SECOND DIVISION
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GILBERT URMA, TEOFILO URMA,
DANTE URMA, and JERRY URMA, Petitioners, - versus - HON. ORLANDO BELTRAN, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 11, Tuao, Cagayan, LOLITA URMA,
MELBA R. MAMUAD, MARCELA URMA CAINGAT, HIPOLITO MARTIN, EDMUND URMA, ALBINA
URMA MAMUAD, CIANITA AGUSTIN FAUSTO MADAMBA, and LAUREANO ANTONIO,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 180836 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: August 8, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA,
J.:
This is a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing 1] the September 18, 2007 Judgment[1]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Tuao, Cagayan (RTC), in Civil Case No. 354-T, deciding the
case in favor of the private respondents; and 2] its December 10, 2007
Order[2]
denying petitioners’ Motion For New Trial.
The case stemmed from a complaint
filed by the respondents against the petitioners for partition, quieting of
title, recovery of ownership, and damages over two parcels of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1812 and No. P-1630.
The petitioners and respondents are
blood relatives being the nearest of kin of the deceased spouses Laureano Urma (Laureano) and Rosa Labrador-Urma (
The petitioners claim ownership of
the lot they are occupying by virtue of a deed of sale allegedly executed by
Laureano on April 10, 1985 in favor of petitioner Teofilo Urma, and in agreement
with respondent Marcela Urma-Caingat. On the other hand, six (6) of the respondents
claim ownership over portions of the subject property by virtue of a deed of
donation executed in their favor by Rosa in February 1996.
During the pre-trial proceedings of
the case, both parties agreed that the only matter to be resolved was the
validity of the absolute deed of sale, which as claimed by the petitioners was
executed by Laureano in 1985 over one-half of the property covered by OCT No. P-1630. If the said deed of sale was valid, the
subsequent deeds of donation executed by
The parties also agreed that the thumb
mark of Laureano affixed on the notarized deed of sale be subjected to a
dactylascopic examination by an expert from the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). Said examination would entail
comparison of the thumb mark on the questioned absolute deed of sale with the
genuine specimen thumb mark of Laureano in his Voter’s Registration Record on
file with the Office of the Election Registrar.
Upon orders of the trial court, the
NBI performed the examination and found that the questioned fingerprint was not
identical with the genuine specimen thumbmark.
Hence, the NBI concluded that the absolute deed of sale supposedly
executed by Laureano was a spurious document.
In its decision dated September 18, 2007, the RTC
ruled in favor of the respondents by declaring them the absolute owners of
portions of the disputed land and ordering the petitioners to vacate said portions. In the same ruling, the RTC also ordered the
partition of the remaining portions of the subject property among all the parties
in equal shares. Specifically, the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Declaring
plaintiff Lolita Urma, Melba Mamuad, Marcela Urma-Caingat, Hipolito Martin,
Edmund Urma and Albina Urma-Mamuad to be the absolute owners of one-eight (1/8)
of each of the property covered by O.C.T. No. P-1630 equivalent to Ten Thousand
Seven Hundred Seventy-seven (10,
777 sq. m.) square meters;
2.
Ordering
defendant Teofilo Urma to vacate the property which he is occupying equivalent
to one-half (1/2) of the property covered by O.C.T. No. P-1630 and surrender
possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
3.
Ordering
the other defendants, namely Gilbert Urma, Dante Urma and Jerry Urma to vacate
the portions of the property covered by O.C.T. No. 1630 which they have
occupied and are still occupying and surrender possession thereof to the
plaintiffs;
4.
Ordering
the partition of the remaining 21,559 square meters covered by O.C.T. No. 1630
as well as the entire property covered by O.C.T. No. 1812 in favor of all the
parties in equal shares.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[3]
In the belief that their counsel committed gross
negligence in handling their case, the
defendants filed a Motion For New Trial.[4] They argued
that their counsel should not have joined the motion for a judgment on the pleadings
because their answer contained specific denials and defenses which tendered an
issue. They likewise claimed that they
were uneducated and “not too familiar with the niceties of the law and legal
procedures.” Hence, they should not be bound by the
mistakes and omissions of their counsel.[5]
On December 10, 2007, the RTC issued the questioned Order[6] denying
petitioners’ Motion For New Trial on the ground that the same was
without factual or legal basis and that there were no irregularities committed
during the trial.
