Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
|
China
banking corporation, Petitioner, -versus- cebu printing and packaging
corporation, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 172880 Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD,
and MENDOZA,
JJ. Promulgated: August 11, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to annul and set aside the Amended
Decision[2]
dated March 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71017.
The facts, as shown in the records, are the
following:
On January
29, 2002, Cebu Printing and Packaging
Corporation (CEPRI) filed a Petition for Rehabilitation[3]
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 11.[4] Finding
the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued a Stay Order[5]
dated February 11, 2002: staying enforcement of all claims against CEPRI, its
guarantors and sureties; appointing Mr. Sergio D. Lim, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver
and fixing his bond at P100,000.00;
directing CEPRI to publish said Order in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks; fixing the initial
hearing on the petition on March 21, 2002; and directing all creditors and all
interested parties (including the Securities and Exchange Commission) to file
and serve on CEPRI a verified comment on or opposition to the petition, with
supporting affidavits and documents, not later than ten (10) days before March
21, 2002, and putting them on notice that their failure to do so will bar them
from participating in the proceedings, among others.
After due publication of the Stay Order, only China Banking Corporation (Chinabank) filed a Comment/Opposition[6] dated March 8, 2002.
After the initial hearing, the RTC
issued the Order[7]
dated April 30, 2002 denying due course to the petition for rehabilitation. The
Order reads in part:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, this Court hereby does not
give due course to the petition for rehabilitation filed in this case.
Accordingly, the Court lifts the stay order issued in
this case on February 11, 2002 and recalls the appointment of Mr. Carlos G. Co
as rehabilitation receiver.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CEPRI received the Order of the RTC on
May 8, 2002, and filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[8]
on May 14, 2002, which the court, in an Order[9]
dated May 23, 2002, desisted from taking cognizance because such motion is a
prohibited pleading. Thus:
The Court hereby desists from taking cognizance of the
petitioner's urgent motion for reconsideration of the order issued in this case
on April 30, 2002 because a motion for
reconsideration of an order is a prohibited pleading under Section 1 of Rule 3
of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation.
On June 4,
2002, or past the period within which to file an appeal, CEPRI filed with the
CA a Petition for Certiorari[10]
which the court denied, and affirmed in
toto the Order dated April 30, 2002 of the RTC, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Orders dated April 30, 2002
and May 23, 2002 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, CEPRI filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[12]
dated September 27, 2005 which the CA granted in its Amended Decision[13]
dated March 3, 2006, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Orders dated April 30, 2002
and May 23, 2002 are REVERSED, and the case is remanded to the lower
court. The Stay Order issued by the
public respondent is REINSTATED, and the appointment of the Rehabilitation
Receiver, Mr. Carlos G. Co, is RESTORED.
The Petition for Rehabilitation is given DUE COURSE, and the petition is
referred to the Rehabilitation Receiver for the evaluation of the
rehabilitation plan. The Rehabilitation
Receiver is given ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) days from receipt of this Amended
Decision to submit his recommendations to the lower court for the proper disposition
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Due to the
above ruling, Chinabank
filed a motion for reconsideration[14]
dated March 23, 2006, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution[15]
dated May 29, 2006.
Hence, the present petition with the
following issues raised:
A -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT EVEN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS EMBRACED UNDER A.M. NO. 04-9-07-SC
PROMULGATED ON SEPTEMBER 14, 2004 AND TOOK EFFECT ON OCTOBER 15, 2004,
GOVERNING APPEALS IN CORPORATE REHABILITATION CASES.
B -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT CONVENIENTLY DISREGARDED THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE COMMERCIAL COURT, AND SUBSTITUTED THE SAME WITH ITS OWN
JUDGMENT, BY MERELY RELYING ON THE OPINION OF AN AUTHOR IN CORPORATE
REHABILITATION, WHOSE EXPERTISE IN THE FIELD IS NOT EVEN WELL ESTABLISHED.
C -
THE ASSAILED AMENDED DECISION
REINSTATING THE REHABILITATION CASE HAD UNWITTINGLY SANCTIONED THE DESPICABLE
PRACTICE OF FORUM SHOPPING BY THE RESPONDENT AND ITS COUNSEL, WHEREBY THERE ARE
NOW TWO (2) CASES PENDING, ONE FOR CORPORATE REHABILITATION UNDER SRC CASE NO.
