THIRD DIVISION
THE
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - |
G.R. No.
176354 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, PERALTA,* BERSAMIN, ABAD,** and VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ. |
WILSON LOPEZ, VICTORINO
CRUZ @ BONG MADAYAG and FELIPE MAGLAYA, JR., Accused-Appellants. |
Promulgated: August 3,
2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VILLARAMA,
JR., J.:
On appeal is the February 16, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00527 which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] rendered by Branch 46 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, finding appellants Wilson Lopez, Victorino Cruz alias “Bong Madayag” and Felipe Maglaya, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
On
That
on or about the 28th day of June, 1997 at around 7:40 in the
evening, in Barangay Bagong Sikat, Municipality of San Jose, Province of
Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused being then armed with guns, with intent to kill and with
treachery and abuse of superior strength, conspiring and confederating together
with four others whose true names and identities are still unknown, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shoot with
the said weapons one Melchor Tabora, Sr. thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious wound which caused his untimely death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellants, with the
assistance of counsel, entered their respective pleas of not guilty.[4]
Trial on the merits then ensued.
Based on the narration of witnesses,
the facts are summed up as follows:
In the
evening of
Upon
entering the Tabora compound, two (2) men pointed their guns at the security
guards and ordered them to lie face down. Their hands and feet were tied with a
nylon cord, their mouths covered with masking tape, and their service firearms
were confiscated. Then, the other two
(2) men arrived and watched over the security guards. Before proceeding to the main house, one (1) of
the intruders switched off the fluorescent light at the buying station. Shortly afterwards, the security guards heard
a commotion coming from the kitchen.
Col. Melchor Tabora shouted “Guard! Guard!” and a few
seconds later, a gun was fired. Witnesses
Gregorio Reyno, Irene Barbosa, Mirasol Fernandez, Ronnie Cabangisan, Dina Dela
Torre, Salvacion Cercidillo and Corazon Tabora, the widow of the late Col.
Tabora, also heard the shouts of Col. Tabora, as well as the gunshot.[6]
Salvacion
Cercidillo, a house helper of the Taboras, testified that she was at the
compound’s kitchen at around
Soon after
the gunshot was heard, witnesses Gregorio Reyno, Irene Barbosa and Ronnie Cabangisan
saw four (4) men in dark pants and dark jackets, one (1) in camouflage, with
their bonnets rolled up to their foreheads, coming out of the gate of the Tabora
compound. They identified three (3) of
the men as appellants Wilson Lopez, Victorino Cruz alias Bong Madayag, and
Felipe Maglaya, Jr. The witnesses, together
with Mirasol Fernandez, saw appellants and their unidentified companion walking
fast along the concrete fence of the Tabora compound, with their bonnets rolled
up to their foreheads. The four (4) men
proceeded to the direction of
Responding to
a call from security guard Jesus Cornejo, police operatives from the San Jose
Municipal Police Station, led by Major Winston Ebersole, hurried to the Tabora
residence. In the course of their
investigation conducted at the crime scene, the police officers were able to
recover the following: three (3) pieces yellow-orange nylon cord, measuring about
one (1) yard each; one (1) blue colored bull cap marked “American
Birkerreiner XII Volunteer”; one (1) piece soft leather black holster for a
.45 caliber firearm; one (1) gray colored packing tape measuring approximately seven
(7) inches long by two (2) inches wide; and one (1) piece caliber
Firearms
Examiner Gerardo Umayao of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Region
IV, Camp Vicente Lim, examined the caliber
Dr. Edwin P.
Sulit, Medical Officer III of the
(a) the entry wound which he described as “0.5 x
0.25cms. oval deformity (wound) with collar contusion, located 3.0 cms. above
the nipple,
(b) the exit wound which the doctor described as “
On
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused WILSON LOPEZ, VICTORINO CRUZ @ BONG MADAYAG and FELIPE MAGLAYA, JR., GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The three (3) accused are hereby ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of MELCHOR TABORA SR. in the amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) and to furthermore pay said heirs the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages.
The
Provincial Warden is hereby directed to cause the immediate transfer of the
three (3) accused from the Provincial Jail at Magbay,
SO
ORDERED.[12]
Initially, this case was brought to
this Court for review and docketed as G.R. No. 146571. However, in a Resolution[13]
dated
On
The dispositive portion
of the Decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the Regional Trial Court’s decision convicting accused-appellants Wilson Lopez, Victorino Cruz alias Bong Madayag and Felipe Maglaya, Jr. of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. R-4221 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In
lieu of the death penalty which the RTC imposed, the accused-appellants are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. The
appellants shall solidarily pay the heirs of Melchor Tabora, Sr. the sum of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
3. The
trial court’s award of [P1,000,000] as moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00
SO ORDERED.[15]
Hence, the present
appeal.
On
In their brief,[16]
appellants assigned the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE KILLING OF THE LATE COL. TABORA.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A
SERIOUS AND GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT ABUSE OF
V
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MELCHOR TABORA, SR. IN THE AMOUNT OF SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00).
