Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
|
FILEMON A. VERZANO, JR., Petitioner, -
versus - FRANCIS VICTOR D. PARO, JANET A FLORENCIO, HON.
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, and HON. CITY PROSECUTOR OF Respondents. |
G.R. No. 171643 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 8, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the July 28, 2005 Decision[2] and the February 7, 2006 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 86521.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On
The complaint was founded on petitioner’s alleged violation of company policy on prohibited sale of drug samples given for free to doctors and for the unauthorized act of “channeling,” or the transfer of stocks within the same area falsely creating an impression that there was a sale. After conducting its own investigation and giving petitioner an opportunity to explain his side, Wyeth resolved to dismiss petitioner tendering him a Notice of Termination.[4]
Aggrieved by
his termination, petitioner filed a Complaint[5]
for illegal dismissal with the Regional Labor Arbitration Board, National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC),
It was on account of the said affidavits that petitioner filed a criminal complaint[7] against respondents for perjury, false testimony and incriminatory machination. In said complaint, petitioner argued that the affidavits of respondents contained falsehoods against him, particularly on the material date of the alleged sale and the fact that he sold products which are to be given free to doctors. He also argued that the alleged acts of “channeling” by him are false and unfounded.
Subpoenas were issued by the City Prosecutor against respondents for the submission of their respective counter-affidavits; however, the return of the subpoenas showed that respondents could not be located at their given addresses.
In a Resolution[8] dated March 3, 2004, notwithstanding that no counter-affidavits were submitted by respondents, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss petitioner’s complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause, all the charges
are hereby recommended dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[9]
Petitioner then
filed a motion for reconsideration,[10]
which was, however, denied by the City Prosecutor in a Resolution[11]
dated
Petitioner
appealed the Resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Office of Regional State
Prosecutor via a petition for review.[12]
On
WHEREFORE, your Resolution dated March 3, 2004 is
hereby reversed and you are hereby directed to file the appropriate information
for Perjury against Francis Victor D. [Paro] and Janet A. Florencio within (5)
days from receipt hereof, furnishing this Office with proof of compliance
within the same period.[14]
Aggrieved, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.[15] In a Resolution[16] dated August 25, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor denied respondents’ motion.
On
On the same
day,
On
In a Resolution
dated
x x x x
In order not to render moot and academic the instant
petition, a temporary restraining order (TRO) is hereby issued temporarily
enjoining the public respondent Chief Prosecutor from acting on the assailed
Order issued by the public respondent Regional State Prosecutor for a period of
sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.[17]
In light of the
issuance of a TRO by the CA, respondents filed with the MTCC a Manifestation
and Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings[18]
on
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.[21]
In ruling against petitioner, the CA ruled, among others, that the Regional State Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion when he directed the filing of the Informations for perjury on the simple reason that no counter-affidavits were submitted by respondents. In addition, the CA held that even though the Informations had already been filed in the MTCC, the same did not bar the CA from reviewing and correcting acts tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied by
the CA in a Resolution[22]
dated
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following issues for this Court’s consideration, to wit:
I.
THE PETITION FILED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD BEEN RENDERED MOOT AND
ACADEMIC BY THE FILING OF THE CASES IN COURT.
II.
THE REGIONAL STATE
PROSECUTOR DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE RESOLUTION
OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR.
III.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FILED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITH THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT
THE PROPER REMEDY.[23]
The petition has no merit.
Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that the filing of the informations in the MTCC had already removed the cases from the power and authority of the prosecution to dismiss the same in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Crespo v. Mogul[24] (Crespo), to wit:
The
rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.
It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.[25]
In addition, petitioner points out that warrants of arrest were already issued by the MTCC and that respondents had already individually posted bail. Petitioner thus concludes, that the issue of whether or not the Regional State Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion when he directed the filing of Informations for perjury against respondents had already become moot and academic.
Petitioner is not entirely correct. As discussed in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[26] (Ledesma), Crespo does not foreclose an appeal made to the resolution of a prosecutor in the determination of probable cause notwithstanding that informations had already been filed in court, to wit:
In Marcelo
vs. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that Crespo did not
foreclose the power or authority of the secretary of justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Court recognized in Crespo
that the action of the investigating fiscal or prosecutor in the preliminary
investigation is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or
chief state prosecutor. Thereafter, it may be appealed to the secretary of justice.