001-CEB, AND THE OTHER, FOR ANNULMENT OF LOANS AND MORTGAGE CONTRACTS, AMONG
OTHERS, UNDER CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-4372, PRESENTLY PURSUED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY THE
RESPONDENT, EACH ASKING FOR RELIEF INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE OTHER.[16]
In its Comment[17]
dated October 23, 2006, CEPRI argued that the CA did not commit any reversible
error when it ruled that even a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is embraced under
A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC promulgated on September 14, 2004 and took effect on
October 15, 2004, governing appeals in corporate rehabilitation cases. It further claimed that the CA did not err in
disregarding the factual findings of the RTC.
It also pointed out that the issue on forum shopping should not have
been raised in this Court, because the said issue had already been addressed by
the CA.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that a special
civil action under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not a remedy
for the failure to timely file a petition for review under Rule 45. It adds that Rule 65 is an independent action
that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one's own negligence
or error in the choice of remedies. It
also claims that CEPRI was prompted to file the petition for certiorari not because of its firm conviction
that grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the commercial court's
Order dated April 30, 2002, denying due course on the petition for
rehabilitation, but in a bid to make up for the lost remedy of appeal.
Nevertheless, the CA, in its Amended
Decision dated March 3, 2006, treated the petition for certiorari as a petition for review citing several decisions[18]
of this Court. The CA went on to state
that the petition for certiorari filed
by CEPRI was pursuant to A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC which treats the said petition as
a petition for review under Rule 43.
This is an error on the part of the CA.
The foremost issue to be resolved is
whether or not CEPRI availed of the proper remedy. This Court rules in the negative.
Section 5,[19]
Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation provides:
Sec. 5. Executory
Nature of Orders. - Any order issued by the court under these Rules is
immediately executory. A petition for
review or an appeal therefrom shall not stay the execution of the order unless
restrained or enjoined by the appellate court.
The review of any order or decision of the court or an appeal therefrom
shall be in accordance with the Rules of Court: Provided, however,
that the reliefs ordered by the trial or appellate courts shall take into
account the need for resolution of proceedings in a just, equitable, and speedy
manner.
As correctly argued by petitioner, the
proceedings for corporate rehabilitation is categorized as a special
proceeding; hence, as supplied in A.M. 00-8-10-SC:
Following
the discussion above, the period of appeal provided in section 3, Rule 41[20]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for ordinary civil actions shall apply to
cases involving intra-corporate disputes.
Corollarily, the period of appeal provided in paragraph 19 (b) of the
Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129 for special
proceedings shall apply to petitions for rehabilitation.
However, this Court issued A.M. No.
04-9-07-SC[21] as a clarification on the proper mode of
appeal of cases which were formerly under the jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, such as those cases involving corporate
rehabilitation. Now, there is no more need to file a notice of appeal and
record on appeal. An appeal may now be
perfected by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the decision or final order of the trial court, directly to the CA under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. As
stated:
WHEREFORE,
the Court Resolves:
1. All decisions
and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court.
2. The petition for review shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the Regional
Commercial Court. Upon proper motion and
the payment of the full amount of the legal fee prescribed in Rule 141, as
amended before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reasons and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
3. This
Resolution shall apply to all pending appeals filed within the reglementary
period from decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim
Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799, regardless of the
mode of appeal or petition resorted to by the appellant.
4. These
pending appeals or petitions shall be treated in the following manner:
a. In case a notice of appeal
and/or record on appeal was filed with the Regional Commercial Court within the
period provided in A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, and the original record or the approved
record on appeal has not been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the
appealing party shall have fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of this
Resolution to file a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of
Appeals, without prejudice to filing a motion for extension in accordance with
1 hereof.
The notice of appeal and/or record on appeal shall remain
in the original record but the Regional Commercial Court and/or its clerk shall
not transmit the original record or the approved record on appeal to the Court
of Appeals anymore.
