8]
[9] 221 Phil. 685, 695 (1985).
[10]
[11] 185 Phil. 40, 47 (1980).
[12]
[13]
[14] 146 Phil. 292, 296 (1970).
[15]
[16] Philippine Veterans Bank v. Solid Homes, G.R. No. 170126, June 9, 2009, 589 SCRA 40.
[17]
[18] Bausa
v. Heirs of Juan Dino, G.R. No. 167281,
[19] Macias v. Lim, G.R. No. 139284,
[20] Asociacion Cooperativa de Credito Agricola de Miagao v. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 281 (1943).