Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
EMILIA MICKING VDA. DE CORONEL and
BENJAMIN CORONEL, Petitioners, - versus - MIGUEL
TANJANGCO, JR., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 170693 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: August 8, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court originated from a Complaint[1]
for cancellation of certificate of land transfer and for ejectment filed by
respondent Miguel Tanjangco, Jr. on June 24, 1997 before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Malolos, Bulacan. The complaint stated that respondent was the
owner of parcels of land found in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an
aggregate area of 26,428 square meters.[2] These pieces of land, identified as Lot Nos.
37, 38 and 39, were respectively covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 10547, 10572
and 8203 – all of which show that they were declared for taxation purposes in
respondent’s name.[3] Initially, these pieces of property were
being cultivated by petitioner Emilia Micking Coronel and her husband as
agricultural lessees, and when the latter died Emilia was given, by force of
the government’s Operation Land Transfer,
a certificate of land transfer (CLT) covering the lots.[4]
Over time saltwater gradually
saturated the property, making it unsuitable for rice cultivation.[5] Hence, in a 1980 agreement denominated as Kasunduan sa Pagbabago ng Kaurian ng Lupang
Sakahan (Palayan na Gagawing Palaisdaan), Emilia and her son,
petitioner Benjamin Coronel,[6]
allegedly agreed with respondent to convert Lot No. 38 into a fish farm.[7] Respondent claimed that for a consideration
of P6,000.00, petitioners had bound to relinquish their rights as
tenants not only on Lot No. 38 but also on Lot Nos. 37 and 39, which were
likewise converted into fish farms following the execution of the agreement.
Petitioners then purportedly leased Lot No. 38 to a certain Jess Santos for a
term of five years and then to one Dionisio Toribio, both of whom successively
operated fishing ponds on the land. When
respondent supposedly learned about these leases, he demanded that petitioners
vacate not only Lot No. 38 but also Lot Nos. 37 and 39. The demand went unheeded. Respondent was, thus, urged to bring the
matter before the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee, yet the parties could not amicably settle their issues before
the said body.[8]
Petitioners suspected that
respondent’s claim of ownership was a ploy to circumvent agrarian law
provisions on land retention. In their
Answer[9] to
the complaint, they disclosed that the subject lots were owned not by
respondent but by the latter’s father, Miguel Tanjangco, Sr., who had given
them leasehold rights therein many years ago.
They claimed that CLT No. 0-092761 was issued in favor of Emilia upon
the death of her husband, and that she and her family had since been in
possession of the property as beneficiaries of the government’s agrarian reform
program. As holders of a CLT, they
asserted that they had every right to retain possession of the lots.[10] Furthermore, they denied having relinquished
their rights as land reform beneficiaries, and assuming there was such
relinquishment the same was nevertheless void for being contrary to existing
agrarian laws and rules. They suggest
that it was respondent who committed a breach against their rights when he
himself actually constituted a lease on a portion of the property in favor of
Jess Santos. Lastly, they posited that
respondent had no cause of action and if he did have cause to bring suit, the
same nevertheless had already prescribed.[11]
It is evident from the records that
in 1976, respondent had filed before the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR)
a petition, docketed as MARCO Adm. Case No. III-1474-86, for the retention of not more than
seven hectares of inherited land acquired from his grandparents, Adriano and
Juana Tanjangco – the parents of Miguel, Sr.
Lot No. 38 was included in the area applied to be retained and it was
then being tenanted by Emilia. This
lot, together with others in possession of different individuals, could have
redounded to Miguel, Sr. had it not been for the waiver of his share following
an extrajudicial settlement of the inherited estate among the heirs. The MAR granted respondent’s application in
its July 27, 1986 Order, and accordingly, it declared exempt from Operation Land Transfer the lots subject
of the petition and directed that existing tenants in the covered area be
maintained in their peaceful possession as agricultural lessees.[12]
That ruling in MARCO Adm.
