Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee, -
versus - FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO, Appellant. |
G.R. No. 179029
Present: CARPIO
MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, *ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: August 12, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
|
D E C I S I O N
|
|
|
|
BRION, J.: |
We review
the decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01597 which affirmed in toto the
decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in
Criminal Case No. 4600, finding appellant Felimon Pagaduan y Tamayo (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu,
under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The
prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under an Information that states:
That
on or about December 27, 2003 at about 4:30 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of
Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, trade, dispense, deliver and give away 0.01 gram, more or
less, of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, as contained
in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet to PO3 Peter C. Almarez, a member
of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) who posed as a buyer of shabu
in the amount of P200.00, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of
the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The
appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits, thereafter, followed.
The
evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts.
After having received information
that the appellant was selling illegal drugs in Nueva Vizcaya, Captain Jaime de
Vera called, on his cellular phone, PO3 Peter Almarez and SPO1 Domingo Balido –
who were both in Santiago City – and
informed them of a planned buy-bust operation. They agreed to meet at the SSS
Building near LMN Hotel in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.[4] On
their arrival there, Captain de Vera conducted a briefing and designated PO3
Almarez as the poseur buyer. Thereafter,
Captain de Vera introduced PO3 Almarez to the police informant (tipster),[5] and
gave him (PO3 Almarez) two P100 bills (Exhibits “D” and “E”) which the
latter marked with his initials.[6]
After this briefing, the buy-bust
team went to Bintawan Road, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya to conduct the entrapment
operation.[7] PO3
Almarez and the informant rode a tricycle, while Captain de Vera and SPO1
Balido followed on board a tinted van.[8] The
buy-bust team arrived at the target area at around 4:30 p.m., and saw the
appellant already waiting for the informant. The informant approached the
appellant and introduced PO3 Almarez to him as a buyer. PO3 Almarez told the
appellant that he needed shabu worth P200,
and inquired from him (appellant) if he had a “stock.” The appellant replied in the affirmative, and then
handed one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance to PO3 Almarez. PO3 Almarez, in turn, gave the two pre-marked P100
bills to the appellant.[9] Immediately
after, PO3 Almarez made the pre-arranged signal to his companions, who then approached
the appellant. Captain de Vera took the marked money from the appellant’s right
pocket, and then arrested him.[10] PO3
Almarez, for his part, marked the sachet with his initials.[11] Thereafter,
the buy-bust team brought the appellant to the Diadi Police Station for
investigation.[12]
At the police station, Captain de
Vera prepared a request for laboratory examination (Exh. “C”).[13] The appellant was transferred to the Diadi
Municipal Jail where he was detained.[14] Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3
Almarez transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the
seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by
PO2 Fernando Dulnuan.[15] Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
conducted an examination on the specimen submitted, and found it to be positive
for the presence of shabu (Exh. “B”).[16]
On the hearing of August 13, 2004,
the prosecution offered the following as exhibits:
Exhibit “A” – the shabu confiscated from the appellant
Exhibit “B” – the report by the PNP Crime Laboratory
Exhibit “C” – the request for laboratory examination
Exhibits “D” and “E” – the buy-bust money
Exhibit “F” - the request for laboratory examination received by Forensic Chemist Quintero
The defense presented a different
version of the events, summarized as follows:
At around 4:30 p.m. of December 27,
2003, Jojo Jose came to the appellant’s house and informed him that Captain de
Vera was inviting him to be an “asset.” The appellant and Jojo boarded a
tricycle and proceeded to the SSS Building where Captain de Vera was waiting
for them.[17] As the tricycle approached the Methodist
Church along Bintawan Road, Jojo dropped his slippers and ordered the driver to
stop. Immediately after, a van stopped in front of the tricycle; Captain de
Vera alighted from the van and handcuffed the appellant. Captain de Vera brought the appellant inside
the van, frisked him, and took P200 from his pocket.[18] Afterwards,
Captain de Vera took the appellant to the SSS Building, where he (Captain de
Vera) and the building manager drank coffee. Captain de Vera then brought the
appellant to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained for almost two days.[19]
On the morning of December 29, 2003,
the appellant was transferred to the Provincial Jail. He signed a document
without the assistance of a lawyer after being told that it would result in his
immediate release.[20]
The RTC, in its decision[21]
of August 16, 2005, convicted the appellant of the crime charged, and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. The RTC likewise ordered the
appellant to pay a P500,000.00 fine.