VI
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO PAY THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MELCHOR TABORA, SR. THE AMOUNT OF ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) AS MORAL DAMAGES.[17]
Essentially, appellants submit that
the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They argue that the prosecution witnesses
failed to positively identify them as the culprits of the crime. They also contend that there was total absence
of evidence to show that they attacked and killed the victim. They insist that the prosecution failed to
show that they were inside the Tabora compound on the date and time in
question. Thus, they implore us to
acquit them.
The appeal has no merit.
After a
thorough evaluation and scrutiny of the evidence on record, we arrive at the
conclusion that the guilt of appellants of the crime charged was established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Well settled
is the doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses
deserve a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
clear showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could reverse a
judgment of conviction. In fact, in some
instances, such findings are even accorded finality. This is so because the assignment of value to
a witness’ testimony is essentially the domain of the trial court, not to
mention that it is the trial judge who has the direct opportunity to observe
the demeanor of a witness on the stand, thus providing him unique facility in
determining whether or not to accord credence to the testimony or whether the
witness is telling the truth or not.[18]
In the
present case, both the RTC and the CA found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
to be convincing. Witnesses Cornejo and Baylosis,
the security guards on duty, narrated that the armed men who entered the Tabora
compound were wearing dark pants and jackets with dark bonnets. They were armed with an armalite rifle and a
.45 caliber pistol. Two (2) men went to
the kitchen of the Tabora residence and the guards heard a commotion. Col. Tabora shouted “Guard! Guard!” and
a single gunshot was heard. Meanwhile, in
her testimony, Cercidillo stated that Col. Tabora was about to enter the main
house when two (2) armed men wearing bonnets arrived, pointing their guns at
him. Col. Tabora called out “Guard!
Guard!” as he kicked the two (2) men.
She also heard the gunshot. Likewise,
witnesses Gregorio Reyno, Irene Barbosa and Ronnie Cabangisan affirmed that they
saw four (4) men wearing dark pants and dark jackets with their bonnets rolled
up to their foreheads, coming out of the Tabora compound. Three (3) of the men were positively
identified by the witnesses as appellants Wilson Lopez, Victorino Cruz and Felipe
Maglaya, Jr. Taken in their entirety, we
find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to be credible and consistent
with each other, and therefore, must be given full faith and credence.
Although no one (1) witnessed the
actual killing of Col. Tabora, this Court should emphasize that direct evidence
is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Established facts that form a chain of
circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of
reasoning towards a conviction. Indeed,
rules on evidence and principles in jurisprudence have long recognized that the
accused may be convicted through circumstantial evidence.[19]
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.─ Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
To uphold a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others,
as the guilty person. The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial
evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of
circumstances duly proved must be
consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with the accused’s
innocence.[20]
The circumstantial evidence must exclude
the possibility that some other person has committed the offense.
Here, the
appellate court considered the following circumstances to establish an unbroken
chain of events pointing to the logical conclusion that appellants killed the
victim:
1. Security guard Jesus Cornejo testified that the four-armed men who entered the compound were wearing dark clothings and bonnets over their faces. One of the men was carrying an Armalite rifle while another had a .45 caliber pistol.
2. The housemaid Salvacion Cercidillo saw two armed men wearing black bonnets approach and point their guns at the victim who called the guards and kicked the armed men.
3. The prosecution witnesses inside the compound (Cornejo, Cercidillo and Mrs. Tabora) and outside the compound (Reyno, Barbosa, Fernandez and Cabangisan) heard the victim shout the words, “Guardia, guardia” followed by a lone gunshot.
4. Cornejo testified that after the gunshot, the four armed men left through the compound’s gate.
5. A few minutes after the commotion inside the compound and after the gunshot, prosecution witnesses Reyno, Barbosa, Fernandez and Cabangisan saw four men leave the Tabora compound.
6. Reyno identified accused-appellants Wilson Lopez, Victorino Cruz and Felipe Maglaya, Jr. as three of the men who went out of the compound. Victorino Cruz was carrying a long firearm.
7. Barbosa identified accused-appellants Wilson Lopez and Felipe Maglaya, [Jr.] as two of the men who exited the compound.
8. Fernandez identified accused-appellant Felipe Maglaya, Jr. as one of the men who went out of the compound.
9. Cabangisan identified accused-appellants Wilson Lopez, Victorino Cruz and Felipe Maglaya, Jr. as three of the men who went out of the compound. Victorino Cruz was carrying a long firearm.
10.
Police investigation revealed that the cal.
11. Dr. Sulit testified that the victim sustained two wounds, with the first wound located on the right side of the chest (entry point of the bullet) and the second wound located at the back (the exit wound). He said that a gunshot caused the wounds and the hematoma surrounding the wounds.[21]
Thus, while no one (1) directly saw appellants shoot the
victim, the Court is satisfied that the circumstantial
evidence in this case constituted an unbroken chain that leads to the logical conclusion
that appellants were guilty of the murder of Col. Tabora. The combination of the circumstances is
such as to leave no reasonable doubt as to their guilt; hence, appellants’ conviction
based on circumstantial evidence is justified.
