THIRD DIVISION
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JOSE
ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner, - versus - HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA,
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE
LAS ALAS, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 182677 Present: CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
NACHURA,* BERSAMIN, ABAD,** and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: August 3, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Jose
Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) assails via the present petition for review filed
on May 30, 2008 the August 30, 2007 Decision[1]
and the April 18, 2008
Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 that affirmed the trial
court’s Orders of January 24, 31, February 7, 8, all in 2007, and denied the
motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner
was, by Information[3] of
After
petitioner posted a P40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved,[6] he
was released from detention, and his arraignment was set on
The
private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the
public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion[7]
praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the
public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order
of January 24, 2007[8] deferring petitioner’s arraignment and allowing
the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense
and submit a recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter alia;
and (2) Order of January 31, 2007[9]
denying reconsideration of the first order.
Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
Meantime,
petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the public
prosecutor’s recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate
court resolves his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant
him time to comment on the prosecutor’s recommendation and thereafter set a
hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause.[10] Petitioner also separately moved for the
inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the
Amended Information.[11]
The trial
court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: (1) Order of
The
appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition, hence, his present petition,
arguing that:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO
CAUSE THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL CASE BELOW WHEN THE CRIMINAL
INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING STATE PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S AMENDED INFORMATION, ISSUING
A WARRANT OF ARREST, AND SETTING THE CASE BELOW FOR ARRAIGNMENT, CONSIDERING
THAT THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF HIS ORDERS DATED 24 AND 31 JANUARY 2007,
WHICH LED TO THE QUESTIONABLE REINVESTIGATION AND ILLEGAL AMENDED
INFORMATION[,] ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT (sic); [AND]
CONSIDERING THAT PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S
FINDINGS IN HIS RESOLUTION DATED 2 FEBRUARY 2007 ARE BLATANTLY BASED ON MERE
SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES, WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR MATERIAL NEW EVIDENCE
BEING ADDUCED DURING THE REINVESTIGATION, RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST
ALLOWED PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A HEARING FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF
PROBABLE CAUSE.[15]
(emphasis in the original omitted)
Records show that the arraignment scheduled on
Prior thereto or on P300,000
for his provisional liberty.
The trial court, absent any writ of
preliminary injunction from the appellate court, went on to try petitioner
under the Amended Information. By
Decision of January 14, 2009, the trial court found petitioner guilty of
homicide, sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. From the Decision, petitioner filed an appeal
to the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, during the pendency
of which he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. The appellate court denied petitioner’s
application which this Court, in G.R. No. 189122, affirmed by Decision of
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued
that the present petition had been rendered moot since the presentation of
evidence, wherein petitioner actively participated, had been concluded.[18]
Waiver on
the part of the accused must be
distinguished from mootness of the petition, for in
the present case, petitioner did not, by his active participation in the trial,
waive his stated objections.
Section 26,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to
objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. –
An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before
entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable
but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the
reinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission of the
Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended
Information, as he vigorously
raised them prior to his arraignment. During the arraignment on
The principle that the accused is
precluded after arraignment from questioning the
illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary investigation
applies “only if he voluntarily enters
his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his
objections thereto.”[19] There
must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on
what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the
particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible.[20]
From the given circumstances, the
Court cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of petitioner to preclude him from obtaining a
definite resolution of the objections he so timely invoked. Other
than its allegation of active participation, the OSG offered no clear and
convincing proof that petitioner’s participation in the trial was unconditional
with the intent to voluntarily and unequivocally abandon his petition. In fact, on
Whatever delay arising from petitioner’s
availment of remedies against the trial court’s Orders cannot be imputed to
petitioner to operate as a valid waiver on his part. Neither can the non-issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction be deemed as a voluntary relinquishment of petitioner’s
principal prayer. The non-issuance of
such injunctive relief only means that the appellate court did not
preliminarily find any exception[22]
to the long-standing doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal
prosecution.[23] Consequently, the trial of the case took its
course.
The
petition is now moot, however, in view of the trial court’s rendition of
judgment.
A moot and academic
case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use
or value.[24]
The
judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the Amended Information for
murder operates as a supervening event that mooted the present petition. Assuming that there is ground[25]
to annul the finding of probable cause for murder, there is no practical use or value in abrogating the concluded proceedings and
retrying the case under the original Information for homicide just to arrive,
more likely or even definitely, at the same conviction of homicide. Mootness would have also set in had
petitioner been convicted of murder, for proof beyond reasonable doubt, which
is much higher than probable cause, would have been established in that
instance.
