Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
JOSE REYES y
VACIO, Petitioner, -versus - PEOPLE
OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. Nos. 177105-06
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, ABAD,* and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: August 12, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
BERSAMIN, J.:
The
petitioner appeals by petition for review on certiorari the decision
dated
Antecedents
Belen
Lopez Vda. de Guia (Belen) was the registered absolute owner of two parcels of
agricultural land with an area of 197,594 square meters located in Santa
Barbara, Baliwag, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 209298 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. On
On
Upon
learning of the transfers of her land, Belen filed on
On
Belen
appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), docketed as AC-G.R. CV No.
5524-UDK.
On
Thereafter,
the tenants of the land, namely, Paulino Sacdalan, Leonardo Sacdalan, Santiago
Sacdalan, Numeriano Bautista and Romeo Garcia (tenants), invoked their right to
redeem pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended.[4] Acting
thereon, Ricardo executed a deed of
reconveyance in favor of the tenants on
Upon
registration of the deed of reconveyance,
TCT No. 210338 was cancelled, and TCT No. 301375 was issued in the names of the
tenants. The land was subdivided into several lots, and individual TCTs were
issued in the names of the tenants.
In
the meanwhile, Belen discovered for the first time through a letter-inquiry to
the IAC Clerk of Court that her appeal in AC-G.R. CIV No. 5524-UDK had been
dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. She thus filed in the IAC a motion to reinstate her appeal. The IAC
granted her motion.[6]
The
reinstated appeal was re-docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 02883.
On
WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered:
(1) declaring as
null and void and without any effect whatsoever the deed of sale executed by
and between appellant Belen Lopez vda. De Guia and defendant Carlos de Guia,
Exhibit “A;”
(2) declaring
defendant-appellant Ricardo San Juan as a purchaser in bad faith and ordering
him to reconvey to appellant the two (2) parcels of land described in the
complaint;
(3) ordering the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel and/or annul TCT No. 210338 in the name
of defendant-appellee Ricardo San Juan as well as TCT No. 210108 in the name of
defendant-appellee Carlos de Guia for being null and void and to reinstate TCT
No. 209298 in the name of appellant as the true and valid title over the lands
described therein; and
(4) ordering the
defendants-appellees to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The
IAC decision became final on
On
On
P200.00.
It directed Ricardo and the tenants to reconvey the land to Belen and to
deliver to her the share in the harvest.
Ricardo
and the tenants appealed the RTC order to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 14783
entitled
Mariano Bautista, et al vs. Hon. Felipe N. Villajuan, Jr. as Judge RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch XIV and Belen Lopez Vda. De Guia.
On
On
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Board finds the instant case wanting of merit, the
same is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of titles Nos.
T-307845, T-307846, T-307856, T-307857, T-307869, T-307870, T-307871, T-307873
and T-307874 issued in the name of Numeriano Bautista, Romeo Garcia, Leonardo
Sacdalan, Paulino Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan respectively are hereby
AFFIRMED. The plaintiff and all other persons acting in their behalf are hereby
ordered to permanently cease and desist from committing any acts tending to
oust or eject the defendants or their heirs or assigns from the landholding in
question.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Belen
filed a notice of appeal in the DARAB
on
On
Aggrieved,
Belen, through Melba, filed an urgent
motion to set aside the writ of execution in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88,[14]
but her motion was denied.
On
After
her motion for reconsideration was
denied, Belen lodged an appeal to the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 39315).
In
due course, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB Central
Office,[16]
and
ordered the tenants: (a) to vacate
the land; (b) to deliver its
possession to Belen; and (c) to pay
to Belen the rents on the land corresponding to the period from 1981 until they
would have vacated.
The
tenants filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion.
Thus,
the tenants appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 128967), which affirmed the CA’s decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39315.[17]
On
Criminal Case No.