The RTC reasoned out that the parties, through their
respective counsels, agreed during the pre-trial that the only issue of fact
around which the whole case revolved was the genuineness of the deed of absolute
sale dated April 10, 1985 allegedly executed by Laureano in favor of Teofilo
Urma; that said document be examined by
the NBI; that both parties would accept the result
of the dactyloscopic examination to be conducted; and that said result would be
the basis of the judgment to be rendered. It was further stipulated that if the NBI
report would state that Laureano indeed executed the deed of sale, the judgment
would be in favor of the petitioners. Otherwise,
the decision should favor the respondents.
Aggrieved, petitioners came straight to this Court,
through a petition for review under Rule 45, anchored on the following
ARGUMENTS:
IT WAS CLEAR ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE COURT A QUO TO HAVE RENDERED JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS MOTU PROPIO[7]
IN DENYING THEIR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, THE
COURT A QUO HAS LIKEWISE ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION[8]
PETITIONER TEOFILO URMA IS THE OWNER IN FEE SIMPLE OF ONE-HALF PORTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN VIEW OF THE ISSUANCE OF A TCT FOR SAID PORTION.[9]
In the
Resolution of April 13, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties
were required to submit their respective memoranda.[10]
In
advocacy of their position, the petitioners in their memorandum argue that the
Rules of Court provides that a judgment on the pleadings is proper only when
the answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations in the
complaint. According to the petitioners,
the answer filed by their former counsel raised specific denials/affirmative
defenses thereby tendering an issue on litigable matters. Hence, judgment on the pleadings was not
proper.
Petitioners
further argue that the judgment of the RTC was merely based on the result of
the dactylascopic examination conducted by the NBI forensic expert who was not even
presented in open court. Thus, they were
not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine him. Moreover, since the NBI handwriting examiner
was not qualified as an expert witness, the
NBI report is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be used against them.
The
petitioners also lament that the RTC denied their Motion For New Trial without
conducting any hearing on said motion.
They claim that, in fact, with the execution of the deed of sale by
Laureano in favor of Teofilo Urma, OCT No. P-1630 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-5950 and T-5951 were issued in the names of
Laureano Urma and Teofilo Urma, respectively.
The RTC, however, was not apprised of the cancellation of OCT No. P-1630
because their former counsel did not present any evidence.
RESPONDENTS’ POSITION
The respondents
counter that the petition should be dismissed since under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, only questions of law may be raised. They claim that the petition on its face does
not state any special or important reason that merits the discretionary
jurisdiction of the Court to review this case.
Petitioners’ issues refer to 1)
the actions of their former counsel, and 2) the reliance by the RTC in the
result of the dactylascopic examination, which obviously are not questions of
law.
Respondents
also assert that during the pre-trial stage, the Rules of Court allows
stipulation or admission of facts and documents to avoid unnecessary proof. Thus, the RTC has the discretion to put
evidentiary value on the report of the NBI expert who enjoys the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his duties.
For the
respondents, it would be pointless to go to trial or to conduct a new trial
because it was already ascertained that the deed of sale was a product of
forgery.
The petition fails.
As correctly
argued by the respondents, the petitioners are questioning the procedural
decisions of their former counsel and the reliance by the RTC on the result of the dactylascopic examination.
The petitioners claim that their substantive
and procedural rights were violated due to their former counsel’s mistake or
negligence in handling their case.
Thus,
the petitioners pray for the reopening of Civil Case No. 354-T so that the evidence
pertaining to the authenticity of the subject deed of sale would be evaluated
again. This is obviously a question of fact which was already ruled upon by the
RTC with the holding that it was not executed by Laureano Urma. In other words, it would entail another
review of the evidence.
