Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
|
CENTURY
CANNING CORPORATION, RICARDO T. PO, JR. and AMANCIO C. RONQUILLO,
Petitioners, - versus - VICENTE RANDY R. RAMIL,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 171630 Present:
CARPIO,
j., Chairperson, nachura, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August
8, 2010 |
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D
E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 86939, dated December 1, 2005 and
February 17, 2006, respectively.
The
antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner
Century Canning Corporation, a company engaged in canned food manufacturing,
employed respondent Vicente Randy Ramil in August 1993 as technical specialist. Prior to his
dismissal on May 20, 1999, his job included, among others, the preparation of
the purchase requisition (PR) forms and capital expenditure (CAPEX) forms, as
well as the coordination with the purchasing department regarding technical
inquiries on needed products and services of petitioner's different
departments.
On
March 3, 1999, respondent prepared a CAPEX form for external fax modems and terminal
server, per order of Technical Operations Manager Jaime Garcia, Jr. and
endorsed it to Marivic Villanueva, Secretary of Executive Vice-President
Ricardo T. Po, for the latter's signature. The CAPEX form, however, did not
have the complete details[3]
and some required signatures.[4]
The following day, March 4, 1999, with the form apparently signed by Po,
respondent transmitted it to Purchasing Officer Lorena Paz in Taguig Main Office.
Paz processed the paper and found that
some details in the CAPEX form were left blank. She also doubted the
genuineness of the signature of Po, as appearing in the form. Paz then
transmitted the CAPEX form to Purchasing Manager Virgie Garcia and informed her
of the questionable signature of Po. Consequently, the request for the
equipment was put on hold due to Po's forged signature. However, due to the
urgency of purchasing badly needed equipment, respondent was ordered to make
another CAPEX form, which was immediately transmitted to the Purchasing Department.
Suspecting
him to have committed forgery, respondent was asked to explain in writing the
events surrounding the incident. He vehemently denied any participation in the
alleged forgery. Respondent was, thereafter, suspended on April 21, 1999.
Subsequently, he received a Notice of Termination from Armando C. Ronquillo, on
May 20, 1999, for loss of trust and confidence.
Due to
the foregoing, respondent, on May 24, 1999, filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, separation pay, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees against petitioner and its officers before the
Labor Arbiter (LA), and was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-05894-99.[5]
LA
Potenciano S. Canizares rendered a Decision[6]
dated December 6, 1999 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Aggrieved by the LA's finding, respondent appealed to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Upon recommendation of LA
Cristeta D. Tamayo, who reviewed the case, the NLRC First Division, in its
Decision[7]
dated August 26, 2002, set aside the ruling of LA Canizares. The NLRC declared
respondent's dismissal to be illegal and directed petitioner to reinstate
respondent with full backwages and seniority rights and privileges. It found that petitioner failed to show clear
and convincing evidence that respondent was responsible for the forgery of the
signature of Po in the CAPEX form.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration. To respondent's surprise and dismay, the
NLRC reversed itself and rendered a new Decision[8]
dated October 20, 2003, upholding LA Canizares' dismissal of his complaint.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC.
Frustrated
by this turn of events, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA. The CA, in its Decision dated December 1, 2005, rendered judgment in
favor of respondent and reinstated the
earlier decision of the NLRC, dated August 26, 2002. It ordered petitioner to reinstate
respondent, without loss of seniority rights and privileges, and to pay
respondent full backwages from the time his employment was terminated on May
20, 1999 up to the time of the finality of its decision. The CA, likewise, remanded the case to the LA
for the computation of backwages of the respondent.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated
February 17, 2006. Hence, the instant petition assigning the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE UNANIMOUS FINDINGS OF THE LABOR
ARBITER AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S TERMINATION FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER CORPORATION FAILED TO
SATISFY THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS FOR
A VALID OR AUTHORIZED CAUSE.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FOR LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE TO BE
A VALID GROUND FOR AN EMPLOYEE'S DISMISSAL, IT MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL AND NOT
ARBITRARY, AND MUST BE FOUNDED ON CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FACTS, OVERLOOKING THE
RULE THAT THE MERE EXISTENCE OF A BASIS FOR BELIEVING THAT SUCH EMPLOYEE HAS
BREACHED THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE OF HIS EMPLOYER SUFFICES FOR HIS DISMISSAL.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT ASIDE FROM HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE
FORGERY OF THE CAPITAL EXPENDITURE (CAPEX) FORMS, PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PAST
VIOLATIONS OR ADMITTED INFRACTIONS OF COMPANY RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE MORE
THAN SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO JUSTIFY THE TERMINATION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH
PETITIONER CORPORATION.