The justice secretary's power of review may
still be availed of despite the filing of an information in court.
x x x[27]
In the case at bar, while it is generally the Secretary of Justice who has the authority to review the decisions of the prosecutors, this Court agrees with the CA that the same precedential principles apply in full force and effect to the authority of the CA to correct the acts tainted with grave abuse of discretion by the prosecutorial officers notwithstanding the filing of the informations before the MTCC.[28] The authority of the CA is bolstered by the fact that the petition filed before it was one under Rule 65, therefore it has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the Regional State Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Ledesma[29] adds that where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only after an Information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. On this note, the MTCC was thus correct when it suspended the proceedings in view of the appeal taken by respondents to the resolution of the Regional State Prosecutor. As observed by the CA, the suspension of the proceedings by the MTCC was done in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to wit:
To a certain extent, the respondents’ asseverations
are correct when they say by the operative act of filing of the informations
before it, the MTCC has acquired jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings
against petitioners. Indeed, the suspension of said proceedings is one such
exercise of jurisdiction, and therefore, respondents’ worries of the MTCC being
divested of jurisdiction or competence over the proceedings are at best,
speculative and illusory.[30]
Anent
the second issue raised by petitioner, the same is without merit. Petitioner
argues that the Regional State Prosecutor did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it reversed the finding of the city prosecutor that no probable
cause existed to warrant the filing of the Informations against respondents.
In
finding grave abuse of discretion, the CA opined that the Regional State
Prosecutor reversed the finding of the City Prosecutor on the simple reason
that respondents failed to submit counter-affidavits. The CA ruled that it
would have been different had the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the
resolutions of his subordinate upon a positive finding of probable cause.
The
pertinent portions of the
Perusal
of the affidavits executed by Francis Victor D. [Paro] and Janet A. Florencio
reveals the following:
a)
The material matter contained in these
affidavits refer to the act of selling by Filemon Verzano, Jr. of Tazocin
products intended to be distributed as free samples in violation of company
policy. The date when the sale was made is not a material issue.
b)
The affidavits of the respondent were
executed before a Labor Arbiter and a Notary Public who are persons authorized
to administer oaths.
c)
There is also no question that these
affidavits are required by law as they were attached as part of the position
paper submitted with the Labor Arbiter handling the labor case.
d)
Although there is yet no clear evidence that
there was an apparent willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on their
part, the respondents by their failure to file or submit their respective
counter-affidavit for their defense, are deemed to have waived the same and in
effect, the allegations in the complaint remain uncontroverted.
The
case record will show that your Office, in the determination of probable cause
vis-à-vis the attending set of facts and circumstances, failed to consider the
application of the procedure laid down under Section 3 paragraph (d) of Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Procedure which provides:
If
the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits
within the ten (10)-day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the
complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
Only
a counter-affidavit subscribed and sworn to by the respondent before the Public
Prosecutor can dispute or put at issue the allegations in the complaint thus, a
respondent who fails to submit his counter-affidavit within the required period
is deemed not to have controverted the complainant’s evidence.[31]
Contrary
to the claim of petitioner that the Regional State Prosecutor found probable
cause, the July 30, 2004 Resolution does not show that the latter actually made
an independent assessment of the evidence presented in the investigation. As a
matter of fact, the clear import of the
To
follow the public respondent Regional State Prosecutor’s skewed premise that
only counter-affidavits can dispute or controvert allegations in the Complaint,
would be to perpetuate an absurdity wherein a criminal complaint should automatically
be resolved in favor of the complainant in the absence of counter-affidavits. x
x x[32]
It
is not disputed that the Regional State Prosecutor has the authority to reverse
the findings of the existence of probable cause on review. However, a perusal
of the July 30, 2004 Resolution would show that little attempt was made by the
Regional State Prosecutor to discuss the existence or non-existence of probable
cause and that much reliance was made on a flawed interpretation of Section 3,
paragraph (d) of the Revised Rules of Procedure.
What
makes matters worse is that in his August 25, 2004 Resolution which dealt with
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration, the Regional State Prosecutor stuck
with his theory and even relied on another flawed interpretation of Section 3,
paragraph (b) of Rule 112, to wit:
x
x x It would have been a different scenario if it falls within the scope of
Rule 112, Section 3, paragraph (b) which provides:
b)
Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating
officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the
investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of
the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
In the instant case, the Investigating
Prosecutor found ground to continue with the inquiry which is why he issued
subpoenas to the respondents to submit their counter affidavit within the
10-day period, since he could have dismissed it initially if indeed there was
really no evidence to serve as a ground for continuing with the inquiry.
