Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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THE PEOPLE OF THE |
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G.R. No. 175315 |
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Appellee, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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BERSAMIN,* |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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ELIZER BEDUYA and RIC BEDUYA, |
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Promulgated: |
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Appellants. |
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August 9, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
In this appeal, we are
tasked to determine whether the appellants killed the victim with abuse of
superior strength for which they were convicted of murder.
Factual Antecedents
For our review is the
Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00161 which affirmed with
modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 12, Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental, finding appellants
Elizer Beduya (Elizer) and Ric Beduya (Ric) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of murder. The Information
against the appellants contained the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about the 6th day of May
2002, at about 12:15 o’clock midnight, more or less, in barangay Baga,
Municipality of Pana-on, province of Misamis Occidental and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with abuse
and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, box and then stab one DOMINADOR S. ACOPE[,]
SR. with the use of a knife hitting him on the left hypochondriac area which
caused his death.
CONTRARY
TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength[.][3]
Both appellants were
arrested. They entered separate pleas of
“not guilty” during their arraignment.[4] After the termination of the mandatory
pre-trial conference,[5] trial ensued.
The Prosecution’s Evidence
Culled from the
evidence presented by the prosecution, the following case against the
appellants emerged:
On May 6, 2002, at
around 11:45 p.m., Roy Bughao (Bughao) was carrying a torch on his way home
from the birthday celebration of his cousin when Elizer and Ric suddenly
appeared. Ric went around him while his
brother Elizer pointed a knife. He drew
back and swung the torch at them and shouted, “Why do you hurt me, what is my
fault?”[6] The Beduya brothers did not reply and
continued their assault. Bughao then
scrambled for safety and ran towards the yard of victim Dominador S. Acope, Sr.
(Acope, Sr.) and hid in a dark area.
At around 12:30 a.m. of
May 7, 2002, the victim and his son, Dominador Acope, Jr. (Acope, Jr.), were
roused from their sleep by a voice coming from the road in front of their
house. The victim went outside while his
son peeped through the window. The
victim saw Bughao who readily identified himself and said that Elizer pointed a
knife at him. As the Beduya brothers
entered the yard of the victim’s house, Bughao hid himself. While in hiding, he saw the Beduya brothers
approach the victim after they were advised to go home since it was already
late. The Beduya brothers did not heed
the advice and instead Ric slapped the victim while Elizer stabbed him. The victim retaliated by striking them with a
piece of wood he got hold of. Elizer and
Ric ran away but one of them stumbled on the pile of firewood and the
clothesline in the yard before they succeeded in departing from the premises.
Acope, Jr. immediately
proceeded to his uncle’s house which was 40 meters away and sought his
help. The incident was also reported to
their Barangay Captain, who responded by going to the residence of the
victim. Upon arrival, he saw the victim
lying on the ground and bleeding from a stab wound. The victim told him that, “I will die because
of this. x x x I was boxed by Ric and I was stabbed by
Elizer.”[7] He also told the Barangay Captain that
he had no previous quarrel with the Beduya brothers.
The Barangay
Captain took the victim to the
The Appellants’ Version
Elizer maintained that
he did not commit any crime. On May 6,
2002, he went to Baybay, Punta, Panaon, to buy fish. He usually carried a knife to slice and eat
the fish while it is still raw. While on
his way home at 10:30 p.m., he was suddenly attacked and struck by the victim
and Bughao. He got hit several times
with a piece of wood and Bughao smashed his right foot. To defend himself, he pulled out his knife
and struck randomly. He had no knowledge
if he hit someone but his assailants fled.
Eduardo Eltagon (Eduardo) testified that he witnessed the event but he
did not interfere since he did not want to get involved.
Elizer continued to
walk, and arrived home at 12:15 a.m. At
1:30 a.m., policemen came to his house and took him to a hospital. They passed by the house of his brother Ric
before proceeding to their destination.
For his part, Ric
testified that he was asleep at the time of the incident. He stated that he went to sleep at eight
o’clock in the evening on May 5, 2002 and woke up at four o’clock in the
morning of the following day, May 6, 2002, when the Barangay Captain and
policemen came to his house with his brother and asked him to come with them to
the hospital.