24655
(for violation
of section 3 (e) of RA 3019)
That on or about
16 March 1993, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer being then employed as
Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in Malolos, Bulacan, while in the performance of his official function
as such and acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally render his decision in DARAB Case
No. 034-Bul-88 favorable to the tenants who were respondents in said agrarian
case, thereby ignoring and disregarding the final and executory decision of the
Court of Appeals in AC-GR CV-02883 which declared complainant Belen de Guia as
the true owner of the lands subject of the litigation in both cases, thus
causing undue injury and damage to the said Belen de Guia and to the public
interest.[19]
Criminal Case No.
24656
(for usurpation
of judicial functions under
Article 241 of
the Revised Penal Code)
That on or about
16 March 1993, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan,
Philippines, above-named accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer being then
employed as Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) in Malolos, Bulacan, while in the performance of his official
function as such and taking advantage thereof, with full knowledge of a
Decision in AC-GR CV-02883 of the Court of Appeals, which declared Belen de
Guia as the true owner of the lands litigated in said case, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously disregard, obstruct and ignore the said
final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals, by rendering a decision
in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 thereby favoring and emboldening the
tenants-respondents in said DARAB case to unlawfully continue occupying the
lands of Belen de Guia, the complainant, to her damage and prejudice, as well
as to the public interest.[20]
Arraigned
on
After
trial, on January 15, 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision,[22]
finding the petitioner guilty of both charges; and sentencing him to suffer: (a) in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019), an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment
from six years and one month, as minimum, to 10 years as maximum, with
perpetual disqualification from holding public office; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 24656 (for
usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code), imprisonment of four months of arresto
mayor.
The
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration on
Hence, this appeal by petition for
review on certiorari.
Issues
The
issues raised herein are:
a) Whether the petitioner was guilty of
violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in DARAB CASE NO.
034 BUL’88; and
b) Whether the petitioner was guilty of
usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code.[24]
Anent
the first issue, the petitioner maintains that there was no evident bad faith,
manifest partiality, and gross inexcusable negligence on his part when he
decided DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88; that his decision therein had been solely based
on what he had perceived to be in keeping with the letter and spirit of the pertinent
laws; and that his decision had been rendered upon a thorough appreciation of
the facts and the law.[25]
As
to the second issue, the petitioner insists that his rendition of the decision did not amount to the felony of usurpation of judicial
functions.
Ruling
The
petitioner was correctly held guilty of and liable for violating Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88, but his
conviction for usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code is reversed and set
aside.
A.
Elements of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
established herein
RA 3019 was enacted to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike that constitute graft or corrupt practices or may lead
thereto.[26] The
law enumerates the punishable acts or omissions and provides their
corresponding penalties.
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, under which petitioner was charged and
found guilty, relevantly provides:
Section.
3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
x x
x
(e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
x x
x
The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the
following:
1.
The
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions;
2.
He
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. His
action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions.[27]
The first element was established. The petitioner was a public
officer when he rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88, being then
a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB discharging the duty of adjudicating the conflicting
claims of parties.
The second element includes the different and distinct modes by
which the offense is committed, that is,
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence. Proof of the existence of any of the modes suffices to warrant
conviction under Section 3 (e).[28]
Manifest partiality exists when the accused has a clear,
notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or one person
rather than another.[29]
It is synonymous with bias, which excites a disposition to see and report matters
as they are wished for rather than as they are.[30]
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the
part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage.[31]
It contemplates a breach of sworn duty through some perverse motive or ill
will.[32]
Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence characterized by
the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.[33]
The decision rendered on February 20, 1986 in AC-G.R.