For failure of the respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits, they
are deemed to have forfeited their right to preliminary investigation as due
process only requires that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit
counter-affidavit, if he is so minded. x x x[33]
The clear import of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Rule 112 is that the Investigating Prosecutor may issue subpoenas if he finds grounds to continue with the investigation. However, the continuance of the investigation does not necessarily mean that the result will be an automatic conclusion of a finding of probable cause. To subscribe to such a theory would defeat the very purpose of a counter-affidavit which is to honor due process and to provide respondents an opportunity to refute the allegations made against them. Again, the conclusion reached by the Regional State Prosecutor is manifestly wrong as the CA was correct when it observed that the issuance of a subpoena would become unceremoniously clothed with the untoward implication that probable cause is necessarily extant.[34]
Based on the foregoing, because of the manner by which the Regional State Prosecutor resolved the case, this Court finds that the same constitutes grave abuse of discretion, as his interpretation and appreciation of the Rules of Court have no legal bases.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the petition for certiorari filed by respondents with the CA was the wrong remedy, considering that the proper procedure was to appeal to the Secretary of Justice under Department Circular No. 70,[35] otherwise known as the “2000 NPS Rule on Appeal.”
The same deserves scant consideration.
Time and again, this Court has held that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without exception. Based on the previous discussion, the actions of the Regional State Prosecutor, being patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the same constitutes an exception to the rule on administrative remedies.[36]
Finally, what is damning to petitioner’s cause is the fact that the MTCC had already withdrawn the two Informations filed against respondents. As previously stated, the MTCC suspended the proceedings before it in view of the petition filed by the respondents with the CA. In Ledesma,[37] this Court stated that such deferment or suspension, however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.[38] Since the Informations for perjury had already been filed in the MTCC, any subsequent action must be addressed to the said court’s discretion.
In
the case at bar, the CA found that the Regional State Prosecutor acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the City Prosecutor to file the Informations
for perjury against respondents. It was because of the CA Decision that the
City Prosecutor eventually filed two Motions for Leave to Withdraw Informations[39]
with the MTCC. On
Acting
on the Motion for Leave to Withdraw Informations filed by the prosecution,
through 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Arlene Catherine A. Dato, and
finding it to be impressed with merit, the same is hereby Granted.
Accordingly,
the information against accused Janet Florencio in the above-entitled case is
hereby Withdrawn.
SO ORDERED.[41]
The
court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
Thus, the court may deny or grant a motion to withdraw an information, not out
of subservience to the (Special) Prosecutor, but in faithful exercise of
judicial discretion and prerogative.[42]
The dismissal of the two informations against respondents were subject to the
MTCC’s jurisdiction and discretion in view of the circumstances of the case at
bar. Such dismissal ultimately renders the case moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The July 28, 2005 Decision and the February 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 86521, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-23.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring; id. at 24-35.
[3] Rollo, p. 36.
[4]
[5] Entitled Filemon Verzano, Jr. v. Wyeth Philippines, Inc., docketed as RAB Case No. 06-04-10236-2.
[6] Records (Criminal Case No. 04-9-8480), pp. 17-21; records (Criminal Case No. 04-9-8479), pp. 39-40.
[7] Records (Criminal Case No. 04-9-8480), p. 6.
[8] CA rollo, pp. 48-57.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Records (Criminal Case No. 04-9-8480), p. 92.
[18]
[19]
[20] Rollo, pp. 24-35.
[21]
[22]
[23] Id at. 18-21.
[24] G.R. No. L-53373,
[25]
[26] G.R. No. 113216,
[27] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 678.
[28] Rollo, p. 34.
[29] Supra note 26, at 680.
[30] Rollo, p. 35.
[31] CA rollo, pp. 197-198. (Underscoring in the Original).
[32] Rollo, p. 31.
[33]
[34]
35 The foregoing delegation of
authority notwithstanding, the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to his power
of supervision and control over the entire National Prosecution Service and in
the interest of justice, review the resolutions of the Regional State
Prosecutors in appealed cases.
[36] Buston-Arendain
v. Gil, G.R. No. 172585,
[37] Supra note 26, at 680.
[38]
[39] Records (Criminal Case No. 04-9-8480), pp. 95-97. See also records (Criminal Case No. 04-9-8479), pp. 95-97.
[40]
[41]
[42] People v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 401, 410-411 (1999).