The Trial Court’s Decision
The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the prosecution, whose witnesses testified
candidly on the events that resulted in the death of the victim. On the other hand, the trial court found as
unreliable the witnesses presented by the defense. It held that Eduardo, at 86 years of age,
could not have seen the victim and Bughao attacking Elizer 30 meters away with
a flashlight as his only source of illumination in the dead of night since a
test on his vision showed that he could not “see at a distance little more than
beyond his nose.”[9] Moreover, it ruled that the injuries suffered
by Elizer were more consistent with the defensive blows from a piece of wood
the victim used to defend himself, rather than the alleged assault on him by
the victim and Bughao.[10]
The trial court also
held that the circumstance of abuse of superior strength that qualifies the
killing of the victim to murder is present in this case. According to the trial court, the appellants’
combined assault gave them the advantage over the victim who must have been
taken by surprise. The retaliation of
the victim with a piece of wood was done only after he had already been
stabbed.[11]
In disposing of the
case, the trial court ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE,
finding accused Elizer Beduya and Ric Beduya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder qualified by abuse of superior strength without other modifying
circumstances, the court sentences them to reclusion
perpetua and orders them to pay in
solidum the heirs of Dominador Acope P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P6,000.00
as funeral expenses, P9,411.85 as medical expenses, and P264,000.00
as lost earnings. With costs.
Accused
are credited with the full time spent under preventive detention since May 7,
2002.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The Decision of the Court of
Appeals
The case was forwarded
to this Court on automatic review and docketed as G.R. No. 158473. However, we referred it to the CA in
accordance with our ruling in People
v. Mateo.[13] The appellate court affirmed with
modification the trial court’s decision and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of increasing the
award of the victim’s heirs for the loss of earning capacity of the victim [to]
P408,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Assignment of Errors
Still aggrieved, the
appellants sought a final review of their case raising the following as errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE [OF] THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF
During the pendency of
the appeal, appellant Ric died of cardio pulmonary arrest secondary to bleeding
peptic ulcer as shown by his certificate of death.[16] Accordingly, we dismissed[17]
the appeal insofar as said appellant is concerned. However, judgment shall be rendered as to
Elizer.
Our
Ruling
There is partial merit in the appeal.
Abuse of
Circumstance in the Crime of Murder
Murder is the unlawful
killing by the accused of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide,
provided that any of the attendant circumstances enumerated in Article 248[18]
of the Revised Penal Code is present.
Abuse of superior strength is one of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned therein that qualifies the killing of the victim to murder.
In this case, the trial and appellate courts
commonly concluded that there was intent to kill on the part of the appellants
and that they employed abuse of superior strength to ensure the execution and
success of the crime. The appellate
court even adopted the trial court’s finding and conclusion that as Ric punched
the victim in the shoulder and appellant Elizer delivered the fatal stab wound,
this combined assault “gave them the advantage over the victim who must have
been taken by surprise. Although the
victim struck at accused with a piece of wood, he did so only after he had been
stabbed, causing the two accused to run away.”[19]
This reasoning is erroneous.
“Abuse of superior strength is present whenever
there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime.”[20] “The fact that there were two persons who
attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with
abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of
the aggressors and the victim.”[21] The evidence must establish that the
assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate
intent to use this advantage.[22] “To take advantage of superior strength means
to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked.”[23] The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.[24]
The prosecution in this case failed to adduce
evidence of a relative disparity in age, size and strength, or force, except
for the showing that two assailants, one of them (Elizer) armed with a knife,
assaulted the victim. The presence of
two assailants, one of them armed with a knife, does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength.[25] Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative
of the presence of this circumstance.[26] Neither did the prosecution present proof to
show that the victim suffered from an inferior physical condition from which
the circumstance can be inferred. In
fact, there is evidence that the victim was able to get hold of a piece of wood
and deliver retaliatory blows against the knife-wielder, Elizer.[27]
The events leading to the stabbing further
disprove any finding of deliberate intent on the part of the assailants to
abuse their superior strength over that of the victim. The testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses, on the whole, show that the incident between the victim and his
assailants was unplanned and unpremeditated.
