Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
|
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -
versus - ZENAIDA
GUINTO-ALDANA, in her own behalf as Attorney-in-fact of MA. AURORA
GUINTO-COMISO, MA. LUISA GUINTO-DIONISIO, ALFREDO GUINTO, JR., PACITA R.
GUINTO, ERNESTO R. GUINTO, NATIVIDAD R. GUINTO and ALBERTO R. GUINTO, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 175578 Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated:
August 11, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
In
this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assails the March
30, 2006 Decision[1] and the
November 20, 2006 Resolution,[2]
both of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500. The assailed decision reversed and set aside
the July 10, 2003 judgment[3] of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 199 in LRC Case No. 02-0036,
one for original registration of title, whereas the assailed Resolution denied
reconsideration.
The facts follow.
On
April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana[4]
(Zenaida), Ma. Aurora Guinto-Comiso, Ma. Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto,
Jr., Pacita R. Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R. Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 199 an
Application for Registration of Title[5]
over two pieces of land in Talango, Pamplona Uno, Las Piñas City. These lands, identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot
No. 5 in Conversion Consolidation Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,[6]
measure 1,509 square meters and 4,640 square meters, respectively.[7] Respondents professed themselves to be
co-owners of these lots, having acquired them by succession from their
predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-Guinto (Lucia)—Zenaida’s
parents—who, in turn, had acquired the property under a 1969 document
denominated as “Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng
Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan.” Under this document, Sergio and Lucia Guinto
acquired for a consideration the respective shares on the property of Pastor
Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana Guinto and Marcelina Bernardo who, together
with Luisa, had derived the same from Romulado Guinto.[8]
Respondents also alleged that until the time of the application, they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse,
exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of owner and
that they had consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of
real estate taxation.[9]
In support of their application,
respondents submitted to the court the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,[10]
as well as copies of the technical descriptions of each lot,[11] a
certification from the geodetic engineer[12]
and the pertinent tax declarations,[13]
together with the receipts of payment therefor.[14] Expressly, they averred that the property’s
original tracing cloth plan had previously been submitted to the RTC of Las
Piñas City, Branch 255 (Las Piñas RTC) in connection with the proceedings in
LRC Case No. LP-128—a previous registration case involving the subject property
which, however, had been dismissed without prejudice.[15]
The trial court found the application
to be sufficient in form and substance; hence, it gave due course thereto and
ordered compliance with the publication and notification requirements of the
law.[16]
Opposing the application, petitioner,
through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City, advanced that the
lots sought to be registered were inalienable lands of the public domain; that
neither respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in prior
possession thereof; and that the muniment of title and the tax declaration
submitted to the court did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or of prior
possession in the concept of owner.[17]
At the hearing, Zenaida identified
her herein co-respondents to be her siblings, nephews and nieces. She likewise identified the adjoining lot
owners named in the application and the supporting documents attached to the
application as well. She testified that
the subject lots had been surveyed at the instance of her family sometime
between 1994 and 1995, and that said survey was documented in Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D
and in the geodetic engineer’s technical description of the lots. She implied that they did obtain the original
tracing cloth plan of the property, but it was forwarded to the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) by the Las Piñas RTC in connection with the
proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128.
Notwithstanding this admission, and without objection from the
oppositor, the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and the technical
description of the property were provisionally marked in evidence.[18]
Furthermore, Zenaida—61 years old at
the time of her testimony—declared that she has known that the subject lots
were owned by her family since she was 5 years old and from her earliest
recollection, she narrated that her grandparents had lived in the subject lots
until the death of her grandmother in 1961.
