Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
BERNARDO DE Petitioner, -versus- PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY substituted
by the CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, RAMON ARELLANO, JR., RICARDO PENA and REYMUNDO
ORPILLA,
Respondents. x-----------------------------------------------x PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (now
PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY), substituted by the CITY OF Petitioner, -versus- HON. SELMA
PALACIO ALARAS, in her capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of
Branch 135, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, and BERNARDO DE LEON. Respondents. |
G.R. No. 181970 G.R.
No. 182678 Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES,* PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 3, 2010 |
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 181970 is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by Bernardo de Leon seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November 21, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328
which dismissed his petition for certiorari.
De
On the other hand, G.R. No. 182678 is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed by the Public Estates Authority (PEA)[3] seeking
the nullification of the Orders dated December 28, 2007 and March 4, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The pertinent factual and procedural
antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
On [January 15, 1993], petitioner Bernardo De Leon (“De Leon”) filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Makati City, raffled to Branch 135, against respondent Public Estates Authority (“PEA”), a government-owned corporation, as well as its officers, herein private respondents Ramon Arellano, Jr., Ricardo Pena and Reymundo Orpilla. The suit for damages hinged on the alleged unlawful destruction of De Leon’s fence and houses constructed on Lot 5155 containing an area of 11,997 square meters, situated in San Dionisio, Parañaque, which De Leon claimed has been in the possession of his family for more than 50 years. Essentially, De Leon prayed that – one, lawful possession of the land in question be awarded to him; two, PEA be ordered to pay damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on Lot 5155; and, three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA from committing acts which would violate his lawful and peaceful possession of the subject premises.
The
court a quo found merit in De
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented and without going into the actual merits of the case, this Court finds that plaintiff (De Leon) has duly established by preponderance of evidence that he has a legal right over the subject matter of the instant case and is entitled to the injunctive relief demanded for and may suffer irreparable damage or injury if such right is not protected by Law [Rules (sic) 58, Section 3 of the Revised (Rules of Court)].
Premises considered upon plaintiff’s
(De Leon’s) filing of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00, let a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued against the defendants, their agents,
representatives and other persons (PEA and its officers) acting for and in
their behalf are hereby enjoined from disturbing the peaceful possession of plaintiff (De Leon) and his co-owners over Lot 5155 and
further, from destroying and/or removing whatever other improvements thereon
constructed, until further orders of this Court.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
PEA sought recourse before the Supreme Court through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for a Restraining Order, ascribing grave abuse of discretion against the court a quo for issuing injunctive relief. The Petition was later referred to this Court for proper determination and disposition, and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 30630.
On 30 September 1993, the Ninth Division of this Court rendered a Decision discerning that the court a quo did not act in a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against PEA. The Ninth Division ruled that the court a quo was precisely careful to state in its Order that it was “without going into the actual merits of the case” and that the words “plaintiff (De Leon) and his co-owners” were used by the court a quo rather “loosely and did not intend it to be an adjudication of ownership.”
Unfazed, PEA appealed to the Supreme
Court via a Petition for Certiorari
insisting that
Ruling squarely on the issue adduced
before it, the Supreme Court declared that
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30630, and DISMISSES
the complaint in Civil Case No. 93-143 of the Regional Trial Court,
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The aforesaid Decision became final and executory as no motion for
reconsideration was filed. In due course, PEA moved for the issuance of a writ
of execution praying that De Leon and persons claiming rights under him be
ordered to vacate and peaceably surrender possession of
Acting on PEA’s motion, the court a quo issued the first assailed Order dated 15 September 2004, viz:
Acting on the “Motion For Issuance Of Writ of Execution” filed by defendant Public Estate[s] Authority, and finding the same to be impressed with merit, the same is GRANTED.
Let a Writ of Execution issue
directing plaintiff, his agents, principals, successors-in-interest and all
persons claiming rights under him to vacate and peaceably turn over possession
of
SO ORDERED.
As could well be expected, De
However, both motions met the same fate as these were denied by the court a quo in the second disputed Order dated 29 April 2005.[4]
Dissatisfied, De
De
Subsequently, De
On July 26, 2006, PEA filed a Very Urgent Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Demolition[5]
praying that the RTC issue a Special Order directing De Leon and persons
claiming under him to remove all improvements erected inside the premises of
the subject property and, in case of failure to remove the said structures,
that a Special Order and Writ of Demolition be issued directing the sheriff to
remove and demolish the said improvements.
On October 11, 2006, the RTC issued an Order[6]
holding in abeyance the Resolution of PEA’s Motion. PEA
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[7]
but it was denied by the RTC in an Order[8]
dated January 12, 2007.
On February 27, 2007, PEA filed an Omnibus Motion[9] to
dismiss or, in the alternative, resolve the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328
and CA-G.R. SP No. 90984.