Case No. III-1474-86 was
central to the provincial adjudicator’s resolution of the present case. In its April 1, 1998 Decision,[13]
the provincial adjudicator noted that the matter of cancelling petitioners’ CLT
covering Lot No. 38 was already water under the bridge in view of the MAR’s
directive to cancel it along with all the other existing CLTs. As to whether petitioners could be ejected
not only from Lot No. 38 but also from Lot Nos. 37 and 39, the provincial
adjudicator ruled in the affirmative. Citing the 1980 Kasunduan, in relation to Sections 36 and 27 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3844, it was found that
petitioners’ relinquishment of rights, coupled with the conversion of the lots
into fishing ponds, as well as the voluntary surrender of possession to Jess
Santos, had validly terminated existing tenurial rights.[14] The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and order is hereby issued:
1. ORDERING the defendants to vacate peacefully the subject property;
2. ORDERING the defendants to restore possession of the subject property to the herein plaintiff;
3. ORDERING the defendants and all other persons acting in their behalves not to molest, interfere [with] or harass the herein plaintiff;
4. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to
the DAR-Central Adjudication Board (DAR-CAB).[16]
On January 15, 2001, it reversed the decision of the provincial adjudicator,
holding that petitioners were already deemed owners of the subject property on
the effective date of Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 27 and that the provisions
in the law on prohibited transfers and relinquishment of land awards should
apply to the transactions entered into by the parties.[17] The decision states:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the assailed decision dated April 1, 1998 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment
is rendered:
1.
Ordering Plaintiff-Appellee to maintain Defendants-Appellants in peaceful
possession and cultivation of
2. Ordering the cancellation of
CLT No. 0-09276 generated in favor of Defendant-Appellant Emilia Micking Vda.
de Coronel covering Lot Nos. 37, 38 and 39. An Emancipation Patent (EP) CLT be issued in
favor of Defendant-Appellant Emilia Micking Vda. de Coronel with respect to Lot
Nos. 37 and 39, subject matter of this case; and
3. Ordering the parties to execute a leasehold contract over Lot No.
38.
SO
ORDERED.[18]
Following the denial of his motion
for reconsideration,[19]
respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
review in CA-G.R. SP No. 75112.[20] On October 28, 2003, the appellate court
rendered the assailed Decision[21]
granting the petition in part.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that
inasmuch as Miguel, Sr. had failed to exercise his right of retention during
his lifetime, respondent, as successor-in-interest acquired such right which he
could therefore exercise as he in fact did.
Thus, it noted, when the MAR ordered the cancellation of Emilia’s CLT
affecting Lot No. 38 and affirmed respondent’s retention rights, petitioners
became leaseholders on the property but their rights as such would terminate on
the execution of the 1980 Kasunduan
whereby they relinquished their rights for a consideration in accordance with
Sections 8[22]
and 28[23]
of R.A. No. 3844. As to Lot Nos. 37 and
39, the appellate court held that petitioners remained to be the owners thereof
and saw no reason to cancel petitioners’ title thereto since proof was lacking
to the effect that petitioners had surrendered these lots to respondent.[24]
Modifying the DAR-CAB’s
decision, the appeal was disposed of as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The January 15, 2001 Decision of the Central Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is MODIFIED, in that the CORONELs are hereby ordered to vacate and restore possession of Lot No. 38 to TANJANGCO. The CLT No. 0-092761 shall be cancelled insofar as it covers Lot No. 38. Lot Nos. 37 and 39 shall remain in the ownership of the CORONELs.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Both parties moved for
reconsideration[26] which
the Court of Appeals denied. [27]
Hence, this petition.