She implied that aside from her predecessors there were other persons,
caretakers supposedly, who had tilled the land and who had lived until sometime
between 1980 and 1990. She remembered
her grandmother having constructed a house on the property, but the same had
already been destroyed. Also, sometime
in 1970, her family built an adobe fence around the perimeter of the lots and
later, in the 1990s, they reinforced it with hollow blocks and concrete after
an inundation caused by the flood.[19] She claimed that she and her father, Sergio,
had been religious in the payment of real estate taxes as shown by the tax
declarations and tax receipts which she submitted to the court and which,
following identification, were forthwith marked in evidence.[20]
Zenaida’s claim of prior, open,
exclusive and continuous possession of the land was corroborated by Josefina
Luna (Josefina), one of the adjoining lot owners. Josefina, then 73 years old, strongly
declared that the subject lots were owned by Zenaida’s parents, Sergio Guinto
and Lucia Rivera, since she reached the age of understanding, and that she had
not come to know of any instance where a third party had placed a claim on the
property. When asked whether there was anyone residing in the property and
whether there were improvements made thereon, she said there was no one
residing therein and that there was nothing standing thereon except for a nipa hut. [21]
At
the close of Josefina’s testimony, respondents formally offered their exhibits
without the oppositor placing any objection thereto.[22]
After weighing the evidence, the trial court, on July 10, 2003, rendered its Decision
denying the application for registration.
It found that respondents were unable to establish with certainty the
identity of the lots applied for registration, because of failure to submit to
the court the original tracing cloth plan as mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529. It likewise noted that the
fact of adverse, continuous, open, public and peaceful possession in the
concept of owner has not been proved by the evidence as Zenaida’s and
Josefina’s respective testimonies did not establish the nature of the
possession of respondents’ predecessors.[23] The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the applicants to
comply with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Application
for Original Registration of Title is hereby DENIED.
ORDERED.[24]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to
the Court of Appeals which, on March 30, 2006, issued the assailed Decision
reversing the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was denied.[26] Hence, it filed the instant petition which
attributes error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court’s July
10, 2003 decision.
Petitioner principally posits that
under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission in court of the original
tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered is a mandatory
requirement in registration proceedings in order to establish the exact
identity of the property. While
respondents admitted that the original tracing cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5
in this case was in the custody of the LRA as a consequence of their first
attempt to have the property registered, petitioner, invoking Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines,[27] believes that respondents, on that
score alone, are not relieved of their procedural obligation to adduce in
evidence the original copy of the plan, because they could have easily
retrieved it from the LRA and presented it in court.[28]
Furthermore, petitioner suggests that
the blueprint of the subdivision plan submitted by respondents cannot
approximate substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 17 of P.D.
No. 1529. Again, relying on the
aforementioned Del Rosario case,
petitioner observes that the blueprint in this case, allegedly illegible and
unreadable, does not even bear the certification of the Lands Management
Bureau.[29] Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents’ claim
of prior possession. It notes that there
is no clear and convincing evidence that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, adverse, public and
exclusive possession of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 for 30 years.[30]
Commenting on the petition,
respondents observe that petitioner’s arguments are mere reiterative theses on
the issues that have already been addressed by the Court of Appeals in the
assailed Decision and Resolution, and that there are no new matters raised
which have not yet been previously passed upon.
Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be denied.[31]
We find
the petition to be unmeritorious.
Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529,
otherwise known as The Property
Registration Decree of 1978, materially provides:
Section 17. What and where to file.–The application for land registration shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file, together with the application, all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.
The provision denotes that it is imperative in an application for
original registration that the applicant submit to the court, aside from the
original or duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a copy of a duly
approved survey plan of the land sought to be registered. The survey plan is indispensable as it
provides a reference on the exact identity of the property. This begs the question in the instant case:
Does the blueprint copy of the survey plan suffice for compliance with the
requirement? In not so many cases,[32]
it was held that the non-submission, for any reason, of the original tracing
cloth plan is fatal to the registration application, since the same is
mandatory in original registration of title.
For instance, in the Del Rosario case
relied on by petitioner, the Court ruled that the submission of the original
copy of the duly approved tracing cloth plan is a mandatory condition for land
registration as it supplies the means by which to determine the exact metes and
bounds of the property. The applicant in
that case was unable to submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land he was
claiming because apparently, as in the present case, it was previously
transmitted by the clerk of court to the LRA.