Petitioner's
main allegation is that there are factual and legal grounds constituting
substantial proof that respondent was clearly involved in the forgery of the
CAPEX form, i.e., respondent is the
forger of the signature of Po, as he is the custodian and the one who prepared
the CAPEX form; the forged signature was already existing when he submitted the
same for processing; he has the motive to forge the signature; respondent has
the propensity to deviate from the Standard Operating Procedure as shown by the
fact that the CAPEX form, with the forged signature of Po, is not complete in
details and lacks the required signatures; also, in February 1999, respondent
ordered 8 units of External Fax Modem without the required CAPEX form and a PR
form.
Petitioner
insists that the mere existence of a basis for believing that respondent
employee has breached the trust and confidence of his employer suffices for his
dismissal. Finally, petitioner maintains that aside from respondent's
involvement in the forgery of the CAPEX form, his past violations of company
rules and regulations are more than sufficient grounds to justify his
termination from employment.
In his
Comment, respondent alleged that petitioner failed to present clear and
convincing evidence to prove his participation in the charge of forgery nor any
damage to the petitioner.
Anent the first issue raised,
petitioner faults the CA in disregarding the unanimous findings of the LA and
the NLRC sustaining the legality of respondent's termination from his
employment. The rule is that high respect is accorded to the findings of fact
of quasi-judicial agencies, more so in the case at bar where both the LA and
the NLRC share the same findings. The rule is not, however, without
exceptions one of which is when the findings of fact of the labor officials on
which the conclusion was based are not supported by substantial evidence. The same holds true when it is perceived that
far too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from bare facts adduced in evidence.[9]
In the case at bar, the NLRC's findings of fact upon which its conclusion was based are not supported by substantial evidence, that is, the amount of relevant evidence, which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[10]
As correctly found by the CA:
x x x The record of the case is bereft of evidence that would clearly establish Ramil's involvement in the forgery. They did not even submit any affidavit of witness[11] or present any during the hearing to substantiate their claim against Ramil.[12]
Respondent
alleged in his position paper that after preparing the CAPEX form on March 3,
1999, he endorsed it to Marivic Villanueva for the signature of the Executive
Vice-President Ricardo T. Po. The next day, March 4, 1999, respondent received
the CAPEX form containing the signature of Po. Petitioner never controverted
these allegations in the proceedings before the NLRC and the CA despite its
opportunity to do so. Petitioner's belated allegations in its reply filed
before this Court that Marivic Villanueva
denied having seen the CAPEX form cannot be given credit. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court,
administrative agency or quasi-judicial body
need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot
be raised for the first time at that late stage.[13]
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and
the case is decided upon that theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on
appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.[14]
Thus,
if respondent retrieved the form on March 4, 1999 with the signature of Po, it
can be correctly inferred that he is not the forger. Had the CAPEX form been
returned to respondent without Po's signature, Villanueva or any officer of the
petitioner's company could have readily noticed the lack of signature, and
could have easily attested that the form was unsigned when it was released to respondent.
Further,
as correctly found by the NLRC in its original decision dated August 26, 2002,
if respondent was the one who forged the signature of Po in the CAPEX form,
there was no need for him to endorse the same to Villanueva and transmit it the
next day. He could have easily forged the signature of Po on the same day that
he prepared the CAPEX form and submitted it on the very same day to
petitioner's main office without passing through any officer of
petitioner.
Accordingly,
for want of substantial basis,
in fact or in law, factual
findings of an administrative agency, such as the NLRC, cannot
be given the stamp of finality
and conclusiveness normally accorded to it,
as even decisions of administrative agencies which are
declared “final” by law are not exempt from judicial review
when so warranted.[15]
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, therefore, this Court sees no error on the
part of the CA when it made a new determination of the case and, upon this,
reversed the ruling of the NLRC.