CV No. 02883 – nullifying the forged deed of sale between Belen and Carlos;
declaring Ricardo a purchaser in bad faith; ordering Ricardo to reconvey the
land to Belen; directing the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the respective
TCTs of Ricardo and Carlos; and reinstating Belen’s TCT – became final on March
15, 1986. After the entry of judgment was made on
Due
to its finality, the decision in AC-G.R. CV
No. 02883 became immutable, and could no longer be modified in any respect,
whether the modification was to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law,
whether made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.[34]
The reason for such immutability is that a litigation must end sometime, and an
effective and efficient administration of justice requires that the winning
party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict once a judgment becomes
final.[35]
The
petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 prior to his promulgation of the decision in
DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88. Indeed, he actually admitted having read and examined the
following documents (adduced by the Prosecution) prior to his rendition
of the decision,[36] namely:
(1) Belen’s
position paper dated August 7, 1992 submitted to him in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88, in which Belen stated that the
decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 had become final and executory;[37]
(2) The entry of
judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883;[38]
(3) Belen’s TCT
No. 209298, reflecting the entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 and
the cancellation of the TCTs of the tenants-lessees by virtue of the decision
in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883;[39]
and
(4) Addendum to
Belen’s position paper, mentioning the decree in the decision in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883.[40]
Yet, the petitioner still rendered his
decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88 that completely
contradicted and disregarded the decision in AC-G.R.
CV No. 02883 by invalidating Belen’s title on the land and upholding the TCTs
of the tenants. He thereby exhibited manifest partiality, for such decision of
his was a total and willful disregard of the final decision
in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883. His granting
the tenants’ motion for execution made
his partiality towards the tenants and bias against Belen that much more apparent.
Similarly, the petitioner’s evident bad faith displayed itself by his arrogant refusal to recognize and
obey the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, despite his unqualified obligation
as Provincial Adjudicator to abide by the CA’s ruling that was binding on him
as Provincial Adjudicator and on all the parties in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL’88.
Worthy
of note is that the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39315, and this Court, in G.R. No.
128967, had characterized the petitioner’s aforementioned conduct as “an utter
disrespect to the judiciary,” as vested with a “dishonest purpose,” and as
constituting “a contumacious attitude which should not be tolerated.”[41]
These acute characterizations fortify the holding that he harbored a deliberate
intent to do wrong to Belen.
Correctly
did the Sandiganbayan find that the petitioner had displayed
manifest partiality and evident bad faith in rendering his decision in DARAB
Case No. 034-BUL’88.
The third element of the offense – when the act of the accused
caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or, gave any
private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of the
functions of the accused – was also established. In this regard, proof of the
extent or quantum of damage was not essential, it being sufficient that the
injury suffered or the benefit received could be perceived to be substantial
enough and was not merely negligible.[42]
Belen was constrained to engage the services of a lawyer and to
incur other expenses in order to protect and prosecute her interest in DARAB
Case No. 034 BUL’88. In all, her expenses were in the substantial sum of P990,000.00.[43]
Moreover, the petitioner’s stubborn refusal to recognize and obey the decision
in AC-G.R.
CV No. 02883 forced a further but needless prejudicial delay in the prompt termination
of the cases. The delay proved very costly to Belen, for, in that length of
time (that is, from
Likewise, the petitioner’s ruling in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL’88 gave
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to the tenants by allowing them to
remain in possession of the land and to enjoy the fruits.
Given the foregoing considerations, the Sandiganbayan correctly
convicted the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 24655 for violating Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019.
B.
Usurpation of judicial functions
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code states:
xxx The penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correcional in
its minimum period shall be imposed upon any officer of the executive branch of
the government who shall assume judicial powers or shall obstruct the execution
of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
In
usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a judge, attempts to
perform an act the authority for which the law has vested only in a judge.[44] However,
the petitioner’s task as Provincial
Adjudicator when he rendered judgment in DARAB Case
No. 034 BUL’88 was to adjudicate the claims of the opposing parties. As such,
he performed a quasi-judicial function, closely akin to the function of a judge
of a court of law. He could not be held liable under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore,
considering that the acts constitutive of usurpation of judicial function were
lacking herein.
C.
Penalties
The
Sandiganbayan appreciated the mitigating circumstance of old age in favor of the
petitioner by virtue of his being already over 70 years old.
The
Sandiganbayan thereby erred. The mitigating circumstance of old age under
Article 13 (2) of the Revised Penal Code
applied only when the offender was over 70 years at the time of the commission
of the offense.[45]
The petitioner, being only 63 years old when he committed the offenses charged,[46]
was not entitled to such mitigating circumstance.