Yet the Court, deeming it the applicant’s obligation to retrieve the
plan himself and present it in evidence, denied the application, to wit:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner’s application for registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. x x x[33]
Yet if the reason for requiring an
applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely to
provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact
identity of the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same
does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be
no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to present
the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied by pieces
of evidence—such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly
executed technical description of the property—which may likewise substantially
and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought
to be registered.
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept
laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[34] and in the later
cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the Philippines[35] and Republic of
the Philippines v. Hubilla,[36]
that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration
purposes is the original tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now
the Lands Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources [DENR]), blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide
sufficient identification. Pertinently,
the Court in Hubilla, citing Recto, pronounced:
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory requirement, this Court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for registration purposes. x x x[37]
In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the
blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D, together with the technical description
of the property, operates as substantial compliance with the legal requirement
of ascertaining the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration. The blueprint, which is shown to have been duly executed by
Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas (Roxas), attached to the application and
subsequently identified, marked, and offered in evidence, shows that it
proceeded officially from the Lands Management Services and, in fact, bears the
approval of Surveys Division Chief Ernesto Erive. It also shows on its face that the survey of
the property was endorsed by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of the DENR.[38] This, compounded by the accompanying
technical description of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 duly executed and verified also by
Roxas,[39]
should substantially supply as it did the means by which the identity of Lot
Nos. 4 and 5 may be ascertained.
Verily, no
error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that respondents
were able to approximate compliance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Also
telling is the observation made by the Court of Appeals that there was no
objection raised by the oppositor or by the LRA to the admission of the
blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the fact that they were
well-informed of the present proceedings, to wit:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants do not deny that only the blueprint copy of the plan of the subject lands (Exh. “J”) and not the original tracing cloth plan thereof was submitted to the court a quo since they had previously submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the Land Registration Authority. However, despite the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants to present the original tracing cloth plan, neither the Land Registration Authority nor the oppositor-appellee question[ed] this deficiency. Likewise, when the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. “J”) was offered in evidence, the oppositor-apellee did not raise any objection thereto. Such silence on the part of the Land Registration [Authority] and the oppositor-appellee can be deemed as an implied admission that the original tracing cloth plan and the blueprint copy thereof (Exh. “J”) are one and the same, free from all defects and clearly identify the lands sought to be registered. In this regard x x x, the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. “J”), together with its technical descriptions (Exhs. “K” and “L”), is deemed tantamount to substantial compliance with the requirements of law.[40]
We
now proceed to the issue of possession.
Petitioner theorizes that not only were respondents unable to identify
the lots applied for registration; it also claims that they have no credible
evidence tending to establish that for at least 30 years they and their
predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the property openly,
continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[41] We do not agree.
In
an original registration of title under Section 14(1)[42]
P.D. No. 1529, the applicant for registration must be able to establish by
evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the
lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[43] He must prove that for at least 30 years, he
and his predecessor have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land. Republic v. Alconaba[44] well explains possession and occupation
of this character, thus:
The law speaks of possession and
occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession
is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it
of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.[45]
Proceeding
from this fundamental principle, we find that indeed respondents have been in
possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona fide claim of ownership for the duration required by law. This conclusion is primarily factual.
From
the records, it is clear that respondents’ possession through their
predecessor-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937. In that year, the subject property had already
been declared for taxation by Zenaida’s father, Sergio, jointly with a certain
Toribia Miranda (Toribia).[46]
Yet, it also can be safely inferred that Sergio and Toribia had declared the
land for taxation even earlier because the 1937 tax declaration shows that it
offsets a previous tax number.[47] The property was again declared in 1979,[48]
1985[49]
and 1994[50] by Sergio,
Toribia and by Romualdo.