Before
the Court, petitioners assail the validity of the exercise by respondent of the
right of retention over Lot No. 38. That
right, they claim, is purely personal to the real owner of the property,
Miguel, Sr., who however had not entered into the exercise thereof at any time
since P.D. No. 27 came into force. They note that under the law, before any of
the heirs may exercise the right of retention belonging to the deceased
landowner, it must be shown that the latter had manifested in his lifetime the
intention to exercise the right. This,
they believe, has not been proven by respondent.[28]
Petitioners also aver that the 1980 Kasunduan is against the law and public
policy, because the stipulated consideration of P6,000.00 is shockingly
low and clearly unconscionable, and that they were not fully apprised of the
consequences of the agreement when they acceded to be bound by it. They disown the alleged act of relinquishment
of tenurial rights relative to Lot No. 38, arguing that had there been such relinquishment,
it would have been void nonetheless.[29] Finally, they deny having entered into any
leasehold contract with respondent over Lot No. 38; they advance instead that
it was respondent who constituted a lease on Lot No. 38 in favor of Jess Santos
in violation of their rights as agrarian reform beneficiaries.[30]
To
this, respondent counters that he, as the son of Miguel, Sr., has validly
exercised the right of retention over Lot No. 38. He is banking on the July 27, 1986 Order in
MARCO Adm. Case No. III-1474 which had already affirmed his retention right to
the mass of property that included Lot No. 38.[31] He asserts the validity of the 1980 Kasunduan and the resulting
relinquishment of rights made by petitioners thereunder, as these were
supposedly executed in accordance with Sections 8 and 28 of R.A. No. 3844. Lastly, he attributes to petitioners a
violation of Section 36, in relation to Section 27, of R.A. No. 3844 and a
breach of the leasehold contract covering all three lots when portions of the
property were subleased by respondents to Jess Santos and Daniel Toribio.[32]
The Court gave due course to the
petition, and on the submission of the parties’ memoranda, the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
To begin with, it is conceded that
Lot Nos. 37, 38 and 39 have all come under the land redistribution system of
R.A. No. 3844[33] and the
government’s Operation Land Transfer under
P.D. No. 27.[34] It is likewise conceded, as the parties
themselves do, that a certificate of land transfer has previously been issued
in favor of petitioners. However,
petitioners’ ejectment from the landholding is sought on account of the alleged
relinquishment of tenurial rights which they had executed in accordance with
the provisions of Sections 27 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844. Petitioners argue that the agreement was not
intended to effect a termination of their tenurial rights on Lot No. 38. In this regard, respondent submits as proof the 1980 Kasunduan which, for
easy reference, is materially reproduced as follows:
x x x Na ang Maylupa
na si Miguel Tanjangco, Jr. ang siyang tunay at ganap na may-ari ng isang
lupang sakahan o palayan na may laki at sukat na humigit-kumulang sa apat na
hektarya na matatagpuan sa San Jose at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan;
Na ang naturang lupang palayan ay
binubuwisan ng 40 kaban sa kasalukuyan ng mag-inang Emilia Micking at Benjamin
Coronel na nagsasaka rito;
Na iminungkahi noong mga nakaraang
araw ng Namumuwisan sa Maylupa na ang bahaging binubuwisang palayan na saklaw
at napapailalim sa Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-177647 ng Tanggapan ng
Kasulatan ng Lupa para sa Lalawigan ng Bulacan, na mapagkikilala Bilang 10 na
natatala sa titulo at may parisukat at kalakhan na 18,844 metrong parisukat at
ito ang Lote Blg. 38, plano Psu-64699, SWO-14929, ay gawing palaisdaan sa
dahilang ayaw nang mag-ani rito ng palay sapagkat inaabot at nadaramay sa alat
na tubig ng karatig na palaisdaan, at ang mungkahing ito ay tinanggap at
sinang-ayunan ng Maylupa sa kasunduang sumusunod;
Na alang-alang sa halagang P6,000.00,
perang Pilipino, na tinanggap ng Namumuwisan bilang kabayaran sa anumang
kalalabasan ng pagbabago ng kaurian ng lupang palayan (Blg. Lote 38, TCT
T-177647) ay pumapayag ang Namumuwisan at ipinauubaya sa Maylupa na gawing
palaisdaan ang naturang bahaging lupang hindi na pinag-aanihan; x x x [35]
Indeed, petitioners are not mistaken.