The
appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01597. The CA, in
its decision[22] dated May 22, 2007,
affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA found unmeritorious the
appellant’s defense of instigation, and held that the appellant was apprehended
as a result of a legitimate entrapment operation. It explained that in
inducement or instigation, an innocent person is lured by a public officer or
private detective to commit a crime. In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation
was planned only after the police had received information that the appellant
was selling shabu.
The
CA also held that the failure of the police to conduct a prior surveillance on
the appellant was not fatal to the prosecution’s case. It reasoned out that the
police are given wide discretion to select effective means to apprehend drug dealers.
A prior surveillance is, therefore, not necessary, especially when the police
are already accompanied by their informant.
The
CA further ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove an
unbroken chain of custody of the shabu. It explained that PO3 Almarez sealed the
plastic sachet seized from the appellant, marked it with his initials, and
transmitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PSI Quintero
conducted a qualitative examination and found the specimen positive for the
presence of shabu. According to the CA, the prosecution was able
to prove that the substance seized was the same specimen submitted to the laboratory
and presented in court, notwithstanding that this specimen was turned over to
the crime laboratory only after two days.
In
his brief,[23] the appellant claims that
the lower courts erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the
prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He harps on
the fact that the police did not conduct a prior surveillance on him before
conducting the buy-bust operation.
The appellant further contends that
the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of
the seized drug. He claims that there
was no evidence to show when the markings were done. Moreover, a period of two
days had elapsed from the time the shabu
was confiscated to the time it was forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the
chain of custody of the shabu was
sufficiently established. It explained that the shabu was turned over by the police officers to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, where it was found by the forensic chemist to be positive for the
presence of shabu. The OSG likewise
claimed that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties by the police. The OSG further added that a
prior surveillance is not indispensable to a prosecution for illegal sale of
drugs.[24]
THE COURT’S RULING
After
due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the
prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed
to show that the police complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act.
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act: A Brief Background
R.A. No. 9165 was enacted in 2002 to
pursue the State’s policy to “safeguard the integrity of its territory and the
well-being of its citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, and to defend the same
against acts or omissions detrimental to their development and preservation.”
R.A.
No. 9165 repealed and superseded R.A. No. 6425, known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. Realizing that dangerous drugs are one of the most serious social
ills of the society at present, Congress saw the need to further enhance the
efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. The new law thus mandates the
government to pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug
abuse policies, programs and projects.[25]
Illegal Sale of Drugs under Section 5
vis-à-vis the
Inventory and Photograph
Requirement under Section 21
In a prosecution for illegal sale of
a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove
the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale transaction
transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has
actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal
transaction.[26] To remove any doubt or
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered
from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug
pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.[27]
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of
drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(a)
The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed
procedure is required because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic
rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.[28] The records of the present case are
bereft of evidence showing that the buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure
despite its mandatory terms. The deficiency is patent from the following
exchanges at the trial:
PROSECUTOR [EMERSON TURINGAN]:
Q: After you handed this buy-bust money to the accused, what happened next?
[PO3 ALMAREZ:]
A: When the shabu was already with me and I gave him the money[,] I signaled the two, Captain Jaime de Vera and SPO1 Balido, sir.
x x x x
Q: After you gave that signal, what happened?
A: Then they approached us and helped me in arresting Felimon Pagaduan, sir.
Q: After Pagaduan was arrested, what happened next?
A: After arresting Pagaduan[,] we brought him directly in Diadi Police Station, sir.
Q: What happened when you brought the accused to the Police Station in Diadi?
A: When we were already in Diadi Police Station, we first put him in jail in the Municipal Jail of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.
Q: What
did you do with the shabu?