Instead, however, of denying the
petition outright on the ground of mootness, the Court proceeds to resolve the
legal issues in order to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench,
bar and public.[26] In the present case, there is compelling
reason to clarify the remedies available before
and after the filing of an information
in cases subject of inquest.
After going over into the substance
of the petition and the assailed issuances, the Court finds no reversible error
on the part of the appellate court in finding no grave abuse of discretion in
the issuance of the four trial court Orders.
In his
first assignment of error, petitioner posits that the prosecution has no right
under the Rules to seek from the trial court an investigation or reevaluation
of the case except through a petition for review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ). In cases when an accused is
arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of preliminary
investigation belongs only to the accused.
The
contention lacks merit.
Section 6,[27]
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule. (underscoring supplied)
A preliminary investigation is
required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day
without regard to fine.[28] As an exception, the rules provide that there
is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without
a warrant[29]
involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has
been conducted.[30]
Inquest is defined as an informal and
summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases
involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of
arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether said persons
should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.[31]
It is imperative to first take a
closer look at the predicament of both the arrested person and the private
complainant during the brief period of inquest, to grasp the respective
remedies available to them before and after the filing of a complaint or
information in court.
BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION IN COURT, the private complainant may proceed in coordinating with
the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the latter’s conduct of
inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person
has the option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation, provided he duly
signs a waiver of any objection against delay in his delivery to the proper
judicial authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available
to the private complainant since he cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the provisions of Article 125,
which requires the filing of a complaint or information with the proper
judicial authorities within the applicable period,[32]
belongs to the arrested person.
The accelerated process of inquest,
owing to its summary nature and the attendant risk of running against Article
125, ends with either the prompt filing of an information in court or the
immediate release of the arrested person.[33] Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide
for a motion for reconsideration.[34]
Contrary
to petitioner’s position that private complainant should have appealed to the
DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not immediately available in cases subject of
inquest.
Noteworthy
is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by “petition by a proper
party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe.”[35] The rule referred to is the 2000 National Prosecution
Service Rule on Appeal,[36]
Section 1 of which provides that the Rule shall “apply to appeals from
resolutions x x x in cases subject of preliminary investigation/
reinvestigation.” In cases subject
of inquest, therefore, the private party should first avail of a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the matter to the
DOJ Secretary.
In case the inquest proceedings yield
no probable cause, the private complainant may pursue the case through the
regular course of a preliminary investigation.
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS
FILED IN COURT, the rules yet provide the accused with another opportunity to
ask for a preliminary investigation within five days from the time he learns of
its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules
on Inquest are silent, however, on whether the private complainant could
invoke, as respondent heirs of the victim did in the present case, a similar
right to ask for a reinvestigation.
The Court
holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and
in light of the ensuing disquisition.
All
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.[37] The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a
witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the
reinvestigation of the case after the
information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public
prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case.[38] Thus, in
cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the
criminal action,[39]
and is granted the authority to prosecute,[40]
the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.
In fact, the DOJ instructs that
before the arraignment of the accused, trial prosecutors must “examine the
Information vis-à-vis the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to
make the necessary corrections or revisions and to ensure that the information
is sufficient in form and substance.”[41]
x x x Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a review of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and should institute remedial measures[.][42] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The prosecution of crimes appertains
to the executive department of the government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute
their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide
range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise
of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors.[43]
The
prosecution’s discretion is not boundless or infinite, however.[44] The standing principle is that once an information
is filed in court, any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation must be
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Interestingly, petitioner supports this view.[45] Indeed, the Court ruled in one case that:
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had already been brought therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter
should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
x x x x
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[46] (underscoring supplied)
While Abugotal v. Judge Tiro[47] held
that to ferret out the truth, a trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation,
the Court therein recognized that a trial court may, where the interest of
justice so requires, grant a motion for reinvestigation of a criminal case
pending before it.
Once the trial court grants the
prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred
to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought
the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with
discretion – wide and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof,[48]
subject to the trial court’s approval of the resulting proposed course of
action.
Since a
reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what
happened in the present case, the Court’s holding is bolstered by the rule on
amendment of an information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
A
complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave
of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the
plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
However, any amendment before
plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment
that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided
the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give
bail for their appearance at the trial. (emphasis supplied)
In
fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of
the complaint or information may be made without leave of court.[49] After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice
the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial
to the accused.[50]
It must be clarified though that not all
defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is void ab
initio cannot be amended to
obviate a ground for quashal.[51] An amendment which operates to vest
jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible.[52]
Considering the general
rule that an information may be amended even in substance and even without
leave of court at any time before entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct
of a reinvestigation at that stage is a mere superfluity?