A mere fleeting glance at the 1980 Kasunduan
suggests not a hint that petitioners, for a monetary consideration, agreed to
relinquish their rights as agricultural lessees and thereby surrender
possession of the land to respondent. In
this connection, we take notice that the Court of Appeals, applying Sections 8
and 28 of R.A. No. 3844 on voluntary surrender of landholding, as well as
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657,[36] has
been misguided when it ruled that petitioners became leaseholders on account of
the MAR’s Order affirming respondent’s retention rights over Lot No. 38 but
that said status terminated with the execution of the 1980 Kasunduan. This, because
while the petition for retention was filed in 1976, it was only in 1986 that
respondent’s retention rights were upheld by the MAR six
years since the execution of the Kasunduan
in 1980. Be that as it may,
What comes clear from the foregoing is that respondent and petitioners
merely agreed, as the latter had previously suggested to the former, to operate
fishing ponds on Lot No. 38 and instead of cultivating rice, conduct fish
farming thereon. Contrary to
respondent’s own interpretation, as well as to the Court of Appeals’ assessment
of the agreement, the consideration of P6,000.00 was never meant to
operate as compensation to petitioners for abandoning their rights to the
property. At best, the unmistakable import of the consideration in the Kasunduan is merely to indemnify
petitioners for the consequences of the conversion of the farm lot from rice
land to fish farm.
Respondent
is bent on defeating the rights of petitioners and to that end, he cites
Sections 27 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
Section 36
of R.A. No. 3844 governs the dispossession of an agricultural lessee and the
termination of his rights to enjoy and possess the landholding, whereas Section
27 enumerates certain prohibited transactions involving the landholding. They provide as follows:
Section 27. Prohibitions
to Agricultural Lessee - It shall be unlawful
for the agricultural lessee:
(1) To contract to work additional
landholdings belonging to a different agricultural lessor or to acquire and
personally cultivate an economic family-size farm, without the knowledge and
consent of the agricultural lessor with whom he had entered first into
household, if the first landholding is of sufficient size to make him and the
members of his immediate farm household fully occupied in its cultivation; or
(2) To employ a sub-lessee on his landholding: Provided, however, That
in case of illness or temporary incapacity he may employ laborers whose
services on his landholding shall be on his account.
x x x x
Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions - Notwithstanding any agreement
as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1)
The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will
personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other
useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to
five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections
twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the
agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of
disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at
least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him:
Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself
for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one
year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted
in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the
land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossessions.
x x x x
(7) The
lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of
paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.[37]
From these
two provisions, as well as from his effusive arguments in the earlier and
present proceedings, we derive that the cause of respondent’s grievance are the
alleged conversion of Lot No. 38 into a fish farm and the alleged subleasing of
the landholding by petitioners. But even as we assume merit in respondent’s
arguments in this regard, we still find that his reliance on those provisions
is mislaid.
First, the conversion of the subject landholding under the 1980 Kasunduan is not the conversion of
landholding that is contemplated by Section 36 of the law. Alarcon v. Court of Appeals[38]
defined conversion as the
act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other
use as approved by the DAR.[39] More to the point is that for
conversion to avail as a ground for dispossession, the opening paragraph of
Section 36 implies the necessity of prior court proceedings in which the issue
of conversion has been determined and a final order issued directing
dispossession upon that ground.[40] In the case at bar, however, respondent does
not profess that at any time there had been such proceedings or that there was such court
order. Neither does he assert that Lot
No. 38—and Lot Nos. 37 and 39 for that matter—had undergone conversion with
authority from the DAR.
Second, it is evident from the
records that the lease agreement[41]
over Lot No. 38 in favor of Jess Santos was executed not by petitioners but
rather by respondent himself. It was respondent’s
name that appears therein as the lessor, with Jess Santos acceding to operate a
fishing pond on the land. With respect
to the lease agreement with Daniel Toribio executed after the expiration of the
first lease, we find that although it was Boy Coronel who signed in as lessor,
still, this will not suffice as a ground to dispossess petitioners of the three
lots and eject them from the property inasmuch as, to reiterate, dispossession
on account of having employed a sublessee under Sections 36 and 27 of R.A. No.
3844 requires a final judgment of the court in that respect.
Furthermore, since the inception of this case, respondent has been
grasping at straws in his attempt to dispossess petitioners not only of Lot No.