A: The
request for laboratory examination was prepared and was brought to the Crime
Lab. of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.
x x x x
Q: After
making the request, what did you do next[,] if any[,] Mr. Witness?
A: After
submission of the request to the Crime Lab.[,] we prepared our joint affidavit
for submission of the case to the Court, sir.[29]
From
the foregoing exchanges during trial, it is evident that the apprehending team,
upon confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the seized
items to the police station, and, once there, made the request for laboratory
examination. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were
taken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and an elective official. PO3 Almarez, on
cross-examination, was unsure and could not give a categorical answer when
asked whether he issued a receipt for the shabu
confiscated from the appellant.[30] At any rate, no such receipt or certificate of
inventory appears in the records.
In several cases, we have emphasized the importance of
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the custody and disposition of the
seized drugs. We have repeatedly declared that the deviation from the standard
procedure dismally compromises the integrity of the evidence. In People v. Morales,[31]
we acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and
inventory the seized items, without giving any justifiable ground for the
non-observance of the required procedures. People
v. Garcia[32] likewise resulted in an
acquittal because no physical inventory
was ever made, and no photograph of the
seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A.
No. 9165 and its implementing rules. In Bondad, Jr. v. People,[33] we
also acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to conduct an
inventory and to photograph the seized items, without justifiable grounds.
We
had the same rulings in People v.
Gutierrez,[34]
People v. Denoman,[35] People v. Partoza,[36] People v. Robles,[37] and
People v. dela Cruz,[38] where
we emphasized the importance of complying with the required mandatory
procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
We
recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police
operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the
niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence. For this
reason, the last sentence of the implementing rules provides that “non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]”
Thus, noncompliance with the strict
directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case; police procedures
in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the
present case. These lapses, however,
must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.[39]
In the
present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify
the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending team failed to
show why an inventory and photograph of the seized evidence had not been made
either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as
required by the Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for
the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had been preserved.[40] In
other words, the justifiable ground for noncompliance
must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.[41]
The “Chain of Custody” Requirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus
delicti - the body of the crime
whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established. The
chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as
it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[42]
Black’s Law
Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:
In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the
narcotics in a trial of drug case, must account for the custody of the evidence
from the moment in which it reaches his custody until the moment in which it is
offered in evidence, and such evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of
evidence. Com. V. White, 353
Likewise, Section 1(b) of
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A.
No. 9165 defines “chain of custody” as follows:
“Chain
of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record
of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition[.]
In Malillin v. People,[43]
the Court explained that the chain of custody rule requires that there be
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was
picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received, where
it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition
in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain.
In the present case, the
prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that
the shabu presented in court was the
very same specimen seized from the appellant.
The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the
heat-sealed plastic sachet from the appellant. PO3 Almarez mentioned on cross-examination
that he placed his initials on the confiscated sachet “after apprehending” the
appellant. Notably, this testimony constituted the totality of the
prosecution’s evidence on the marking of the seized evidence. PO3 Almarez’s
testimony, however, lacked specifics on how he marked the sachet and who
witnessed the marking. In People v.
Sanchez, we ruled that the “marking” of the seized
items – to truly ensure
that they are
the same items that enter the
chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in
the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation. In the present case, nothing in the records gives us an
insight on the manner and circumstances that attended the marking of the confiscated
sachet. Whether the marking had been done in the presence of the appellant is
not at all clear from the evidence that merely mentioned that the evidence had
been marked after the appellant’s apprehension.
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the apprehending team to the
police station.
PO3 Almarez testified that the appellant was brought to the
Diadi Police Station after his arrest. However, he failed to identify
the person who had control and possession of the seized drug at the time of its
transportation to the police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we
cannot presume that PO3 Almarez, as the poseur
buyer, handled the seized sachet – to the exclusion of others - during its
transfer from the place of arrest and confiscation to the police station. The prosecution likewise failed to
present evidence pertaining to the identity of the duty desk officer who
received the plastic sachet containing shabu
from the buy-bust team. This is particularly significant
since the seized specimen was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after two days. It was not, therefore, clear who had temporary custody of the
seized items during this significant
intervening period of time. Although the records show that the request for
laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachet was prepared by Captain de
Vera, the evidence does not show that he was the official who received the
marked plastic sachet from the buy-bust team.