It is not.
Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation – be it a complete disposition or an intermediate modification[53] of the charge – is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Since the trial court would ultimately make the determination on the proposed course of action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the appropriate motion to be filed in court.
More importantly, reinvestigation is
required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information. Due process of law demands that no substantial
amendment of an information may be admitted without conducting another or a new
preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of
the Sandiganbayan,[54]
the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an information entitles an
accused to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended information
contains a charge related to or is included in the original Information.
The
question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from
homicide to murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it
not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation.
The
Court answers in the affirmative.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.[55] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two
charges are related does not necessarily or automatically deprive the accused
of his right to another preliminary investigation. Notatu dignum is the fact that both
the original Information and the amended Information in Matalam were
similarly charging the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In one case,[56]
it was squarely held that the amendment of the Information from homicide to
murder is “one of substance with very serious consequences.”[57] The
amendment involved in the present case consists of additional averments of the
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify
the offense charged from homicide to murder.
It being a new and material element of the offense, petitioner should be
given the chance to adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely clarificatory, the amendment
essentially varies the prosecution’s original theory of the case and certainly
affects not just the form but the weight of defense to be mustered by
petitioner.
The
Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA[58]
and Pacoy v. Cajigal,[59]
wherein the amendment of the caption of the Information from homicide to
murder was not considered substantial because there was no real change in the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of the
Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances were already clearly
embedded in the original Information. Buhat
pointed out that the original Information for homicide already alleged the use
of superior strength, while Pacoy states that the averments in the
amended Information for murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in
the original Information for homicide.
None of these peculiar circumstances obtains in the present case.
Considering that another or a new
preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the
present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial
amendment of the Information. There is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a
reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the
same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.[60] What is essential is that petitioner was
placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder[61]
after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first
motion.
Petitioner did not, however, make much
of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended
charge. Despite notice of hearing,
petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively
participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of Appeals states
that the rules do not
even require, as a condition sine qua non to the validity of a preliminary
investigation, the presence of the respondent as long as efforts to reach him
were made and an opportunity to controvert the complainant’s evidence was
accorded him.[62]
In his
second assignment of error, petitioner basically assails the hurried issuance
of the last two assailed RTC Orders despite the pendency before the appellate
court of the petition for certiorari challenging the first two trial court
Orders allowing a reinvestigation.
The Rules
categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary retraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued.[63] The appellate court, by Resolution
of
Regarding
petitioner’s protestations of haste, suffice to state that the pace in
resolving incidents of the case is not per se an
indication of bias. In Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice,[67]
the Court held:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.[68]
There
is no ground for petitioner’s protestations against the DOJ Secretary’s sudden
designation of Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco as Acting City
Prosecutor of Makati City for the present case[69]
and the latter’s conformity to the motion for reinvestigation.
In
granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose the public prosecutor
who will conduct the reinvestigation or preliminary investigation.[70] There is a hierarchy of officials in the
prosecutory arm of the executive branch headed by the Secretary of Justice[71]
who is vested with the prerogative to appoint a special prosecutor or designate
an acting prosecutor to handle a particular case, which broad power of control
has been recognized by jurisprudence.[72]
As for the
trial court’s ignoring the DOJ Secretary’s uncontested statements to the media
which aired his opinion that if the assailant merely intended to maim and not
to kill the victim, one bullet would have sufficed — the DOJ
Secretary reportedly uttered that “the filing of the case of homicide against ano against Leviste lintek naman eh I told you
to watch over that case… there should be a report about the ballistics, about
the paraffin, etc., then that’s not a complete investigation, that’s why you
should use that as a ground” — no abuse
of discretion, much less a grave one, can be imputed to it.
The
statements of the DOJ Secretary do not evince a “determination to file the
Information even in the absence of probable cause.”[73] On the contrary, the remarks merely
underscored the importance of securing basic investigative reports to support a
finding of probable cause. The original
Resolution even recognized that probable cause for the crime of murder cannot
be determined based on the evidence obtained “[u]nless and until a
more thorough investigation is conducted and eyewitness/es [is/]are
presented in evidence[.]”[74]
The trial court concluded that “the
wound sustained by the victim at the back of his head, the absence of paraffin
test and ballistic examination, and the handling of physical evidence,”[75]
as rationalized by the prosecution in its motion, are sufficient circumstances that
require further inquiry.