38 but also of Lot Nos. 37 and 39. He
has been insistent that there was an existing leasehold agreement covering Lot
Nos. 37 and 39 which was violated by petitioners when they supposedly
constituted leases on these lands. But
we have to approve of the Court of Appeals’ finding that aside from this bare
and unassisted claim, respondent was not able to substantiate his thesis.
Section 37 of R.A. No. 3844 clearly rests the burden on respondent, who
proclaims himself to be the landowner, to prove the existence of the grounds
for dispossession and ejectment, yet clearly was unable to discharge this
burden as he has not at any time shown either
a final order of conversion by the DAR or a court judgment authorizing the
tenants’ ejectment on the ground of conversion.
With particular reference to Lot No.
38, it is useful to note that Emilia’s certificate of land transfer has already
been ordered cancelled in the 1986 decision of the MAR in connection with
respondent’s retention application.
Indeed, the ruling in that case cannot be downplayed at this juncture
inasmuch as it explicitly affirmed the viability of respondent’s exercise of
retention rights, under the auspices of P.D. No. 27, over the property.
Thus, because this issue has already
been settled, we are certainly not bound to litigate the same anew as
petitioners would have us do. If at all,
we must only emphasize that even with the confirmation of respondent’s
retention rights over Lot No. 38, petitioners’ leasehold rights to the land
have not been extinguished. In other
words, while indeed petitioners are deemed owners of Lot Nos. 37 and 39 by
operation of P.D. No. 27, the placing of Lot No. 38 under respondent’s
retention limits have made them lessees only on Lot No. 38. Their status as such is protected by Section
7[42]
of R.A. 3844, which afford them security in their tenurial rights. Sarne
v. Maquiling,[43]citing
x x x [T]he Land Reform Code forges by
operation of law, between the landowner and the farmer — be a leasehold tenant
or temporarily a share tenant — a vinculum
juris with certain vital consequences, such as security of tenure of the
tenant and the tenant's right to continue in possession of the land he works
despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to
third persons, and now, more basically, the farmer's pre-emptive right to buy
the land he cultivates under section 11 of the Code, as well as the right to
redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge, under section
12 of this Code.
To strengthen
the security of tenure of tenants, Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844 provides that
the agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. With
unyielding consistency, we have held that transactions involving the
agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in
change of ownership, such as the sale or transfer of legal possession, will not
terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the
law by making such rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's
successor in interest. x x x
In addition,
Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the
tenant, such that it prescribes that the relationship of landholder and tenant
can only be terminated for causes provided by law. x x x [S]ecurity of
tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life
itself and deprivation of their land holdings is tantamount to deprivation of
their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the
leasehold relationship can take place only for causes provided by law.
The causes are specified in Sections 8, 28 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
Finally, even on the hypothesis that petitioners, as alleged, voluntarily
relinquished their rights over Lot Nos. 37, 38 and 39 and surrendered the same
to respondent, the transaction would still be void because it is by all means
prohibited by law.
Our law on agrarian reform is a legislated promise to emancipate poor
farm families from the bondage of the soil.
P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in the exact same spirit, with mechanisms
which hope to forestall a reversion to the antiquated and inequitable feudal
system of land ownership. It aims to
ensure the continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment by the beneficiary
of the land that he tills which would certainly not be possible where the former
owner is allowed to reacquire the land at any time following the award in
contravention of the government's objective to emancipate tenant-farmers from
the bondage of the soil.[47]
In order to ensure the tenant-farmer's continued enjoyment and possession
of the property, the explicit terms of P.D. No. 27 prohibit the transfer by the
tenant of the ownership, rights or possession of a landholding to other
persons, or the surrender of the same to the former landowner. In other words, a tenant-farmer may not
transfer his ownership or possession of, or his rights to the property, except
only in favor of the government or by hereditary succession in favor of his
successors.[48] Any other transfer of the land grant is a
violation of this proscription and is, therefore, null and void[49]
following Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of 1979, which materially states:
Despite the above prohibition, however, there are
reports that many farmer-beneficiaries of P.D. 27 have transferred their
ownership, rights and/or possession of their farms/homelots to other persons or
have surrendered the same to their former landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are
violative of P.D. 27 and therefore null and void.[50]
All told, we find that
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in this case must be modified. In view of the fact that there was no valid
relinquishment of agricultural leasehold rights over Lot No. 38 which may be
attributed to petitioners, they are entitled to possession of the same as
agricultural lessees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
IN PART. The October 28, 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75112 is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioners’ entitlement to the possession and
cultivation of Lot No. 38 as agricultural lessee in accordance with the July
27, 1986 Order of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in MARCO Adm. Case No.
