THIRD
DIVISION
|
SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE
OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No.
182010 Present: CARPIO
MORALES, Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA,
JR., and SERENO,
JJ. Promulgated: August
25, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
Via
petition erroneously captioned as one for Certiorari, Susan Esquillo y Romines
(petitioner) challenges the November 27, 2007 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27894 which affirmed the July 28, 2003 Decision of Branch 116 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 convicting Susan
Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) for violating Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) – possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
The accusatory portion of the
Information dated December 12, 2002 indicting petitioner reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2002 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, custody and control 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).[2] (underscoring supplied)
At the trial, petitioner admitted the
genuineness and due execution of the documentary evidence of the prosecution,
particularly the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports issued by National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen (de Belen),[3]
subject to her defenses, to thus dispense with the testimony of de Belen.
De Belen recorded the results of the
laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet in Dangerous Drugs Report
No. DD-02-613,[4] viz:
x x x x
SPECIMEN:
White crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked “SRE” and further placed in bigger marked transparent plastic sachet.
x x x x
F I N D I N G S:
Net Weight of specimen = 0.1224 gram
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug. x x x
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
With respect to the examination of
the urine of petitioner, de Belen recorded the results thereof in Toxicology
Report No. TDD-02-4128[5]
reading:
x x x x
SPECIMEN:
Urine of one SUSAN ESQUILLO Y
ROMINES. 37 y/o, married, jobless, of no. 1159 Bo. Bayanihan, Maricaban,
x x x x
F I N D I N G S:
Volume of urine = 60 mL.
pH of urine = 5.0
Appearance = yellow orange, turbid
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for the presence of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, and its metabolite AMPHETAMINE. x x x
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on its documentary evidence and
the testimony of PO1 Alvin Cruzin (PO1 Cruzin),[6] a
member of the Pasay City Police Station Special Operations Group (SOG), the
prosecution established its version as follows:
On the basis of an informant’s tip,
PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at around
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the
private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced
in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen
placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic
sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely
as he began to approach her. He then
introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the
plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner
attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin
who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case.
After apprising petitioner of her
constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic sachet[7] on
which he marked her initials “SRE.” With the seized item, petitioner was
brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police Station where P/Insp. Aquilino
E. Almanza, Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a memorandum[8]
dated December 10, 2002 addressed to the Chief Forensic Chemist of the NBI in
Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory examination of the substance
contained in the plastic sachet to determine the presence of shabu, and 2) the conduct of a drug test on the person
of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas soon executed a Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension[9]
recounting the details of their intended surveillance and the circumstances
leading to petitioner’s arrest.
Repudiating the charges, petitioner[10]
gave the following tale:
At around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the
date in question, while she was sick and
resting at home, several policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their
waists barged in and asked her whether she knew one named “Ryan” who they
claimed was a notorious snatcher operating in the area, to which she replied in
the negative. The police officers then
forced her to go with them to the Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where
she was detained.
While she was under detention, the
police officers were toying with a wallet which they claimed contained shabu and recovered from her.
In fine, petitioner claimed that the
evidence against her was “planted,” stemming from an all too obvious attempt by
the police officers to extort money from her and her family.
Two other witnesses for the defense,
petitioner’s daughter Josan Lee[11]
and family friend Ma. Stella Tolentino,[12]
corroborated petitioner’s account. They
went on to relate that the police officers never informed them of the reason why
they were taking custody of petitioner.
By Decision[13]
of
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused Susan Esquillo y Romines GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of par. 3 of Section 11, Article II of R. A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and absent any modifying circumstance to either aggravate or mitigate the criminal liability of the same accused, and furthermore, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P350,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus costs.
The 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or “Shabu” involved in this case is declared forfeited in favor of the Government and ordered to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper and appropriate disposition in accordance with the provisions of the law.[14] (underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals,
appellant questioned as illegal her arrest
without warrant to thus render any evidence obtained on the occasion thereof
inadmissible.
In its challenged Decision affirming
petitioner’s conviction, the appellate court, citing People v. Chua,[15]
held that the police officers had probable cause to search petitioner under the
“stop-and-frisk” concept, a recognized exception to the general rule
prohibiting warrantless searches.[16]
Brushing aside petitioner’s defense
of frame-up, the appellate court noted that petitioner failed to adduce
evidence that the arresting officers were impelled by any evil motive to
falsely charge her, and that she was even found positive for substance abuse.
In her present petition, petitioner
assails the appellate court’s application of the “stop-and-frisk” principle in
light of PO1 Cruzin’s failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was being
committed, he having merely noticed her placing something inside a cigarette
case which could hardly be deemed suspicious.
To petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked if there were
overt acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the suspicion.[17]
Respondent, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision but seeks
a modification of the penalty to conform to the pertinent provisions of R.A.