Appellants advance the defense of
alibi. To bolster their claim of alibi,
appellant Wilson Lopez denied having gone to the place of the late Col. Tabora in
the evening of
However, this Court has time and
again, held that to be believed, an alibi must be supported by the most
convincing evidence, as it is an inherently weak argument that can be easily
fabricated to suit the ends of those who seek its recourse.[22]
Alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses,
otherwise it is fatal to the accused. Further, for alibi to prosper, appellants
must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed,
but also that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene
of the crime or within its immediate vicinity.[23] In the present case, appellants’ alibi was
corroborated by their relatives and friends who may not have been impartial
witnesses. They likewise failed to show that it was physically impossible for them
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Moreover, the alibi resorted to by
appellants is worthless in the face of the categorical testimony and positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses, who did not have any reason to
falsely testify against appellants. Admittedly,
the witnesses for the prosecution had no grudge against appellants. Appellants failed to show that the witnesses
were actuated by ill motive to testify falsely against them. Where there is no showing of any improper
motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against an
accused, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that
the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[24]
Jurisprudence teems with
pronouncements that between the categorical statements of the prosecution
witnesses, on the one hand, and the bare denial of appellants, on the other,
the former must perforce prevail. An
affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative one, especially when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. They are
considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because
they are inherently weak and unreliable, but also because they are easily
fabricated and concocted.[25]
As regards the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, appellants contend that the prosecution failed to
present any evidence to show that the gunmen consciously and deliberately
adopted the execution of the crime committed.
We however agree with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. As we have
consistently ruled, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur for treachery to
exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and (b) the means or
method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.[26]
In the
case at bar, the attack on the victim was deliberate, sudden and unexpected. Appellants, who were armed, surreptitiously
and without warning, entered the Tabora compound and hogtied the security
guards. Two (2) of them guarded the security guards to ensure that they could
not aid the victim while one (1) switched off the light at the post to prevent
discovery. Thereafter, two (2) of the
armed men went after the victim. The victim who was unarmed, alone and
confident in the security of his guarded home, was definitely not in the
position to defend himself against his assailants. Contrary to appellants’
contention, treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was
immediately forewarned of the danger to his person. What is decisive is that
the execution of the attack made it possible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate. The number of the accused, their use of weapons (an M-16 armalite
rifle and a .45 caliber gun) against the unarmed victim, the previous attack
and neutralization of the guards, and the timing of the attack preclude the
possibility of any defense by the victim. These circumstances indicate that appellants
employed means and methods which tended directly and specially to ensure the
execution of the offense without risk to themselves arising from the defense
that the victims might make. Hence,
treachery was correctly appreciated by the trial court.
Under Article 248[27]
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty imposed for the
crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellants is reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the said Code.
A word on the award of damages.
When death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death
of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6)
interest, in proper cases.[28] In murder, the grant of civil indemnity,
which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof
other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of an accused’s
responsibility therefor.[29]
Thus, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded to the heirs of the
victim is in order.
We also sustain the award of P50,000.00
as moral damages to the heirs of the victim in view of the latter’s violent
death. These do not require allegation
and proof of the emotional sufferings of the heirs.[30] Finally, the award in the amount of P25,000.00,
as temperate damages and the amount of exemplary damages are also in order
considering that the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.[31]
The amount of exemplary damages, however, must be increased to P30,000.00
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[32]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00527 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
amount of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
WE
CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson |
||
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
||
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
*
Designated additional member per
Raffle of
** Designated
additional member per Special Order No. 843 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo concurring; rollo, pp. 3-32.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 47-110. Penned by Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4]
[5] TSN,
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8] TSN,
[9] TSN,
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12] CA rollo, pp. 109-110.
[13]
[14] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[15] Rollo, p. 31.
[16] CA rollo, pp. 131-183.
[17]
[18] Lascano
v. People, G.R. No. 166241,
[19] People v.
[20] Aoas
v. People, G.R. No. 155339,
[21] Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[22] People v. Cantere, 363 Phil. 468, 479 (1999).
[23] People v. Delim, G.R. No. 175942,
[24] See Velasco v. People, G.R. No. 166479, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 649, 668; People v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 137782, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 217, 224.
[25] People v. Baniega, 427 Phil. 405, 418 (2002); see People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 125898, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 207.
[26] People v.
Ducabo, G.R. No. 175594,
[27]
ART.
248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, x x x.
[28] People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 176385,
[29] People v. Manchu, G.R. No. 181901,
[30] People v. Tolentino, supra at 700; see People v. Balais, G.R. No. 173242, September 17, 2008, 565 SCR 555, 571.
[31] People v. Tolentino, supra at 701.
[32] People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 188602,