As for
the subsequent links in the chain of
custody, the records show that the seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez
to the PNP Crime Laboratory on December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2
Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero. However, the person from whom PO3
Almarez received the seized illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory
was not identified. As earlier discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer
who received the shabu, as well as
the person who had temporary custody of the seized items for two days, had not
been established.
The
procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain of
custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from the appellant were the same drugs that were
brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually offered
in court as evidence. In the absence of concrete evidence on the illegal
drugs bought and sold, the body of the crime – the corpus delicti – has not been adequately proven.[44] In
effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime
charged, creating reasonable doubt on the appellant’s criminal liability.
Presumption of
Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties
In sustaining the appellant’s
conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary presumption that official duties
have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not
conclusive.[45] It cannot, by itself, overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects
the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In the
present case, the failure of the apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1,
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody
requirement of this Act effectively negates this presumption. As we explained
in Malillin v. People:[46]
The presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot
be regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In
the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner
by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court,
strongly militates a finding of guilt.
We are not unmindful of the
pernicious effects of drugs in our society; they are lingering maladies that
destroy families and relationships, and engender crimes. The Court is one with all the agencies
concerned in pursuing an intensive and unrelenting campaign against this social
dilemma. Regardless of how much we want to curb this menace, we cannot disregard
the protection provided by the Constitution, most particularly the presumption
of innocence bestowed on the appellant. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome this constitutional presumption. If the
prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all the elements of the crime
charged, which in this case is the corpus
delicti, then the appellant deserves no less than an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01597. Appellant Felimon Pagaduan y Tamayo is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is
confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Director, Bureau of Corrections,
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
|
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justice Arcangelita Romilla Lontok and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza; rollo, pp. 2-15.
[2] Penned by Judge Jose B. Rosales; CA rollo, pp. 9-15.
[3] Id. at 8.
[4] TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 3-4; TSN, July 26, 2004, p. 3; see also Joint Affidavit, Records, p. 4.
[5] TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 4; Records, p. 4.
[6] TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 7, 13-14; TSN, July 26, 2004, p. 11; Records, p. 4.
[7] TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 4.
[8] TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 4 and 6.
[9] TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 6-8; TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 5-6; Records, p. 4.
[10] TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 9; TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 16-17.
[11] TSN, July 26, 2004, p. 5.
[12] TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 10.
[13] Id. at 10-11.
[14] Id. at 10; TSN, July 19, 2004, p. 11; Records, pp. 23-24.
[15] Records, p. 5.
[16] TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 22-23; Records, p. 12.
[17] TSN, September 13, 2004, pp. 5-6.
[18] Id. at 7-8.
[19] Id. at 8-9.
[20] Id. at 10.
[21] Supra note 2.
[22] Supra note 1.
[23] CA rollo, pp. 30-44.
[24] Id. at 57-70.
[25] Integrity of Evidence in Dangerous Drugs Cases by Justice (ret.) Josue N. Bellosillo, 596 SCRA 278 (2009).
[26] People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259, 266.
[27] See People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 257, 267.
[28] People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010.
[29] TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 9-13.
[30] TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 17-18.
[31] G.R. No. 172873, March 19, 2010.
[32] Supra note 26.
[33] G.R. No. 173804, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 497.
[34] G.R. No. 179213, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 92.
[35] Supra note 27.
[36] G.R. No. 182418, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 809.
[37] G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647.
[38] G.R. No. 181545, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 273.
[39] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 212.
[40] See People v. Almorfe, G.R. No. 181831, March 29, 2010.
[41] People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010.
[42] Supra note 39, citing People v. Kimura, 428 SCRA 51 (2004) and Lopez v. People, 553 SCRA 619 (2008).
[43] G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632.
[44] Supra note 28.
[45] See People v. Coreche, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350, 364.
[46] Supra note 43, at 623.