Certainly,
respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not been for the
fact that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor, the
relevant portions of the tax records on file with it had been burned when the
assessor’s office was razed by fire in 1997.[51] Of equal relevance is the fact that with
these tax assessments, there came next tax payments. Respondents’ receipts for tax expenditures on
Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are likewise fleshed out in the records
and in these documents, Sergio, Toribia and Romualdo are the named owners of
the property with Zenaida being identified as the one who delivered the payment
in the 1994 receipts.[52]
The
foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show that Zenaida’s
testimony in this respect is no less believable. And the unbroken chain of positive acts
exercised by respondents’ predecessors, as demonstrated by these pieces of
evidence, yields no other conclusion than that as early as 1937, they had
already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property. Not only do they show that they had excluded
all others in their claim but also, that such claim is in all good faith.
Land
registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations and realty tax payment
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession in the concept of owner. These documents constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property, for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property. It also announces
his adverse claim against the state and all other parties who may be in
conflict with his interest. More
importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intention to contribute to government
revenues—an act that strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[53]
Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land
in the concept of owner—open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and
opposition from the government or from any private individual—itself makes
their right thereto unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of protection
under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The March 30, 2006 Decision and the November 20, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500, are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per raffle dated August 9, 2010.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court) and Mariflor Punzalan Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-49.
[2] Rollo, pp. 50-51.
[3] The decision was signed by Judge Joselito Vibandor; records, pp. 556-561.
[4] Zenaida Guinto-Aldana was duly constituted as attorney-in-fact of and by herein co-respondents under a Special Power of Attorney dated January 30, 2002, with specific power to apply for registration of title; id. at 47-48.
[5] Records, pp. 1-4.
[6] Id. at 473.
[7] Id. at 474-475.
[8] Id. at 477-478.
[9] Id. at 3-4.
[10] Id. at 10.
[11] Id. at 11-12.
[12] Id. at 13.
[13] Id. at 479-485.
[14] Id. at 487-497.
[15] Id. at 4.
[16] Orders dated April 10, 2002 and June 3, 2002; id. at 15-16, 58-59.
[17] Records, pp. 135-138.
[18] TSN, February 5, 2003, p. 4.
[19] Id. at 16-25, 35.
[20] Id. at 12-17, 27-33.
[21] TSN, March 17, 2003, pp. 6-7, 12-13.
[22] Records, p. 498.
[23] Rollo, pp. 84-89.
[24] Id. at 89.
[25] Id. at 50-51.
[26] CA rollo, pp. 141-142.
[27] 432 Phil. 824 (2002).
[28] Rollo, pp. 19-21.
[29] Id. at 24-25.
[30] Id. at 28-30.
[31] Id. at 111-113.
[32] Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, supra note 27; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246 March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 65663, October 16, 1992, 214 SCRA 604; Director of Lands v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177.
[33] Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, supra note 27, at 834.
[34] G.R. No. L-62680, November 9, 1988, 167 SCRA 150, 154,
citing Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 229
Phil. 20 (1986) and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 568
(1980).
[35] 483 Phil. 81, 91 (2004).
[36] 491 Phil. 371 (2005).
[37] Id. at 373.
[38] See Exhibit “J,” records, p. 473.
[39] See Exhibits “K” and “L,” id. at 474-475.
[40] Rollo, p. 47.
[41] Id. at 28-29.
[42] Section 14 (1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Who may apply. – The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
[43] See Republic of the
Philippines v. Cayetano L. Serrano, et
al., G.R. No. 183063, February
24, 2010.
[44] 471 Phil. 607 (2004).
[45] Id. at 620. (Emphasis supplied).
[46] Exhibit “O,” records, p. 479.
[47] Exhibit “O-1,” id. at 479 (the back page of the 1937 Tax Declaration).
[48] Exhibits “O-2” and “O-3,” id. at 480-481.
[49] Exhibits “O-4” and “O-5,” id. at 482-483.
[50] Exhibits “O-6” and “O-7,” id. at 484-485.
[51] Exhibit “P,” id. at 486.
[52] Exhibits “Q” to “Q-11,” id. at 487-497.
[53] See Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 426 Phil. 61 (2002); Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 597 (1999); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 674 (1996); Heirs of
Placido Miranda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109312, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 368; Rivera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107903, May 22, 1995, 244 SCRA 218; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70825, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 38.