An appealing party who fails to file a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals within the prescribed period shall not be deemed to
have abandoned his appeal, in which case the appeal shall run its due course.
b. In case a notice of appeal
and/or record on appeal was filed with the Regional Commercial Court within the
period provided in A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, and the original record or the approved
record on appeal has been transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the case shall
continue as an appeal.
c. In case a petition
appealing or assailing the decision and/or final order is filed directly with
the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period, such petition shall be
considered a petition for review under Rule 43.
d. In case a notice of appeal
and/or record on appeal is filed with the Regional Commercial Court and a
petition appealing or assailing the decision and/or final order is likewise
filed with the Court of Appeals, the cases shall be consolidated and treated as
a petition for review under Rule 43. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above resolution emphasizes the
need to perfect an appeal within the given period which is fifteen (15) days by
specifically stating that Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the mode of appeal
that is applicable for those appealing or assailing the decisions and/or final
orders of the RTC. Thus, when it is
mentioned in paragraph 4 (c) of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC that in case a petition
appealing or assailing the decision and/or final order is filed directly with
the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period, such petition shall be
considered a petition for review under Rule 43, it is presumed that the
mode of appeal resorted to was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil
action. Otherwise, the Resolution should have categorically included certiorari under Rule 65 as among those
that should be considered as a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. Again, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court pertains to an ordinary mode of
appeal, whereas CEPRI availed of Rule 65, a special civil action.
In New Frontier Sugar Corporation v.
RTC, Branch 39, Iloilo City,[22]
this Court already ruled that the proper mode of appeal in cases of
corporate rehabilitation is through a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the RTC. As
ruled:
However, it should be noted that the Court issued A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC on September 14,
2004, clarifying the proper mode of appeal in cases involving corporate
rehabilitation and intra-corporate controversies. It is
provided therein that all decisions and final orders in cases falling under the
Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation
and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies
under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealed to the CA through a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to be filed within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the decision or final order of the RTC.[23]
Through
the above decision of this Court, it can be gleaned that the reglementary period
of fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the RTC
within which to file an appeal is of utmost importance.
In reversing its original ruling that
CEPRI availed of wrong mode of appeal, the CA in its Amended Decision reasoned
out that although the petition for certiorari was an incorrect remedy,
it allowed the treatment of such petition as a petition for review based on earlier
rulings of this Court. While it may be
true that this Court, in various cases, has treated a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as a petition
for review, it does not follow that the appellate courts should subscribe to
those rulings as a general rule. In
those decisions, certain exceptional circumstances were present which necessitated
the relaxing of the rule. Highly
instructive is this Court's ruling in Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank:[24]
The
remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Time
and again, this Court has reminded members of the bench and bar that the
special civil action of Certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal where the latter remedy is
available; especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own
negligence or error in the choice of remedies.
To be sure, once again, we take this
opportunity to distinguish between a Petition for Review on Certiorari (an appeal by certiorari) and a Petition for Certiorari (a special civil action/an original
action for Certiorari), under Rules
45 and 65, respectively, of the Revised Rules of Court. Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings
Corporation summarizes the distinctions between these two
remedies, to wit:
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is
a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple
reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged
does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot
be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule.
Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of
its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an
appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a
certiorari, the higher court uses its
original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision
over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the
original suit, while a petition for certiorari
is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that
had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The
parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the
parties to a petition for certiorari
are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower
court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the
private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only
judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declared are
appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or
where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary
appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the
said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed
and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of
the petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari,
the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for
Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to
correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before
appealing a judgment or final order.
x x x x
It is true that in
accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for
certiorari as a petition for review
on certiorari, particularly (1) if
the petition for certiorari was filed
within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment
are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation
of the rules.[25]
This Court was also liberal in its treatment of a wrong mode of appeal
in Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA,[26] wherein it was ruled that:
x x
x However, there are cases where the cert writ may still issue even if the
aggrieved party has a remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law. Thus, where
the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not
prove adequate either in point of promptness or completeness so that a partial
or total failure of justice may result, a cert writ may issue.
The same was also applied in Leyte
IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU,[27]
thus:
In addition, while the settled rule is that an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal, there are a few significant exceptions when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, namely: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[28]
With the above-cited rulings of
this Court in mind, the Amended Decision, as well as the records and the
antecedent circumstances of the present case are devoid of any justification
that would merit the deviation from the strict rule of procedure. The fact still remains that CEPRI had chosen
to file an inappropriate mode of appeal and regardless of the reason behind it,
whether it was to substitute a lost appeal or merely through plain negligence,
such can no longer be corrected. It is
elementary that the special civil action of certiorari
is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is
available, as it was in this case.[29]
A special civil action under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court will not be a cure for failure to timely file an appeal
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Rule 65
is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned
by one’s own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.[30]
Notwithstanding the error committed by the CA in disregarding the proper
mode of appeal or even under the presumption that it committed no mistake in
treating the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 as a petition for review, the CA was still amiss in disregarding
the factual findings of the RTC.