As to
the second issue, the law mandates that the burden of proving the validity of
the termination of employment rests with the employer. Failure to discharge
this evidentiary burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not
justified and, therefore, illegal. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and
conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing
employees. In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved in favor of labor,
pursuant to the social justice policy of labor laws and the Constitution.[16]
The termination letter[17]
addressed to respondent, dated May 20, 1999, provides that:
We also conducted inquiries from
persons concerned to get more information in (sic) this forgery. Some of your
statements do not jibe with theirs. x x x
However, this information which petitioner allegedly obtained from the “persons concerned” was not backed-up by any affidavit or proof. Petitioner did not even bother to name these resource persons.
Petitioner based respondent's dismissal on its unsubstantiated suspicions and conclusion that since respondent was the custodian and the one who prepared the CAPEX forms, he had the motive to commit the forgery. However, as correctly found by the NLRC in its original Decision, respondent would not be benefited by the purchase of the subject equipment. The equipment would be for the use of petitioner company.
With respect to the third issue, while
We have previously held that employers are allowed a wider latitude of
discretion in terminating the services of employees who perform functions which
by their nature require the employers' full trust and confidence
and the mere existence of basis for believing that the employee has breached the trust of the
employer is sufficient,[18]
this does not mean that the said basis may be arbitrary and unfounded.
The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust and confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause.[19] Loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid cause for dismissal, must be based on a willful breach of trust[20] and founded on clearly established facts. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary.[21] It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whim, caprice or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer.[22]
The case of Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Tongson,[23] cited by the petitioner, is not applicable to the present case. In that case, PAL dismissed Tongson from service on the ground of corruption, extortion and bribery in the processing of PAL's passengers' travel documents. We upheld the validity of Tongson's dismissal because PAL's overwhelming documentary evidence reflects an unbroken chain which naturally leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, that at the very least, respondent was involved in extorting money from PAL's passengers. We further said that even if there is no direct evidence to prove that the employees actually committed the offense, substantial proof based on documentary evidence is sufficient to warrant their dismissal from employment.
In the case at bar, there is neither direct evidence nor substantial documentary evidence pointing to respondent as the one liable for the forgery of the signature of Po.
The cited case of Deles Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission[24] is also inapplicable. Therein dismissed employee, Deles Jr., himself admitted during the company investigation that he tampered with the company's sensitive equipment (the JTF Gravitometer No. 5). Thus, there existed sufficient basis for the finding that therein employee breached the trust and confidence of his employer.
As for the final issue raised,
petitioner's reliance on respondent's previous tardiness in reporting for work
as a ground for his dismissal is likewise not meritorious. The correct rule has
always been that such previous offense may be used as valid
justification for dismissal from work only if the infractions
are related to the subsequent offense upon which the basis of termination is
decreed.[25]
His previous offenses were entirely separate and distinct from his latest
alleged infraction of forgery. Hence, the same could no longer be utilized as
an added justification for his dismissal.
Besides, respondent had already been sanctioned for
his prior infractions. To consider these offenses as
justification for his dismissal would be penalizing respondent twice for the
same offense.[26]
Respondent's
illegal dismissal carries the legal consequences defined under Article 279 of
the Labor Code, that is, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges, and to the payment of his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.[27]
However, the Court finds that it
would be best to award separation pay instead of reinstatement, in view of the
strained relations between petitioner and respondent. Respondent was dismissed
due to loss of trust and confidence and it would be impractical to reinstate an
employee whom the employer does not trust, and whose task is to handle and prepare delicate documents.
Under
the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay has been
considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is
no longer desirable or viable. On the one hand, such payment liberates the
employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other
hand, the payment releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation
of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.[28]
In
view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to the payment of full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent,
computed from the date of his dismissal on May 20, 1999 up to the finality of
this decision, and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service, computed from the time of his
engagement by petitioner on August 1993 up to the finality of the decision.[29]
The awards of separation
pay and backwages are
not mutually exclusive and both may be given to the respondent. In Nissan
North Edsa Balintawak, Quezon City v. Serrano, Jr.,[30]
the Court held that:
The
normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed
are, firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement
to his former position without loss of seniority rights and, secondly, the
payment of backwages corresponding to the
period from his illegal dismissal up to
actual reinstatement. The statutory intent on this matter
is clearly discernible. Reinstatement restores the employee
who was unjustly dismissed to the position from which he was removed, that is,
to his status quo ante dismissal,
while the grant of backwages allows the
same employee to recover from the employer that which he had lost by way of
wages as a result of his dismissal. These twin remedies —reinstatement
and payment of backwages — make the
dismissed employee whole who can then look forward to continued employment.