In its Decision[10] dated
March 21, 2007, the CA dismissed De
Subsequently, on November 21, 2007, the CA also dismissed De
Leon’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328 holding that an earlier decision promulgated
by the Supreme Court, finding the subject property to be public and that De
Leon has no title and no clear legal right over the disputed lot, has already
attained finality.[11] De
Thereafter, PEA filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve (Re: Very
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Demolition).[13]
On December 28, 2007, the RTC issued an Order[14]
holding in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s Motion pending receipt by the trial
court of the entry of judgment pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 90328. PEA filed a
Motion for Reconsideration.[15]
In its Order dated March 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order
denying PEA’s Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 23, 2008, De
Subsequently, on May 15, 2008, PEA, on the other hand, filed
the instant special civil action for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 182678, questioning the Orders of the RTC of Makati City, dated
December 28, 2007 and March 4, 2008.
In G.R. No. 181970, De Leon questions the Decision of the CA
on the following grounds: (a) he can only be removed from the subject land through
ejectment proceedings; (b) the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 112172 merely
ordered the dismissal of De Leon’s complaint for damages in Civil Case No.
93-143; and (c) even though petitioner is not the owner and has no title to the
subject land, mere prior possession is only required for the establishment of
his right.
In G.R. No. 182678, the sole issue raised is whether
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Orders which held in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Demolition.
On February 25, 2009, PEA and the City
of
In a Resolution[17] dated
on October 14, 2009, this Court granted the Motion for Substitution filed by
PEA and the City of
The issues raised in the present
petitions boil down to the question of whether PEA is really entitled to
possess the subject property and, if answered in the affirmative, whether the
RTC should proceed to hear PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition.
The Court rules for PEA.
The question of ownership and rightful
possession of the subject property had already been settled and laid to rest in
this Court’s Decision dated November 20, 2000 in G.R. No. 112172 entitled, Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals
(PEA v. CA).[18]
In the said case, the Court ruled thus:
The
issue raised is whether respondent and his brothers and sisters were lawful
owners and possessors of
The Court of Appeals
ruled that respondent Bernardo de Leon and his brothers and sisters were lawful
owners and possessors of Lot 5155 entitled to protection by injunction against
anyone disturbing their peaceful possession of said
The ruling is erroneous. An applicant seeking to establish ownership of land must conclusively show that he is the owner in fee simple, for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.
In this case, the land in question is admittedly public. The respondent
Bernardo de Leon has no title thereto at all. His claim of ownership is based
on mere possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interests, who claim to
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land
in question, under a bona fide claim
of ownership for a period of at least fifty (50) years. However, the survey
plan for the land was approved only in 1992, and respondent paid the realty
taxes thereon on October 30, 1992, shortly before the filing of the suit below
for damages with injunction. Hence, respondent must be deemed to begin
asserting his adverse claim to
x x x x
Consequently, respondent De
The Court does
not subscribe to De
De Leon
insists that what this Court did in PEA
v. CA was to simply dismiss his complaint for damages and nothing more, and
that the RTC erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of
execution placing PEA in possession of the disputed property. He insists that
he can only be removed from the disputed property through an ejectment
proceeding.
The Court is not persuaded.
As a general rule, a writ of execution
should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an
execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or
award.[21]
The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly
to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated,
and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go
beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.[22]
However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute
of ownership.[23] Where the ownership of a parcel of
land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land
should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated
party’s claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.[24]
Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession
if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently
of his claim of ownership which was rejected.[25]
This is precisely what happened in the present case. This Court had already
declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that De Leon does not
have any right to possess the land independent of his claim of ownership.
In addition, a
judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to
place the prevailing party in possession of the property.[26]
If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the
prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him.[27]
No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a
categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or
other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the improvements on the
property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time.[28]
The removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed
read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the
court for the removal of the improvements.[29]
It bears
stressing that a judgment is not confined
to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.[30] In
the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court and file an
ejectment case simply to establish its right to possess the subject property.
Contrary to De
De Leon also
contends that there “was never any government infrastructure project in the
subject land, much less a Manila-Cavite Coastal Road traversing it, at any time
ever since, until now” and that “allegations of a government project in the
subject land and of such Road traversing the subject land have been downright
falsities and lies and mere concoctions of respondent PEA.”[31] However, this Court has already ruled in PEA v. CA that “it is not disputed that
there is a government infrastructure project in progress traversing
Lot 5155, which has been enjoined by the writ of injunction issued by
the trial court.”