That the
evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently assessed in the bail hearings
does not affect the prior determination of probable cause because, as the
appellate court correctly stated, the standard of strong evidence of guilt
which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the
standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal
case.[76]
In his third
assignment of error, petitioner faults the trial court for not conducting, at
the very least, a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause,
considering the lack of substantial or material new evidence adduced during the
reinvestigation.
Petitioner’s
argument is specious.
There are
two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to
have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for
trial. Otherwise stated, such official
has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether that
function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause
in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled
to pass upon.[77]
The judicial determination of
probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused.
The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted,
there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the
judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant.[78] Paragraph (a), Section 5,[79]
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the
RTC.
To move
the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere
superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to
personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting
evidence. In
fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the
court is first and foremost to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.[80]
What
the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure,
he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on
the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the
existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause
exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.[81] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The rules do not require cases to be
set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued.[82] Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right,
insist on a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner “cannot
determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the
records should be [since t]he extent of the judge’s examination depends on the
exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require.”[83] In one case, the Court emphatically stated:
The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge must determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayan’s determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and distracted from his determination of probable cause by needless motions for determination of probable cause filed by the accused.[84] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner
proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters, arguing that no
circumstances exist that would qualify the crime from homicide to murder.
The
allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves no
credence, because new
pieces of evidence are not prerequisites for a valid conduct of
reinvestigation. It is not material that
no new matter or evidence was presented
during the reinvestigation of the
case. It should
be stressed that reinvestigation, as
the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites
for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor to review
and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted.[85]
Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, only questions of law may be raised in, and be subject of, a petition
for review on certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts. The Court cannot thus review the evidence
adduced by the parties on the issue of the absence or presence of probable
cause, as there exists no exceptional circumstances to warrant a factual
review.[86]
In a petition for certiorari, like that
filed by petitioner before the appellate court, the jurisdiction of the court
is narrow in scope. It is limited to
resolving only errors of jurisdiction.
It is not to stray at will and resolve questions and issues beyond its
competence, such as an error of judgment.[87] The court’s duty in the pertinent case is
confined to determining whether the executive and judicial determination of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Although it is
possible that error may be committed in the discharge of lawful functions, this
does not render the act amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[88]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional
Member per Raffle dated
** Designated
as Additional Member, per Special Order No. 843 (
[1] Rollo, pp. 56-82, penned by Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Arturo G. Tayag concurring.
[2] Id.at 84-87, penned by Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Arturo G. Tayag concurring.
[3] Id.at 90, signed by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Henry M. Salazar. The concomitant Resolution was approved by Prosecutor IV Romulo Nanola for Senior State Prosecutor Leo Dacera III, Officer-in-Charge.
[4] Id.at 97.
[5] Id.at 88.
[6] CA rollo, p. 58.
[7] Rollo, pp. 101-107.
[8] Id.at 109-111.
[9] Id.at 122-129.
[10] Id.at 145-147.
[11] Id.at 162-168.
[12] Id.at 171-177.
[13] Id.at 134-135, signed by Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco in his capacity as the designated Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City pro hac vice per Department Order No. 57 of January 22, 2007 (vide rollo, p. 100).
[14] Id.at 180.
[15] Id.at 20-21.
[16] Id.at 255-260.
[17] Id.at 317-350.
[18] Id.at 391-392.
[19] Borlongan, Jr. v. Peña, G.R. No. 143591, November
23, 2007, 538 SCRA 221, 229.
[20] Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez, 473 Phil. 758, 777 (2004).
[21] Rollo, pp. 424-427.
[22] In
extreme cases, the following exceptions to the rule have been recognized: (1)
when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (4) when
the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double
jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9)
where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. [Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, 499 Phil. 36, 48-49 (2005)].
[23] Asutilla v. PNB, 225 Phil. 40, 43 (1986), which explains that public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.
[24] Integrated Bar of the
[25] In exceptional cases, the Court took the extraordinary step of annulling findings of probable cause (vide Brocka v. Enrile, G.R. Nos. 69863-65, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 183, 188-189).
[26] Atienza v. Villarosa, 497 Phil. 689, 699 (2005).
[27] Formerly Sec. 7, as amended by A.M.
No. 05-8-26-SC (
[28] Rules of Court, Rule 112, Sec. 1.
[29]
[30]
[31] New
Rules on Inquest, DOJ Department
Circular No. 61 (September 21, 1993), Sec. 1.
[32] Vide Soria v. Hon. Desierto, 490 Phil. 749 (2005).
[33] New Rules on Inquest, DOJ Department Circular No. 61 (September 21, 1993), Secs. 13 & 15.