It
has always been held that it is not the function of this Court to re-examine or
weigh the evidence submitted by the parties all over again. This Court is
definitely not the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a
trier of facts.
At any rate, the parties
entered into a stipulation of facts and agreed to abide by its terms and the
results thereof. The trial court also
acted on the basis of their stipulations and rendered judgment accordingly. Considering
that the stipulation of facts has not been set aside, the Court agrees that it
would be pointless to hold a new trial. It
would only prolong the litigation and unnecessarily delay the final disposition
of the case. The situation at hand is not substantially different from the case
of Jesus D. Morales & Carolina Nuqui
v. Court of Appeals,[11] where
it was written:
Ostensibly,
the heart of the matter lies in whether or not the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale is valid. And on this score, there is little doubt
that its legitimacy had been duly established. The burden was on the
private respondents to impugn the genuineness of their signatures on the
document which having been notarized is imbued with the character of a public
document; yet they were unable to present a single shred of countervailing
evidence. Moreover, the validity of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale has been strengthened by the findings
of the NBI that the signatures of the private respondents were genuine,
findings with which the private respondents themselves agreed to abide pursuant
to the Stipulation of Facts.
x x x x
x x x x x
For
another, since private respondents undertook in the Stipulation of Facts
to recognize the ownership of the petitioners and immediately vacate the
subject property, together with the tenants, should the genuineness of the signatures
in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement With Sale be upheld, which has
become the case, and since the Stipulation of Facts has not been set
aside, it is perfectly appropriate for the Court to affirm the petitioners’
ownership and to order the private respondents’ eviction from the subject
property. The appellate court’s suggestion that the petitioners institute a
new, separate action to recover possession of the subject property is
inconsistent with the foregoing considerations and contravenes the avowed
policy to achieve just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of cases.
The Court has stated on several occasions that the pre-trial forms part of the proceedings, and matters dealt with therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be inconsequential and worthless.[12]
With regard to the petitioners’
argument that they should be excused from the procedural blunder committed by
their former counsel, the Court finds it bereft of merit. The petitioners were not denied due process
and their rights were not violated when their counsel, Atty. Raul Morales, agreed
that the only issue that needed to be resolved was the authenticity of the deed
of sale in favor of petitioner Teofilo Urma.
There was nothing amiss in entering into such
stipulations. The petitioners only cried
foul when the examination result turned out to be unfavorable to them. It was clearly stipulated that the parties would
abide by the results of the NBI dactylascopic examination. Both parties agreed to submit the questioned
document to the NBI where one of its examiners would be assigned to conduct the
examination. Thus, the parties did not
reserve any right to question the expertise of the NBI examiner. Apparently, there was no stipulation either
that he would be cross-examined on the result.
Granting that their counsel
made a mistake in entering into such stipulations, such procedural error unfortunately
bound them. The Court has consistently
held that the mistake or negligence of a counsel in the area
of procedural technique binds the client unless such mistake or negligence of
counsel is so gross or palpable that would require the courts to step in and
accord relief to the client who suffered thereby. Without this doctrinal rule, there would never
be an end to a suit so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and
show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or
learned.[13]
Finally, the Court finds the judgment of the RTC
correct, fair and judicious considering that both parties, being the nearest of
kin of the deceased spouses Laureano and Rosa, were given their rightful shares
in the subject property. As mentioned earlier, the judgment declared each of the
respondents the absolute owner of one-eight (1/8) of the property covered by
OCT No. P-1630 equivalent to 10,777 square meters by virtue of the notarized deeds
of donations[14] executed in their favor
by
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. Accordingly,
the September 18, 2007 Judgment
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Tuao, Cagayan, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ROBERT A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T
I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 38-41. Penned by Judge Orlando Beltran, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Tuao, Cagayan.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Supra note 2.
[7] Rollo, p. 27.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] 499 Phil. 655, 671 (2005).
[12] Antonio Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 160 Phil. 1101, 1155 (1975).
[13] Jaime T. Torres v. China Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 165408,
[14] Rollo, pp. 59-64.