In
any case, De
As to whether
or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the resolution
of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition, Section 7,[32]
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the general rule that the mere pendency
of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case
pending before a lower court or court of origin does not stay the proceedings
therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order. It is true that there are instances where, even if there is
no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a
higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to
suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy.[33] The
principle of judicial courtesy, however, remains to be the exception rather
than the rule. As held by this Court in Go
v. Abrogar,[34] the precept of judicial courtesy should
not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the
relevance of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, in
the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, a new paragraph is now added
to Section 7, Rule 65, which provides as follows:
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal
case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a
higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed
with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
While the above quoted
amendment may not be applied in the instant case, as A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was
made effective only on December 27, 2007, the provisions of the amendatory rule
clearly underscores the urgency of proceeding with the principal case in the
absence of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.
This urgency is even more
pronounced in the present case, considering that this Court’s judgment in PEA v. CA, finding that De Leon does not
own the subject property and is not entitled to its possession, had long become
final and executory. As a consequence, the writ of execution, as well as the
writ of demolition, should be issued as a matter of course, in the absence of
any order restraining their issuance. In fact, the writ of demolition is merely
an ancillary process to carry out the Order previously made by the RTC for the
execution of this Court’s decision in PEA
v. CA. It is a logical consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.
Neither can De
Furthermore,
the Order of the RTC holding in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Demolition also appears to be a circumvention of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which limit the period
of effectivity of restraining orders issued by the courts. In fact, the
assailed Orders of the RTC have even become more potent than a TRO issued by the
CA because, under the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the CA is effective only
for sixty days. In the present case, even in the absence of a TRO issued by a
higher court, the RTC, in effect, directed the maintenance of the status quo by issuing its assailed
Orders. Worse, the effectivity of the said Orders was made to last for an
indefinite period because the resolution of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Demolition was made to depend upon the finality of the judgment in G.R. No.
181970. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated December 28, 2007 and
March 4, 2008.
Finally, the
Court reminds the De Leon that it does not allow the piecemeal interpretation
of its Decisions as a means to advance his case. To get the true intent and
meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and read
in this context, but the same must be considered in its entirety.[35]
Read in this manner, PEA’s right to possession of the subject property, as well
as the removal of the improvements or structures existing thereon, fully
follows after considering the entirety of the Court’s decision in PEA v. CA. This is consistent with the
provisions of Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
which provide for the procedure for execution of judgments for specific acts, to
wit:
SECTION
10. Execution of judgments for specific
act. -
x x x x
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. - The officer shall demand of the person against whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within the three (3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee; otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the judgment obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for money.
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. - When the property subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements, except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
As a final
note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging for more than 15
years and the execution of this Court’s judgment in PEA v. CA has been delayed for almost ten years now simply because De
WHEREFORE, the Court disposes and orders the following:
The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 181970 is DENIED. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328 dated November 21,
2007 and March 4, 2008, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 182678 is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, dated December 28, 2007 and
March 4, 2008, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court of
Makati is hereby DIRECTED to hear and
resolve PEA’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition with utmost
dispatch. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to remand the records of the case to the court of origin.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per raffle dated July 26, 2010.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Sixto C. Marella, Jr. concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 181970), pp. 35-42.
[2]
[3] Now Philippine Reclamation Authority by virtue of Executive Order No. 380 effective on October 26, 2004.
[4] Rollo (G.R. No. 181970), pp. 36-39.
[5] Rollo (G.R. No. 182678), pp. 59-63.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo (G.R. No. 181970), pp. 44-45.
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 182678), pp. 122-128.
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo (G.R. No. 181970), pp. 107-115; rollo (G.R. No. 182678), pp. 172-180.
[17]
[18] 398 Phil. 901 (2000).
[19]
[20] See Complaint, pp. 3-5; CA rollo, pp. 20-22.
[21] Narciso Tumibay, et al. v. Spouses Yolanda and Honorio Soro, et al., G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010.
[22]
[23] Isaguirre v. De Lara, 388 Phil. 607, 622 (2000).
[24] Baluyut v. Guiao, 373 Phil. 1013, 1022 (1999).
[25]
[26] Narciso Tumibay, et al. v. Spouses Yolanda and Honorio Soro, et al., supra note 20, citing Buñag v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 216 (1999).
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] DHL Philippines Corporation United Rank and File Association-Federation of Free Workers v. Buklod ng Manggagawa ng DHL Philippines Corporation, 478 Phil. 842, 853 (2004); Jaban v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 896, 904 (2001); Isaguirre v. de Lara, supra note 22.
[31] See rollo (G.R. No. 181970), p. 29.
[32] Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
[33] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 747, 752.
[34] 446 Phil. 227, 238 (2003).
[35] La Campana Development Corporation v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 146157, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 137, 156; Heirs of Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, 459 Phil. 948, 964. (2003).
[36] Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 156687-88, May 21, 2009, 588 SCRA 64, 71.
[37]