[34] Unlike in a preliminary
investigation, vide 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, DOJ Department
Circular No. 70 (
If upon petition by a proper party under such Rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe x x x. (Rules of Court, Rule 112, sec. 4, last par.).
[36] 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, DOJ Department
Circular No. 70 (
[37] Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 5.
[38] Vide
People v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 105005,
[39] Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 16.
[40] Id.at Sec. 5, as amended by A.M. No.
02-2-07-SC (
[41] Revised Manual for Prosecutors (2008), Part V, II(A)(1).
[42] Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046, October 24, 1994, 237 SCRA 685, 701-702, et seq.
[43] Soberano v. People, G.R. No.
154629,
[44]
[45] Vide rollo, p. 164.
[46] Galvez v. Court of Appeals, supra at 698-699.
[47] 160 Phil. 884, 890 (1975).
[48] Soberano v. People, supra at 140.
[49] Except those amendments that downgrade the nature of the offense or exclude an accused from the charge as provided by second paragraph of Section 14 of Rule 110, vide Soberano v. People, supra.
[50] Fronda-Baggao v. People, G.R.
No. 151785,
[51] People
v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 123, 134, stated in
response to the argument that the amendment of an Information filed under an
invalid or unauthorized preliminary investigation could retroact to the time of
its filing to thus defeat the claim of prescription.
[52] Agustin v. Pamintuan, G.R. No. 164938, August 2, 2005, 467 SCRA 601, 612, involving the substantial defect of failure to allege in the Information for Libel the place either where the offended party actual resided at the time the offense was committed or where the libelous article was printed or first published.
[53] Baltazar v. Chua, G.R. No.
177583,
Considering that the trial court has the power and duty to look into the propriety of the prosecution’s motion to dismiss, with much more reason is it for the trial court to evaluate and to make its own appreciation and conclusion, whether the modification of the charges and the dropping of one of the accused in the information, as recommended by the Justice Secretary, is substantiated by evidence. This should be the state of affairs, since the disposition of the case – such as its continuation or dismissal or exclusion of an accused – is reposed in the sound discretion of the trial court. (underscoring supplied).
[54] 495 Phil. 664, 675-676 (2005).
[55] Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 160451,
[56] Dionaldo v. Hon. Dacuycuy, etc., 195 Phil. 544 (1981).
[57]
[58] 333 Phil. 562 (1996).
[59] G.R. No. 157472,
[60] People v. Hon. Navarro, 337 Phil. 122, 133 (1997).
[61] Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan, supra at 678, citing People v. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176, 180 (1940).
[62] Mercado v. CA, 315 Phil. 657, 662 (1995), which aims to forestall attempts at thwarting criminal investigations by failing to appear or employing dilatory tactics.
[63] Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 7. The present provision, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC (December 4, 2007), even adds that “[t]he public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration[, and that f]ailure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.”
[64] CA rollo, pp. 126-127.
[65] The appellate court deferred the resolution of the prayer for injunctive reliefs contained in his Supplemental Petition until the responsive pleadings had been filed (vide Resolution of February 27, 2007, id.at 216-217) and found that the resolution of such prayer was closely related to and inextricably interwoven with the resolution of the main case (vide Resolution of April 12, 2007, CA rollo, pp. 307-308).
[66] Rules of Court, Rule 116, Sec. 11.
[67] G.R. No. 175057,
[68]
[69] Rollo, p. 100.
[70] Vide People v. Hon. Navarro, supra at 133, citing Abugotal v. Judge Tiro, supra
[71]
[72] Galvez v. Court of Appeals, supra at 710-711; Jalandoni v. Secretary Drilon, 383 Phil. 855, 866-868 (2000).
[73] Cf. Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R.
Nos. 172070-72,
[74] Rollo, p. 95.
[75] Id.at 126.
[76] Id.at 87.
[77] People v. Castillo, G.R. No.
171188,
[78]
[79] Formerly Sec. 6, as amended by A.M.
No. 05-8-26-SC (
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
[80] Baltazar
v. People, G.R. No. 174016,
[81] Borlongan Jr. v. Peña, supra at 235.
[82] Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 169727-28,
[83] Vide Mayor Abdula v. Hon. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757, 776 (2000).
[84]
[85] Roxas v. Hon. Vasquez, 411
Phil. 276, 286-287 (2001); unless otherwise required by law, vide
Mayor Balindong v. Court of Appeals, 488 Phil. 203, 212-213
(2004), citing Memorandum Circular No. 1266, in relation to Memorandum Circular
No. 1294 of
[86] Chan v. Court of Appeals, 497 Phil. 41, 50 (2005).
[87]
[88] D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168, 1185 (1996).