III-1474-86, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] The complaint was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-03-02-5100 ’97; records, pp. 9-12.
[2] Records, pp. 6-8, 12.
[3] The Declaration of Real Property discloses that all three lots are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-177647; id. at 6-8.
[4] Records, pp. 11-12.
[5]
[6] Alternatively referred to in the records as “Boy Coronel.”
[7] Records, pp. 5, 11.
[8] Id. at 11, 13.
[9] Id. at 30-32.
[10] Id. at 34-35.
[11] Id. at 34.
[12] Id. at 84-85.
[13] Id. at 137-146. The decision was signed by Gregorio D. Sapera.
[14] Id. at 139-140.
[15] Id. at 137-138.
[16] Id. at 154.
[17] Id. at 184-185.
[18] Id. at 183-184. The decision was signed by Assistant Secretary Lorenzo R. Reyes.
[19] Id. at 196-197.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 2-13.
[21] Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) and Renato C. Dacudao, concurring; id. at 115-119.
[22] Section 8, Republic Act No. 3844 provides:
Section 8.
Extinguishment of Agricultural
Leasehold Relation - The
agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be
extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance;
or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to
succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the
lessee.
[23] Section 28, Republic Act No. 3844 provides:
Section 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During
Agricultural Year - The
agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold during the agricultural year
for any of the following causes:
(1) Cruel, inhuman or offensive, treatment of the agricultural lessee or
any member of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor or his
representative with the knowledge and consent of the lessor;
(2) Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of
the obligations imposed upon him by the provisions of this Code or by his
contact with the agricultural lessee;
(3) Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate
farm household by the agricultural lessor to do any work or render any service
not in any way connected with farm work or even without compulsion if no
compensation is paid;
(4) Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his
representative against the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate
farm household; or
(5) Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family.
[24] CA rollo, pp. 118-119.
[25] Id. at 119.
[26] Id. at 120-129
[27] Id. at 141-143.
[28] Rollo, p. 9. See also Reply, rollo, p. 80.
[29] Id. at 10-11, 81-82.
[30] Id. at 12-13. Ses also Reply, rollo, pp. 83-84.
[31] Id. at 64.
[32] Id. at 66-67.
[33] The law is entitled An Act to Ordain the Agricultural Land Reform Code and to Institute Land Reforms in the Philippines, Including the Abolition of Tenancy and the Chanelling of Capital into Industry, Provide for the Necessary Implementing Agencies, Appropriate Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes. Approved on August 8, 1963.
[34] Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor. The law was promulgated on October 21, 1972.
[35] Records, p. 17.
[36] The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
[37] Emphasis supplied.
[38] 453 Phil. 373 (2003).
[39] Id. at 382.
[40] Id. at 381
[41] Records, pp. 14-15.
[42] Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
[43] G.R. No. 138839, May 9, 2002.
[44] 33 SCRA
105 (1970).
[45] 215 SCRA 109 (1992).
[46] 168 SCRA 439 (1988).
[47] Toralba v. Mercado, 478 Phil. 563, 571 (2004).
[48] Paragraph 13 of Presidential Decree No. 27 states: Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms and other existing laws and regulations. See also Caliwag-Carmona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148157, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 723, 734; Torres v. Ventura, G.R. No. 86044, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 97, 105; Corpuz v. Grospe, G.R. No. 135297, June 13, 2000, 333 SCRA 425, 436-437.
[49] Caliwag-Carmona
v. Court of Appeals, supra; Torres v. Ventura, supra; Corpuz v. Grospe, supra.
[50] The Circular is dated April 23, 1979.