The assailants were in pursuit of Bughao when the victim advised them to
go home since it was already late at night.
There was indeed no conscious attempt on the part of the assailants to
use or take advantage of any superior strength that they then enjoyed. Particularly, it has not been clearly
established that the appellants, with an advantage in number, purposely
resorted to punching the victim and delivering a fatal stab wound. Neither has it been shown that the victim was
simply overwhelmed by the fist blows delivered by Ric and Elizer’s act of
stabbing him. The evidence on this
matter is too insufficient for a definitive conclusion. What has been shown with certainty and
clarity is the appellants’ intent to kill, as shown by the stab wound in the
left side of the victim’s body which resulted in his death two days later. As the knife wielder, Elizer is guilty of
assaulting and killing the victim.
In view of the foregoing, we are compelled to
rule out the presence of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying
circumstance. Hence, appellants’ guilt
must be limited to the crime of homicide.
The
Trial Court’s Finding on the Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
Elizer maintains that his guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt since the testimonies of the witnesses of
the prosecution were incredible and materially inconsistent. He argues that Acope, Jr. testified that the
victim immediately went out of his house and approached Bughao, but Bughao
declared in the witness stand that the victim came out of his abode 20 minutes
after hearing his shout. He also finds
it incredible that Bughao did not bother to take the victim to the hospital and
report the incident to the police after the assailants fled the scene of the
crime.
We are not persuaded. It has been “consistently held that appellate
courts, as a rule, will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses. We have
sustained trial courts in this respect, considering their vantage point in
their evaluation of testimonial evidence, absent x x x any showing of serious
error or irregularity that otherwise would alter the result of the case.”[28] Here, we find no serious irregularity.
Besides, the inconsistencies ascribed to the
prosecution witnesses involve minor details, too trivial to adversely affect
their credibility. Said inconsistencies
do not depart from the fact that these witnesses saw the fatal stabbing of the
victim by Elizer. To the extent that
inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to us “to relate to details of
peripheral significance which do not negate or dissolve the positive
identification [by said eyewitnesses of Elizer] as the perpetrator of the
crime.”[29]
Further, the failure of Bughao to immediately
report the incident to the police authorities and to extend help to the victim
cannot destroy his credibility as a witness.
There is no standard of behavior when a person becomes a witness to a
shocking or gruesome event.[30] “The workings of a human mind placed under
severe emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently x x x.”[31] The determining factor to consider is that
Bughao testified in candid and straightforward manner and implicated Elizer and
Ric as the perpetrators of the crime.
Aside from the eyewitness testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, the dying declaration of the victim also established the
guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. He was well aware of his
imminent death and his declaration that Elizer was responsible for his stab
wound was made in the belief that he would not survive his injury. The declarations by the victim certainly
relate to circumstances pertaining to his impending death and he would have
been competent to testify had he survived in view of the general presumption that
a witness is competent to testify.
The victim also
executed a Sworn Statement[32]
on May 7, 2002, while in serious condition in the hospital, declaring that the
appellants assaulted him and it was Elizer who delivered his fatal stab wound.
His dying declaration and sworn statement, taken together with the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, establish the guilt of the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Penalty
Having established
Elizer’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide, he must
suffer the penalty imposed by law. The
crime of homicide is punishable by reclusion
temporal.[33] Since there are no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its medium period.[34] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[35]
he should be sentenced to an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is within
the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which
is that properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Thus, the proper and
precise prison sentence that should be imposed must be within the indeterminate
term of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
The Award of Damages
The trial court
awarded, and the appellate court affirmed, actual damages to the heirs of the
victim in the amounts of P6,000.00 as funeral expenses and P9,411.85
as medical expenses incurred as a result of the incident. However, our review of the records revealed
that the award was not substantiated by any evidence. There was no competent proof on the specific
amounts of actual damages allegedly incurred and this omission cannot be
supplied by a broad and general stipulation during trial that the victim’s wife
would testify on the damages brought about by the commission of the crime. In the absence of proof on the exact sum of
actual damages, there was no basis for granting the same. “Credence can be given only to claims which
are duly supported by receipts.”[36] The award of actual damages should
consequently be deleted as there were no receipts presented evidencing the
expenses allegedly incurred.