Thus, do these two remedies give meaning and substance to the constitutional
right of labor to security of tenure. The two forms of relief are
distinct and separate, one from the other. Though the grant of reinstatement
commonly carries with it an award of backwages,
the inappropriateness or non-availability of one does not carry with it the
inappropriateness or non-availability of the other. x x x As the term suggests,
separation pay is the amount that an
employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and x x x is
designed to provide the employee with “the wherewithal during the period that
he is looking for another employment.” In the instant case, the grant of separation pay was a substitute for immediate
and continued re-employment with the private respondent Bank. The grant of separation pay did not redress the injury
that is intended to be relieved by the second remedy of backwages, that is, the loss of earnings that would have
accrued to the dismissed employee during the period between dismissal and reinstatement. Put a little differently, payment of backwages is a form of
relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal; separation pay, in contrast, is oriented
towards the immediate future, the transitional period the dismissed employee
must undergo before locating a replacement job. x x x The grant of separation pay was a
proper substitute only for reinstatement; it could not be an
adequate substitute both for reinstatement and for backwages. (Emphasis supplied.)[31]
The case is, therefore, remanded to
the Labor Arbiter for the purpose of computing the proper monetary award due to
the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86939, dated December 1, 2005 and February 17, 2006, respectively, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the order of reinstatement is deleted, and in lieu thereof, Petitioner Century Canning Corporation is DIRECTED to pay respondent separation pay.
The
case is REMANDED to the Labor
Arbiter for the purpose of computing respondent's full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the
date of his dismissal on May 20, 1999 up to the finality of the decision, and
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one month salary for
every year of service, computed from the time of his engagement by petitioner
on August 1993 up to the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada (now retired), with Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios (now deceased) and Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, concurring; rollo, pp. 34-40.
[2] Id. at 41.
[3] Starting Date, Estimated Completion Date, Budgeted CAPEX amount, Managers/Functional Unit Head's Comment and Justification Summary.
[4] Cost and Budget Manager/Functional Unit Head, Management Information Service Manager and Recommending Approving Officer.
[5] Records, p. 2.
[6] Id. at 64-68.
[7] Id. at 78-89.
[8] Id. at 96-105.
[9] Felix v. National Labor Relations Commission, 485 Phil. 140, 153 (2004).
[10] Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 133, Sec. 5.
[11] Like Purchasing Officer Lorena Paz, Exec. VP Mr. Ricardo T. Po, his secretary Marivic Villanueva, and a certain technician named “Boyet” mentioned in the private respondents pleadings (the petitioner in this case).
[12] Rollo, p. 38.
[13] Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No.179848, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 295, 311.
[14] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (formerly Southern Energy Quezon, Inc.), G.R. No. 159593, October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 484, 495, citing Carantes v. Court of Appeals, 76 SCRA 514, 521 (1977).
[15] Vicente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175988, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 240, 247-248.
[16] Times Transportation Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 148500-01, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 435, 443.
[17] Records, pp. 29-30.
[18] Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 120030, June 17, 1997, 273 SCRA 549, 558.
[19] Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, 374 Phil. 196, 205 (1999).
[20] Labor
Code, Article 282. Termination by
employer. - An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
x
x x x
c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative.
[21] Abel v. Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 178976, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 683, 684.
[22] Felix v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 9, at 160.
[23] 459 Phil. 742. (2003).
[24] 384 Phil. 271 (2000).
[25] Salas v. Aboitiz One, Inc., G.R. No. 178236, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 374, 390.
[26] Id.
[27] Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc. v. Agito, G.R. No. 179546, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 445, 471.
[28] Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc. v. Daniel, G.R. No. 156893, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 494, 512.
[29] Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. v. Diamse, G.R. No. 169299, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 239, 251.
[30] G.R. No. 162538, June 4, 2009, 588 SCRA 238, 247-248.
[31] Id. at 247-248, citing Santos v. NLRC, 154 SCRA 166, 171-173.