The
RTC found CEPRI to be in the state of insolvency which precludes it from being
entitled to rehabilitation. The findings
of fact of the RTC must be given respect as it is clear and categorical in
ruling that CEPRI is not merely in the state of illiquidity, but in an apparent
state of insolvency. There is nothing
more detailed than the contents of the said Order, which reads, in part:
After
the aforesaid initial hearing, this Court
made a careful and judicious scrutiny and evaluation as to whether the
petition for rehabilitation filed by the petitioner is impressed with merit or
not. Up to this time, this Court is not
satisfied that there is merit in the said petition.
Foremost of all, it
appears that the petitioner does not really have enough assets, net worth and
earning to meet and settle its outstanding liabilities. As stated by it in paragraph 7.8 of the
petition, it has outstanding liabilities in the aggregate sum of P69,539,903.57 to the Bank of
Philippine Islands and China Banking Corporation. These major liabilities are broken down as
follows: P20,230,000.00 to BPI and P49,309,903.57 to China Banking
Corporation as of December 31, 2001.
There is a strong probability that these may still increase
substantially after December 31, 2001.
However, the petitioner has relatively less assets to answer for these
liabilities. As historically shown by
its audited financial statements, the petitioner's assets from 1990 to 2000
were only worth as follows: P352,222.40
in 1990 (Exhibit K), P452,723.33
in 1991 (Exhibit K), P569,948.19
in 1992 (Exhibit L), P787,300.65
in 1993 (Exhibit M), P761,310.69
in 1994 (Exhibit N), P3,042,411.81
in 1995 (Exhibit O), P5,608,866.70
in 1996 (Exhibit P), P8,100,022.81
in 1997 (Exhibit Q), P10,007,490.26
in 1998 (Exhibit R), P10,905,649.83
in 1999 (Exhibit S) and P11,615,251.75
in 2000 (Exhibit T). Of course, there is
a sudden and tremendous supposed increase or leap of the worth of petitioner's
assets as of December 31, 2001, as shown by Annex A of the petition, from P11,615,251.75 as of December 31,
2000 to P65,766,094.28
as of December 31, 2001. But this is
actually of no moment. The fact is that
the petitioner booked as its assets certain properties not actually belonging
to it, like the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
34039, 34040, 34041 and 30696 in the name of Rolando S. Go. The petitioner, through its counsel, admitted
this fact during the hearing on its petition.
And so, the balance sheet of the petitioner as of December 31, 2001 is
not really a faithful one. The
revaluation increments stated or
indicated therein are questionable. For all
intents and purposes, it can thus be said that the petitioner was not actually
better off in terms of its assets and
equity in 2001 than in 2000. In view
thereof, this Court concurs with the oppositor, China Banking Corporation, that
the petitioner is actually now in a state of insolvency, not illiquidity. In
other words, it cannot be the proper subject of rehabilitation.
Secondly,
this Court is not really prepared to give full faith to the financial
projections of the petitioner (Annex H-1 of the petition). The assumption that petitioner's gross sales
will increase by 25% to 30% within the next five years is without adequate
basis. It is too speculative and
unrealistic. It is not borne by
petitioner's historical operations.
Neither is it borne by an objective industry forecast. It is even belied by the Packaging Industry
Profile prepared by the DTI Cebu Provincial Office which the petitioner
submitted to this Court (Exhibit U). In
said Packaging Industry Profile, it is categorically and explicitly stated that
“packaging demand is projected by the Strategic Industry Research and Analysis
(SIRA) to increase only by around 4.7% compound per annum over the period
1997-2003.” And so, there is actually no
faithful and adequate showing by the petitioner that it has ample capacity to
pay its outstanding and overdue loans to its major creditors such as the BPI
and China Banking Corporation, even if it be given a breathing spell.
In the third place, the
petitioner has not met all the
conditions which are required or
necessary to place it under rehabilitation.
It has not been shown categorically and specifically by the petitioner
that its stockholders had irrevocably approved and/or consented to all actions
or matters necessary and desirable to rehabilitate it, such as amending its
articles of incorporation and by-laws, increasing or decreasing its authorized
capital stock, its issuing bonded indebtedness, alienating or encumbering its
assets and modifying the rights of its shareholders. Such is not specifically shown in Annex L of
the petition and Exhibits J and J-1 for the petitioner. In the absence of it, this Court cannot be in
a position to approve the petitioner's proposed rehabilitation plan.[31]
Based
on the above Order of the RTC, this Court finds no reason to disturb the RTC's
findings of fact, and neither should the CA.