No. 9165.
Appellant’s conviction stands.
Petitioner did not question early on
her warrantless arrest – before her arraignment. Neither did she take steps to quash the
Information on such ground. Verily, she
raised the issue of warrantless arrest – as well as the inadmissibility of
evidence acquired on the occasion thereof– for the first time only on appeal
before the appellate court.[18] By such omissions, she is deemed to have
waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.[19]
Be that as it may, the
circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief
that a search on her was warranted.
Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part
of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case,
it was in his plain view. Given
his training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be
drawn to curiosity and to approach her.
That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced
himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic
sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
That
a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid
search warrant is settled. The same,
however, admits of exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident
to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of
immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5)
searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the
prohibited articles are in “plain view;” (7) searches of buildings and premises
to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) “stop and frisk” operations.[20]
(emphasis underscoring supplied)
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, the determination of what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
taking into account, among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made,
the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[21]
Elucidating on what includes “stop-and-frisk”
operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua[22]
held:
. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The
police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in
order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with
the police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about
him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search
and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
This principle of “stop-and-frisk” search was
invoked by the Court in Manalili v.
Court of Appeals. In said case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish
eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as
akin to a “stop-and-frisk.” In People v.
Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to “stop-and-frisk” the accused
after considering the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the
accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw the
policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence
mission to verify reports that armed persons w[h]ere roaming the vicinity.
(emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests
unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him.
Such a “stop-and-frisk” practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and
in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.[23]
From
these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers
constituted a valid “stop-and-frisk” operation. The search/seizure of the
suspected shabu initially noticed in
petitioner’s possession - later
voluntarily exhibited[24]
to the police operative - was
undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette
case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police
officer. And, at the time of her arrest,
petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee
after the police officer had identified himself.
It bears
recalling that petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Dangerous Drugs and
Toxicology Reports, subject, however, to whatever available defenses she would
raise. While such admissions do not necessarily control in determining the
validity of a warrantless search or seizure, they nevertheless provide a
reasonable gauge by which petitioner’s credibility as a witness can be
measured, or her defense tested.
It has not escaped the Court’s
attention that petitioner seeks exculpation by adopting two completely
inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one hand, she argues that the
“stop-and-frisk” search upon her person and personal effects was unjustified as
it constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Constitution. In the
same breadth, however, she denies culpability by holding fast to her version
that she was at home resting on the date in question and had been forcibly
dragged out of the house by the police operatives and brought to the police
station, for no apparent reason than to try and extort money from her. That her two witnesses – a daughter and a
friend – who were allegedly present at the time of her arrest did not do
anything to report it despite their claim that they were not informed why she
was being arrested, should dent the credibility of their testimony.
Courts have tended to look with disfavor on
claims of accused, such as those of petitioner’s, that they are victims of a
frame-up. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been held as a shop-worn
defense of the accused in drug-related cases, the allegation being easily
concocted or contrived. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce
clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of
official acts of government officials. This it failed to do.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the
findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses
prevail over that of petitioner.[25]
A word on the penalty.
While the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, it
overlooked the error in the penalty imposed by the trial court. The trial
court, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentenced
petitioner to “suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as
minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum.”
Article II, Section 11 of
R.A. No. 9165 provides, however:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
x x x x
Otherwise, if the quantity involved
is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as
follows:
x x x x
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000) to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, metamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu”
or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to MDMA or “ecstacy,” PMA,
TMA, LSD, GHB and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possesses
is far behind therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams
of marijuana. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when the
offense is punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, “the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.”
The prayer of the Office of the Solicitor General for a modification of the
penalty is thus in order.
The Court, therefore, imposes on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment
of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the
penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, as maximum. In all other respects, the decision of the RTC in
Criminal Case No. 02-2297 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Magdangal M. De Leon; CA rollo, pp. 108-116.
[2] Records, p. 5.
[3] TSN.
[4] Vide Exhibit “C,” records, p. 116.
[5] Vide Exhibit “D,” id. at 117.
[6] TSN,
[7] Exhibit “A-1-a.”
[8] Exhibits “A” and “B,” records, pp. 114-115.
[9] Exhibits “E” to “E-2,” id. at 118.
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12] TSN,
[13] Rendered by Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero; records, pp. 143-150.
[14]
[15] G.R. No. 136066-67,
[16] CA rollo, pp. 114-115.
[17] Rollo, pp. 18-22.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 54-59.
[19] People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004, 428 SCRA 51, 61 citing People v. Lagarto, 326 SCRA 693, 749 (2000); People v. Timon, 281 SCRA 579, 597 (1997).
[20] People
v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747,
[21] People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233,
[22] Supra, note 15.
[23] Malacat
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595,
[24] TSN,
[25] People
v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 185164,