However, as the heirs
of the victim clearly incurred medical and funeral expenses, P25,000.00
by way of temperate damages should be awarded.[37] “This award is adjudicated so that a right
which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the
purpose of indemnification.”[38]
When death results as a
consequence of the crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the amount
of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim without need of
any evidence or proof of damages.[39] Accordingly, we award said sum to the heirs
of the victim, Acope, Sr.
“Moral damages are
mandatory in cases of murder and homicide without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim.
Consistent with this rule, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.”[40]
The trial court was
correct in awarding indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the
victim. However, the computation for
this award should be more accurate.
Acope, Sr., was 46
years old on the day he died.[41] He earned an average of P3,000.00 a
month as a farmer and barangay tanod.[42] This is equivalent to the sum of P36,000.00
per annum. Pursuant to the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality, which has been adopted in this jurisdiction, the formula for the
computation of loss of earning capacity is provided as follows:
Net Earning Capacity (X) = Life Expectancy x
(Gross Annual Income – Living Expenses, e.g., 50% of Gross Annual
Income)
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with
the following formula:
Life
Expectancy = 2/3 x (80 – age of deceased)[43]
Accordingly, the unearned income of Acope, Sr., is:
X = 2(80-46) x (P36,000.00 – P18,000.00)
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= 22.667 x P18,000.00
= P408,006.00
In applying the formula
and computation for net income stated above, the amount of loss of earning
capacity is the exact sum of P408,006.00.
WHEREFORE, the
appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1.
Elizer Beduya is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide and shall accordingly suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum;
2.
Elizer Beduya is ordered to pay the victim’s heirs the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and P408,006.00 as
indemnity for loss of earning capacity.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* In
lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 876
dated August 2, 2010.
[1] CA rollo, pp. 101-117, penned by
Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associate Justices
Teresita Dy-Llacco Flores and Mario V. Lopez.
[2] Records, pp. 106-110; penned by Acting
Presiding Judge Ma. Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] TSN, September 20, 2002, p. 6.
[7] TSN, March 12, 2003, p. 6.
[8] Records, p. 12.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA
640.
[14] CA rollo, pp. 116-117.
[15]
[16] Rollo, p. 40.
[17]
[18] Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who,
not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to
death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.
With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense,
or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2.
In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3.
By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall
of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin;
4.
On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated
in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic, or other public calamity;
5.
With evident premeditation;
6.
With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person
or corpse.
[19] Records, p. 110.
[20] People v. Daquipil,
310 Phil. 327, 348 (1995).
[21] People v. Casingal,
312 Phil. 945, 956 (1995).
[22] People v. Escoto, 313
Phil. 785, 800-801 (1995).
[23] People v.
[24] People v. Moka,
G.R. No. 88838, April 26, 1991, 196 SCRA 378, 386.
[25] People v. Asis,
349 Phil. 736, 747 (1998).
[26] People v. Escoto,
supra at 800.
[27] TSN, September 25, 2002, pp. 7-8.
[28] People v. Tadulan,
337 Phil. 685, 694 (1997).
[29] People v. Daen, Jr., 314
Phil. 280, 292 (1995).
[30] People v. Morial,
415 Phil. 310, 339 (2001).
[31] People v. Liwanag,
415 Phil. 271, 297 (2001).
[32] Records, p. 8.
[33] Revised
Penal Code, Article 249.
[34] See Revised
Penal Code, Article 64(1).
[35] Section 1.
Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other
law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
[36] B.F. Metal [Corporation] v. Spouses Lomotan,
G.R. No. 170813, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 618, 627.
[37] People v. Bascugin,
G.R. No. 184704, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 453, 465.
[38] People v. Carillo,
388 Phil. 1010, 1025 (2000).
[39] People v. Algarme,
G.R. No. 175978, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 601, 628.
[40]
[41] TSN, October 3, 2002, p. 3.
[42]
[43] People v. Matignas,
428 Phil. 834, 875 (2002).