It must be remembered that the trial court has the authority to dismiss
a petition for rehabilitation after hearing,
or even after due consideration of the pleadings filed before it.[32] This is in accord with the trial court's
authority to give due course to the petition or not under Rule 4,[33]
Section 9 of the Interim Rules.[34] The trial court, acting in its capacity as a
commercial court, has the expertise and knowledge over matters under its
jurisdiction and is in a better position to pass judgment thereon. It is no different than that of
administrative departments and, as such,
its findings of fact are generally accorded respect, if not finality.
Anent
the issue of forum shopping, the resolution of the first two issues renders it
inconsequential.
In
summary, had the CA not reversed its original decision, which was more in tune
with the law and the prevailing jurisprudence, the simple issues presented
before this Court would have been settled expeditiously.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review dated July 18, 2006 of China Banking
Corporation is hereby GRANTED. The
Amended Decision dated
March 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71017 is hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the
Order dated April 30, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 46- 679.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale, with Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring; id. at 10-27.
[3] Rollo, pp. 254-445.
[4] A specially
designated corporate court, pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. 8799.
[5] Rollo, pp. 446-447.
[6] Id. at 448-458, with a Supplemental Comment/Opposition dated April 12, 2002, id. at 459-466.
[7] Rollo, pp. 145-147.
[8] Id. at 467-485.
[9] Id. at 486. (Emphasis supplied.)
[10] Id. at 487-533.
[11] Id. at 36.
[12] Id. at 621-631.
[13] Id. at 10-27.
[14] Id. at 1169-1208.
[15] Id. at 38-39.
[16] Id. at 71-72.
[17] Id.
at 693-732.
[18] Cando v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91344, September 14, 1990, 189 SCRA 666; Royal Crown Internationale v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78085, October 16, 1989, 178 SCRA 569; People v. Ferrer, 150-C Phil. 551 (1972); Universal Textile Mills, Inc. v. C. I. R., 146 Phil. 1101 (1970); Shugo Noda & Co., Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 107404, March 30, 1994, 231 SCRA 620; Commission on Elections v. CA, G.R. No. 108120, January 26, 1994, 229 SCRA 501; Estrada v. Domingo, 139 Phil. 158 (1969); Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973, 51 SCRA 189.
[19] A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC. (Emphasis supplied.)
[20] Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or the final order. x x x
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new commercial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new commercial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
[21] Re: Mode of Appeal in Cases Formerly Cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
[22] G.R. No. 165001, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 601.
[23] Id. at 611. (Emphasis supplied.)
[24] G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008,
552 SCRA 424.
[25] Id. at 434-444, citing Cathay Pacific Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA 226, 236 (2006); Land Bank of the Philippines v. Continental Watchman Agency Incorporated, 465 Phil. 607, 615 (2004); Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 784 (2003); Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 436 SCRA 123, 134-136 (2004); Oaminal v. Sps. Castillo, 459 Phil. 542, 556 (2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 98 (2000); Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 232, 256 (1997); Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066, 1075 (1997); Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 644 (2000); Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., 230 SCRA 9, 15 (2004), citing Alto Sales Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 274 Phil. 914 (1991); Filcon Manufacturing Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 199 SCRA 814 (1999); and Kabushi Kaisha Isetan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 203 SCRA 583 (1991). (Emphasis supplied.)
[26] 456 Phil. 755, 786 (2003), citing State v. Guinotte, 57 S.W. 281 (1900). (Emphasis supplied.)
[27] G.R. No. 157775, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 154.
[28] Id. at 166, citing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65, Sec. 1; Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, supra note 23, at 127; Madriaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142001, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 298; Martillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 195; Heirs of Lourdes Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 296, 204 (2004); Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. JANCOM Environmental Corp., 425 Phil. 961, 974 (2002); Uy Chua v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 17, 30 (2000). (Emphasis supplied.)
[29] See Badiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170691, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 562, 583.
[30] Id.
[31] Rollo, pp. 145-16. (Emphasis supplied.)
[32] See New Frontier Sugar Corporation v. RTC, Branch 39, Iloilo City, et al., supra note 21.
[33] x x x
(4) Initial hearing on any matter relating to the petition or on any comment and/or opposition filed in connection therewith. If the trial court is satisfied that there is merit in the petition, it shall give due course to the petition;
x x x
[34] New Frontier Sugar Corporation v. RTC, Branch 39, Iloilo City, et al., supra note 21.