Under
Section 9 of RA 3019, the penalty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is imprisonment
for not less than six years and one month nor more than 15 years, and perpetual
disqualification from public office. Pursuant to Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the
offense is punished by a special law, the accused is punished with an
indeterminate sentence the maximum of which does not exceed the maximum fixed
by the law violated, and the minimum is not less than the minimum term
prescribed by the law violated.
Accordingly,
in Criminal Case No. 24655, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed on the petitioner
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one month,
as minimum, to 10 years as maximum. The penalty of perpetual disqualification
from public office was also correctly imposed.
WHEREFORE,
the Court affirms the conviction of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for
violation of section 3 (e) of RA 3019), but reverses and sets aside his
conviction in Criminal Case No. 24656 (for usurpation of judicial functions as
defined and penalized under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code).
No
pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional
member per Special Order No. 843 dated
[1] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi (retired), with Associate Justice
Efren N. Dela Cruz and Associate Justice Norberto Y. Geraldez (later Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, now deceased) concurring; rollo, pp.
64-98.
[3] Rollo, pp. 66-67.
[4] RA
3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code):
Section 12. Lessees Right of Redemption. – In case the landholding is sold to a
third person without the knowledge of agricultural lessee, the latter shall
have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided,
That where the there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be
entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually
cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised
within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by
the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon
the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of
legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the
land at the time of the sale. Upon filing of the corresponding petition or
request with the department or corresponding case in court by the agricultural
lessee or lessees, the said period of one hundred and eighty days shall cease
to run. Any petition or request for redemption shall be resolved within sixty
days from the filing thereof; otherwise, the said period shall start to run
again.
[5] Sandiganbayan
records, Volume 2, p. 181.
[6] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit Q, p. 3.
[7] Penned
by Associate Justice Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (retired), with Associate Justice
Eduardo P. Caguioa (retired), Associate Justice Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa
(retired), and Associate Justice Leonor Ines Luciano (retired), concurring;
Folder of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit B.
[8] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit E-1.
[9] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit D.
[10] Folder
of Exhibits of the Prosecution, Exhibit A; penned by Associate Justice Serafin
E. Camilon (retired), with Associate Justice Segundo G. Chua (retired) and
Associate Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. (later a Member of this Court, since
retired), concurring.
[11] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit G.
[12]
[13] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit K.
[14] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit L.
[15] Sandiganbayan
records, Volume 2, p. 185.
[16] Penned
by Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez (later a Member of this Court,
since retired), with Associate Justice Arturo D. Buena (later a Member of this
Court, since retired) and Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez (later a
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, since retired), concurring; Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit C.
[17] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit Q.
[18] Sandiganbayan
records, Volume 2, pp. 1-4.
[19] Sandiganbayan
records, Volume 2, pp. 3.
[20] Sandiganbayan
records, Volume 2, p. 1.
[21] Sandiganbayan
records, C-Volume 2, pp. 69-70.
[22] Rollo, pp. 64-98.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Section
1, RA 3019.
[27] Albert
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164015, 26 February 2009, 580 SCRA 279, 289-290;
Velasco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 160991, 28 February 2005, 452 SCRA
593, 601.
[28] Fonacier
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50691,
[29] Albert
v. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 27.
[30] Supra, note 28, p. 687.
[31] Reyes
v. Atienza, G.R. No. 152243,
[32] Villanueva
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105607, 21 June 1993, 223 SCRA 543, 550, citing Marcelo
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 69983, 14 May 1990, 185 SCRA 346, 349-350.
[33] Supra, note 28.
[34] Philippine
Veterans Bank v. Estrella, G.R. No. 138993,
[35] Salva
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132250,
[36] TSN,
[37] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit E.
[38] Supra, note 89.
[39] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit E-2.
[40] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit F.
[41] Supra, note 16 and 17.
[42] Supra, note 28.
[43] Folder
of Exhibits for the Prosecution, Exhibit O.
[44] Miñoso
v. Pamulag, A.M. No. P-05-2067,
[45] People
v. Nacional, G.R. Nos. 111294-95,
[46] Sandiganbayan
records, C-Volume 2, pp. 277-282.